

Second Edition

What Is an EMOTION?

CLASSIC

AND

CONTEMPORARY

READINGS

Robert C. Solomon



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SECOND EDITION



EDITED BY

Robert C. Solomon

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PREFACE

The nature of emotion has become a vibrant subject in a number of disciplines, including philosophical psychology and the philosophy of mind, psychology, ethology, learning theory and educational psychology, psychiatry, metapsychology, neurology, and theology. It also presents us with a particularly illuminating but often neglected aspect of the history of ideas.

We can learn a great deal about the history and continuing paradigms of philosophy and psychology by looking at what the great thinkers, otherwise employed in building "the great chain of being" and sharpening the faculties of human "reason," had to say about the "affective" side of our psychology. Many neglected it altogether. Some treated the emotions with disdain, as the "lower" part of the soul. It was in reaction to such attitudes and the exclusive celebration of reason that David Hume sounded the rebellion that still motivates much of the current controversies: "reason is, and ought to be, the slave of the passions."

This book is an attempt to capture this rich history of theories and debates about emotion in a single text, appropriate for any course or study in which this history and the nature of emotion can play an important role. I have tried to present selections from many sources, from philosophy, psychology, and biology; from distant history and contemporary debates; from a variety of philosophical, psychological and other social science orientations.

We begin, in Part I, with five classic sets of readings, from Aristotle, the Stoics, Descartes, Spinoza, and Hume. In Part II, we then offer some representation of the classic and more contemporary theories from psychology and biology, where these fields were once a part of philosophy. (William James was both a philosopher and a psychologist; Charles Darwin quite rightly called himself a "natural philosopher.") In Part III, we have included a sampling of the extensive work on emotion that has been developed in Europe over the past century, much of it unknown to theorists in America and England at the time. In some cases, we encountered a problem in the difficulty and accessibility of the key writings. For example, Martin Heidegger's insightful but—to the novice—incomprehensible discussion of moods and emotions has been further closed off to the general public by his literary executors. To compensate for both the extreme difficulty of his text and the impossibility of obtaining reprint permissions, I solicited the aid of Heidegger scholar Charles Guignon, who has admirably summarized both Heidegger's theory and the difficult philosophy in which it is embedded. Finally, in Part IV, I have included a small sampling of the now extensive discussion of emotions among British and American "analytic" philosophers. At the end of the book, there is an annotated bibliography.

The main changes to this second edition have been additions, especially to Parts II and IV, on emotions and the sciences and in recent philosophical theories. (I have eliminated most of the old introduction and edited down some of the first edition selections to make room and keep the length affordable.) There has been an enormous amount of fascinating theorizing and research in the past two decades, and I have tried to provide a sampling of that here. Of special note is the expansion of interest and a resultant dramatic shift in theorizing on three fronts, first, from the wealth of information now being discovered about the central nervous system and the brain, second, in the realm of cross-cultural research and anthropology, and third, the shift to emphasis on "cognition" in emotion both in philosophy and the social sciences. I have tried to represent the first two of these new dimensions of research here, for instance, with pieces from Catherine Lutz and Antonio Damasio. As for the third, the shift to cognitive theories of emotion, I have tried to trace this development in both psychology and philosophy but (as an advocate of that position) I have made a special effort to assure that contrary voices are loud and clear, represented here by Cheshire Calhoun, Michael Stocker, and Paul Griffiths. My hope is that this collection will serve not only as a compendium of historically important documents but also as a source book for the continuing debate and research on the nature of emotion. (I have not included dates for living authors.)

Acknowledgments:

I want to offer my special gratitude to Cheshire Calhoun, who shared with me the labor and credit for the first edition of *What is an Emotion?* Because of other commitments, Cheshire has opted not to share the editing responsibilities for this new edition, but her efforts and her influence are tangible throughout. Many of the section introductions are hers (to be perfectly honest, I no longer remember which are which), and the original choice of readings that remain at the core of the second edition are as much her decision as mine. Since the first edition, Cheshire has gotten much more involved with gender and political issues and her work on emotions has taken this turn. But I have, with considerable reservations, decided not to pursue that avenue in this book.

I also want to thank Joe Campos, of the University of California-Berkeley, Julia Annas, of the University of Arizona, and Jim Hankinson, of the University of Texas for their good advice. And I want to thank Robert Miller of OUP for his encouragement and support of this project and the anonymous reviewers who confirmed our belief that our little collection has served and will continue to serve the purpose of making available in a single convenient volume some of the classic texts on emotions and highlighting and celebrating the rich history and dynamic current interest in the study of emotions.

Austin TX
March 2002

R.C.S.

WHAT IS AN EMOTION?



INTRODUCTION

"What is an Emotion?"

One hundred years ago, the American philosopher and psychologist William James asked that question in the title of an essay in the British journal *Mind*. Both philosophers and psychologists have been debating, refuting, and revising his answer ever since.

The question was not original with James, of course. Twenty-five hundred years ago, Plato and Aristotle debated the nature of emotions, and Aristotle, in his *Rhetoric*, developed a strikingly modern theory of emotion that stands up to the most contemporary criticism and provides an important alternative to the still dominant Jamesian theory.

The Jamesian theory, simply stated, is that an emotion is a physiological reaction, essentially, its familiar sensory accompaniment—a "feeling." The Aristotelean view, by way of contrast, involves a conception of emotion as a more or less intelligent way of conceiving of a certain situation, dominated by a desire (for example, in anger, the desire for revenge). Between these two theories, so far apart in both time and temperament, much of the modern debate continues. On the one side, there is the obvious involvement of physiological reactions and sensations in the experience of an emotion. On the other side, there is the fact that our emotions are often intelligent, indeed, sometimes more appropriate and insightful than the calm deliberations we call "reason." In the so-called "heat of the moment" (although not all emotions generate "heat," as we shall see), the intelligence of our emotions may not be so obvious as their brute physicality. Nevertheless, these two sets of considerations, the physical and the conceptual, are both essential to any adequate answer to the question "What is an emotion?"

Accordingly, many of the more modern theories involve what some have called a "two components" view of emotion, one physiological, the other "cognitive" (that is, involving concepts and beliefs). In psychology, Columbia University psychologists Stanley Schachter and Jerome E. Singer have stated this neo-Jamesian "two components" view rather bluntly: an emotion is a physiological reaction, as James insisted, but it is also the cognitive activity of "labeling," that is, identifying the emotion as an emotion of a certain sort, which involves "appropriate" knowledge of circumstances. In recent years, this emphasis on "cognitivism" has come center stage, as will be evident in the readings in Part II.

In philosophy, predictably, much more attention has been paid to the "cognitive" side of the analysis: What is the connection between an emotion and certain beliefs? If a person is embarrassed, he or she must believe that the situation is awkward, for example; if a person is in love, he or she must believe that the loved one has at least some virtues or attractions. But is the emotion just the set


of beliefs? Or perhaps it is the set of beliefs plus some identifiable physiological reaction? Recent work in philosophy has concentrated on the role of belief in emotion and the precise connection between a belief or beliefs and the emotion. For example, it has been suggested that certain beliefs are antecedent conditions for particular emotions; it has also been suggested that beliefs are a logically essential component of emotion, that certain beliefs are identical to emotion and that emotions simply tend to cause certain kinds of beliefs (for instance, jealousy causes a person to be suspicious or love causes a person to think the best of the person loved). Determining the precise connection between emotion and belief has become one of the focal points of current controversies.

Although we often speak of emotions as being "inside" us, it is clear that the analysis of emotion cannot be limited to the "inner" aspects of physiology and psychology, to visceral disturbances, sensations, desires, and beliefs. Emotions almost always have an "outward" aspect as well, most obviously, their "expression" in behavior. How important is behavior in this analysis? Obviously, we typically identify other peoples' emotions by watching what they do, but is this part of the emotion itself or only a symptom of it? Many philosophers and psychologists have come to identify, even to define, emotions as distinctive patterns of behavior. What part do the circumstances play in the emotion, apart from (sometimes) causing it? Does the culture have any part in the analysis? Could one fall in love, for instance, if one had been raised in a culture where romantic love was virtually unheard of? ("How many people," wrote the French aphorist La Rochefoucauld, "would never have loved if they had not heard the word?") Are there emotions that Europeans and Americans have *never* experienced? What is the range of emotions in the world, and are there universal or "basic" emotions?

Emotion endows our world with meaning. Gone are the days when emotion was dismissed as unimportant, insignificant, or merely "irrational." Some emotions, for example, scientific curiosity and a love of the truth, are essential to the advancement of knowledge. For too long we have emphasized the impersonal demands of knowledge instead of the passion to know, and both knowledge and passion have suffered. So, too, much of the impetus behind the new wave of interest in emotions is the desire to learn how to elicit those much valued emotions that have too long been left to the random contingencies of childhood—not only curiosity and the passion for truth, but also the passion for justice and compassion, life-long love, and even, at the right times and to a degree, righteous indignation. These are not momentary intrusions in our lives, but their very core, and the source of our ideals. Once we begin thinking of emotions in this way, as well as through the more traditional concern for those emotions that seem to be a form of madness or an irrational obsession, the importance of studying the emotions should become all the more apparent, not just as an intellectual curiosity, but also as a practical and personal necessity. "The unexamined life is not worth living," said Socrates. That is the spirit of this collection of essays, as we recognize that emotions, though too long neglected in philosophy and the social sciences, have always been essential to life.

PART 1

THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND



Interest in human emotions goes back as far as philosophy itself, although this interest is often subsidiary to interests in ethics or "human nature." Plato and Aristotle argued about the nature of emotions and their expression in their debates on the efficacy of rhetoric and the place of the theater in the emotional life of society, and Aristotle dealt at length with some emotions (e.g., anger) in his *Ethics*. The Stoics took the understanding and overcoming of emotions as the centerpiece of their philosophy. Two thousand years later, the French philosopher René Descartes advanced a theory of the "passions" as part of his overall theory of mind and body, with the emotions occupying an awkward middle position. Descartes's Dutch contemporary, Benedict Spinoza, defended a theory of emotions as part of his overall ethical theory and, in the next century in Britain, the Scottish philosopher David Hume gave a particularly sophisticated account of the emotions in his theory of human nature. Here, we present selections from Aristotle, the Stoics, Descartes, Spinoza, and Hume.



ARISTOTLE

(384–322 B.C.)

Introduction

As one of the indisputably two or three great philosophers in the history of Western thought, Aristotle has always been seriously considered on almost every philosophical topic—logic, metaphysics, ethics, aesthetics, politics, and even (during their early development) the natural sciences. It is therefore odd that Aristotle's insightful theory of emotion, which in many ways anticipates contemporary theories, has been ignored. Until now, little has been written about it, and even some philosophers who write on historical theories of emotion do not mention Aristotle. Some of the problem has to do with the fact that Aristotle's theory is mostly contained in his treatise on *Rhetoric*, which is no longer a standard subject for philosophers and other academics. But the emotions were an important topic for Aristotle, who was just as much a psychologist as a philosopher and just as interested in motivating people (especially to do the morally right thing) as in analyzing them. Aristotle discusses emotions in the *Rhetoric*, in *de Anima*, and in his *Nicomachean Ethics*, in which correct emotion is a large part of virtue.

In *de Anima*, Aristotle characterizes the human "soul" or "psychē," which is best translated as "life principle." (Thus, plants have souls too insofar as they grow and reproduce, and animals have souls insofar as they can feel, move, and desire). Following his predecessor, Plato, Aristotle divides the human soul into a rational and an irrational part. But unlike Plato, Aristotle does not make a sharp division between the two parts. He argues that they necessarily form a unity, and this is particularly true of emotions that involve a cognitive element, including beliefs and expectations about one's situation, as well as physical sensations.

Aristotle's analysis of emotion is remarkable both for its insights and for the fact that it avoids most of the problems that have plagued all theories of emotion. He avoids mind-body dualism by arguing in *de Anima* that beliefs, bodily motions, and physiological changes are inseparable elements of emotion. Thus, he avoids distinguishing too sharply between the rational (or cognitive) and the irrational (or physical) elements of emotion, recognizing that emotions can be both in varying degrees of complexity. Similarly, he avoids treating emotions as irrational, uncontrolled responses to situations. Our emotions may, at times, be unwarranted, but just as often they may be warranted. Aristotle especially develops this point in the *Nicomachean Ethics*, in which he

argues that virtue (e.g., courage and generosity) is largely a matter of feeling the right thing; thus, the courageous individual is neither fearless nor overwhelmed by fear in a dangerous situation. He also argues that we can mold our emotions through education and habit. And, in the *Rhetoric*, Aristotle sees that what characterizes many emotions is a strong moral belief about how others should behave. This is nowhere more evident than in his analysis of anger.

What Aristotle has to say about anger illustrates the complexity of his view of emotion. Among the necessary elements of and conditions for anger, for example, we find moral beliefs about the wrongness of contempt, spite, and insolence; beliefs about our social status and how individuals should be treated; a desire for revenge, and pleasure in the contemplation of revenge; and frequently, a special circumstance (e.g., being insulted in front of rivals or admirers provokes greater anger than being insulted in front of people whose opinions we do not care about). Only recently have philosophers begun to give similarly complex accounts of emotions.

From Rhetoric (1378^a20–1380^a4)



We shall define an emotion as that which leads one's condition to become so transformed that his judgment is affected, and which is accompanied by pleasure and pain. Examples of emotions include anger, pity, fear, and the like, as well as the opposites of these. We will need with each of these emotions to investigate three particulars; in investigating anger, for instance, we will ask what the temperament is of angry people, with whom they most often become angry, and at what sort of things. To grasp one or two but not all three of these conditions would make it impossible to induce anger in one's audience. The same is true with the other emotions. So, just as we listed propositions in what we said earlier, let us do this again in analyzing these emotions in the same way.

Let anger be defined as a distressed desire for conspicuous vengeance in return for a conspicuous and unjustifiable contempt of one's person or friends. If this indeed defines anger, then the anger of the angry person is necessarily always directed towards someone in particular, e.g., Cleon, but not towards all of humanity; also of necessity is that this individual has done or intended to do something to him or one of his friends, and that accompanying every outburst of anger is a certain pleasure derived from the hope for revenge. I say "pleasure" because it is pleasant to contemplate achieving one's goals; and no one attempts to achieve what seems to be impossible for himself, so the angry man attempts to achieve what is possible for himself. The poet spoke correctly when he said that anger,

Much sweeter than dripping honey,
 Swells in men's hearts.

Pleasure follows upon anger for this reason and because the mind is consumed with thoughts of vengeance; like dreams, the visions then conjured up create pleasure.

Slighting is the implementing of an opinion about what one considers to be worthless; for we think both the good and the bad to be worthy of attention (as well as what is potentially good or bad), but we do not consider whatever is of little or no account to be worthy of attention.

There are three forms of slighting—scorn, spite, and insolence. One slights what he scorns, for whatever one thinks to be worthy of nothing he scorns, and he slights what is worthy of nothing. Then one who is spiteful is also scornful, for spite involves the interference in another's wishes, not to achieve anything for oneself, but only to make sure that the other achieves nothing. Since he achieves nothing for himself, he slights the other. It is evident that the other does not intend to harm him; if he did, it would then be a matter of fear, not of slighting. It is evident also that he does not intend to help him to any appreciable degree, for there would then be an attempt at creating a friendship.

To act insolently constitutes a form of slighting, for insolence involves doing and saying things that produce shame for the person to whom these things are done or said—so that something else might happen to him (other than what has already happened), but for the other's pleasure. If it were done in retaliation, then this would not be insolence, but sheer vengeance. The insolent person derives pleasure from this because he sees others suffer and thus considers himself quite superior. The young and the rich often derive pleasure from such insolence, for they consider themselves superior when acting insolently. Dishonor is an act of insolence, and the one who dishonors is one who slights, since that which is worthy of nothing—of neither good or bad—has no honor. For this reason the angered Achilles says,

He has dishonored me; he has himself taken and keeps my prize.
 and,

I am without honor, as if some foreigner.

and shows that he is angered for this very reason. Some think it fitting that they be esteemed by those of lesser birth, ability, nobility, or whatever quality in which one is generally superior to another; for example, the rich man considers himself worthy of esteem from a poor man where wealth is concerned, as does the rhetorician from one who is inarticulate, the ruler from the governed, and even the hopeful ruler from those he hopes to rule. . . .

It is now evident from these analyses what the temperament is of angered people, at whom they become angered, and for what reasons. They become angry when they are in distress, for one in distress desires something. If someone should in any manner stand in one's way, for instance, if one should directly prevent a thirsty man from drinking (or even if it is done indirectly, he will

appear to be doing the same thing), or if someone opposes, fails to assist, or in some other way annoys a distressed person, he will become angry at any of those individuals. For this reason the sick, the poor, those at war, the lover, and anyone with an unsatisfied desire, are prone to anger and irascibility, particularly against those who make light of their present distress. Examples include the ill person angry at those making light of his illness, the poor man angry at those making light of his poverty, the warrior angry at those making light of his struggle, the lover at those making light of his love, and so forth, for each person is predisposed towards his own kind of anger caused by his own sort of distress. He will also anger if he should happen to receive the opposite of what he expected, for the unexpected creates a greater bitterness just as it can create the greater joy if one attains his desires contrary to his expectations. From these observations the hours, periods, moods, and ages most conducive to anger become apparent, as do the places and occasions; and the more intense or numerous these conditions are, the more conducive to anger they become.

We have now seen what sort of temperament belongs to people predisposed to anger. They become angry at those who laugh, scoff, and jeer at them—all acts of insolence—and at those doing them harm in manners which represent an attitude of insolence. This harm cannot be either retaliatory or beneficial to the doers, for then it would not seem to be an act of insolence. They also become angry at those who malign them or scorn matters they take greatly to heart; zealous philosophers and those concerned with their appearance, to cite just two of many examples, anger at those who scorn philosophy and those who scorn their appearance, respectively. Such anger becomes increasingly severe if the angered individuals suspect that this ability or quality does not belong or appear to belong to them, for they do not mind the ridicule when they feel thoroughly superior in those abilities or qualities at which others scoff. Anger is also directed at their friends more often than at others, since better treatment is expected from them, and also at those who normally give honor to or take thought of them, but then cease to act in this way; the angry individuals here assume they are being scorned, for otherwise they would be treated in the same way as usual. They also become angry at those who fail to repay or inadequately repay acts of kindness and at inferiors who work against them, for any such people appear to have a scornful attitude; in the latter example the angered individuals are opposed by those who consider them inferior, and in the former they have offered kindness to those who consider them inferior.

They especially anger at those of no account who slight them, since we suggested that an anger resulting from a slight was directed towards those who have no right to slight another, and it is one's inferiors who have no right to do so. They also become angry at their friends who fail to speak well of them or who fail to treat them well, or especially when they do the opposite, or when they do not understand their needs (just as Antiphon's Plexippus failed to understand Meleager's needs). It is a sign of contempt to fail to perceive the needs of a friend, since we do not forget those who are on our mind. One also angers at those who celebrate or act quite cheerfully in his misfortunes; either action is a sign of enmity or slight. One also feels anger against those who show no concern for the pains they have given him, which explains why one becomes

angry with messengers who bring bad news. One also feels anger at those who listen to talk about him or ogle at his weaknesses, for it is as if they are slights or enemies; friends would sympathize, since everyone is pained to focus on his own weaknesses. In addition, one angers at those who slight him in the presence of five classes of people—those who envy him, those he admires, those by whom he wishes to be admired, those whom he respects, and those who respect him. When people slight him in the presence of these, they incite him to an even greater anger. One also feels anger at those who slight those whom it would be a disgrace not to defend—parents, children, wives, subordinates—or to those who do not return a favor (since such a slight is an impropriety), or to those who pretend not to know about a matter he feels to be of importance, since this is an act of scorn. And one feels anger toward those beneficent to others, but not to him as well, for it is again an act of scorn to deem everyone else worthy of treatment he is not deemed worthy to receive. Forgetfulness, even of something so insignificant as a name, also produces anger, since forgetfulness as well seems to be a sign of slight and since forgetfulness derives from neglect, which is a slight.

We have now established simultaneously at whom one becomes angry, the temperament of the angry person, and the causes for his anger. It is clear that in his speech the orator must create in his audience a temperament suitable for anger and establish his adversaries as those to be held liable for what makes his audience angry and as the sort of men at whom they should be angry.

From On the Soul (403^a2–403^b19)

Do the conditions of the soul belong as well to the body or is there one that belongs only to the soul itself? We encounter this difficulty here, and it is a difficulty neither avoidable nor easily treated. It seems that most of the soul's conditions—anger, courage, desire, and any sensation—neither act nor are activated without the body. The act of thinking probably belongs to the soul alone, but if even this thinking happens to be some sort of imagination or connected with imagination then it, too, can belong to the body as well as the soul. If any aspect of what the soul does or of what is done to the soul belongs to the soul alone, then the soul can be individually identified; but if these do not belong to the soul alone, it cannot be individually identified. It would be similar to straightness in that there is much occurring where there is straightness, such as the touching of a bronze sphere at a point, even though straightness as a separate entity will not be able to touch a sphere in this way.

One cannot separate it if it needs be in connection with the body. Apparently then all the conditions of the soul are connected with the body, including anger, gentleness, fear, pity, courage, not to mention joy, loving, and hating, for the

body is affected by each of these. Evidence for this is found in our not being provoked to anger or fear after encountering a blatantly powerful stimulus, even though at other times we are provoked by small, slight stimuli—when the body is in a physical state resembling that occurring when there is actual anger. Here is still another example: we sometimes feel the conditions of fear even when there is nothing fearful present.

If this is so, it is clear that the soul's conditions are material considerations, in which case when one defies something such as anger, he looks for some movement of some sort of body or part of a body or function of a body from some origin and for some reason.

Because of this, the investigation of the soul or its representations must be the science of nature—"physics," for the physicist and the dialectician would define each of the soul's conditions differently. What is anger? One might define it as the desire for vengeance or some such feeling, the other as the boiling of the heart's blood and warmth. One applies the form and the concept, the other the substance. This "concept" is an actuality, and if this actuality exists then it must consist of some substance. This applies, for example, to the concept of the house—a shelter that protects against destruction by wind, rain, or heat. The one describes the form and the purpose; the other describes a house as stones, brick, and wood. . . .

But enough of this investigation. We were saying that the conditions of the soul are somehow not separable from the physical substance of life to which anger and fear belong, not at all substances like a line or plane.

From Nicomachean Ethics (1125^b26–1126^b9)



In analyzing states connected with anger, mildness is a mean between the extremes. The middle emotion has actually no name, as is almost true for the extremes. We place mildness in the middle more to the side of lacking in anger, which also has no name. The other extreme, the excess of angry emotion, one might label as "irascibility." The condition itself is anger, which is caused by many different things. If one becomes angry at what and at whom he should, not to mention in the way and when and for as long as he should, he is praised. Thus we might call him mild mannered, since mildness is what is praised. After all, the mild-mannered man is not bothered or influenced by his emotional condition, but is provoked only in that way and at those matters and for that much time as the situation dictates. His fault lies more in leaning towards the side of the lacking in anger since the mild-mannered man is more forgiving than vengeful.

To be lacking in anger, as if it involved some sort of "unanger," is to merit criticism; they are thought to be fools who fail to become angry at those matters they ought, or in the way or when or at whom they ought. Such a person will

appear to be without feeling or invulnerable, and in not turning to anger he will not protect himself and will slavishly have to suffer insult to himself and those around him.

The excess of angry emotion can be applied to the same parameters—becoming angry at those matters and at whom one should not, and becoming more angry than one should and more swiftly and for too long a time. Yet not all of these manifestations of excess are present in the same instance. They could not be, for evil destroys even itself, and consummate anger becomes unbearable.

This sort of anger rises swiftly and is aimed at those matters and at those people it ought not, and more vehemently than it ought, and yet it ceases just as swiftly—the best aspect of this condition. They who lose their anger swiftly do so because they do not persevere in their anger, but in characteristic brevity unload their anger freely and then become calm.

Hot-tempered people, because of this excess, anger swiftly and at everything and at everyone, whence their name. Bitter people have an anger difficult to be reconciled and one that lasts a long time; they persevere in their anger. Only vengeance produces a cessation, since retaliation puts an end to anger by exchanging pleasure for pain. Before or without retaliation, those people carry their emotional burden. No one can see their hidden anger to talk them out of it, and it will gnaw away at them as time passes. Such a person becomes an annoyance to his friends as well as to himself.

We describe as “unbearable” those who bear anger in those matters not deserving of anger, and who bear more and longer lasting anger than they should, and who are not reconciled shy of vengeance and punishment.

We place the excess of anger in contrast to mildness. It occurs more frequently—not to forgive is more human—and “unbearable” people are worse to encounter.

What was said earlier is demonstrated also in this argument, and that is that it is not an easy task to delineate how, at whom, at what, and for how long one should anger, nor at what point justifiable anger turns to unjustifiable. He who swerves a bit towards excess of or to the lacking in anger is not to be blamed; at times we praise those who are lacking in anger and call them mild mannered, and at other times we praise the unbearably angry as being manly and equipped for leadership. How far and how much one has to swerve before he becomes no longer praiseworthy is not easy to specify. The criteria belong within the circumstances and one's perception of them. On the other hand, this much is in fact evident: The middle tendency is praiseworthy, that in which one angers with those people and at those matters he should, in the way he should, for as much time as he should, and so on; and the excessive tendency and the tendency to be lacking in anger are blameworthy proportionately to their amount. Surely, we should grasp onto the middle tendency.



THE STOICS

Introduction

The Stoics were a long-running school of philosophy dating back to the Greeks Zeno of Citium (4th century B.C.) and Chrysippus (3rd century B.C.) and continuing into the Roman Empire with Seneca (4–65), a powerful Roman politician, Epictetus (55–135), a slave, and Marcus Aurelius (121–180), the emperor of all Rome. The Stoic philosophy reflects the unpredictability of life and the fickleness of fate. Thus, the movement as a whole is centrally concerned with the passions, which are our “natural” responses to misfortune and catastrophe. But rather than accept the passions as rendering us passive, the Stoics defended a bold philosophy in which the passions were conceived of as *judgments*, judgments of assent or refusal to assent to the “first movements” prompted by nature. In contrast to the animals, we are rational creatures, and because we are rational we do not need to assent or to act upon our first impulses. The following excerpts are drawn, first of all, from the early Stoics, then from Seneca’s *De Ira* (*Of Anger*), and finally from Galen (129–200), a famous Roman physician (to Marcus Aurelius) and a harsh critic of the Stoics.

From Early Stoics



1. They say that what moves an impulse is nothing but an impulsory appearance of what is then and there appropriate, and that impulse is in general a movement of the soul toward something. The species of impulse, they say, is observed to be that which comes about in the rational animals and that in the nonrational ones; but these have no [distinct] names; for desire is not rational impulse, but a species of rational impulse. As for rational impulse, it would properly be defined by saying that it is a movement of the mind toward something involved in acting; and to this is opposed counterimpulse, a kind of movement [of the mind away from something in acting]. (Arius Didymus in Stobaeus, *Eclogae* II, 86–87)

2. They say that all the impulses are assents, but that the practical ones contain the motive element. Actually, assents are to one thing, and impulses toward another; assents are to statements of a kind, and impulses are toward predicates, those that are somehow contained in the statements to which they assent. . . .

An emotion (*pathos*), they say, is an impulse that is excessive and disobedient.

From Julia Annas, *Voices of Ancient Philosophy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000). Reprinted with the permission of Oxford University Press and Julia Annas.

ent to reason, which is dictating: or an [irrational] movement in the soul contrary to nature (all emotions belong in the soul's ruling part); so that every upset is an emotion, and again every emotion is an upset. Emotion being of such a kind, we must suppose that some are primary and lead the way, while others have their reference to these. Primary in the genus are these four: desire, fear, pain, and pleasure. Desire and fear take the lead, desire being directed toward apparent good and fear directed toward apparent evil. Pleasure and pain supervene on these, pleasure when we get what we were desiring or escape what we were fearing, and pain when we fail to get what we were desiring or happen on what we were fearing. With all the soul's emotions, since they call them beliefs, the belief is understood as a weak supposition. (Arius, 88–89)

COMMENTS by *Julia Annas*

For the Stoics, any action, in humans or in animals, is brought about by an impulse (*horme*), which is a response to something in the environment that strikes the agent as requiring a response (technically, this is an "impulsory appearance"). Humans are distinguished from animals, however, in their possession of reason, and this informs everything they do. Reason is the "craftsman of impulse," so in a human, every impulse, that is, every response to our environment, is rational in the sense of involving reason in some way, although, of course, not every impulse is rational in the sense of involving *good* reasoning.

All our impulses can be represented as articulated in language (for the Stoics, the ability to communicate in language is the most important characteristic of reason). Hence, in the second passage, we find an articulation of the logical form of the beliefs, which, for the Stoics, are implied in every human impulse. (The details of this point are controversial and disputed by scholars.) This does not, of course, imply that every time we act on an impulse, we utter language or go through statements in our heads. In any case, when a human acts in accordance with an impulse, there is a belief that can, in principle, be represented in language and that has a particular logical form.

Emotions are a kind of impulse—that is, a kind of response we make to the world when it seems to us to require a reaction on our part. What distinguishes them is that an impulse is always an *excessive* impulse, one that, while rational in the sense in which all human impulses are rational, is also disobedient to reason in the sense of *good* reason.

From De Ira

SENECA 4 BCE–65



The Horrors of Anger

You have demanded, Novatus, that I write on how anger can be alleviated. I think that you were right to have a particular dread of this the most hideous and

frenzied of all the emotions. The others have something quiet and placid in them, whereas anger is all excitement and impulse. Raving with a desire that is utterly inhuman for instruments of pain and reparations in blood, careless of itself so long as it harms the other, it rushes onto the very spear-points, greedy for vengeance that draws down the avenger with it.

Some of the wise, accordingly, have described anger as "brief insanity"—it is just as uncontrolled. Oblivious of decency, heedless of personal bonds, obstinate and intent on anything once started, closed to reasoning or advice, agitated on pretexts without foundation, incapable of discerning fairness or truth, it most resembles those ruins which crash in pieces over what they have crushed. You can see that men possessed by anger are insane, if you look at their expression. The sure signs of raving madness are a bold and threatening look, a gloomy countenance, a grim visage, a rapid pace, restless hands, change of colour, heavy and frequent sighing. The marks of anger are the same: eyes ablaze and glittering, a deep flush over all the face as blood boils up from the vitals, quivering lips, teeth pressed together, bristling hair standing on end, breath drawn in and hissing, the crackle of writhing limbs, groans and bellowing, speech broken off with the words barely uttered, hands struck together too often, feet stamping the ground, the whole body in violent motion "menacing mighty wrath in mien," the hideous horrifying face of swollen self-degradation—you would hardly know whether to call the vice hateful or ugly.

Other passions can be concealed and nourished in secret. Anger parades itself; it shows on the face; the greater it is, the more obviously it seethes out. You can see how any animal, the moment it rears itself to do harm, shows some preliminary sign; the entire body forsakes its normal state of repose as it whets its savagery. Boars foam at the mouth, grinding and sharpening their teeth; bulls toss their horns about, stamping and scattering the sand; lions growl; serpents swell at the neck when roused; rabid dogs are a grim spectacle—no animal has a nature so horrendous, so pernicious that it does not reveal, at the onset of anger, a fresh access of ferocity. I know that other emotions, too, can scarce be concealed. Lust, fear and overconfidence have their indications, and can be told in advance. None, in fact, of the more violent disturbances makes its entry without causing some change to the face. What, then, is the difference? The other affections make themselves seen. Anger sticks right out.

What Counts as Anger

Anger is "a burning desire to avenge a wrong" or, according to Posidonius, "a burning desire to punish him by whom you think yourself to have been unfairly harmed." Some define it thus: "anger is an incitement of the mind to damage him who has done damage or wished to do damage."

Aristotle's definition is not far from ours: he says that "anger is a burning desire to pay back pain." To explain the difference between this definition and ours would take long. Against both it may be said that wild animals are angered without being provoked by wrong and without aiming to inflict punishment or pain on others. That may be what they succeed in doing; it is not what they are seeking. To this we must reply that wild animals are incapable of anger, as is

everything, apart from man. Anger may be the enemy of reason. It cannot, all the same, come into being except where there is a place for reason. Wild animals are subject to impulse, to fits of frenzy, ferocity and aggression. But not to anger, any more than to self-indulgence—even if, in some pleasures, they are more intemperate than man.

Without speech, animals are without human emotions, though they have certain impulses that are similar to them. Otherwise, if they were capable of love and hatred, they would also be capable of friendship and feud, disagreement and concord. Of these, too, there is some trace in animals. But they belong properly to the good and evil in human breasts.

I have said enough about what anger is. Its difference from irascibility will be apparent. It is the difference between the drunk and the drunkard, the frightened and the timid. An angry man need not be irascible; the irascible can sometimes not be angry.

Is Anger Natural?

We have asked what anger is, whether it occurs in any animal other than man, how it differs from irascibility, how many species of it there are. We must now ask whether anger accords with nature and whether it is useful and, in part, worth retaining.

Is anger in accordance with nature? The answer will be clear, if we turn our eyes upon man. What is milder than man, when he is in his right mind? But what is crueller than anger? What is more loving of others than man is? What more adverse than anger? Man was begotten for mutual assistance, anger for mutual destruction. The one would flock together with his fellows, the other would break away. The one seeks to help, the other to harm; the one would succour even those unknown to him, the other would fly at even those who are dearest. Man will go so far as to sacrifice himself for the good of another; anger will plunge into danger, if it can draw the other down. What greater ignorance of nature could there be than to credit its finest, most flawless work with this savage, ruinous fault? Anger, as I said, is greedy for punishment. That such a desire should reside in that most peaceful of dwellings, the breast of man, is utterly out of accord with his nature. Human life rests upon kindnesses and concord; bound together, not by terror but by love reciprocated, it becomes a bond of mutual assistance.

The nature of man, therefore, is not eager to punish; nor, then, can anger be in accordance with the nature of man; for anger is eager to punish.

I will also bring in some evidence from Plato—what harm is there in using other people's ideas on points where they coincide with ours? "A good man," he says, "does no damage." Punishment does do damage: therefore punishment does not go with being a good man. Nor, for that reason, does anger, since punishment does go with anger.

Can Anger Be Useful, or Controlled?

Can it really be that anger, although it is not natural, should be adopted because it has often proved useful? "It rouses and spurs on the mind. Without it, courage

can achieve nothing magnificent in war—without the flame of anger beneath, to goad men on to meet danger with boldness." Some, accordingly, think it best to moderate anger, not to remove it. They would confine it to a wholesome limit by drawing off any excess, while retaining what is essential for unenfeebled action, for unsapped force and vigour of spirit. [Well], in the first place, it is easier to exclude the forces of ruin than to govern them, to deny them admission than to moderate them afterwards. For once they have established possession, they prove to be more powerful than their governor, refusing to be cut back or reduced. Moreover, reason itself, entrusted with the reins, is only powerful so long as it remains isolated from the affections. Mixed and contaminated with them, it cannot contain what it could previously have dislodged. Once the intellect has been stirred up and shaken out, it becomes the servant of the force which impels it. Some things at the start are in our power; thereafter they sweep us on with a force of their own and allow no turning back. . . . It is best to beat back at once the first irritations, to resist the very germs of anger and take care not to succumb. Once it has begun to carry us off course, the return to safety is difficult. Reason amounts to nothing, once the affection has been installed and we have voluntarily given it some legal standing. From then on, it will do what it wants, not what you allow it. The enemy, I say, must be stopped at the very frontier; when he has invaded and rushed on the city gates, there is no "limit" which his captives can make him accept. It is not the case that the mind stands apart, spying out its affections from without, to prevent their going too far—the mind itself turns into affection. It cannot, accordingly, reinstate that useful and wholesome force which it has betrayed and weakened. As I said, it is not the case that they dwell apart, in isolation from one another. Reason and affection are the mind's transformations for better or for worse. How then can reason, under the oppressive domination of its failings, rise again, if it has already given way to anger? How can it free itself from the chaos, if the admixture of baser ingredients has prevailed?

Now my next question: is anger stronger than reason—or weaker? If stronger, how can reason put a limit on it? It is only the feeble, normally, who submit. If anger is weaker, reason can do without it. It is sufficient by itself for getting things done and has no need for a weaker ally. "But some people stay true to themselves and control themselves in their anger." When? As their anger evaporates and departs of its own accord, not at its boiling-point—it is too strong then.

Is Anger Voluntary?

Our question is whether anger starts with a decision or with an impulse, that is, whether it is set in motion of its own accord—or in the same way as most inner events which occur with our full knowledge. . . . They are followed by the components on which beauty in appearance and looks depends. After all this, comes what most seizes the eye; when the body is at last complete, the complexion is finally applied.

Anger is undoubtedly set in motion by an impression received of a wrong. But does it follow immediately on the impression itself and break out without

any involvement of the mind? Or is some assent by the mind required for it to be set in motion? Our view is that it undertakes nothing on its own, but only with the mind's approval. To receive an impression of wrong done to one, to lust for retribution, to put together the two propositions that the damage ought not to have been done and that punishment ought to be inflicted, is not the work of a mere involuntary impulse. That would be a simple process. What we have here is a complex with several constituents—realization, indignation, condemnation, retribution. These cannot occur without assent by the mind to whatever has struck it.

"What is the point," you ask, "of this question?" That we may know what anger is, since it will never, if it comes to birth against our will, yield to reason. Involuntary movements can be neither overcome nor avoided. Take the way that we shiver when cold water is sprinkled on us, or recoil at the touch of some things. Take the way that bad news makes our hair stand on end and indecent language brings on a blush. Take the vertigo that follows the sight of a precipice. None of these is in our power; no amount of reasoning can induce them not to happen. But anger is put to flight by precept. For it is a voluntary fault of the mind, and not one of those which occur through some quirk of the human condition and can therefore happen to the very wisest of men, even though they include that first mental jolt which affects us when we think ourselves wronged. . . .

None of these fortuitous mental impulses deserves to be called an "emotion." They are something suffered, so to speak, not something done by the mind. Emotion is not a matter of being moved by impressions received, but of surrendering oneself to them and following up the chance movement. If anyone thinks that pallor, falling tears, sexual excitement or deep sighing, a sudden glint in the eyes or something similar are an indication of emotion or evidence for a mental state, he is wrong; he fails to see that these are just bodily agitations. Thus it is that even the bravest man often turns pale as he puts on his armour, that the knees of even the fiercest soldier tremble a little as the signal is given for battle, that a great general's heart is in his mouth before the lines have charged against one another, that the most eloquent orator goes numb at the fingers as he prepares to speak. Anger, however, must not only be set in motion: it has to break out, since it is an impulse. But impulse never occurs without the mind's assent, nor is it possible to act for retribution and punishment unbeknown to the mind. Suppose that someone thinks himself harmed and wishes to exact retribution, that something dissuades him and he promptly calms down—this I do not call "anger," since it is a motion of the mind obedient to reason. Anger is a motion which outleaps reason and drags it along. So the first mental agitation induced by the impression of wrong done is no more anger than is the impression itself. The impulse that follows, which not only registers but confirms the impression, is what counts as anger, the agitation of a mind proceeding by its own deliberate decision to exact retribution. Nor can there be any doubt that, as fear implies flight, anger implies attack. Do you really think, then, that anything can be sought or shunned without the mind's assent?

If you want to know how the emotions begin, grow or get carried away, the first movement is involuntary, a preparation, as it were, for emotion, a kind of

threat. The next is voluntary but not insistent—I may, for example, think it right for me to wreak vengeance because I have been harmed or for him to be punished because he has committed a crime. The third really is out of control; wanting retribution not just “if it is right” but at all costs, it has completely overcome the reason. The first is a mental jolt which we cannot escape through reason, just as we cannot escape those physical reactions which I mentioned—the urge to yawn when some one else yawns, or blinking when fingers are flicked at the eye. These cannot be overcome by reason, though habituation and constant attention may perhaps lessen them. The other sort of movement, generated by decision, can be eliminated by decision.

From On the Doctrines of Hippocrates and Plato

GALEN 129–199



Odysseus [in Homer] seeing the maidservants misbehaving was dragged forcibly toward punishing them by his anger, but was held back by reason, which explained that this would be untimely. . . .

Plato, I consider, recalls this passage of Homer most opportunely in the fourth book of the *Republic*. But it is most inopportune of Chrysippus to cite it, and even more so is his citation of the passage that Euripides has Medea speak when reason was warring with anger in her soul. She knew that she was performing an impious and terrible action in setting her hand to the murder of her children, and for this reason was hesitant, put it off, and did not do at once the deed she had had the impulse to do. But then again anger, like a disobedient horse that has got the better of the charioteer, dragged her by force toward the children—and back again reason pulled her and led her away, and then again anger pulled against this, and then again reason.

So as she is repeatedly driven back and forth between the two of them, when she has conceded to anger, then at that point Euripides has her say, “I know that what I am about to do is bad, but anger is master of my plans.” She understands, indeed, the magnitude of the evils that she intends to do because she is taught by reason, but she says that anger is stronger than it and that for this reason she is led forcibly by it toward the action. She is the opposite of Odysseus, who held back his anger by reason. Euripides has put forward his Medea as an example of barbarians and other uncivilized people, in whom anger is stronger than reason. With Greeks and civilized people, such as Homer represents Odysseus as being, reason is stronger than anger.

Often reason is stronger than the spirited part of the soul to such an extent that there is never any conflict between them: The one rules and the other is ruled. This happens with people who have reached the goal of philosophy. Often, however, anger is so much stronger than reason that it rules and completely governs; this is observable in barbarians and children who are spirited

by nature, in several wild animals, and in humans who are animal-like. Sometimes neither is sufficiently strong to pull the other over right away; they oppose each other and fight it out, and eventually one of them wins—reason in Odysseus, anger in Medea—since they are two parts of the soul (or, if not parts, at least powers of a sort).

But Chrysippus, who does not think that they are parts of the soul or even irrational powers separate from the rational, still does not hesitate to recall the words of Odysseus and Medea, words that obviously refute his opinion. How can anyone argue with people like this, who pay no attention to what is patently evident (as I have already shown repeatedly) and who bring up things that refute their doctrines as though they were evidence *for* them?

COMMENTS by *Julia Annas*

Galen thinks that Medea is an obvious *counterexample* to the Stoic view; why can't the Stoics just see that Medea refutes their theory? He thinks that the idea of distinct parts of the soul, which battle with each other until one wins by superior force, is built into commonsense ways of understanding talk of psychological conflict.

Is Galen moving too fast here? Or is there something to the thought that it is more natural for us, when we talk of reason and emotion conflicting, to think in terms of distinct sources of motivation than to think of the whole person oscillating between different courses?



RENÉ DESCARTES

(1596–1650)

Introduction

Descartes was a physically frail but mentally energetic child, who spent much of his time, then and for the rest of his life, reading, thinking, and writing. He was raised in the scholastic tradition in which all questions were appealed to authority; but Descartes rebelled against this, even as a student, and insisted on “the natural light of reason” and the ability of the individual to resolve questions for himself. With this attitude, the methods of mathematics quite naturally appealed to him, and he soon developed the idea that these methods could be applied to other fields as well, notably physics and philosophy. The foundation of his philosophy, accordingly, is a deductive method, the goal being absolute certainty. This required at least one indubitable premise; and Descartes found it in his realization that he could not doubt his own existence, summarized in the familiar formula, “I think, therefore I am.” He quickly argued from this premise that his belief in God could be equally certain and, therefore, so could his confidence in his own sense perceptions, since the accuracy of these was guaranteed by God’s goodness. It was in these deliberations that he also developed his dualistic distinction between mind (whose existence, thoughts, beliefs, etc., one knows immediately) and body (whose existence and features one knows only through sense perceptions), particularly in his *Meditations* of 1641. Descartes spent the last years of his life in somewhat heated controversy over his doctrines and almost one-half of his life in exile from France. He died in Sweden on his way to see the Queen, from exposure to the cold.

The key to Descartes’s theory of emotion and to his theory of mind, in general, is his metaphysical distinction between two kinds of substance—mental and physical. The mind, according to Descartes, is “unextended substance,” defined by its properties of thought and free will. Bodies, on the other hand, are extended in space and subject to the mechanical laws of physics. A general task of Descartes’s philosophy, therefore, is to explain how such different substances (which, by definition, are wholly self-contained and independent of one another) might interact. His answer is crude and not entirely consistent. He sometimes argues (e.g., in the work the following selection is drawn from) that mind and body come together in a small gland at the base of the brain, the pineal gland, the function of which was then entirely unknown. Other times he argues that the mind can interact with any part of the body by means of what he calls “animal spirits” (minute particles of blood), which carry messages to various parts of the body.

This dualistic view of mind and body raises special problems when the topic is emotion. Emotions, which are a subset of that general group of psychic phenomena Descartes refers to as "the passions," seem to be split between the mind and the body; and this accounts for some of the problems Descartes had with his own theory. On the one hand, Descartes thinks of emotions as feelings of physical agitation and excitement; and he endeavors to describe, in terms appropriate to the level of scientific knowledge at his time, what happens in the body when we experience an emotion. So, for instance, he points out how the blood rushes out of the heart in fear and the animal spirits move from the brain to the limbs, disposing us for flight. To the extent that Descartes thinks of emotions as sensations, his theory of emotion sets the stage for many later theories, such as Hume's (Part I) and James's (Part II), which treat emotions as nothing but sensations of agitation. But Descartes does not confine himself to this physiological analysis of emotion. He also describes emotions in straightforward mentalistic language, speaking of the perceptions, desires, and beliefs associated with different emotions. And so, for example, he says that wonder depends on our perceiving a thing's novelty and believing it worthy of much consideration and that hatred arises from the perception of a thing's hurtfulness and involves a desire to avoid it. In recognizing the conceptual dimension of emotions, Descartes appears to be struggling toward a more cognitive picture of emotions, a picture characteristic of many contemporary theories of emotion.

From The Passions of the Soul

Of the Passions in General, and Incidentally of the Whole Nature of Man

ARTICLE I

That What in Respect of a Subject Is Passion, Is in Some Other Regard Always Action There is nothing in which the defective nature of the sciences which we have received from the ancients appears more clearly than in what they have written on the passions; for, although this is a matter which has at all times been the object of much investigation, and though it would not appear to be one of the most difficult, inasmuch as since every one has experience of the passions within himself, there is no necessity to borrow one's observations from elsewhere in order to discover their nature; yet that which the ancients have taught regarding them is both so slight, and for the most part so far from credible, that I am unable to entertain any hope of approximating to the truth excepting by shunning the paths which they have followed. This is why I shall be here obliged to write just as though I were

treating of a matter which no one had ever touched on before me; and, to begin with, I consider that all that which occurs or that happens anew, is by the philosophers, generally speaking, termed a passion, in as far as the subject to which it occurs is concerned, and an action in respect of him who causes it to occur. Thus although the agent and the recipient are frequently very different, the action and the passion are always one and the same thing, although having different names, because of the two-diverse subjects to which it may be related.

ARTICLE XVII

What the Functions of the Soul Are After having thus considered all the functions which pertain to the body alone, it is easy to recognise that there is nothing in us which we ought to attribute to our soul excepting our thoughts, which are mainly of two sorts, the one being the actions of the soul, and the other its passions. Those which I call its actions are all our desires, because we find by experience that they proceed directly from our soul, and appear to depend on it alone: while, on the other hand, we may usually term one's passions all those kinds of perception or forms of knowledge which are found in us, because it is often not our soul which makes them what they are, and because it always receives them from the things which are represented by them.

ARTICLE XVIII

Of the Will Our desires, again, are of two sorts, of which the one consists of the actions of the soul which terminate in the soul itself, as when we desire to love God, or generally speaking, apply our thoughts to some object which is not material; and the other of the actions which terminate in our body, as when from the simple fact that we have the desire to take a walk, it follows that our legs move and that we walk.

ARTICLE XIX

Of the Perceptions Our perceptions are also of two sorts, and the one have the soul as a cause and the other the body. Those which have the soul as a cause are the perceptions of our desires, and of all the imaginations or other thoughts which depend on them. For it is certain that we cannot desire anything without perceiving by the same means that we desire it; and, although in regard to our soul it is an action to desire something, we may say that it is also one of its passions to perceive that it desires. Yet because this perception and this will are really one and the same thing, the more noble always supplies the denomination, and thus we are not in the habit of calling it a passion, but only an action.

ARTICLE XXII

Of the Difference Which Exists Among the Other Perceptions All the perceptions which I have not yet explained come to the soul by the intermission of the nerves, and there is between them this difference, that we relate them in the one case to objects outside which strike our senses, in the other to our soul.

ARTICLE XXV

Of the Perceptions Which We Relate to Our Soul The perceptions which we relate solely to the soul are those whose effects we feel as though they were in the soul

itself, and as to which we do not usually know any proximate cause to which we may relate them: such are the feelings of joy, anger, and other such sensations, which are sometimes excited in us by the objects which move our nerves and sometimes also by other causes. But, although all our perceptions, both those which we relate to objects which are outside us, and those which we relate to the diverse affections of our body, are truly passions in respect of our soul, when we use this word in its most general significance, yet we are in the habit of restricting it to the signification of those alone which are related to soul itself; and it is only these last which I have here undertaken to explain under the name of the passions of the soul.

ARTICLE XXVI

That the Imaginations Which only Depend on the Fortuitous Movements of the Spirits, May Be Passions Just as Truly as the Perceptions Which Depend on the Nerves It remains for us to notice here that all the same things which the soul perceives by the intermission of the nerves, may also be represented by the fortuitous course of the animal spirits, without there being any other difference excepting that the impressions which come into the brain by the nerves are usually more lively or definite than those excited there by the spirits, which caused me to say in Article XXI that the former resemble the shadow or picture of the latter. We must also notice that it sometimes happens that this picture is so similar to the thing which it represents that we may be mistaken therein regarding the perceptions which relate to objects which are outside us, or at least those which relate to certain parts of our body, but that we cannot be so deceived regarding the passions, inasmuch as they are so close to, and so entirely within our soul, that it is impossible for it to feel them without their being actually such as it feels them to be. Thus often when we sleep, and sometimes even when we are awake, we imagine certain things so forcibly, that we think we see them before us, or feel them in our body, although they do not exist at all; but although we may be asleep, or dream, we cannot feel sad or moved by any other passion without its being very true that the soul actually has this passion within it.

ARTICLE XXVII

The Definition of the Passions of the Soul After having considered in what the passions of the soul differ from all its other thoughts, it seems to me that we may define them generally as the perceptions, feelings, or emotions of the soul which we relate specially to it, and which are caused, maintained, and fortified by some movement of the spirits.

ARTICLE XXVIII

Explanation of the First Part of This Definition We may call them perceptions when we make use of this word generally to signify all the thoughts which are not actions of the soul, or desires, but not when the term is used only to signify clear cognition; for experience shows us that those who are the most agitated by their passions, are not those who know them best; and that they are of the number of perceptions which the close alliance which exists between the soul and the body, renders confused and obscure. We may also call them feelings because they are

received into the soul in the same way as are the objects of our outside senses, and are not otherwise known by it; but we can yet more accurately call them emotions of the soul, not only because the name may be attributed to all the changes which occur in it—that is, in all the diverse thoughts which come to it, but more especially because of all the kinds of thought which it may have, there are no others which so powerfully agitate and disturb it as do these passions.

ARTICLE XXIX

Explanation of the Second Part I add that they particularly relate to the soul, in order to distinguish them from the other feelings which are related, the one to outside objects such as scents, sounds, and colours; the others to our body such as hunger, thirst, and pain. I also add that they are caused, maintained, and fortified by some movement of the spirits, in order to distinguish them from our desires, which we may call *emotions* of the soul which relate to it, but which are caused by itself; and also in order to explain their ultimate and most proximate cause, which plainly distinguishes them from the other feelings.

ARTICLE XXXIV

How the Soul and the Body Act on One Another Let us then conceive here that the soul has its principal seat in the little gland which exists in the middle of the brain, from whence it radiates forth through all the remainder of the body by means of the animal spirits, nerves, and even the blood, which, participating in the impressions of the spirits, can carry them by the arteries into all the members. And recollecting what has been said above about the machine of our body, i.e. that the little filaments of our nerves are so distributed in all its parts, that on the occasion of the diverse movements which are there excited by sensible objects, they open in diverse ways the pores of the brain, which causes the animal spirits contained in these cavities to enter in diverse ways into the muscles, by which means they can move the members in all the different ways in which they are capable of being moved; and also that all the other causes which are capable of moving the spirits in diverse ways suffice to conduct them into diverse muscles; let us here add that the small gland which is the main seat of the soul is so suspended between the cavities which contain the spirits that it can be moved by them in as many different ways as there are sensible diversities in the object, but that it may also be moved in diverse ways by the soul, whose nature is such that it receives in itself as many diverse impressions, that is to say, that it possesses as many diverse perceptions as there are diverse movements in this gland. Reciprocally, likewise, the machine of the body is so formed that from the simple fact that this gland is diversely moved by the soul, or by such other cause, whatever it is, it thrusts the spirits which surround it towards the pores of the brain, which conduct them by the nerves into the muscles, by which means it causes them to move the limbs.

ARTICLE XXXV

Example of the Mode in Which the Impressions of the Objects Unite in the Gland Which Is in the Middle of the Brain Thus, for example, if we see some animal approach us, the light reflected from its body depicts two images of it, one in each of our eyes,

and these two images form two others, by means of the optic nerves, in the interior surface of the brain which faces its cavities; then from there, by means of the animal spirits with which its cavities are filled, these images so radiate towards the little gland which is surrounded by these spirits, that the movement which forms each point of one of the images tends towards the same point of the gland towards which tends the movement which forms the point of the other image, which represents the same part of this animal. By this means the two images which are in the brain form but one upon the gland, which, acting immediately upon the soul, causes it to see the form of this animal.

ARTICLE XXXVI

Example of the Way in Which the Passions Are Excited in the Soul And, besides that, if this figure is very strange and frightful—that is, if it has a close relationship with the things which have been formerly hurtful to the body, that excites the passion of apprehension in the soul and then that of courage, or else that of fear and consternation according to the particular temperament of the body or the strength of the soul, and according as we have to begin with been secured by defence or by flight against the hurtful things to which the present impression is related. For in certain persons that disposes the brain in such a way that the spirits reflected from the image thus formed on the gland, proceed thence to take their places partly in the nerves which serve to turn the back and dispose the legs for flight, and partly in those which so increase or diminish the orifices of the heart, or at least which so agitate the other parts from whence the blood is sent to it, that this blood being there rarefied in a different manner from usual, sends to the brain the spirits which are adapted for the maintenance and strengthening of the passion of fear, i.e. which are adapted to the holding open, or at least reopening, of the pores of the brain which conduct them into the same nerves. For from the fact alone that these spirits enter into these pores, they excite a particular movement in this gland which is instituted by nature in order to cause the soul to be sensible of this passion; and because these pores are principally in relation with the little nerves which serve to contract or enlarge the orifices of the heart, that causes the soul to be sensible of it for the most part as in the heart.

ARTICLE XXXIX

How One and the Same Cause May Excite Different Passions in Different Men The same impression which a terrifying object makes on the gland, and which causes fear in certain men, may excite in others courage and confidence; the reason of this is that all brains are not constituted in the same way, and that the same movement of the gland which in some excites fear, in others causes the spirits to enter into the pores of the brain which conduct them partly into the nerves which serve to move the hands for purposes of self-defence, and partly into those which agitate and drive the blood towards the heart in the manner requisite to produce the spirits proper for the continuance of this defence, and to retain the desire of it.

ARTICLE XL

The Principal Effect of the Passions For it is requisite to notice that the principal effect of all the passions in men is that they incite and dispose their soul to desire those

things for which they prepare their body, so that the feeling of fear incites it to desire to fly, that of courage to desire to fight, and so on.

ARTICLE XLV

What Is the Power of the Soul in Reference to its Passions Our passions cannot likewise be directly excited or removed by the action of our will, but they can be so indirectly by the representation of things which are usually united to the passions which we desire to have, and which are contrary to those which we desire to set aside. Thus, in order to excite courage in oneself and remove fear, it is not sufficient to have the will to do so, but we must also apply ourselves to consider the reasons, the objects or examples which persuade us that the peril is not great; that there is always more security in defence than in flight; that we should have the glory and joy of having vanquished, while we could expect nothing but regret and shame for having fled, and so on.

ARTICLE XLVI

The Reason Which Prevents the Soul from Being Able Wholly to Control Its Passion And there is a special reason which prevents the soul from being able at once to change or arrest its passions, which has caused me to say in defining them that they are not only caused, but are also maintained and strengthened by some particular movement of the spirits. This reason is that they are nearly all accompanied by some commotion which takes place in the heart, and in consequence also in the whole of the blood and the animal spirits, so that until this commotion has subsided, they remain present to our thought in the same manner as sensible objects are present there while they act upon the organs of our senses. And as the soul, in rendering itself very attentive to some other thing, may prevent itself from hearing a slight noise or feeling a slight pain, but cannot prevent itself in the same way from hearing thunder or feeling the fire which burns the hand, it may similarly easily get the better of the lesser passions, but not the most violent and strongest, excepting after the commotion of the blood and spirits is appeased. The most that the will can do while this commotion is in its full strength is not to yield to its effects and to restrain many of the movements to which it disposes the body. For example, if anger causes us to lift our hand to strike, the will can usually hold it back; if fear incites our legs to flee, the will can arrest them, and so on in other similar cases.

ARTICLE XLVIII

How We Recognise the Strength or Infirmary of Souls, and What Is Lacking in Those That Are Most Feeble And it is by success in these combats that each individual can discover the strength or the weakness of his soul; for those in whom by nature the will can most easily conquer the passions and arrest the movements of the body which accompany them, without doubt possess the strongest souls. But there are those people who cannot bring their strength to the test, because they never cause their will to do battle with its proper arms, but only with those with which certain passions furnish it in order to resist certain others. That which I call its proper arms consists of the firm and determinate judgments respecting the knowledge of good and evil, in pursuance of which it has resolved to conduct

the actions of its life; and the most feeble souls of all are those whose will does not thus determine itself to follow certain judgments, but allows itself continually to be carried away by present passions, which, being frequently contrary to one another, draw the will first to one side, then to the other, and, by employing it in striving against itself, place the soul in the most deplorable possible condition. Thus when fear represents death as an extreme evil, and one which can only be avoided by flight, ambition on the other hand sets forth the infamy of this flight as an evil worse than death. These two passions agitate the will in diverse ways; and in first obeying one and then the other, it is in continual opposition to itself, and thus renders the soul enslaved and unhappy.

Of the Number and Order of the Passions and an Exposition of the Six Primitive Passions

ARTICLE LI

What Are the First Causes of the Passions We know from what has been said above that the ultimate and most proximate cause of the passions of the soul is none other than the agitation with which the spirits move the little gland which is in the middle of the brain. But that does not suffice to distinguish one from another; it is necessary to investigate their sources, and to examine their first causes: and, although they may sometimes be caused by the action of the soul which determines itself to conceive of this or that object, and also simply by the temperament of the body or by the impressions which are fortuitously met with in the brain, as happens when we feel sad or joyous without being able to give a reason, it yet appears by what has been said, that in all cases the same passions can also be excited by the objects which move the senses, and that these objects are their most ordinary and principal causes; from which it follows that in order to find them all, it is sufficient to consider all the effects of these objects.

ARTICLE LII

What Is Their Mode of Operation and How They May Be Enumerated I notice besides, that the objects which move the senses do not excite diverse passions in us because of all the diversities which are in them, but only because of the diverse ways in which they may harm or help us, or in general be of some importance to us; and that the customary mode of action of all the passions is simply this, that they dispose the soul to desire those things which nature tells us are of use, and to persist in this desire, and also bring about that same agitation of spirits which customarily causes them to dispose the body to the movement which serves for the carrying into effect of these things; that is why, in order to enumerate them, we must merely examine in their order in how many diverse ways which are significant for us, our senses can be moved by their objects; and I shall here make an enumeration of all the principal passions according to the order in which they may thus be found.

ARTICLE LXIX

That There Are Only Six Primitive Passions But the number of those which are simple and primitive is not very large. For, in making a review of all those which I have

enumerated, we may easily notice that there are but six which are such, i.e. wonder, love, hatred, desire, joy and sadness; and that all the others are composed of some of these six or are species of them. That is why, in order that their multitude may not embarrass my readers, I shall here treat the six primitive passions separately; and afterwards I shall show in what way all the others derive from them their origin.

ARTICLE LXX

Of Wonder; Its Definition and Cause Wonder is a sudden surprise of the soul which causes it to apply itself to consider with attention the objects which seem to it rare and extraordinary. It is thus primarily caused by the impression we have in the brain which represents the object as rare, and as consequently worthy of much consideration; then afterwards by the movement of the spirits, which are disposed by this impression to tend with great force towards the part of the brain where it is, in order to fortify and conserve it there; as they are also disposed by it to pass thence into the muscles which serve to retain the organs of the senses in the same situation in which they are, so that it is still maintained by them, if it is by them that it has been formed.

ARTICLE LXXIV

The End Which the Passions Serve, and to What They Are Detrimental And it is easy to understand from what has been said above, that the utility of all the passions consists alone in their fortifying and perpetuating in the soul thoughts which it is good it should preserve, and which without that might easily be effaced from it. And again, all the harm which they can cause consists in the fact that they fortify and conserve these thoughts more than necessary, or that they fortify and conserve others on which it is not good to dwell.

ARTICLE LXXIX

The Definition of Love and Hate Love is an emotion of the soul caused by the movement of the spirits which incites it to join itself willingly to objects which appear to it to be agreeable. And hatred is an emotion caused by the spirits which incite the soul to desire to be separated from the objects which present themselves to it as hurtful. I say that these emotions are caused by the spirits in order to distinguish love and hate, which are passions and depend on the body, both from the judgments which also induce the soul by its free will to unite itself with the things which it esteems to be good, and to separate itself from those it holds to be evil, and from the emotions which these judgments excite of themselves in the soul.

ARTICLE LXXX

What It Is to Join or Separate Oneself by One's Free Will For the rest, by the word will I do not here intend to talk of desire, which is a passion apart, and one which relates to the future, but of the consent by which we consider ourselves from this time forward as united with what we love, so that we imagine a whole of which we conceive ourselves as only constituting one part, while the thing loved constitutes another part. In the case of hatred, on the other hand, we consider our-

selves only and as a whole, entirely separated from the matter for which we possess an aversion.

ARTICLE LXXXII

How Very Different Passions Agree, Inasmuch as They Participate in Love There is also no need to distinguish as many kinds of love as there are diverse objects which we may love; for, to take an example, although the passions which an ambitious man has for glory, a miser for money, a drunkard for wine, a brutal man for a woman whom he desires to violate, a man of honour for his friend or mistress, and a good father for his children, may be very different, still, inasmuch as they participate in love, they are similar. But the four first only have love for the possession of the objects to which their passion relates, and do not have any for the objects themselves, for which they only have desire mingled with other particular passions. But the love which a good father has for his children is so pure that he desires to have nothing from them, and does not wish to possess them otherwise than he does, nor to be united with them more closely than he already is. For, considering them as replicas of himself, he seeks their good as his own, or even with greater care, because, in setting before himself that he or they form a whole of which he is not the best part, he often prefers their interests to his, and does not fear losing himself in order to save them. The affection which honourable men have for their friends is of this nature even though it is rarely so perfect; and that which they have for their mistress participates largely in it, but it also participates a little in the others.

ARTICLE LXXXVI

The Definition of Desire The passion of desire is an agitation of the soul caused by the spirits which dispose it to wish for the future the things which it represents to itself as agreeable. Thus we do not only desire the presence of the absent good, but also the conservation of the present, and further, the absence of evil, both of that which we already have, and of that which we believe we might experience in time to come.

ARTICLE XCI

The Definition of Joy Joy is an agreeable emotion of the soul in which consists the enjoyment that the soul possesses in the good which the impressions of the brain represent to it as its own. I say that it is in this emotion that the enjoyment of the good consists; for as a matter of fact the soul receives no other fruits from all the good things that it possesses; and while it has no joy in these, it may be said that it does not enjoy them more than if it did not possess them at all. I add also that it is of the good which the impressions of the brain represent to it as its own, in order not to confound this joy, which is a passion, with the joy that is purely intellectual, and which comes into the soul by the action of the soul alone, and which we may call an agreeable emotion excited in it, in which the enjoyment consists which it has in the good which its understanding represents to it as its own. It is true that while the soul is united to the body this intellectual joy can hardly fail to be accompanied by that which is a passion; for as soon as our understanding perceives that we possess some good thing, even although

this good may be so different from all that pertains to body that it is not in the least capable of being imagined, imagination does not fail immediately to make some impression in the brain from which proceeds the movement or the spirits which excites the passion of joy.

ARTICLE XCII

The Definition of Sadness Sadness is a disagreeable languor in which consists the discomfort and unrest which the soul receives from evil, or from the defect which the impressions of the brain set before it as pertaining to it. And there also is an intellectual sadness which is not passion, but which hardly ever fails to be accompanied by it.

ARTICLE XCIII

The Causes of These Two Passions But when intellectual joy or sadness thus excites that which is a passion their cause is evident enough; and we see from their definitions that joy proceeds from the belief that we have of possessing some good, and sadness from the belief that we have of possessing some evil or defect. It often, however, happens that we feel sad or joyful without being thus able distinctly to observe the good or evil which are the causes of it; e.g. when this good or this evil form their impressions in the brain without the intermission of the soul, sometimes because they only pertain to the body, and sometimes, too, although they pertain to the soul, because it does not consider them as good and evil, but under some other form the impression of which is joined to that of good and of evil in the brain.



BENEDICT SPINOZA

(1632–1677)

Introduction

Spinoza developed his theory of emotion in reaction to Descartes's treatise; but his theory, in fact, echoed that of the Stoics, particularly Chrysippus and Seneca, a thousand years earlier. The Stoics saw emotions as erred judgments about the world, false and destructive ways of seeing life and its misfortunes. In emotions, we rebel against life's tragedies and rejoice in its fortunes; but, worldly events are totally outside human control. And so we should replace emotions with reason and what they called "psychic indifference" (*apatheia*, or apathy). Spinoza, too, saw the world as wholly determined, wholly outside our control; and so his conception of wisdom is, ultimately, self-control, a refusal to be "moved" by emotion, an attempt to "see through" emotions with reason. Also, like the Stoics, he viewed emotions as a species of thoughts, albeit misguided thoughts.

The central work of Spinoza's career is his *Ethics*, which is, at first glance, primarily a work in metaphysics; but it actually is, as the title tells us, a systematic view of the world, aimed primarily at answering such questions as "What am I to do?" "What can I hope for?" and "What is the meaning of life?" In style, the *Ethics* (from which the following selection is taken) is a formidable, quasi-mathematical deductive sequence modeled after Euclid's geometry, in which every argument begins with another already demonstrated one, and the whole is based on a series of definitions and first principles. Spinoza first argues that the entire universe consists of a single "substance," which he tells us is "God." (This identification of God with the universe is usually called "pantheism.") Among God's many attributes are thought and physical matter. By making thought and matter attributes in this way, rather than independent substances, Spinoza avoids the problem of interaction that plagued Descartes, since mind and body are but two such attributes of the one substance.

In this cosmic identification of God with the universe, we as individuals have little significance, and, in any case, we are simply tiny particles in the grand scheme of things. Spinoza then goes on to argue that everything that happens in the universe is determined by God and therefore necessary. We cannot change anything, and there is no point whatsoever in our bemoaning our misfortunes or cursing tragedy; we can only understand them. According to Spinoza, there is no free will; and he argues that our every idea and intention is but a modification in the great mind of

God and thus determined: "In the mind there is no free will; but the mind is determined to wish this or that by a cause, which has been determined by another cause, and so on to infinity."

In his Part III, reprinted here, Spinoza introduces his theory of emotion. Like the Stoics before him, he sees the emotions as flawed thoughts about the world, misunderstandings. He defines emotions as "modifications of the body, which increase or decrease our active powers," for example, anger, which spurs us on, and sadness, which hinders us. He adds that all emotions are ultimately defined by reference to pleasure and pain; and he distinguishes the passive emotions, which originate from outside of us, from the active emotions, which are the outcome of our own natures and a pleasurable sense of heightened activity. The ills of life, Spinoza tells us, are due to the passive emotions, which cause us pain and lower our vitality.

Spinoza was brought up an orthodox Jew in Amsterdam, where his parents had fled the Spanish Inquisition. His early studies were in Hebrew—the Bible and the Talmud; later he read medieval philosophy. At the age of twenty-four, he was excommunicated from the Jewish community because of his pantheistic philosophy; at age thirty, he began his *Ethics*, which he was to finish in 1675. He lived a lonely life wandering around Holland, earning a frugal living as a lensgrinder, and died of tuberculosis at the age of forty-five.

From Ethics



(Part III) on the Origin and Nature of the Emotions

Most writers on the emotions and on human conduct seem to be treating rather of matters outside nature than of natural phenomena following nature's general laws. They appear to conceive man to be situated in nature as a kingdom within a kingdom: for they believe that he disturbs rather than follows nature's order, that he has absolute control over his actions, and that he is determined solely by himself. They attribute human infirmities and fickleness, not to the power of nature in general, but to some mysterious flaw in the nature of man, which accordingly they bemoan, deride, despise, or, as usually happens, abuse: he, who succeeds in hitting off the weakness of the human mind more eloquently or more acutely than his fellows, is looked upon as a seer. Still there has been no lack of very excellent men (to whose toil and industry I confess myself much indebted), who have written many noteworthy things concerning the right way of life, and have given much sage advice to mankind. But no one, so far as I know, has defined the nature and strength of the emotions, and the power of the mind against them for their restraint.

I do not forget, that the illustrious Descartes, though he believed that the mind has absolute power over its actions, strove to explain human emotions by

their primary causes, and, at the same time, to point out a way, by which the mind might attain to absolute dominion over them. However, in my opinion, he accomplishes nothing beyond a display of the acuteness of his own great intellect, as I will show in the proper place. For the present I wish to revert to those, who would rather abuse or deride human emotions than understand them. Such persons will doubtless think it strange that I should attempt to treat of human vice and folly geometrically, and should wish to set forth with rigid reasoning those matters which they cry out against as repugnant to reason, frivolous, absurd, and dreadful. However, such is my plan. Nothing comes to pass in nature, which can be set down to a flaw therein; for nature is always the same, and everywhere one and the same in her efficacy and power of action; that is, nature's laws and ordinances, whereby all things come to pass and change from one form to another, are everywhere and always the same; so that there should be one and the same method of understanding the nature of all things whatsoever, namely, through nature's universal laws and rules. Thus the passions of hatred, anger, envy, and so on, considered in themselves, follow from this same necessity and efficacy of nature; they answer to certain definite causes, through which they are understood, and possess certain properties as worthy of being known as the properties of anything else, whereof the contemplation in itself affords us delight. I shall, therefore, treat of the nature and strength of the emotions according to the same method, as I employed heretofore in my investigations concerning God and the mind. I shall consider human actions and desires in exactly the same manner, as though I were concerned with lines, planes, and solids.

DEFINITIONS

I. By an *adequate* cause, I mean a cause through which its effect can be clearly and distinctly perceived. By an *inadequate* or partial cause, I mean a cause through which, by itself, its effect cannot be understood.

II. I say that we *act* when anything takes place, either within us or externally to us, whereof we are the adequate cause; that is (by the foregoing definition) when through our nature something takes place within us or externally to us, which can through our nature alone be clearly and distinctly understood. On the other hand, I say that we are passive as regards something when that something takes place within us, or follows from our nature externally, we being only the partial cause.

III. By *emotion* I mean the modifications of the body, whereby the active power of the said body is increased or diminished, aided or constrained, and also the ideas of such modifications.

N.B. If we can be the adequate cause of any of these modifications, I then call the emotion an activity, otherwise I call it a passion, or state wherein the mind is passive.

POSTULATES

I. The human body can be affected in many ways, whereby its power of activity is increased or diminished, and also in other ways which do not render its power of activity either greater or less.

II. The human body can undergo many changes, and, nevertheless, retain the impressions or traces of objects, and, consequently, the same images of things.

PROP. I. *Our mind is in certain cases active, and in certain cases passive. In so far as it has adequate ideas, it is necessarily active, and in so far as it has inadequate ideas, it is necessarily passive.*

PROP. XIII. *When the mind conceives things which diminish or hinder the body's power of activity, it endeavours, as far as possible, to remember things which exclude the existence of the first-named things.*

Proof. So long as the mind conceives anything of the kind alluded to, the power of the mind and body is diminished or constrained; nevertheless it will continue to conceive it, until the mind conceives something else, which excludes the present existence thereof, that is (as I have just shown), the power of the mind and of the body is diminished, or constrained, until the mind conceives something else, which excludes the existence of the former thing conceived: therefore the mind, as far as it can, will endeavour to conceive or remember the latter. *Q.E.D.*

Corollary. Hence it follows, that the mind shrinks from conceiving those things, which diminish or constrain the power of itself and of the body.

Note. From what has been said we may clearly understand the nature of Love and Hate. *Love* is nothing else but *pleasure accompanied by the idea of an external cause*: *Hate* is nothing else but *pain accompanied by the idea of an external cause*. We further see, that he who loves necessarily endeavours to have, and to keep present to him, the object of his love; while he who hates endeavours to remove and destroy the object of his hatred. But I will treat these matters at more length hereafter.

PROP. XIV. *If the mind has once been affected by two emotions at the same time, it will, whenever it is afterwards affected by one of the two, be also affected by the other.*

Proof. If the human body has once been affected by two bodies at once, whenever afterwards the mind conceives one of them, it will straightway remember the other also. But the mind's conceptions indicate rather the emotions of our body than the nature of external bodies; therefore, if the body, and consequently the mind has been once affected by two emotions at the same time, it will, whenever it is afterwards affected by one of the two, be also affected by the other.

PROP. XV. *Anything can, accidentally, be the cause of pleasure, pain, or desire.*

Proof. Let it be granted that the mind is simultaneously affected by two emotions, of which one neither increases nor diminishes its power of activity, and the other does either increase or diminish the said power. From the foregoing proposition it is evident that, whenever the mind is afterwards affected by the former, through its true cause, which (by hypothesis) neither increases nor diminishes its power of action, it will be at the same time affected by the latter, which does increase or diminish its power of activity,

that is it will be affected with pleasure or pain. Thus the former of the two emotions will, not through itself, but accidentally, be the cause of pleasure or pain. In the same way also it can be easily shown, that a thing may be accidentally the cause of desire. *Q.E.D.*

[In Prop. IX, Spinoza tells us, "the term desire is generally applied to men, in so far as they are conscious of their appetite, and may accordingly be thus defined: *Desire is appetite with consciousness thereof.* It is thus plain from what has been said, that in no case do we strive for, wish for, long for, or desire anything, because we deem it to be good, but on the other hand, we deem a thing to be good, because we strive for it, wish for it, long for it, or desire it."]]

Corollary. Simply from the fact that we have regarded a thing with the emotion of pleasure or pain, though that thing be not the efficient cause of the emotion, we can either love or hate it.

Proof. For from this fact alone it arises, that the mind afterwards conceiving the said thing is affected with the emotion of pleasure or pain, that is, according as the power of the mind and body may be increased or diminished, &c.; and consequently, according as the mind may desire or shrink from the conception of it.

PROP. LIII. *When the mind regards itself and its own power of activity, it feels pleasure; and that pleasure is greater in proportion to the distinctness wherewith it conceives itself and its own power of activity.*

Proof. A man does not know himself except through the modifications of his body, and the ideas thereof. When, therefore, the mind is able to contemplate itself, it is thereby assumed to pass to a greater perfection, or to feel pleasure; and the pleasure will be greater in proportion to the distinctness, wherewith it is able to conceive itself and its own power of activity. *Q.E.D.*

Corollary. This pleasure is fostered more and more, in proportion as a man conceives himself to be praised by others. For the more he conceives himself as praised by others, the more will he imagine them to be affected with pleasure, accompanied by the idea of himself; thus he is himself affected with greater pleasure, accompanied by the idea of himself. *Q.E.D.'*

PROP. LIV. *The mind endeavours to conceive only such things as assert its power of activity.*

Proof. The endeavour or power of the mind is the actual essence thereof (III. vii.); but the essence of the mind obviously only affirms that which the mind is and can do; not that which it neither is nor can do; therefore the mind endeavours to conceive only such things as assert or affirm its power of activity. *Q.E.D.*

PROP. LV. *When the mind contemplates its own weakness, it feels pain thereat.*

Proof. The essence of the mind only affirms that which the mind is, or can do; in other words, it is the mind's nature to conceive only such things as assert its power of activity (last Prop.). Thus, when we say that the mind contemplates its own weakness, we are merely saying that while the mind

is attempting to conceive something which asserts its power of activity, it is checked in its endeavour—in other words, it feels pain. *Q.E.D.*

Corollary. This pain is more and more fostered, if a man conceives that he is blamed by others.

Note. This pain, accompanied by the idea of our own weakness, is called *humility*; the pleasure, which springs from the contemplation of ourselves, is called *self-love* or *self-complacency*. And inasmuch as this feeling is renewed as often as a man contemplates his own virtues, or his own power of activity, it follows that everyone is fond of narrating his own exploits, and displaying the force both of his body and mind, and also that, for this reason, men are troublesome one to another. Again, it follows that men are naturally envious, rejoicing in the shortcomings of their equals, and feeling pain at their virtues. For whenever a man conceives his own actions, he is affected with pleasure, in proportion as his actions display more perfection, and he conceives them more distinctly—that is, in proportion as he can distinguish them from others, and regard them as something special.

DEFINITIONS OF THE EMOTIONS

I. *Desire* is the actual essence of man, in so far as it is conceived, as determined to a particular activity by some given modification of itself.

Explanation.—We have said above, in the note to Prop. ix. of this part, that desire is appetite, with consciousness thereof; further, that appetite is the essence of man, in so far as it is determined to act in a way tending to promote its own persistence. But, in the same note, I also remarked that, strictly speaking, I recognize no distinction between appetite and desire. For whether a man be conscious of his appetite or not, it remains one and the same appetite. Thus, in order to avoid the appearance of tautology, I have refrained from explaining desire by appetite; but I have taken care to define it in such a manner, as to comprehend, under one head, all those endeavours of human nature, which we distinguish by the terms appetite, will, desire, or impulse. I might, indeed, have said, that desire is the essence of man, in so far as it is conceived as determined to a particular activity; but from such a definition. It would not follow that the mind can be conscious of its desire or appetite. Therefore, in order to imply the cause of such consciousness, it was necessary to add, *in so far as it is determined by some given modification*, &c. For, by a modification of man's essence, we understand every disposition of the said essence, whether such disposition be innate, or whether it be conceived solely under the attribute of thought, or solely under the attribute of extension, or whether, lastly, it be referred simultaneously to both these attributes. By the term desire, then, I here mean all man's endeavours, impulses, appetites, and volitions, which vary according to each man's disposition, and are, therefore, not seldom opposed one to another, according as a man is drawn in different directions, and knows not where to turn.

II. *Pleasure* is the transition of a man from a less to a greater perfection.

III. *Pain* is the transition of a man from a greater to a less perfection.

I, therefore, recognize only three primitive or primary emotions, namely, pleasure, pain, and desire.

VI. *Love* is pleasure, accompanied by the idea of an external cause.

Explanation. This definition explains sufficiently clearly the essence of love; the definition given by those authors who say that love is *the lover's wish to unite himself to the loved object* expresses a property, but not the essence of love; and, as such authors have not sufficiently discerned love's essence, they have been unable to acquire a true conception of its properties, accordingly their definition is on all hands admitted to be very obscure. It must, however, be noted, that when I say that it is a property of love, that the lover should wish to unite himself to the beloved object, I do not here mean by *wish* consent, or conclusion, or a free decision of the mind (for I have shown such, in II. xlviii., to be fictitious); neither do I mean a desire of being united to the loved object when it is absent, or of continuing in its presence when it is at hand; for love can be conceived without either of these desires; but by *wish* I mean the contentment, which is in the lover, on account of the presence of the beloved object, whereby the pleasure of the lover is strengthened, or at least maintained.

VII. *Hatred* is pain, accompanied by the idea of an external cause.

IX. *Aversion* is pain, accompanied by the idea of something which is accidentally the cause of pain.

X. *Devotion* is love towards one whom we admire.

XI. *Derision* is pleasure arising from our conceiving the presence of a quality, which we despise, in an object which we hate.

Explanation. In so far as we despise a thing which we hate, we deny existence thereof, and to that extent rejoice. But since we assume that man hates that which he derides, it follows that the pleasure in question is not without alloy.

XII. *Hope* is an inconstant pleasure, arising from the idea of something past or future, whereof we to a certain extent doubt the issue.

XIII. *Fear* is an inconstant pain arising from the idea of something past or future, whereof we to a certain extent doubt the issue (cf. III. xviii. note).

Explanation. From these definitions it follows, that there is no hope unmingled with fear, and no fear unmingled with hope. For he, who depends on hope and doubts concerning the issue of anything, is assumed to conceive something, which excludes the existence of the said thing in the future; therefore he, to this extent, feels pain; consequently, while dependent on hope, he fears for the issue. Contrariwise he, who fears, in other words doubts, concerning the issue of something which he hates, also conceives something which excludes the existence of the thing in question; to this extent he feels pleasure, and consequently to this extent he hopes that it will turn out as he desires.

XIV. *Confidence* is pleasure arising from the idea of something past or future, wherefrom all cause of doubt has been removed.

XV. *Despair* is pain arising from the idea of something past or future, wherefrom all cause of doubt has been removed.

Explanation. Thus confidence springs from hope, and despair from fear, when all cause for doubt as to the issue of an event has been removed: this comes to pass, because man conceives something past or future as present and regards it as such, or else because he conceives other things, which exclude the

existence of the causes of his doubt. For, although we can never be absolutely certain of the issue of any particular event, it may nevertheless happen that we feel no doubt concerning it. For we have shown, that to feel no doubt concerning a thing is not the same as to be quite certain of it. Thus it may happen that we are affected by the same emotion of pleasure or pain concerning a thing past or future, as concerning the conception of a thing present.

XVI. *Joy* is pleasure accompanied by the idea of something past, which has had an issue beyond our hope.

XVII. *Disappointment* is pain accompanied by the idea of something past, which has had an issue contrary to our hope.

XVIII. *Pity* is pain accompanied by the idea of evil, which has befallen someone else whom we conceive to be like ourselves.

Explanation. Between pity and sympathy (*misericordia*) there seems to be no difference, unless perhaps that the former term is used in reference to a particular action, and the latter in reference to a disposition.

XIX. *Approval* is love towards one who has done good to another.

XX. *Indignation* is hatred towards one who has done evil to another.

Explanation. I am aware that these terms are employed in senses somewhat different from those usually assigned. But my purpose is to explain, not the meaning of words, but the nature of things. I therefore make use of such terms, as may convey my meaning without any violent departure from their ordinary signification.

XXIII. *Envy* is hatred, in so far as it induces a man to be pained by another's good fortune, and to rejoice in another's evil fortune.

Explanation. Envy is generally opposed to sympathy, which, by doing some violence to the meaning of the word, may therefore be thus defined:

XXIV. *Sympathy* (*misericordia*) is love, in so far as it induces a man to feel pleasure at another's good fortune, and pain at another's evil fortune.

XXVI. *Humility* is pain arising from a man's contemplation of his own weakness of body or mind.

Explanation. Self-complacency is opposed to humility, in so far as we thereby mean pleasure arising from a contemplation of our own power of action; but, in so far as we mean thereby pleasure accompanied by the idea of any action which we believe we have performed by the free decision of our mind, it is opposed to repentance, which we may thus define:

XXVII. *Repentance* is pain accompanied by the idea of some action, which we believe we have performed by the free decision of our mind.

XXVIII. *Pride* is thinking too highly of one's self from self-love.

Explanation. Thus pride is different from partiality, for the latter term is used in reference to an external object, but pride is used of a man thinking too highly of himself. However, as partiality is the effect of love, so is pride the effect or property of *self-love*, which may therefore be thus defined, *love of self or self-approval, in so far as it leads a man to think too highly of himself.* To this emotion there

is no contrary. For no one thinks too meanly of himself because of self-hatred; I say that no one thinks too meanly of himself, in so far as he conceives that he is incapable of doing this or that. For whatsoever a man imagines that he is incapable of doing, he imagines this of necessity, and by that notion he is so disposed, that he really cannot do that which he conceives that he cannot do. For, so long as he conceives that he cannot do it, so long is he not determined to do it, and consequently so long is it impossible for him to do it. However, if we consider such matters as only depend on opinion, we shall find it conceivable that a man may think too meanly of himself; for it may happen, that a man, sorrowfully regarding his own weakness, should imagine that he is despised by all men, while the rest of the world are thinking of nothing less than of despising him. Again, a man may think too meanly of himself, if he deny of himself in the present something in relation to a future time of which he is uncertain. As, for instance, if he should say that he is unable to form any clear conceptions, or that he can desire and do nothing but what is wicked and base, &c. We may also say, that a man thinks too meanly of himself, when we see him from excessive fear of shame refusing to do things which others, his equals, venture. We can, therefore, set down as a contrary to pride an emotion which I will call self-abasement, for as from self-complacency springs pride, so from humility springs self-abasement, which I will accordingly thus define:

XXIX. *Self-abasement* is thinking too meanly of one's self by reason of pain.

Explanation. We are nevertheless generally accustomed to oppose pride to humility, but in that case we pay more attention to the effect of either emotion than to its nature. We are wont to call *proud* the man who boasts too much, who talks of nothing but his own virtues and other people's faults, who wishes to be first; and lastly who goes through life with a style and pomp suitable to those far above him in station. On the other hand, we call *humble* the man who too often blushes, who confesses his faults, who sets forth other men's virtues, and who, lastly, walks with bent head and is negligent of his attire. However, these emotions, humility and self-abasement, are extremely rare. For human nature, considered in itself, strives against them as much as it can; hence those, who are believed to be most self-abased and humble, are generally in reality the most ambitious and envious.

XXX. *Honour* is pleasure accompanied by the idea of some action of our own, which we believe to be praised by others.

XXXI. *Shame* is pain accompanied by the idea of some action of our own, which we believe to be blamed by others.

Explanation. On this subject see the note to III. xxx. But we should here remark the difference which exists between shame and modesty. Shame is the pain following the deed whereof we are ashamed. Modesty is the fear or dread of shame, which restrains a man from committing a base action. Modesty is usually opposed to shamelessness, but the latter is not an emotion, as I will duly show; however, the names of the emotions (as I have remarked already) have regard rather to their exercise than to their nature.

I have now fulfilled my task of explaining the emotions arising from pleasure and pain. I therefore proceed to treat of those which I refer to desire.

XXXII. *Regret* is the desire or appetite to possess something, kept alive by the remembrance of the said thing, and at the same time constrained by the remembrance of other things which exclude the existence of it.

XXXIII. *Emulation* is the desire of something, engendered in us by our conception that others have the same desire.

XXXIV. *Thankfulness* or *Gratitude* is the desire or zeal springing from love, whereby we endeavour to benefit him, who with similar feelings of love has conferred a benefit on us.

XXXV. *Benevolence* is the desire of benefiting one whom we pity. Cf. III. xxvii. note.

XXXVI. *Anger* is the desire, whereby through hatred we are induced to injure one whom we hate.

XXXVII. *Revenge* is the desire whereby we are induced, through mutual hatred, to injure one who, with similar feelings, has injured us.

XXXVIII. *Cruelty* or *savageness* is the desire, whereby a man is impelled to injure one whom we love or pity.

Explanation. To cruelty is opposed clemency, which is not a passive state of the mind, but a power whereby man restrains his anger and revenge.

XXXIX. *Timidity* is the desire to avoid a greater evil, which we dread, by undergoing a lesser evil.

XL. *Daring* is the desire, whereby a man is set on to do something dangerous which his equals fear to attempt.

XLI. *Cowardice* is attributed to one, whose desire is checked by the fear of some danger which his equals dare to encounter.

Explanation. Cowardice is, therefore, nothing else but the fear of some evil, which most men are wont not to fear; hence I do not reckon it among the emotions springing from desire. Nevertheless, I have chosen to explain it here, because, in so far as we look to the desire, it is truly opposed to the emotion of daring.

The definitions of jealousy and other waverings of the mind I pass over in silence, first, because they arise from the compounding of the emotions already described; secondly, because many of them have no distinctive names, which shows that it is sufficient for practical purposes to have merely a general knowledge of them. However, it is established from the definitions of the emotions, which we have set forth, that they all spring from desire, pleasure, or pain, or, rather, that there is nothing besides these three; wherefore each is wont to be called by a variety of names in accordance with its various relations and extrinsic tokens. If we now direct our attention to these primitive emotions, and to what has been said concerning the nature of the mind, we shall be able thus to define the emotions, in so far as they are referred to the mind only.

GENERAL DEFINITION OF THE EMOTIONS

Emotion, which is called a passivity of the soul, is a confused idea, whereby the mind affirms concerning its body, or any part thereof, a force for existence (*existendi vis*) greater or less than before, and by the presence of which the mind is determined to think of one thing rather than another.

Explanation. I say, first, that emotion or passion of the soul is a *confused idea*. For we have shown that the mind is only passive, in so far as it has inadequate or confused ideas. I say, further, *whereby the mind affirms concerning its body or any part thereof a force for existence greater than before*. For all the ideas of bodies, which we possess, denote rather the actual disposition of our own body than the nature of an external body. But the idea which constitutes the reality of an emotion must denote or express the disposition of the body, or of some part thereof, which is possessed by the body, or some part thereof, because its power of action or force for existence is increased or diminished, helped or hindered. But it must be noted that, when I say *a greater or less force for existence than before*, I do not mean that the mind compares the present with the past disposition of the body, but that the idea which constitutes the reality of an emotion affirms something of the body, which, in fact, involves more or less of reality than before.

And inasmuch as the essence of mind consists in the fact, that it affirms the actual existence of its own body, and inasmuch as we understand by perfection the very essence of a thing, it follows that the mind passes to greater or less perfection, when it happens to affirm concerning its own body, or any part thereof, something involving more or less reality than before.

When, therefore, I said above that the power of the mind is increased or diminished, I merely meant that the mind had formed of its own body, or of some part hereof, an idea involving more or less of reality, than it had already affirmed concerning its own body. For the excellence of ideas, and the actual power of thinking are measured by the excellence of the object. Lastly, I have added *by the presence of which the mind is determined to think of one thing rather than another*, so that, besides the nature of pleasure and pain, which the first part of the definition explains, I might also express the nature of desire.

(Part V) of the Power of the Understanding, or of Human Freedom

PREFACE

At length I pass to the remaining portion of my Ethics, which is concerned with the way leading to freedom. I shall therefore treat therein of the power of the reason, showing how far the reason can control the emotions, and what is the nature of Mental Freedom or Blessedness; we shall then be able to see, how much more powerful the wise man is than the ignorant. . . . That we do not possess absolute dominion over [the emotions], I have already shown. Yet the Stoics have thought, that the emotions depended absolutely on our will, and that we could absolutely govern them. But these philosophers were compelled, by the protest of experience, not from their own principles, to confess, that no slight practice and zeal is needed to control and moderate them. . . . To this opinion Descartes not a little inclines. For he maintained, that the soul or mind is specially united to a particular part of the brain, namely, to that part called the pineal gland, by the aid of which the mind is enabled to feel all the movements which are set going in the body, and also external objects, and which the mind by a simple act of volition can put in motion in various ways. . . . He thence concludes, that there is no soul so weak, that it cannot, under proper direction, acquire absolute power over its passions. . . . I omit all the assertions which he

makes concerning the will and its freedom, inasmuch as I have abundantly proved that his premises are false. Therefore, since the power of the mind, as I have shown above, is defined by the understanding only, we shall determine solely by the knowledge of the mind the remedies against the emotions, which I believe all have had experience of, but do not accurately observe or distinctly see, and from the same basis we shall deduce all those conclusions, which have regard to the mind's blessedness.

PROP. I. *Even as thoughts and the ideas of things are arranged and associated in the mind, so are the modifications of body or the images of things precisely in the same way arranged and associated in the body.*

PROP. II. *If we remove a disturbance of the spirit, or emotion, from the thought of an external cause, and unite it to other thoughts, then will the love or hatred towards that external cause, and also the vacillations of spirit which arise from these emotions, be destroyed.*

PROP. III. *An emotion, which is a passion, ceases to be a passion, as soon as we form a clear and distinct idea thereof.*

Corollary. An emotion therefore becomes more under our control, and the mind is less passive in respect to it, in proportion as it is more known to us.

PROP. IV. *There is no modification of the body, whereof we cannot form some clear and distinct conception.*

Corollary. Hence it follows that there is no emotion, whereof we cannot form some clear and distinct conception. For an emotion is the idea of a modification of the body (by the general Def. of the Emotions), and must therefore (by the preceding Prop.) involve some clear and distinct conception.

PROP. VI. *The mind has greater power over the emotions and is less subject thereto, in so far as it understands all things as necessary.*

Proof. The mind understands all things to be necessary and to be determined to existence and operation by an infinite chain of causes; therefore (by the foregoing Proposition), it thus far brings it about, that it is less subject to the emotions arising therefrom, and feels less emotion towards the things themselves. Q.E.D.

PROP. VII. *Emotions which are aroused or spring from reason, if we take account of time, are stronger than those which are attributable to particular objects that we regard as absent.*

PROP. VIII. *An emotion is stronger in proportion to the number of simultaneous concurrent causes whereby it is aroused.*

Proof. Many simultaneous causes are more powerful than a few; therefore, in proportion to the increased number of simultaneous causes whereby it is aroused, emotion becomes stronger. Q.E.D.

PROP. IX. *An emotion which is attributable to many and diverse causes which the mind regards as simultaneous with the emotion itself is less hurtful, and we are less subject thereto and less affected towards each of its causes, than if it were a different and equally powerful emotion attributable to fewer causes or to a single cause.*

Proof. An emotion is only bad or hurtful, in so far as it hinders the mind from being able to think; therefore, an emotion, whereby the mind is determined to the contemplation of several things at once, is less hurtful than another equally powerful emotion, which so engrosses the mind in the single contemplation of a few objects or of one, that it is unable to think of anything else; this was our first point. Again, as the mind's essence, in other words, its power, consists solely in thought, the mind is less passive in respect to an emotion, which causes it to think of several things at once, than in regard to an equally strong emotion, which keeps it engrossed in the contemplation of a few or of a single object: this was our second point. Lastly, this emotion, in so far as it is attributable to several causes, is less powerful in regard to each of them. *Q.E.D.*

PROP. X. *So long as we are not assailed by emotions contrary to our nature, we have the power of arranging and associating the modifications of our body according to the intellectual order.*

Proof. The emotions, which are contrary to our nature, that is, which are bad, are bad in so far as they impede the mind from understanding. So long, therefore, as we are not assailed by emotions contrary to our nature, the mind's power, whereby it endeavours to understand things, is not impeded, and therefore it is able to form clear and distinct ideas and to deduce them one from another; consequently we have in such cases the power of arranging and associating the modifications of the body according to the intellectual order. *Q.E.D.*



DAVID HUME

(1711–1776)

Introduction

Although now considered a major figure in the history of philosophy, David Hume was more esteemed in his day as a historian than as a philosopher. In 1739, while still in his twenties, he published *A Treatise of Human Nature*, which, in his words, “fell stillborn from the press.” Though it received little recognition during Hume’s life-time, the *Treatise* is now considered a landmark work in both epistemology and ethics. In the *Treatise*, Hume defended a radically skeptical view of human knowledge. He argued, for example, that since our ordinary beliefs in general causal laws, in the endurance of objects, and in the existence of God cannot be proven true through experience, they do not count as genuine knowledge; these beliefs are simply a matter of custom or habit. This skeptical view of human knowledge in large part motivated Hume’s successor, Kant, to write his famous *Critique of Pure Reason*. In the *Treatise*, Hume also joined in the battle then raging between those moral philosophers who believed moral knowledge is based on reason and those who believed it is based on feeling. Hume argued there, as well as in *An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals*, published in 1751, that we are guided in our judgments of what is morally right and wrong by certain feelings of approval and disapproval, which he called moral sentiments. In defense of this, Hume argued that if feeling did not play an important part in moral knowledge, we would never be motivated to do the right thing and to avoid the wrong.

Hume is perhaps best known for his work on moral sentiments, a topic pioneered by his predecessor, Francis Hutcheson, but his theory of moral sentiments fits within a general theory and classification of emotions. Reprinted here is an excerpt from Book II of the *Treatise*, “Of the Passions,” which is devoted to his theory of emotion. Hume also published a dissertation, “Of the Passions,” in 1757. He was the first modern philosopher to give serious attention to the role ideas and beliefs play in generating emotions as well as to hint at the idea that emotions are always felt “about” or “toward” objects. [See Brentano (Part III) for a fuller explanation of this idea, which is called “intentionality.”]

Following in Descartes’s footsteps, Hume defines emotion as varying degrees of physical and possibly mental agitation. There are, in his view, both “calm” emotions, like the moral sentiments that involve little agitation, as well as “violent” emotions, such as anger and love. Since these sensations are simple and unanalyz-

able, Hume argues that a theory of emotion cannot be about the component "parts" of emotion. Rather, the task of such a theory should be the enumeration of the causes of emotion and any other conditions associated with emotions. With this in mind, Hume classifies emotions into two general categories—"direct" and "indirect"—each category having a distinct type of causal history. Joy, grief, and hope are direct emotions; they are caused simply by feelings of pleasure or pain. Receiving an unexpected gift, for example, gives us pleasure and this, in turn, causes joy. In contrast, indirect emotions, such as love, hatred, and pride, are caused by pleasures or pains plus certain beliefs about the object and the association with some person. It is in his analysis of these indirect emotions that Hume contributes most to the theory of emotion. He sees, for example, that taking pride in a house causally depends on our believing we own the house; and pride is always accompanied by the idea of self. (That is, even though we talk about being proud of the house, we think of it as reflecting well on ourselves, e.g., by indicating our social status; and so, in a sense, we are always also proud of ourselves.)

Hume's theory of emotion, like any of the theories within the Cartesian tradition (e.g., James's), can be criticized for being overly simplistic. Are emotions really nothing but simple sensations of agitation, or do they not also include behavioral and other features? Although Hume's view of emotions as simple unanalyzable sensations prevents him from seeing that emotions are always felt about or toward things (i.e., that they are intentional), his claim that indirect emotions and the idea of some person always go together is at least a step in this direction. Contemporary philosophers still share Hume's interest in the causes of emotion (though many reject his account); and Hume's cognitive view of emotion as it relates to his moral theory is still a topic of debate.

From A Treatise of Human Nature



OF THE PASSIONS

Division of the Subject As all the perceptions of the mind may be divided into *impressions* and *ideas*, so the impressions admit of another division into *original* and *secondary*. This division of the impressions is the same with that which I formerly made use of when I distinguish'd them into impressions of *sensation* and *reflexion*. Original impressions or impressions of sensation are such as without any antecedent perception arise in the soul, from the constitution of the body, from the animal spirits, or from the application of objects to the external organs. Secondary, or reflective impressions are such as proceed from some of these original ones, either immediately or by the interposition of its idea. Of the first kind are all the impressions of the senses, and all bodily pains and pleasures: Of the second are the passions, and other emotions resembling them.

'Tis certain, that the mind, in its perceptions, must begin somewhere; and that since the impressions precede their correspondent ideas, there must be some impressions, which without any introduction make their appearance in the soul. As these depend upon natural and physical causes, the examination of them wou'd lead me too far from my present subject, into the sciences of anatomy and natural philosophy. For this reason I shall here confine myself to those other impressions, which I have call'd secondary and reflective, as arising either from the original impressions, or from their ideas. Bodily pains and pleasures are the source of many passions, both when felt and consider'd by the mind; but arise originally in the soul, or in the body, whichever you please to call it, without any preceding thought or perception. A fit of the gout produces a long train of passions, as grief, hope, fear; but is not deriv'd immediately from any affection or idea.

The reflective impressions may be divided into two kinds, *viz.* the *calm* and the *violent*. Of the first kind is the sense of beauty and deformity in action, composition, and external objects. Of the second are the passions of love and hatred, grief and joy, pride and humility. This division is far from being exact. The raptures of poetry and music frequently rise to the greatest height; while those other impressions, properly called *passions*, may decay into so soft an emotion, as to become, in a manner, imperceptible. But as in general the passions are more violent than the emotions arising from beauty and deformity, these impressions have been commonly distinguish'd from each other. The subject of the human mind being so copious and various, I shall here take advantage of this vulgar and specious division, that I may proceed with the greater order; and having said all I thought necessary concerning our ideas, shall now explain these violent emotions or passions, their nature, origin, causes, and effects.

When we take a survey of the passions, there occurs a division of them into *direct* and *indirect*. By direct passions I understand such as arise immediately from good or evil, from pain or pleasure. By indirect such as proceed from the same principles, but by the conjunction of other qualities. This distinction I cannot at present justify or explain any farther. I can only observe in general, that under the indirect passions I comprehend pride, humility, ambition, vanity, love, hatred, envy, pity, malice, generosity, with their dependants. And under the direct passions, desire, aversion, grief, joy, hope, fear, despair and security. I shall begin with the former.

Section II

Of Pride and Humility; Their Objects and Causes The passions of PRIDE and HUMILITY being simple and uniform impressions, 'tis impossible we can ever, by a multitude of words, give a just definition of them, or indeed of any of the passions. The utmost we can pretend to is a description of them, by an enumeration of such circumstances, as attend them: But as these words, *pride* and *humility*, are of general use, and the impressions they represent the most common of any, every one, of himself, will be able to form a just idea of them, without any danger of mistake. For which reason, not to lose time upon preliminaries, I shall immediately enter upon the examination of these passions.

'Tis evident, that pride and humility, tho' directly contrary, have yet the same OBJECT. This object is self, or that succession of related ideas and impressions, of which we have an intimate memory and consciousness. Here the view always fixes when we are actuated by either of these passions. According as our idea of ourself is more or less advantageous, we feel either of those opposite affections, and are elated by pride, or dejected with humility. Whatever other objects may be comprehended by the mind, they are always consider'd with a view to ourselves; otherwise they wou'd never be able either to excite these passions, or produce the smallest encrease or diminution of them. When self enters not into the consideration, there is no room either for pride or humility.

But tho' that connected succession of perceptions, which we call *self*, be always the object of these two passions, 'tis impossible it can be their CAUSE, or be sufficient alone to excite them. For as these passions are directly contrary, and have the same object in common; were their object also their cause; it cou'd never produce any degree of the one passion, but at the same time it must excite an equal degree of the other; which opposition and contrariety must destroy both. 'Tis impossible a man can at the same time be both proud and humble; and where he has different reasons for these passions, as frequently happens, the passions either take place alternately; or if they encounter, the one annihilates the other, as far as its strength goes, and the remainder only of that, which is superior, continues to operate upon the mind. But in the present case neither of the passions cou'd ever become superior; because supposing it to be the view only of ourself, which excited them, that being perfectly indifferent to either, must produce both in the very same proportion; or in other words, can produce neither. To excite any passion, and at the same time raise an equal share of its antagonist, is immediately to undo what was done, and must leave the mind at last perfectly calm and indifferent.

We must, therefore, make a distinction betwixt the cause and the object of these passions; betwixt that idea, which excites them, and that to which they direct their view, when excited. Pride and humility, being once rais'd, immediately turn our attention to ourself, and regard that as their ultimate and final object; but there is something farther requisite in order to raise them: Something, which is peculiar to one of the passions, and produces not both in the very same degree. The first idea, that is presented to the mind, is that of the cause or productive principle. This excites the passion, connected with it; and that passion, when excited, turns our view to another idea, which is that of self. Here then is a passion plac'd betwixt two ideas, of which the one produces it, and the other is produc'd by it. The first idea, therefore, represents the *cause*, the second the *object* of the passion.

To begin with the causes of pride and humility; we may observe, that their most obvious and remarkable property is the vast variety of *subjects*, on which they may be plac'd. Every valuable quality of the mind, whether of the imagination, judgment, memory or disposition; wit, good-sense, learning, courage, justice, integrity; all these are the causes of pride; and their opposites of humility. Nor are these passions confin'd to the mind, but extend their view to the body likewise. A man may be proud of his beauty, strength, agility, good mien, address in dancing, riding, fencing, and of his dexterity in any manual business

or manufacture. But this is not all. The passion looking farther, comprehends whatever objects are in the least ally'd or related to us. Our country, family, children, relations, riches, houses, gardens, horses, dogs, cloaths; any of these may become a cause either of pride or of humility.

From the consideration of these causes, it appears necessary we shou'd make a new distinction in the causes of the passion, betwixt that *quality*, which operates, and the *subject*, on which it is plac'd. A man, for instance, is vain of a beautiful house, which belongs to him, or which he has himself built and contriv'd. Here the object of the passion is himself, and the cause is the beautiful house: Which cause again is sub-divided into two parts, *viz.* the quality, which operates upon the passion, and the subject, in which the quality inheres. The quality is the beauty, and the subject is the house, consider'd as his property or contrivance. Both these parts are essential, nor is the distinction vain and chimerical. Beauty, consider'd merely as such, unless plac'd upon something related to us, never produces any pride or vanity; and the strongest relation alone, without beauty, or something else in its place, has as little influence on that passion. Since, therefore, these two particulars are easily separated, and there is a necessity for their conjunction, in order to produce the passion, we ought to consider them as component parts of the cause; and infix in our minds an exact idea of this distinction.

Of the Influence of These Relations on Pride and Humility These principles being establish'd on unquestionable experience, I begin to consider how we shall apply them, by revolving over all the causes of pride and humility, whether these causes be regarded, as the qualities, that operate, or as the subjects, on which the qualities are plac'd. In examining these *qualities* I immediately find many of them to concur in producing the sensation of pain and pleasure, independent of those affections, which I here endeavour to explain. Thus the beauty of our person, of itself, and by its very appearance, gives pleasure, as well as pride; and its deformity, pain as well as humility. A magnificent feast delights us, and a sordid one displeases. What I discover to be true in some instances, I *suppose* to be so in all; and take it for granted at present, without any farther proof, that every cause of pride, by its peculiar qualities, produces a separate pleasure, and of humility a separate uneasiness.

Again, in considering the *subjects*, to which these qualities adhere, I make a new *supposition*, which also appears probable from many obvious instances, *viz.* that these subjects are either parts of ourselves, or something nearly related to us. Thus the good and bad qualities of our actions and manners constitute virtue and vice, and determine our personal character, than which nothing operates more strongly on these passions. In like manner, 'tis the beauty or deformity of our person, houses, equipage, or furniture, by which we are render'd either vain or humble. The same qualities, when transfer'd to subjects, which bear us no relation, influence not in the smallest degree either of these affections.

Having thus in a manner suppos'd two properties of the causes of these affections, *viz.* that the *qualities* produce a separate pain or pleasure, and that the *subjects*, on which the qualities are plac'd, are related to self; I proceed to examine the passions themselves, in order to find something in them, correspondent to the suppos'd properties of their causes. *First*, I find, that the peculiar object of

pride and humility is determin'd by an original and natural instinct, and that 'tis absolutely impossible, from the primary constitution of the mind, that these passions shou'd ever look beyond self, or that individual person, of whose actions and sentiments each of us is intimately conscious. Here at last the view always rests, when we are actuated by either of these passions; nor can we, in that situation of mind, ever lose sight of this object. For this I pretend not to give any reason; but consider such a peculiar direction of the thought as an original quality.

The *second* quality, which I discover in these passions, and which I likewise consider as an original quality, is their sensations, or the peculiar emotions they excite in the soul, and which constitute their very being and essence. Thus pride is a pleasant sensation, and humility a painful; and upon the removal of the pleasure and pain, there is in reality no pride nor humility. Of this our very feeling convinces us; and beyond our feeling, 'tis here in vain to reason or dispute.

If I compare, therefore, these two *establish'd* properties of the passions, *viz.* their object, which is self, and their sensation, which is either pleasant or painful, to the two *suppos'd* properties of the causes, *viz.* their relation to self, and their tendency to produce a pain or pleasure, independent of the passion; I immediately find, that taking these suppositions to be just, the true system breaks in upon me with an irresistible evidence. That cause, which excites the passion, is related to the object, which nature has attributed to the passion; the sensation, which the cause separately produces, is related to the sensation of the passion: From this double relation of ideas and impressions, the passion is deriv'd. The one idea is easily converted into its cor-relative; and the one impression into that, which resembles and corresponds to it: With how much greater facility must this transition be made, where these movements mutually assist each other, and the mind receives a double impulse from the relations both of its impressions and ideas?

That we may comprehend this the better, we must suppose, that nature has given to the organs of the human mind, a certain disposition fitted to produce a peculiar impression or emotion, which we call *pride*: To this emotion she has assign'd a certain idea, *viz.* that of *self*, which it never fails to produce. This contrivance of nature is easily conceiv'd. We have many instances of such a situation of affairs. The nerves of the nose and palate are so dispos'd, as in certain circumstances to convey such peculiar sensations to the mind: The sensations of lust and hunger always produce in us the idea of those peculiar objects, which are suitable to each appetite. These two circumstances are united in pride. The organs are so dispos'd as to produce the passion; and the passion, after its production, naturally produces a certain idea. All this needs no proof. 'Tis evident we never shou'd be possess'd of that passion, were there not a disposition of mind proper for it; and 'tis as evident, that the passion always turns our view to ourselves, and makes us think of our own qualities and circumstances. . . .

The difficulty, then, is only to discover this cause, and find what it is that gives the first motion to pride, and sets those organs in action, which are naturally fitted to produce that emotion. Upon my consulting experience, in order to resolve this difficulty, I immediately find a hundred different causes, that produce pride; and upon examining these causes, I suppose, what at first I perceive

to be probable, that all of them concur in two circumstances; which are, that of themselves they produce an impression, ally'd to the passion, and are plac'd on a subject, ally'd to the object of the passion. When I consider after this the nature of *relation*, and its effects both on the passions and ideas, I can no longer doubt, upon these suppositions, that 'tis the very principle, which gives rise to pride, and bestows motion on those organs, which being naturally dispos'd to produce that affection, require only a first impulse or beginning to their action. Any thing, that gives a pleasant sensation, and is related to self, excites the passion of pride, which is also agreeable, and has self for its object.

What I have said of pride is equally true of humility. The sensation of humility is uneasy, as that of pride is agreeable; for which reason the separate sensation, arising from the causes, must be revers'd, while the relation to self continues the same. Tho' pride and humility are directly contrary in their effects, and in their sensations, they have notwithstanding the same object; so that 'tis requisite only to change the relation of impressions, without making any change upon that of ideas. Accordingly we find, that a beautiful house, belonging to ourselves, produces pride; and that the same house, still belonging to ourselves, produces humility, when by any accident its beauty is chang'd into deformity, and thereby the sensation of pleasure, which corresponded to pride, is transform'd into pain, which is related to humility. The double relation between the ideas and impressions subsists in both cases, and produces an easy transition from the one emotion to the other.

OF LOVE AND HATRED

Of the Objects and Causes of Love and Hatred 'Tis altogether impossible to give any definition of the passions of *love* and *hatred*; and that because they produce merely a simple impression, without any mixture or composition. 'Twou'd be as unnecessary to attempt any description of them, drawn from their nature, origin, causes and objects; and that both because these are the subjects of our present enquiry, and because these passions of themselves are sufficiently known from our common feeling and experience. This we have already observ'd concerning pride and humility, and here repeat it concerning love and hatred; and indeed there is so great a resemblance betwixt these two sets of passions, that we shall be oblig'd to begin with a kind of abridgment of our reasonings concerning the former, in order to explain the latter.

As the immediate *object* of pride and humility is self or that identical person, of whose thoughts, actions, and sensations we are intimately conscious; so the *object* of love and hatred is some other person, of whose thoughts, actions, and sensations we are not conscious. This is sufficiently evident from experience. Our love and hatred are always directed to some sensible being external to us; and when we talk of *self-love*, 'tis not in a proper sense, nor has the sensation it produces any thing in common with that tender emotion, which is excited by a friend or mistress. 'Tis the same case with hatred. We may be mortified by our own faults and follies; but never feel any anger or hatred, except from the injuries of others.

But tho' the object of love and hatred be always some other person, 'tis plain that the object is not, properly speaking, the *cause* of these passions, or alone suf-

ficient to excite them. For since love and hatred are directly contrary in their sensation, and have the same object in common, if that object were also their cause, it wou'd produce these opposite passions in an equal degree; and as they must, from the very first moment, destroy each other, none of them wou'd ever be able to make its appearance. There must, therefore, be some cause different from the object.

If we consider the causes of love and hatred, we shall find they are very much diversify'd, and have not many things in common. The virtue, knowledge, wit, good sense, good humour of any person, produce love and esteem; as the opposite qualities, hatred and contempt. The same passions arise from bodily accomplishments, such as beauty, force, swiftness, dexterity; and from their contraries; as likewise from the external advantages and disadvantages of family, possessions, cloaths, nation and climate. There is not one of these objects, but what by its different qualities may produce love and esteem, or hatred and contempt.

From the view of these causes we may derive a new distinction betwixt the *quality* that operates, and the *subject* on which it is plac'd. A prince, that is possess'd of a stately palace, commands the esteem of the people upon that account; and that *first*, by the beauty of the palace, and *secondly*, by the relation of property, which connects it with him. The removal of either of these destroys the passion; which evidently proves that the cause is a compounded one.

'Twou'd be tedious to trace the passions of love and hatred, thro' all the observations which we have form'd concerning pride and humility, and which are equally applicable to both sets of passions. 'Twill be sufficient to *remark* in general, that the object of love and hatred is evidently some thinking person; and that the sensation of the former passion is always agreeable, and of the latter uneasy. We may also *suppose* with some shew of probability, *that the cause of both these passions is always related to a thinking being, and that the cause of the former produce a separate pleasure, and of the latter a separate uneasiness.*

One of these suppositions, *viz.* that the cause of love and hatred must be related to a person or thinking being, in order to produce these passions, is not only probable, but too evident to be contested. Virtue and vice, when consider'd in the abstract; beauty and deformity, when plac'd on inanimate objects; poverty and riches, when belonging to a third person, excite no degree of love or hatred, esteem or contempt towards those, who have no relation to them. A person looking out at a window, sees me in the street, and beyond me a beautiful palace, with which I have no concern: I believe none will pretend, that this person will pay me the same respect, as if I were owner of the palace.

'Tis not so evident at first sight, that a relation of impressions is requisite to these passions, and that because in the transition the one impression is so much confounded with the other, that they become in a manner undistinguishable. But as in pride and humility, we have easily been able to make the separation, and to prove, that every cause of these passions produces a separate pain or pleasure, I might here observe the same method with the same success, in examining particularly the several causes of love and hatred. But as I hasten to a full and decisive proof of these systems, I delay this examination for a moment: And in the mean time shall endeavour to convert to my present purpose all my rea-

sonings concerning pride and humility, by an argument that is founded on unquestionable experience.

There are few persons, that are satisfy'd with their own character, or genius, or fortune, who are not desirous of shewing themselves to the world, and of acquiring the love and approbation of mankind. Now 'tis evident, that the very same qualities and circumstances, which are the causes of pride or self-esteem, are also the causes of vanity or the desire of reputation; and that we always put to view those particulars with which in ourselves we are best satisfy'd. But if love and esteem were not produc'd by the same qualities as pride, according as these qualities are related to ourselves or others, this method of proceeding wou'd be very absurd, nor cou'd men expect a correspondence in the sentiments of every other person, with those themselves have entertain'd. 'Tis true, few can form exact systems of the passions, or make reflexions on their general nature and resemblances. But without such a progress in philosophy, we are not subject to many mistakes in this particular, but are sufficiently guided by common experience, as well as by a kind of *presensation*; which tells us what will operate on others, by what we feel immediately in ourselves. Since then the same qualities that produce pride or humility, cause love or hatred; all the arguments that have been employ'd to prove, that the causes of the former passions excite a pain or pleasure independent of the passion, will be applicable with equal evidence to the causes of the latter. . . .

Regard now with attention the nature of these passions, and their situation with respect to each other. 'Tis evident here are four affections, plac'd, as it were, in a square or regular connexion with, and distance from each other. The passions of pride and humility, as well as those of love and hatred, are connected together by the identity of their object, which to the first set of passions is self, to the second some other person. These two lines of communication or connexion form two opposite sides of the square. Again, pride and love are agreeable passions; hatred and humility uneasy. This similitude of sensation betwixt pride and love, and that betwixt humility and hatred form a new connexion, and may be consider'd as the other two sides of the square. Upon the whole, pride is connected with humility, love with hatred, by their objects or ideas: Pride with love, humility with hatred, by their sensations or impressions.

OF THE WILL AND DIRECT PASSIONS

A passion is an original existence, or, if you will, modification of existence, and contains not any representative quality, which renders it a copy of any other existence or modification. When I am angry, I am actually possess'd with the passion, and in that emotion have no more a reference to any other object, than when I am thirsty, or sick, or more than five foot high. 'Tis impossible, therefore, that this passion can be oppos'd by, or be contradictory to truth and reason; since this contradiction consists in the disagreement of ideas, consider'd as copies, with those objects, which they represent.

What may at first occur on this head, is, that as nothing can be contrary to truth or reason, except what has a reference to it, and as the judgments of our understanding only have this reference, it must follow, that passions can be contrary to reason only so far as they are *accompany'd* with some judgment or

opinion. According to this principle, which is so obvious and natural, 'tis only in two senses, that any affection can be call'd unreasonable. First, When a passion, such as hope or fear, grief or joy, despair or security, is founded on the supposition of the existence of objects, which really do not exist. Secondly, When in exerting any passion in action, we chuse means insufficient for the design'd end, and deceive ourselves in our judgment of causes and effects. Where a passion is neither founded on false suppositions, nor chuses means insufficient for the end, the understanding can neither justify nor condemn it. 'Tis not contrary to reason to prefer the destruction of the whole world to the scratching of my finger. 'Tis not contrary to reason for me to chuse my total ruin, to prevent the least uneasiness of an *Indian* or person wholly unknown to me. 'Tis as little contrary to reason to prefer even my own acknowledg'd lesser good to my greater, and have a more ardent affection for the former than the latter. A trivial good may, from certain circumstances, produce a desire superior to what arises from the greatest and most valuable enjoyment; nor is there any thing more extraordinary in this, than in mechanics to see one pound weight raise up a hundred by the advantage of its situation. In short, a passion must be accompany'd with some false judgment, in order to its being unreasonable; and even then 'tis not the passion, properly speaking, which is unreasonable, but the judgment.

The consequences are evident. Since a passion can never, in any sense, be call'd unreasonable, but when founded on a false supposition, or when it chuses means insufficient for the design'd end, 'tis impossible, that reason and passion can ever oppose each other, or dispute for the government of the will and actions. The moment we perceive the falshood of any supposition, or the insufficiency of any means our passions yield to our reason without any opposition. I may desire any fruit as of an excellent relish; but whenever you convince me of my mistake, my longing ceases. I may will the performance of certain actions as means of obtaining any desir'd good; but as my willing of these actions is only secondary, and founded on the supposition, that they are causes of the propos'd effect; as soon as I discover the falshood of that supposition, they must become indifferent to me.

'Tis natural for one, that does not examine objects with a strict philosophic eye, to imagine, that those actions of the mind are entirely the same, which produce not a different sensation, and are not immediately distinguishable to the feeling and perception. Reason, for instance, exerts itself without producing any sensible emotion; and except in the more sublime disquisitions of philosophy, or in the frivolous subtilties of the schools, scarce ever conveys any pleasure or uneasiness. Hence it proceeds, that every action of the mind, which operates with the same calmness and tranquillity, is confounded with reason by all those, who judge of things from the first view and appearance. Now 'tis certain, there are certain calm desires and tendencies, which, tho' they be real passions, produce little emotion in the mind, and are more known by their effects than by the immediate feeling or sensation. These desires are of two kinds; either certain instincts originally implanted in our natures, such as benevolence and resentment, the love of life, and kindness to children; or the general appetite to good, and aversion to evil, consider'd merely as such. When any of these passions are calm, and cause no disorder in the soul, they are very readily taken for the

determinations of reason, and are suppos'd to proceed from the same faculty, with that, which judges of truth and falshood. Their nature and principles have been suppos'd the same, because their sensations are not evidently different.

Beside these calm passions, which often determine the will, there are certain violent emotions of the same kind, which have likewise a great influence on that faculty. When I receive any injury from another, I often feel a violent passion of resentment, which makes me desire his evil and punishment, independent of all considerations of pleasure and advantage to myself. When I am immediately threaten'd with any grievous ill, my fears, apprehensions, and aversions rise to a great height, and produce a sensible emotion.

The common error of metaphysicians has lain in ascribing the direction of the will entirely to one of these principles, and supposing the other to have no influence. Men often act knowingly against their interest: For which reason the view of the greatest possible good does not always influence them. Men often counter-act a violent passion in prosecution of their interests and designs: 'Tis not therefore the present uneasiness alone, which determines them. In general we may observe, that both these principles operate on the will; and where they are contrary, that either of them prevails, according to the *general* character or *present* disposition of the person. What we call strength of mind, implies the prevalence of the calm passions above the violent; tho' we may easily observe, there is no man so constantly possess'd of this virtue, as never on any occasion to yield to the sollicitations of passion and desire. From these variations of temper proceeds the great difficulty of deciding concerning the actions and resolutions of men, where there is any contrariety of motives and passions.

PART 2

THE MEETING OF PHILOSOPHY AND PSYCHOLOGY

It is only recently that the various disciplines concerned with emotions were separated from each other and scattered into separate university departments with self-consciously different methodologies. William James, for example, would not have understood the separation of philosophy and psychology (they were one and the same department at Harvard in his days), and he himself was trained as a physician, which is evident, especially, in his works in psychology. Almost all the authors in the following section integrate philosophy, psychology, and biology into their views. Charles Darwin was primarily a biologist, of course, but his writings are filled with philosophical speculations and psychological observations. James's 1884 essay—"What is an Emotion?"—is one of the classic starting points from which almost all studies of emotion begin today, either in agreement or in reaction. Walter Cannon, the most prominent of a number of early pragmatist critics of James's theory, was a physiologist. John Dewey, a fellow "pragmatist," nevertheless found serious inadequacies in James's too-physical theory. Freud, a contemporary and admirer of James, amends the study of emotions to account for "unconscious" emotions and to provide for that "free-floating" emotion, anxiety. In recent years, interest in emotions in psychology has virtually exploded, with ambitious theories exploring all sorts of new directions. In another

sense, however, the roots remain Darwin and James. Stanley Schachter and J. E. Singer update James with a radical twist. They continue the Jamesian view that an emotion is basically physiological arousal but add that *what* emotion is determined by cognition, by the way in which a subject identifies his or her emotion. Paul Ekman, following Darwin more or less directly, developed a carefully codified technique for studying facial expressions of emotion and their recognition and through his studies defends a bold thesis regarding universal and biologically based "affect programs." Richard Lazarus, by contrast, has long argued the learned and "cognitive/motivational/relational" nature of emotions by way of an emphasis on appraisal, the way we understand and evaluate the world through our emotions. Nico Frijda, also following the path established by Darwin, has pursued a "functionalist" line of thinking, in which he stresses the evolutionary and more immediate advantages of emotion, particularly in the "action tendencies" that are an essential aspect of them. Other psychologists, for instance, Klaus Scherer at the University of Geneva, have turned to culture as a determinant of emotion, and Catherine Lutz, an anthropologist, is one of the many voices now stressing the importance of culture in the generation of emotions. The "natural" emotions and emotional expressions of the individual organism are to be seen as no more than material for human culture to shape and form. Finally, Antonio Damasio represents the exciting new discoveries in neurobiology and the tremendous impact these are having on the very conception of emotion and emotional feelings.



CHARLES ROBERT DARWIN

(1809–1882)

Introduction

Charles Darwin's greatest contribution, the theory of species evolution through natural selection, not only revolutionized scientific thought, but sent reverberations throughout other fields as well; we now have, for example, evolutionary theories of ethics, epistemology, and society. And by challenging the doctrine of the fixity of the species, as well as suggesting an alternative explanation of the apparent design in nature, Darwin's theory of evolution raised serious theological questions and doubts. Darwin presented his theory in two major works, *Origin of the Species* (1859) and *The Descent of Man* (1871).

Darwin's original training was not in the biological sciences, but rather in medicine. Unsuccessful at pursuing his father's medical profession, Darwin began studying theology at Cambridge, intending to become a country clergyman; but before he could assume his clerical duties, he signed on as naturalist for a scientific expedition on the H.M.S. *Beagle*. On this expedition (1831–1836), he noticed differences in species that suggested to him that they had not arisen in their present form, but rather had evolved over time. Darwin found an explanation for how this evolution would occur in Malthus's work which compared the arithmetical increase in food supplies to the geometrical increase in animal populations—during the inevitable competition for food, only the fittest would survive. And the possibility of chance variations, already known to horticulturalists and breeders, would explain how new characteristics might arise.

After publishing *Origin*, Darwin applied his general theory of evolution and natural selection to specific cases. As one might expect, Darwin's interest in the emotions was part of this endeavor. As early as *Origin*, Darwin argues that emotions and emotional expression in man and animals are similar; and his belief that man evolved from lower lifeforms, furthered this comparison. This argument is codified in his *The Expression of Emotion in Man and Animals*, published in 1872. In the following excerpt from that work, Darwin outlines the three main principles explaining the origin of emotional expression. Some emotional expressions originally arise because they are useful in dealing with the emotion-arousing situation; they thus have survival value. Others are simply the opposite of those useful emotional behaviors associated with an opposite emotion. And yet others, such as trem-

bling, are simply a result of the physiological changes that occur during emotional experiences.

Darwin's theory of the origin of emotional expression, like his theory of evolution, in general, can be criticized because there is no direct evidence to support it. And to the extent that Darwin's account of emotional expression depends heavily on the Lamarckian thesis that acquired habits can be passed on genetically, it is now discredited. Darwin does, however, ask some interesting and troublesome questions. What is the relation between expressing our emotions and the intensity of the emotion? (Does suppressing an emotion make it more or less intense?) To what extent is human expression of emotion innate and to what extent is it learned or determined by one's culture? Moreover, Darwin's emphasis on the purposefulness of emotional behavior finds echoes in later theories, such as those of James and Dewey, Ekman, and Frijda.

From The Expression of Emotion in Man and Animals



General Principles of Expression

I will begin by giving the three Principles, which appear to me to account for most of the expressions and gestures involuntarily used by man and the lower animals, under the influence of various emotions and sensations.

I. *The principle of serviceable associated Habits.*—Certain complex actions are of direct or indirect service under certain states of the mind, in order to relieve or gratify certain sensations, desires, &c.; and whenever the same state of mind is induced, however feebly, there is a tendency through the force of habit and association for the same movements to be performed, though they may not then be of the least use. Some actions ordinarily associated through habit with certain states of the mind may be partially repressed through the will, and in such cases the muscles which are least under the separate control of the will are the most liable still to act, causing movements which we recognize as expressive. In certain other cases the checking of one habitual movement requires other slight movements; and these are likewise expressive.

II. *The principle of Antithesis.*—Certain states of the mind lead to certain habitual actions, which are of service, as under our first principle. Now when a directly opposite state of mind is induced, there is a strong and involuntary tendency to the performance of movements of a directly opposite nature, though these are of no use; and such movements are in some cases highly expressive.

III. *The principle of actions due to the constitution of the Nervous System, independently from the first of the Will, and independently to a certain extent of Habit.*—When the sensorium is strongly excited, nerve-force is generated in excess, and is transmitted in certain definite directions, depending on the connection of the nerve-cells, and partly on habit: or the supply of nerve-force may, as it appears,

be interrupted. Effects are thus produced which we recognize as expressive. This third principle may, for the sake of brevity, be called that of the direct action of the nervous system.

With respect to our *first Principle*, it is notorious how powerful is the force of habit. The most complex and difficult movements can in time be performed without the least effort or consciousness. It is not positively known how it comes that habit is so efficient in facilitating complex movements; but physiologists admit "that the conducting power of the nervous fibres increases with the frequency of their excitement." This applies to the nerves of motion and sensation, as well as to those connected with the act of thinking. That some physical change is produced in the nerve-cells or nerves which are habitually used can hardly be doubted, for otherwise it is impossible to understand how the tendency to certain acquired movements is inherited.

From the foregoing remarks it seems probable that some actions, which were at first performed consciously, have become through habit and association converted into reflex actions, and are now so firmly fixed and inherited, that they are performed, even when not of the least use, as often as the same causes arise, which originally excited them in us through the volition. In such cases the sensory nerve-cells excite the motor cells, without first communicating with those cells on which our consciousness and volition depend. It is probable that sneezing and coughing were originally acquired by the habit of expelling, as violently as possible, any irritating particle from the sensitive air-passages. As far as time is concerned, there has been more than enough for these habits to have become innate or converted into reflex actions; for they are common to most or all of the higher quadrupeds, and must therefore have been first acquired at a very remote period. Why the act of clearing the throat is not a reflex action, and has to be learnt by our children, I cannot pretend to say; but we can see why blowing the nose on a handkerchief has to be learnt.

So again it appears probable that starting was originally acquired by the habit of jumping away as quickly as possible from danger, whenever any of our senses gave us warning. Starting, as we have seen, is accompanied by the blinking of the eyelids so as to protect the eyes, the most tender and sensitive organs of the body; and it is, I believe, always accompanied by a sudden and forcible inspiration, which is the natural preparation for any violent effort.

It further deserves notice that reflex actions are in all probability liable to slight variations, as are all corporeal structures and instincts; and any variations which were beneficial and of sufficient importance, would tend to be preserved and inherited. Thus reflex actions, when once gained for one purpose, might afterwards be modified independently of the will or habit, so as to serve for some distinct purpose. Such cases would be parallel with those which, as we have every reason to highly complex ones have been developed through the preservation of variations of pre-existing instincts—that is, through natural selection.

I have discussed at some little length, though as I am well aware, in a very imperfect manner, the acquirement of reflex actions, because they are often

brought into play in connection with movements expressive of our emotions; and it was necessary to show that at least some of them might have been first acquired through the will in order to satisfy a desire, or to relieve a disagreeable sensation.

We will now consider our second Principle, that of Antithesis. Certain states of the mind lead . . . to certain habitual movements which were primarily, or may still be, of service; and we shall find that when a directly opposite state of mind is induced, there is a strong and involuntary tendency to the performance of movements of a directly opposite nature, though these have never been of any service. . . .

When a dog approaches a strange dog or man in a savage or hostile frame of mind he walks upright and very stiffly; his head is slightly raised, or not much lowered; the tail is held erect and quite rigid; the hairs bristle, especially along the neck and back; the pricked ears are directed forwards, and the eyes have a fixed stare. These actions, as will hereafter be explained, follow from the dog's intention to attack his enemy, and are thus to a large extent intelligible. As he prepares to spring with a savage growl on his enemy, the canine teeth are uncovered, and the ears are pressed close backwards on the head; but with these latter actions, we are not here concerned. Let us now suppose that the dog suddenly discovers that the man he is approaching, is not a stranger, but his master; and let it be observed how completely and instantaneously his whole bearing is reversed. Instead of walking upright, the body sinks downwards or even crouches, and is thrown into flexuous movements; his tail, instead of being held stiff and upright, is lowered and wagged from side to side; his hair instantly becomes smooth; his ears are depressed and drawn backwards, but not closely to the head; and his lips hang loosely. From the drawing back of the ears, the eyelids become elongated, and the eyes no longer appear round and staring. It should be added that the animal is at such times in an excited condition from joy; and nerve-force will be generated in excess, which naturally leads to action of some kind. Not one of the above movements, so clearly expressive of affection, are of the least direct service to the animal. They are explicable, as far as I can see, solely from being in complete opposition or antithesis to the attitude and movements which, from intelligible causes, are assumed when a dog intends to fight, and which consequently are expressive of anger.

If we now turn to the gestures which are innate or common to all the individuals of the same species, and which come under the present head of antithesis, it is extremely doubtful, whether any of them were at first deliberately invented and consciously performed. With mankind the best instance of a gesture standing in direct opposition to other movements, naturally assumed under an opposite frame of mind, is that of shrugging the shoulders. This expresses impotence or an apology,—something which cannot be done, or cannot be avoided. The gesture is sometimes used consciously and voluntarily, but it is extremely improbable that it was at first deliberately invented, and afterwards fixed by habit; for not only do young children sometimes shrug their shoulders under the above states of mind, but the movement is accompanied, as will be shown in a future chapter, by various subordinate movements, which

not one man in a thousand is aware of, unless he has specially attended to the subject.

Hence for the development of the movements which come under the present head, some other principle, distinct from the will and consciousness, must have intervened. This principle appears to be that every movement which we have voluntarily performed throughout our lives has required the action of certain muscles; and when we have performed a directly opposite movement, an opposite set of muscles has been habitually brought into play—as in turning to the right or to the left, in pushing away or pulling an object towards us, and in lifting or lowering a weight. So strongly are our intentions and movements associated together, that if we eagerly wish an object to move in any direction, we can hardly avoid moving our bodies in the same direction, although we may be perfectly aware that this can have no influence. . . . A man or child in a passion, if he tells any one in a loud voice to begone, generally moves his arm as if to push him away, although the offender may not be standing near, and although there may be not the least need to explain by a gesture what is meant. On the other hand, if we eagerly desire some one to approach us closely, we act as if pulling him towards us; and so in innumerable other instances.

As the performance of ordinary movements of an opposite kind, under opposite impulses of the will, has become habitual in us and in the lower animals, so when actions of one kind have become firmly associated with any sensation or emotion, it appears natural that actions of a directly opposite kind, though of no use, should be unconsciously performed through habit and association, under the influence of a directly opposite sensation or emotion. On this principle alone can I understand how the gestures and expressions which come under the present head of antithesis have originated. If indeed they are serviceable to man or to any other animal, in aid of inarticulate cries or language, they will likewise be voluntarily employed, and the habit will thus be strengthened. But whether or not of service as a means of communication, the tendency to perform opposite movements under opposite sensations or emotions would, if we may judge by analogy, become hereditary through long practice; and there cannot be a doubt that several expressive movements due to the principle of antithesis are inherited.

We now come to our third Principle, namely, that certain actions which we recognize as expressive of certain states of the mind, are the direct result of the constitution of the nervous system, and have been from the first independent of the will, and, to a large extent, of habit. When the sensorium is strongly excited nerve-force is generated in excess, and is transmitted in certain directions, dependent on the connection of the nerve-cells, and, as far as the muscular system is concerned, on the nature of the movements which have been habitually practised. Or the supply of nerve-force may, as it appears, be interrupted. Of course every movement which we make is determined by the constitution of the nervous system; but actions performed in obedience to the will, or through habit, or through the principle of antithesis, are here as far as possible excluded. Our present subject is very obscure, but, from its importance, must be discussed at some little length; and it is always advisable to perceive clearly our ignorance.

The most striking case, though a rare and abnormal one, which can be adduced of the direct influence of the nervous system, when strongly affected, on the body, is the loss of colour in the hair, which has occasionally been observed after extreme terror or grief. One authentic instance has been recorded, in the case of a man brought out for execution in India, in which the change of colour was so rapid that it was perceptible to the eye.

Another good case is that of the trembling of the muscles, which is common to man and to many, or most, of the lower animals. Trembling is of no service, often of much disservice, and cannot have been at first acquired through the will, and then rendered habitual in association with any emotion. I am assured by an eminent authority that young children do not tremble, but go into convulsions under the circumstances which would induce excessive trembling in adults. Trembling is excited in different individuals in very different degrees, and by the most diversified causes,—by cold to the surface, before fever-fits, although the temperature of the body is then above the normal standard; in blood-poisoning, delirium tremens, and other diseases; by general failure of power in old age; by exhaustion after excessive fatigue; locally from severe injuries, such as burns; and, in an especial manner, by the passage of a catheter. Of all emotions, fear notoriously is the most apt to induce trembling; but so do occasionally great anger and joy. I remember once seeing a boy who had just shot his first snipe on the wing, and his hands trembled to such a degree from delight, that he could not for some time reload his gun; and I have heard of an exactly similar case with an Australian savage, to whom a gun had been lent. Fine music, from the vague emotions thus excited, causes a shiver to run down the backs of some persons. There seems to be very little in common in the above several physical causes and emotions to account for trembling; and Sir J. Paget, to whom I am indebted for several of the above statements, informs me that the subject is a very obscure one. As trembling is sometimes caused by rage, long before exhaustion can have set in, and as it sometimes accompanies great joy, it would appear that any strong excitement of the nervous system interrupts the steady flow of nerve-force to the muscles.

Finally, so many expressive movements can be explained, as I trust will be seen in the course of this volume, through the three principles which have now been discussed, that we may hope hereafter to see all thus explained, or by closely analogous principles. It is, however, often impossible to decide how much weight ought to be attributed, in each particular case, to one of our principles, and how much to another; and very many points in the theory of Expression remain inexplicable.

We will now consider how far the will and consciousness have come into play in the development of the various movements of expression. As far as we can judge, only a few expressive movements . . . are learnt by each individual; that is, were consciously and voluntarily performed during the early years of life for some definite object, or in imitation of others, and then became habitual. The far greater number of the movements of expression, and all the more important ones, are, as we have seen, innate or inherited; and such cannot be said to depend on the will of the individual. Nevertheless, all those included under our

first principle were at first voluntarily performed for a definite object,—namely, to escape some danger, to relieve some distress, or to gratify some desire. For instance, there can hardly be a doubt that the animals which fight with their teeth, have acquired the habit of drawing back their ears closely to their heads, when feeling savage, from their progenitors having voluntarily acted in this manner in order to protect their ears from being torn by their antagonists; for those animals which do not fight with their teeth do not thus express a savage state of mind. We may infer as highly probable that we ourselves have acquired the habit of contracting the muscles round the eyes, whilst crying gently, that is, without the utterance of any loud sound, from our progenitors, especially during infancy, having experienced, during the act of screaming, an uncomfortable sensation in their eyeballs. Again, some highly expressive movements result from the endeavour to check or prevent other expressive movements; thus the obliquity of the eyebrows and the drawing down of the corners of the mouth follow from the endeavour to prevent a screaming-fit from coming on, or to check it after it has come on. Here it is obvious that the consciousness and will must at first have come into play; not that we are conscious in these or in other such cases what muscles are brought into action, any more than when we perform the most ordinary voluntary movements.

With respect to the expressive movements due to the principle of antithesis, it is clear that the will has intervened, though in a remote and indirect manner. So again with the movements coming under our third principle; these, in as far as they are influenced by nerve-force readily passing along habitual channels, have been determined by former and repeated exertions of the will. The effects indirectly due to this latter agency are often combined in a complex manner, through the force of habit and association, with those directly resulting from the excitement of the cerebro-spinal system. This seems to be the case with the increased action of the heart under the influence of any strong emotion. When an animal erects its hair, assumes a threatening attitude, and utters fierce sounds, in order to terrify an enemy, we see a curious combination of movements which were originally voluntary with those that are involuntary. It is, however, possible that even strictly involuntary actions, such as the erection of the hair, may have been affected by the mysterious power of the will.

In the course of the foregoing remarks and throughout this volume, I have often felt much difficulty about the proper application of the terms, will, consciousness, and intention. Actions, which were at first voluntary, soon became habitual, and at last hereditary, and may then be performed even in opposition to the will. Although they often reveal the state of the mind, this result was not at first either intended or expected. Even such words as that "certain movements serve as a means of expression" are apt to mislead, as they imply that this was their primary purpose or object. This, however, seems rarely or never to have been the case; the movements having been at first either of some direct use, or the indirect effect of the excited state of the sensorium. An infant may scream either intentionally or instinctively to show that it wants food; but it has no wish or intention to draw its features into the peculiar form which so plainly indicates misery; yet some of the most characteristic expressions exhibited by man are derived from the act of screaming, as has been explained.

The movements of expression in the face and body, whatever their origin may have been, are in themselves of much importance for our welfare. They serve as the first means of communication between the mother and her infant; she smiles approval, and thus encourages her child on the right path, or frowns disapproval. We readily perceive sympathy in others by their expression; our sufferings are thus mitigated and our pleasures increased; and mutual good feeling is thus strengthened. The movements of expression give vividness and energy to our spoken words. They reveal the thoughts and intentions of others more truly than do words, which may be falsified. . . . The free expression by outward signs of an emotion intensifies it. On the other hand, the repression, as far as this is possible, of all outward signs softens our emotions. He who gives way to violent gestures will increase his rage; he who does not control the signs of fear will experience fear in a greater degree; and he who remains passive when overwhelmed with grief loses his best chance of recovering elasticity of mind. These results follow partly from the intimate relation which exists between almost all the emotions and their outward manifestations; and partly from the direct influence of exertion on the heart, and consequently on the brain. Even the simulation of an emotion tends to arouse it in our minds. Shakespeare, who from his wonderful knowledge of the human mind ought to be an excellent judge, says:

Is it not monstrous that this player here,
But in a fiction, in a dream of passion,
Could force his soul so to his own conceit,
That, from her working, all his visage wann'd;
Tears in his eyes, distraction in 's aspect,
A broken voice, and his whole function suiting
With forms to his conceit? And all for nothing!

—*Hamlet*, Act II. sc. 2.



WILLIAM JAMES

(1842-1910)

Introduction

Although William James received his training in medicine and began his career teaching anatomy and physiology at Harvard in 1873, he became increasingly interested in psychology and philosophy. By 1890, when he published his famous *Principles of Psychology*, he was a professor of philosophy at Harvard. James's wide-ranging philosophical interests included ethics, religion, and epistemology; he was one of the central figures in the American philosophical movement known as pragmatism.

James applied both his psychological knowledge and philosophical acumen in developing his theory of emotion. His essay—"What Is an Emotion?"—which is reprinted here, was published in *Mind* in 1884. About the time that James was developing his theory, a Danish psychologist, C. G. Lange, was working on a similar one. The theory, accordingly, is often called the James-Lange theory; and the two authors collaborated on a defense of their theory in *The Emotions*, published in 1885.

The James-Lange theory begins with a definition of emotion as the perception of physiological disturbances caused by our awareness of events and objects in our environment. When we stumble suddenly upon a snake, for example, our muscles involuntarily contract and our respiration increases in an instinctive preparation for flight; and fear of the snake is nothing but the perception of these involuntary, instinctive, physiological changes. In defense of this definition, James points out that if we abstract from our experience of emotion all the characteristic bodily symptoms, we find we have left only a "cold and neutral state of intellectual perception." Because it defines emotion in terms of physical sensations the James-Lange theory falls squarely within the Cartesian tradition. But it is a more sophisticated theory, relying heavily on then-current scientific knowledge of physiology, neurology, and animal behavior, including Darwin's investigations of emotional expression in man and animals.

Viewing emotions as perceptions of physiological disturbances leads to a curious reversal of what we ordinarily consider to be the causal order of events. James says we do not cry because we feel sad, but we feel sad because we cry, angry because we strike, afraid because we tremble. Thus, the physiological reaction is central to emotion; and "feeling sad" is not the cause of this reaction, but instead our experience of that reaction. James leaves largely unspecified how events and objects in our environment

come to produce these physiological disturbances, though he says in certain instances that our instincts are called upon. (Thus, he suggests that we instinctively fear a snake and are instinctively revolted by the sight of blood.) And James is singularly vague in explaining how we can identify and distinguish among many different emotions simply on the basis of the physiological changes associated with them; this has led to the most devastating criticism of his entire theory. (See Cannon and Dewey, for example.) Why, it is now asked, does fear make a person *run away*, instead of just experiencing the fearful symptoms?

The James-Lange theory has influenced both psychology and philosophy and is perhaps the only theory of emotion to have an equal impact in both fields. But many theorists—including those who continue to accept its basic physiological emphasis—find it inadequate as it stands. The complaint is that the theory neglects the cognitive, behavioral, and other, more sophisticated aspects of emotion and fails to account for the many subtle distinctions between similar emotions (e.g., shame and embarrassment, fear and anxiety, love and infatuation). Nevertheless, it continues to be the starting point for many contemporary theories of emotion, however they may disagree with its initial formulation.

From What Is an Emotion?



The physiologists who, during the past few years, have been so industriously exploring the functions of the brain, have limited their attempts at explanation to its cognitive and volitional performances. Dividing the brain into sensorial and motor centres, they have found their division to be exactly paralleled by the analysis made by empirical psychology, of the perceptive and volitional parts of the mind into their simplest elements. But the *æsthetic* sphere of the mind, its longings, its pleasures and pains, and its emotions, have been so ignored in all these researches that one is tempted to suppose that if either Dr. Ferrier or Dr. Munk were asked for a theory in brain-terms of the latter mental facts, they might both reply, either that they had as yet bestowed no thought upon the subject, or that they had found it so difficult to make distinct hypotheses, that the matter lay for them among the problems of the future, only to be taken up after the simpler ones of the present should have been definitively solved.

And yet it is even now certain that of two things concerning the emotions, one must be true. Either separate and special centres, affected to them alone, are their brain-seat, or else they correspond to processes occurring in the motor and sensory centres, already assigned, or in others like them, not yet mapped out. If the former be the case we must deny the current view, and hold the cortex to be something more than the surface of "projection" for every sensitive spot and every muscle in the body. If the latter be the case, we must ask whether the emotional "process" in the sensory or motor centre be an altogether peculiar one, or

whether it resembles the ordinary perceptive processes of which those centres are already recognized to be the seat. The purpose of the following pages is to show that the last alternative comes nearest to the truth, and that the emotional brain-processes not only resemble the ordinary sensorial brain-processes, but in very truth *are* nothing but such processes variously combined. . . .

I should say first of all that the only emotions I propose expressly to consider here are those that have a distinct bodily expression. That there are feelings of pleasure and displeasure, of interest and excitement, bound up with mental operations, but having no obvious bodily expression for their consequence, would, I suppose, be held true by most readers. Certain arrangements of sounds, of lines, of colours, are agreeable, and others the reverse, without the degree of the feeling being sufficient to quicken the pulse or breathing, or to prompt to movements of either the body or the face. Certain sequences of ideas charm us as much as others tire us. It is a real intellectual delight to get a problem solved, and a real intellectual torment to have to leave it unfinished. The first set of examples, the sounds, lines, and colours, are either bodily sensations, or the images of such. The second set seem to depend on processes in the ideational centres exclusively. Taken together, they appear to prove that there are pleasures and pains inherent in certain forms of nerve-action as such, wherever that action occur. The case of these feelings we will at present leave entirely aside, and confine our attention to the more complicated cases in which a wave of bodily disturbance of some kind accompanies the perception of the interesting sights or sounds, or the passage of the exciting train of ideas. Surprise, curiosity, rapture, fear, anger, lust, greed, and the like, become then the names of the mental states with which the person is possessed. The bodily disturbances are said to be the "manifestation" of these several emotions, their "expression" or "natural language"; and these emotions themselves, being so strongly characterised both from within and without, may be called the *standard* emotions.

Our natural way of thinking about these standard emotions is that the mental perception of some fact excites the mental affection called the emotion, and that this latter state of mind gives rise to the bodily expression. My thesis on the contrary is that *the bodily changes follow directly the PERCEPTION of the exciting fact, and that our feeling of the same changes as they occur IS the emotion*. Common sense says, we lose our fortune, are sorry and weep; we meet a bear, are frightened and run; we are insulted by a rival, are angry and strike. The hypothesis here to be defended says that this order of sequence is incorrect, that the one mental state is not immediately induced by the other, that the bodily manifestations must first be interposed between, and that the more rational statement is that we feel sorry because we cry, angry because we strike, afraid because we tremble, and not that we cry, strike, or tremble, because we are sorry, angry, or fearful, as the case may be. Without the bodily states following on the perception, the latter would be purely cognitive in form, pale, colourless, destitute of emotional warmth. We might then see the bear, and judge it best to run, receive the insult and deem it right to strike, but we could not actually *feel* afraid or angry.

Stated in this crude way, the hypothesis is pretty sure to meet with immediate disbelief. And yet neither many nor far-fetched considerations are required to mitigate its paradoxical character, and possibly to produce conviction of its truth.

To begin with, readers . . . do not need to be reminded that the nervous system of every living thing is but a bundle of predispositions to react in particular ways upon the contact of particular features of the environment. As surely as the hermit-crab's abdomen presupposes the existence of empty whelk-shells somewhere to be found, so surely do the hound's olfactories imply the existence, on the one hand, of deer's or foxes' feet, and on the other, the tendency to follow up their tracks. The neural machinery is but a hyphen between determinate arrangements of matter outside the body and determinate impulses to inhibition or discharge within its organs. When the hen sees a white oval object on the ground, she cannot leave it; she must keep upon it and return to it, until at last its transformation into a little mass of moving chirping down elicits from her machinery an entirely new set of performances. The love of man for woman, or of the human mother for her babe, our wrath at snakes and our fear of precipices, may all be described similarly, as instances of the way in which peculiarly conformed pieces of the world's furniture will fatally call forth most particular mental and bodily reactions, in advance of, and often in direct opposition to, the verdict of our deliberate reason concerning them. The labours of Darwin and his successors are only just beginning to reveal the universal parasitism of each special creature upon other special things, and the way in which each creature brings the signature of its special relations stamped on its nervous system with it upon the scene.

Every living creature is in fact a sort of lock, whose wards and springs presuppose special forms of key,—which keys however are not born attached to the locks, but are sure to be found in the world near by as life goes on. And the locks are indifferent to any but their own keys. The egg fails to fascinate the hound, the bird does not fear the precipice, the snake waxes not wroth at his kind, the deer cares nothing for the woman or the human babe. . . .

Now among these nervous anticipations are of course to be reckoned the emotions, so far as these may be called forth directly by the perception of certain facts. In advance of all experience of elephants no child can but be frightened if he suddenly find one trumpeting and charging upon him. No woman can see a handsome little naked baby without delight, no man in the wilderness see a human form in the distance without excitement and curiosity. I said I should consider these emotions only so far as they have bodily movements of some sort for their accompaniments. But my first point is to show that their bodily accompaniments are much more far-reaching and complicated than we ordinarily suppose.

In the earlier books on Expression, written mostly from the artistic point of view, the signs of emotion visible from without were the only ones taken account of. Sir Charles Bell's celebrated *Anatomy of Expression* noticed the respiratory changes; and Bain's and Darwin's treatises went more thoroughly still into the study of the visceral factors involved,—changes in the functioning of glands and muscles, and in that of the circulatory apparatus. But not even a Darwin has exhaustively enumerated *all* the bodily affections characteristic of any one of the standard emotions. More and more, as physiology advances, we begin to discern how almost infinitely numerous and subtle they must be. The researches of Mosso with the plethysmograph have shown that not only the

heart, but the entire circulatory system, forms a sort of sounding-board, which every change of our consciousness, however slight, may make reverberate. Hardly a sensation comes to us without sending waves of alternate constriction and dilatation down the arteries of our arms. The blood-vessels of the abdomen act reciprocally with those of the more outward parts. The bladder and bowels, the glands of the mouth, throat, and skin, and the liver, are known to be affected gravely in certain severe emotions, and are unquestionably affected transiently when the emotions are of a lighter sort. That the heartbeats and the rhythm of breathing play a leading part in all emotions whatsoever, is a matter too notorious for proof. And what is really equally prominent, but less likely to be admitted until special attention is drawn to the fact, is the continuous co-operation of the voluntary muscles in our emotional states. Even when no change of outward attitude is produced, their inward tension alters to suit each varying mood, and is felt as a difference of tone or of strain. In depression the flexors tend to prevail; in elation or belligerent excitement the extensors take the lead. And the various permutations and combinations of which these organic activities are susceptible, make it abstractly possible that no shade of emotion, however slight, should be without a bodily reverberation as unique, when taken in its totality, as is the mental mood itself.

The immense number of parts modified in each emotion is what makes it so difficult for us to reproduce in cold blood the total and integral expression of any one of them. We may catch the trick with the voluntary muscles, but fail with the skin, glands, heart, and other viscera. Just as an artificially imitated sneeze lacks something of the reality, so the attempt to imitate an emotion in the absence of its normal instigating cause is apt to be rather "hollow."

The next thing to be noticed is this, that every one of the bodily changes, whatsoever it be, is *felt*, acutely or obscurely, the moment it occurs. If the reader has never paid attention to this matter, he will be both interested and astonished to learn how many different local bodily feelings he can detect in himself as characteristic of his various emotional moods. It would be perhaps too much to expect him to arrest the tide of any strong gust of passion for the sake of any such curious analysis as this; but he can observe more tranquil states, and that may be assumed here to be true of the greater which is shown to be true of the less. Our whole cubic capacity is sensibly alive; and each morsel of it contributes its pulsations of feeling, dim or sharp, pleasant, painful, or dubious, to that sense of personality that every one of us unfailingly carries with him. It is surprising what little items give accent to these complexes of sensibility. When worried by any slight trouble, one may find that the focus of one's bodily consciousness is the contraction, often quite inconsiderable, of the eyes and brows. When momentarily embarrassed, it is something in the pharynx that compels either a swallow, a clearing of the throat, or a slight cough; and so on for as many more instances as might be named. Our concern here being with the general view rather than with the details, I will not linger to discuss these but, assuming the point admitted that every change that occurs must be felt, I will pass on.

I now proceed to urge the vital point of my whole theory, which is this. If we fancy some strong emotion, and then try to abstract from our consciousness of it all the feelings of its characteristic bodily symptoms, we find we have nothing

left behind, no "mind-stuff" out of which the emotion can be constituted, and that a cold and neutral state of intellectual perception is all that remains. It is true, that although most people, when asked, say that their introspection verifies this statement, some persist in saying theirs does not. Many cannot be made to understand the question. When you beg them to imagine away every feeling of laughter and of tendency to laugh from their consciousness of the ludicrousness of an object, and then to tell you what the feeling of its ludicrousness would be like, whether it be anything more than the perception that the object belongs to the class "funny," they persist in replying that the thing proposed is a physical impossibility, and that they always *must* laugh, if they see a funny object. Of course the task proposed is not the practical one of seeing a ludicrous object and annihilating one's tendency to laugh. It is the purely speculative one of subtracting certain elements of feeling from an emotional state supposed to exist in its fulness, and saying what the residual elements are. I cannot help thinking that all who rightly apprehend this problem will agree with the proposition above laid down. What kind of an emotion of fear would be left, if the feelings neither of quickened heart-beats nor of shallow breathing, neither of trembling lips nor of weakened limbs, neither of goose-flesh nor of visceral stirrings, were present, it is quite impossible to think. Can one fancy the state of rage and picture no ebullition of it in the chest, no flushing of the face, no dilatation of the nostrils, no clenching of the teeth, no impulse to vigorous action, but in their stead limp muscles, calm breathing, and a placid face? The present writer, for one, certainly cannot. The rage is as completely evaporated as the sensation of its so-called manifestations, and the only thing that can possibly be supposed to take its place is some cold-blooded and dispassionate judicial sentence, confined entirely to the intellectual realm, to the effect that a certain person or persons merit chastisement for their sins. In like manner of grief: what would it be without its tears, its sobs, its suffocation of the heart, its pang in the breast-bone? A feelingless cognition that certain circumstances are deplorable, and nothing more. Every passion in turn tells the same story. A purely disembodied human emotion is a nonentity. I do not say that it is a contradiction in the nature of things, or that pure spirits are necessarily condemned to cold intellectual lives; but I say that for *us*, emotion dissociated from all bodily feeling is inconceivable. The more closely I scrutinise my states, the more persuaded I become, that whatever moods, affections, and passions I have, are in very truth constituted by, and made up of, those bodily changes we ordinarily call their expression or consequence; and the more it seems to me that if I were to become corporeally anæsthetic, I should be excluded from the life of the affections, harsh and tender alike, and drag out an existence of merely cognitive or intellectual form. Such an existence, although it seems to have been the ideal of ancient sages, is too apathetic to be keenly sought after by those born after the revival of the worship of sensibility, a few generations ago.

But if the emotion is nothing but the feeling of the reflex bodily effects of what we call its "object," effects due to the connate adaptation of the nervous system to that object, we seem immediately faced by this objection: most of the objects of civilised men's emotions are things to which it would be preposterous to suppose their nervous systems connately adapted. Most occasions of shame

and many insults are purely conventional, and vary with the social environment. The same is true of many matters of dread and of desire, and of many occasions of melancholy and regret. In these cases, at least, it would seem that the ideas of shame, desire, regret, &c., must first have been attached by education and association to these conventional objects before the bodily changes could possibly be awakened. And if in *these* cases the bodily changes follow the ideas, instead of giving rise to them, why not then in all cases?

To discuss thoroughly this objection would carry us deep into the study of purely intellectual *Æsthetics*. A few words must here suffice. We will say nothing of the argument's failure to distinguish between the idea of an emotion and the emotion itself. We will only recall the well-known evolutionary principle that when a certain power has once been fixed in an animal by virtue of its utility in presence of certain features of the environment, it may turn out to be useful in presence of other features of the environment that had originally nothing to do with either producing or preserving it. A nervous tendency to discharge being once there, all sorts of unforeseen things may pull the trigger and let loose the effects. That among these things should be conventionalities of man's contriving is a matter of no psychological consequence whatever. The most important part of my environment is my fellow-man. The consciousness of his attitude towards me is the perception that normally unlocks most of my shames and indignations and fears. The extraordinary sensitiveness of this consciousness is shown by the bodily modifications wrought in us by the awareness that our fellow-man is noticing us *at all*. No one can walk across the platform at a public meeting with just the same muscular innervation he uses to walk across his room at home. No one can give a message to such a meeting without organic excitement. "Stage-fright" is only the extreme degree of that wholly irrational personal self-consciousness which every one gets in some measure, as soon as he feels the eyes of a number of strangers fixed upon him, even though he be inwardly convinced that their feeling towards him is of no practical account. This being so, it is not surprising that the additional persuasion that my fellow-man's attitude means either well or ill for me, should awaken stronger emotions still. In primitive societies "Well" may mean handing me a piece of beef, and "Ill" may mean aiming a blow at my skull. In our "cultured age," "Ill" may mean cutting me in the street, and "Well," giving me an honorary degree. What the action itself may be is quite insignificant, so long as I can perceive in it intent or *animus*. That is the emotion-arousing perception; and may give rise to as strong bodily convulsions in me, a civilised man experiencing the treatment of an artificial society, as in any savage prisoner of war, learning whether his captors are about to eat him or to make him a member of their tribe.

But now, this objection disposed of, there arises a more general doubt. Is there any evidence, it may be asked, for the assumption that particular perceptions *do* produce wide-spread bodily effects by a sort of immediate physical influence, antecedent to the arousal of an emotion or emotional idea?

The only possible reply is, that there is most assuredly such evidence. In listening to poetry, drama, or heroic narrative, we are often surprised at the cutaneous shiver which like a sudden wave flows over us, and at the heartswelling and the lachrymal effusion that unexpectedly catch us at intervals. In listening to

music, the same is even more strikingly true. If we abruptly see a dark moving form in the woods, our heart stops beating, and we catch our breath instantly and before any articulate idea of danger can arise. If our friend goes near to the edge of a precipice, we get the well-known feeling of "all-overishness," and we shrink back, although we positively *know* him to be safe, and have no distinct imagination of his fall. The writer well remembers his astonishment, when a boy of seven or eight, at fainting when he saw a horse bled. The blood was in a bucket, with a stick in it, and, if memory does not deceive him, he stirred it round and saw it drip from the stick with no feeling save that of childish curiosity. Suddenly the world grew black before his eyes, his ears began to buzz, and he knew no more. He had never heard of the sight of blood producing faintness or sickness, and he had so little repugnance to it, and so little apprehension of any other sort of danger from it, that even at that tender age, as he well remembers, he could not help wondering how the mere physical presence of a pailful of crimson fluid could occasion in him such formidable bodily effects.

Imagine two steel knife-blades with their keen edges crossing each other at right angles, and moving too and fro. Our whole nervous organisation is "on-edge" at the thought; and yet what emotion can be there except the unpleasant nervous feeling itself, or the dread that more of it may come? The entire fund and capital of the emotion here is the senseless bodily effect the blades immediately arouse. This case is typical of a class: where an ideal emotion seems to precede the bodily symptoms, it is often nothing but a representation of the symptoms themselves. One who has already fainted at the sight of blood may witness the preparations for a surgical operation with uncontrollable heart-sinking and anxiety. He anticipates certain feelings, and the anticipation precipitates their arrival. I am told of a case of morbid terror, of which the subject confessed that what possessed her seemed, more than anything, to be the fear of fear itself. In the various forms of what Professor Bain calls "tender emotion," although the appropriate object must usually be directly contemplated before the emotion can be aroused, yet sometimes thinking of the symptoms of the emotion itself may have the same effect. In sentimental natures, the thought of "yearning" will produce real "yearning." And, not to speak of coarser examples, a mother's imagination of the caresses she bestows on her child may arouse a spasm of parental longing.

In such cases as these, we see plainly how the emotion both begins and ends with what we call its effects or manifestations. It has no mental *status* except as either the presented feeling, or the idea, of the manifestations; which latter thus constitute its entire material, its sum and substance, and its stock-in-trade. And these cases ought to make us see how in all cases the feeling of the manifestations may play a much deeper part in the constitution of the emotion than we are wont to suppose.

If our theory be true, a necessary corollary of it ought to be that any voluntary arousal of the so-called manifestations of a special emotion ought to give us the emotion itself. Of course in the majority of emotions, this test is inapplicable; for many of the manifestations are in organs over which we have no volitional control. Still, within the limits in which it can be verified, experience fully corroborates this test. Everyone knows how panic is increased by flight, and

how the giving way to the symptoms of grief or anger increases those passions themselves. Each fit of sobbing makes the sorrow more acute, and calls forth another fit stronger still, until at last repose only ensues with lassitude and with the apparent exhaustion of the machinery. In rage, it is notorious how we "work ourselves up" to a climax by repeated outbreaks of expression. Refuse to express a passion, and it dies. Count ten before venting your anger, and its occasion seems ridiculous. Whistling to keep up courage is no mere figure of speech. On the other hand, sit all day in a moping posture, sigh, and reply to everything with a dismal voice, and your melancholy lingers. There is no more valuable precept in moral education than this, as all who have experience know: if we wish to conquer undesirable emotional tendencies in ourselves, we must assiduously, and in the first instance cold-bloodedly, go through the *outward motions* of those contrary dispositions we prefer to cultivate. The reward of persistency will infallibly come, in the fading out of the sullenness or depression, and the advent of real cheerfulness and kindness in their stead. Smooth the brow, brighten the eye, contract the dorsal rather than the ventral aspect of the frame, and speak in a major key, pass the genial compliment, and your heart must be frigid indeed if it do not gradually thaw!

The only exceptions to this are apparent, not real. The great emotional expressiveness and mobility of certain persons often lead us to say "They would feel more if they talked less." And in another class of persons, the explosive energy with which passion manifests itself on critical occasions, seems correlated with the way in which they bottle it up during the intervals. But these are only eccentric types of character, and within each type the law of the last paragraph prevails. The sentimentalist is so constructed that "gushing" is his or her normal mode of expression. Putting a stopper on the "gush" will only to a limited extent cause more "real" activities to take its place; in the main it will simply produce listlessness. On the other hand the ponderous and bilious "slumbering volcano," let him repress the expression of his passions as he will, will find them expire if they get no vent at all; whilst if the rare occasions multiply which he deems worthy of their outbreak, he will find them grow in intensity as life proceeds.

I feel persuaded there is no real exception to the law. The formidable effects of suppressed tears might be mentioned, and the calming results of speaking out your mind when angry and having done with it. But these are also but specious wanderings from the rule. Every perception must lead to *some* nervous result. If this be the normal emotional expression, it soon expends itself, and in the natural course of things a calm succeeds. But if the normal issue be blocked from any cause, the currents may under certain circumstances invade other tracts, and there work different and worse effects. Thus vengeful brooding may replace a burst of indignation; a dry heat may consume the frame of one who fain would weep, or he may, as Dante says, turn to stone within; and then tears or a storming-fit may bring a grateful relief. When we teach children to repress their emotions, it is not that they may *feel* more, quite the reverse. It is that they may *think* more; for to a certain extent whatever nerve-currents are diverted from the regions below, must swell the activity of the thought-tracts of the brain.

The last great argument in favour of the priority of the bodily symptoms to the felt emotion, is the ease with which we formulate by its means pathological

cases and normal cases under a common scheme. In every asylum we find examples of absolutely unmotivated fear, anger, melancholy, or conceit; and others of an equally unmotivated apathy which persists in spite of the best of outward reasons why it should give way. In the former cases we must suppose the nervous machinery to be so "labile" in some one emotional direction, that almost every stimulus, however inappropriate, will cause it to upset in that way, and as a consequence to engender the particular complex of feelings of which the psychic body of the emotion consists. Thus, to take one special instance, if inability to draw deep breath, fluttering of the heart, and that peculiar epigastric change felt as "precordial anxiety," with an irresistible tendency to take a somewhat crouching attitude and to sit still, and with perhaps other visceral processes not now known, all spontaneously occur together in a certain person; his feeling of their combination is the emotion of dread, and he is the victim of what is known as morbid fear. A friend who has had occasional attacks of this most distressing of all maladies, tells me that in his case the whole drama seems to centre about the region of the heart and respiratory apparatus, that his main effort during the attacks is to get control of his inspirations and to slow his heart, and that the moment he attains to breathing deeply and to holding himself erect, the dread, *ipso facto*, seems to depart.

If our hypothesis be true, it makes us realise more deeply than ever how much our mental life is knit up with our corporeal frame, in the strictest sense of the term. Rapture, love, ambition, indignation, and pride, considered as feelings, are fruits of the same soil with the grossest bodily sensations of pleasure and of pain. But it was said at the outset that this would be affirmed only of what we then agreed to call the "standard" emotions; and that those inward sensibilities that appeared devoid at first sight of bodily results should be left out of our account. We had better, before closing, say a word or two about these latter feelings.

They are, the reader will remember, the moral, intellectual, and æsthetic feelings. Concords of sounds, of colours, of lines, logical consistencies, teleological fitnesses, affect us with a pleasure that seems ingrained in the very form of the representation itself, and to borrow nothing from any reverberation surging up from the parts below the brain. The Herbartian psychologists have tried to distinguish feelings due to the *form* in which ideas may be arranged. A geometrical demonstration may be as "pretty," and an act of justice as "neat" as a drawing or a tune, although the prettiness and neatness seem here to be a pure matter of sensation, and there to have nothing to do with sensation. We have then, or some of us seem to have, genuinely *cerebral* forms of pleasure and displeasure, apparently not agreeing in their mode of production with the so-called "standard" emotions we have been analysing. And it is certain that readers whom our reasons have hitherto failed to convince, will now start up at this admission, and consider that by it we give up our whole case. Since musical perceptions, since logical ideas, can immediately arouse a form of emotional feeling, they will say, is it not more natural to suppose that in the case of the so-called "standard" emotions, prompted by the presence of objects or the experience of events, the emotional

feeling is equally immediate, and the bodily expression something that comes later and is added on?

But a sober scrutiny of the cases of pure cerebral emotion gives little force to this assimilation. Unless in them there actually be coupled with the intellectual feeling a bodily reverberation of some kind, unless we actually laugh at the neatness of the mechanical device, thrill at the justice of the act, or tingle at the perfection of the musical form, our mental condition is more allied to a judgment of *right* than to anything else. And such a judgment is rather to be classed among awarenesses of truth: it is a *cognitive* act. But as a matter of fact the intellectual feeling hardly ever does exist thus unaccompanied. The bodily sounding-board is at work, as careful introspection will show far more than we usually suppose. Still, where long familiarity with a certain class of effects has blunted emotional sensibility thereto as much as it has sharpened the taste and judgment, we do get the intellectual emotion, if such it can be called, pure and undefiled. And the dryness of it, the paleness, the absence of all glow, as it may exist in a thoroughly expert critic's mind, not only shows us what an altogether different thing it is from the "standard" emotions we considered first, but makes us suspect that almost the entire difference lies in the fact that the bodily sounding-board, vibrating in the one case, is in the other mute. "Not so very bad" is, in a person of consummate taste, apt to be the highest limit of approving expression. "*Rien ne me choque*" is said to have been Chopin's superlative of praise of new music. A sentimental layman would feel, and ought to feel, horrified, on being admitted into such a critic's mind, to see how cold, how thin, how void of human significance, are the motives for favour or disfavour that there prevail. The capacity to make a nice spot on the wall will outweigh a picture's whole content; a foolish trick of words will preserve a poem; an utterly meaningless fitness of sequence in one musical composition set at naught any amount of "expressiveness" in another.

I remember seeing an English couple sit for more than an hour on a piercing February day in the Academy at Venice before the celebrated "Assumption" by Titian; and when I, after being chased from room to room by the cold, concluded to get into the sunshine as fast as possible and let the pictures go, but before leaving drew reverently near to them to learn with what superior forms of susceptibility they might be endowed, all I overheard was the woman's voice murmuring: "What a *deprecatory* expression her face wears! What self-abnegation! How *unworthy* she feels of the honour she is receiving!" Their honest hearts had been kept warm all the time by a glow of spurious sentiment that would have fairly made old Titian sick. Mr. Ruskin somewhere makes the (for him) terrible admission that religious people as a rule care little for pictures, and that when they do care for them they generally prefer the worst ones to the best. Yes! in every art, in every science, there is the keen perception of certain relations being *right* or not, and there is the emotional flush and thrill consequent thereupon. And these are two things, not one. In the former of them it is that experts and masters are at home. The latter accompaniments are bodily commotions that they may hardly feel, but that may be experienced in their fulness by *Crétins* and Philistines in whom the critical judgment is at its lowest ebb. The "marvels" of Science, about which so much edifying popular literature is written, are apt

to be "caviare" to the men in the laboratories. Cognition and emotion are parted even in this last retreat,—who shall say that their antagonism may not just be one phase of the world-old struggle known as that between the spirit and the flesh?—a struggle in which it seems pretty certain that neither party will definitively drive the other off the field.

To return now to our starting-point, the physiology of the brain. If we suppose its cortex to contain centres for the perception of changes in each special sense-organ, in each portion of the skin, in each muscle, each joint, and each viscus, and to contain absolutely nothing else, we still have a scheme perfectly capable of representing the process of the emotions. An object falls on a sense-organ and is apperceived by the appropriate cortical centre; or else the latter, excited in some other way, gives rise to an idea of the same object. Quick as a flash, the reflex currents pass down through their preordained channels, alter the condition of muscle, skin and viscus; and these alterations, apperceived like the original object, in as many specific portions of the cortex, combine with it in consciousness and transform it from an object—simply-apprehended into an object—emotionally-felt. No new principles have to be invoked, nothing is postulated beyond the ordinary reflex circuit, and the topical centres admitted in one shape or another by all to exist.

It must be confessed that a crucial test of the truth of the hypothesis is quite as hard to obtain as its decisive refutation. A case of complete internal and external corporeal anæsthesia, without motor alteration or alteration of intelligence except emotional apathy, would afford, if not a crucial test, at least a strong presumption, in favour of the truth of the view we have set forth; whilst the persistence of strong emotional feeling in such a case would completely overthrow our case. Hysterical anæsthesias seem never to be complete enough to cover the ground. Complete anæsthesias from organic disease, on the other hand, are excessively rare. In the famous case of Remigius Leims, no mention is made by the reporters of his emotional condition, a circumstance which by itself affords no presumption that it was normal, since as a rule nothing ever is noticed without a pre-existing question in the mind. Dr. Georg Winter has recently described a case somewhat similar, and in reply to a question, kindly writes to me as follows:—"The case has been for a year and a half entirely removed from my observation. But so far as I am able to state, the man was characterised by a certain mental inertia and indolence. He was tranquil, and had on the whole the temperament of a phlegmatic. He was not irritable, not quarrelsome, went quietly about his farm-work, and left the care of his business and housekeeping to other people. In short, he gave one the impression of a placid countryman, who has no interests beyond his work." Dr. Winter adds that in studying the case he paid no particular attention to the man's psychic condition, as this seemed "*nebensächlich*" to his main purpose. I should add that the form of my question to Dr. Winter could give him no clue as to the kind of answer I expected.

Of course, this case proves nothing, but it is to be hoped that asylum-physicians and nervous specialists may begin methodically to study the relation between anæsthesia and emotional apathy. If the hypothesis here suggested is ever to be definitively confirmed or disproved it seems as if it must be by them, for they alone have the data in their hands.



WALTER B. CANNON

(1871-1945)

Introduction

Walter Cannon, a leading American physiologist, received his medical degree from Harvard University in 1900, and held the position of Higginson professor of physiology at Harvard from 1906 until he retired in 1942. His studies of shock during World War I and his later research on the endocrine system led to his developing the theory of homeostasis, that is, that ongoing physiological processes serve to maintain the stability of bodily systems.

Cannon's work on the physiology of the gastrointestinal tract (summarized in his 1911 paper, "The Mechanical Factors of Digestion") led quite naturally to a more general interest in the bodily changes associated not only with hunger, but also with pain, fear, rage, and other intense emotions. A four-year study at the Harvard Physiological Laboratory culminated in his major work, *Bodily Changes in Pain, Hunger, Fear and Rage*, in which he demonstrates how the physiological changes associated with these states contribute to the individual's welfare and self-preservation. Following publication of this work, Cannon realized how his results could be used to critique the James-Lange theory of emotion. Although in formulating their theory James and Lange described the physiological changes that occur during emotional states, neither conducted experiments to confirm the truth of their thesis that emotions are nothing but the perception of these physiological changes. James, for instance, merely argued that in imagining an emotion without its attendant physiological changes, one inevitably loses sight of the emotion itself. Walter Cannon, however, tested this claim experimentally, reporting his results in the second edition of *Bodily Changes in Pain, Hunger, Fear and Rage*. He confirmed the correlation between emotion and visceral disturbances; but, on the basis of experiments specifically designed to test the James-Lange theory, concluded that emotions cannot be simply the perception of these visceral disturbances. Excerpted below is Cannon's forceful attack on the James-Lange theory.

From Bodily Changes in Pain, Hunger, Fear and Rage

A CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF THE JAMES-LANGE THEORY OF EMOTIONS

The famous theory of emotions associated with the names of James and Lange was propounded by them independently. James first presented his view in 1884, Lange's monograph appeared in Danish in 1885. The cardinal points in their respective ideas of the nature of emotions are so well known that for purposes of comment only brief references need be made to them. James' theory may be summarized, in nearly his own terms, as follows. An object stimulates one or more sense organs; afferent impulses pass to the cortex and the object is perceived; thereupon currents run down to muscles and viscera and alter them in complex ways; afferent impulses from these disturbed organs course back to the cortex and when there perceived transform the "object-simply-apprehended" to the "object-emotionally-felt." In other words, "the feeling of the bodily changes as they occur is the emotion—the common sensational, associational and motor elements explain all." The main evidence cited for the theory is that we are aware of the tensions, throbs, flushes, pangs, suffocations—we feel them, indeed, the moment they occur—and that if we should take away from the picture of a fancied emotion these bodily symptoms, nothing would be left.

According to Lange stimulation of the vasomotor center is "the root of the causes of the affections, however else they may be constituted." We owe all the emotional side of our mental life," he wrote, "our joys and sorrows, our happy and unhappy hours, to our vasomotor system. If the impressions which fall upon our senses did not possess the power of stimulating it, we would wander through life unsympathetic and passionless, all impressions of the outer world would only enrich our experience, increase our knowledge, but would arouse neither joy nor anger, would give us neither care nor fear." Since we are unable to differentiate subjectively between feelings of a central and peripheral origin, subjective evidence is unreliable. But because wine, certain mushrooms, hashish, opium, a cold shower, and other agencies cause physiological effects which are accompanied by altered states of feeling, and because abstraction of the bodily manifestations from a frightened individual leaves nothing of his fear, the emotion is only a perception of changes in the body. It is clear that Lange had the same conception as James, but elaborated it on a much narrower basis—on changes in the circulatory system alone.

The backflow of impulses from the periphery, on which James relied to account for the richness and variety of emotional feeling, was assumed to arise from all parts of the organism, from the muscles and skin as well as the viscera. To the latter, however, he inclined to attribute the major rôle—on "the visceral and organic part of the expression," he wrote, "it is probable that the chief part of the felt emotion depends." We may distinguish, therefore, his two sources of the afferent stream. We shall now consider critically the visceral source. In con-

nection therewith we shall comment on Lange's idea that the vasomotor center holds the explanation of emotional experience.

Total Separation of the Viscera from the Central Nervous System does not alter Emotional Behavior

Sherrington transected the spinal cord and the vagus nerves of dogs so as to destroy any connection of the brain with the heart, the lungs, the stomach and the bowels, the spleen, the liver and other abdominal organs—indeed, to isolate all the structures in which formerly feelings were supposed to reside. Recently Lewis and Britton and I have succeeded in keeping cats in a healthy state for many months after removal of the entire sympathetic division of the autonomic system, the division which operates in great excitement. Thus all vascular reactions controlled by the vasomotor center were abolished; secretion from the adrenal medulla could no longer be evoked; the action of the stomach and intestines could not be inhibited, the hairs could not be erected, and the liver could not be called upon to liberate sugar into the blood stream. These extensively disturbing operations had little if any effect on the emotional responses of the animals. In one of Sherrington's dogs, having a "markedly emotional temperament," the surgical reduction of the sensory field caused no obvious change in her emotional behavior; "her anger, her joy, her disgust, and when provocation arose, her fear, remained as evident as ever." And in the sympathectomized cats all superficial signs of rage were manifested in the presence of a barking dog—hissing, growling, retraction of the ears, showing of the teeth, lifting of the paw to strike—*except* erection of the hairs. Both sets of animals behaved with full emotional expression in all the organs still connected with the brain; the only failure was in organs disconnected. The absence of reverberation from the viscera did not alter in any respect the appropriate emotional display; its only abbreviation was surgical.

As Sherrington has remarked, with reference to his head-and-shoulder dogs, it is difficult to think that the perception initiating the wrathful expression should bring in sequel angry conduct and yet have been impotent to produce "angry feeling."

At this point interpretations differ. Angell has argued that Sherrington's experiments afford no evidence that visceral sensation plays no part in the emotional psychosis, and further that they do not prove that the psychic state, "emotion," precedes its "expression." And Perry has declared that whether, in the absence of sensations from the organs surgically isolated, the emotion is *felt* remains quite undecided.

It must be admitted, of course, that we have no real basis for either affirming or denying the presence of "felt emotion" in these reduced animals. We have a basis, however, for judging their relation to the James-Lange theory. James attributed the chief part of the felt emotion to sensations from the viscera, Lange attributed it wholly to sensations from the circulatory system. Both affirmed that if these organic sensations are removed *imaginatively* from an emotional experience nothing is left. Sherrington and the Harvard group varied this procedure by removing the sensations *surgically*. In their animals all visceral disturbances through sympathetic channels—the channels for nervous discharge in great excitement—were abolished. The possibility of return impulses by these

channels, and in Sherrington's animals by vagus channels as well, were likewise abolished. According to James's statement of the theory the felt emotion should have very largely disappeared, and according to Lange's statement it should have wholly disappeared (without stimulation of our vasomotor system, it will be recalled, impressions of the outer world "would arouse neither joy nor anger, would give us neither care nor fear"). The animals *acted*, however, insofar as nervous connections permitted, with no lessening of the intensity of emotional display. In other words, operations which, in terms of the theory, largely or completely destroy emotional feeling, nevertheless leave the animals behaving as angrily, as joyfully, as fearfully as ever.

The Same Visceral Changes Occur in Very Different Emotional States and in Non-Emotional States

The preganglionic fibers of the sympathetic division of the autonomic system are so related to the outlying neurones, as we have seen, that the resulting innervation of smooth muscles and glands throughout the body is not particular but diffuse. At the same time with the diffuse emission of sympathetic impulses adrenin is poured into the blood. Since it is thereby generally distributed to all parts and has the same effects as the sympathetic impulses wherever it acts, the humoral and the neural agents coöperate in producing diffuse effects. In consequence of these arrangements the sympathetic system goes into action as a unit—there may be minor variations as, for example, the presence or absence of sweating, but in the main features integration is characteristic.

The visceral changes wrought by sympathetic stimulation may be listed as follows: acceleration of the heart, contraction of arterioles, dilation of bronchioles, increase of blood sugar, inhibition of activity of the digestive glands, inhibition of gastro-intestinal peristalsis, sweating, discharge of adrenin, widening of the pupils and erection of hairs. These changes are seen in great excitement under any circumstances. They occur in such readily distinguishable emotional states as fear and rage. Fever and also exposure to cold are known to induce most of the changes—certainly a faster heart rate, vasoconstriction, increased blood sugar, discharge of adrenin and erection of the hairs. Asphyxia at the stimulating stage evokes all the changes enumerated above, with the possible exception of sweating. A too great reduction of blood sugar by insulin provokes the "hypoglycemic reaction"—characterized by pallor, rapid heart, dilated pupils, discharge of adrenin, increase of blood sugar and profuse sweating.

In this group of conditions which bring about in the viscera changes which are typical of sympathetic discharge are such intense and distinct emotions as fear and rage, such relatively mild affective states as those attending chilliness, hypoglycemia and difficult respiration, and such a markedly different experience as that attending the onset of fever. The responses in the viscera seem too uniform to offer a satisfactory means of distinguishing emotions which are very different in subjective quality. Furthermore, if the emotions were due to afferent impulses from the viscera, we should expect not only that fear and rage would feel alike but that chilliness, hypoglycemia, asphyxia, and fever should feel like them. Such is not the case.

In commenting on this criticism of the James-Lange theory Angell admits that there may be a considerable matrix of substantially identical visceral excitement for some emotions, but urges that the differential features may be found in the extra-visceral disturbances, particularly in the differences of tone in skeletal muscles. Perry likewise falls back on the conformation of the proprioceptive patterns, on the "motor set" of the expression, to provide the distinctive elements of the various affective states. The possible contribution of skeletal muscles to the genesis of the felt emotion will be considered later. At present the fact may be emphasized that Lange derived no part of the emotional psychosis from that source; and James attributed to it a minor rôle—the chief part of the felt emotion depended on the visceral and organic part of the expression.

The Viscera Are Relatively Insensitive Structures

There is a common belief that the more deeply the body is penetrated the more sensitive does it become. Such is not the fact. Whereas in a spinal nerve trunk the sensory nerve fibers are probably always more numerous than the motor, in the nerves distributed to the viscera the afferent (sensory) fibers may be only one-tenth as numerous as the efferent. We are unaware of the contractions and relaxations of the stomach and intestines during digestion, of the rubbing of the stomach against the diaphragm, of the squeezing motions of the spleen, of the processes in the liver—only after long search have we learned what is occurring in these organs. Surgeons have found that the alimentary tract can be cut, torn, crushed or burned in operations on the unanesthetized human subject without evoking any feeling of discomfort. We can feel the thumping of the heart because it presses against the chest wall, we can also feel the throbbing of blood vessels because they pass through tissues well supplied with sensory nerves, and we may have abdominal pains but apparently because there are pulls on the parietal peritoneum. Normally the visceral processes are extraordinarily undemonstrative. And even when the most marked changes are induced in them, as when adrenalin acts, the results, as we shall see, are sensations mainly attributable to effects on the cardiovascular system.

Visceral Changes Are Too Slow to Be a Source of Emotional Feeling

The viscera are composed of smooth muscle and glands—except the heart, which is modified striate muscle. The motions of the body with which we are familiar result from quick-acting striate muscle, having a true latent period of less than 0.001 second. Notions of the speed of bodily processes acquired by observing the action of skeletal muscle we should not apply to other structures. Smooth muscle and glands respond with relative sluggishness. Although Stewart found that the latent period of smooth muscle of the cat was about 0.25 second, Sertoli observed that it lasted for 0.85 second in the dog and 0.8 second in the horse. Langley reported a latent period of 2 to 4 seconds on stimulating the *chorda tympani* nerve supply to the submaxillary salivary gland; and Pavlov a latent period of about 6 minutes on stimulating the vagus, the secretory nerve of the gastric glands. Again, Wells and Forbes noted that the latent period of the

psychogalvanic reflex (in man), which appears to be a phenomenon due to sweat glands, was about 3 seconds.

In contrast to these long delays before peripheral action in visceral structures barely starts are the observations of Wells; he found that the latent period of affective reactions to pictures of men and women ended not uncommonly within 0.8 second. More recent studies with odors as stimuli have yielded a similar figure (personal communication). According to the James-Lange theory, however, these affective reactions result from reverberations from the viscera. But how is that possible? To the long latent periods of smooth muscles and glands, cited above, there must be added the time required for the nerve impulses to pass from the brain to the periphery and thence back to the brain again. It is clear that the organic changes could not occur soon enough to be the occasion for the appearance of affective states, certainly not the affective states studied by Wells.

Artificial Induction of the Visceral Changes Typical of Strong Emotions Does Not Produce Them

That adrenin acts in the body so as to mimic the action of sympathetic nerve impulses has repeatedly been mentioned. When injected directly into the blood stream or under the skin it induces dilation of the bronchioles, constriction of blood vessels, liberation of sugar from the liver, stoppage of gastro-intestinal functions, and other changes such as are characteristic of intense emotions. If the emotions are the consequence of the visceral changes we should reasonably expect them, in accordance with the postulates of the James-Lange theory, to follow these changes in all cases. Incidental observations on students who received injections of adrenalin sufficiently large to produce general bodily effects have brought out the fact that no specific emotion was experienced by them—a few who had been in athletic competitions testified to feeling “on edge,” “keyed up,” just as before a race. In a careful study of the effects of adrenin on a large number of normal and abnormal persons Marañon has reported that the subjective experiences included sensations of precordial or epigastric palpitation, of diffuse arterial throbbing, of oppression in the chest and tightness in the throat, of trembling, of chilliness, of dryness of the mouth, of nervousness, malaise and weakness. Associated with these sensations there was *in certain cases* an indefinite affective state coldly appreciated, and without real emotion. The subjects remarked, “I feel as if afraid,” “as if awaiting a great joy,” “as if moved,” “as if I were going to weep without knowing why,” “as if I had a great fright yet am calm,” “as if they are about to do something to me.” In other words, as Marañon remarks, a clear distinction is drawn “between the perception of the peripheral phenomena of vegetative emotion (i.e., the bodily changes) and the psychical emotion proper, which does not exist and which permits the subjects to report on the vegetative syndrome with serenity, without true feeling.” In a smaller number of the affected cases a real emotion developed, usually that of sorrow, with tears, sobs and sighings. This occurs, however, “only when the emotional predisposition of the patient is very marked,” notably in hyperthyroid cases. In some instances Marañon found that this state supervened only when the

adrenalin was injected after a talk with the patients concerning their sick children or their dead parents. In short, only when an emotional mood already exists does adrenalin have a supporting effect.

From the evidence adduced by Marañon we may conclude that adrenin induces in human beings typical bodily changes which are reported as sensations, that in some cases these sensations are reminiscent of previous emotional experiences but do not renew or revive those experiences, that in exceptional cases of preparatory emotional sensitization the bodily changes may tip the scales towards a true affective disturbance. These last cases are exceptional, however, and are not the usual phenomena as James and Lange supposed. In normal conditions the bodily changes, though well marked, do not provoke emotion.

The numerous events occurring in the viscera in consequence of great excitement, as detailed in earlier chapters, have been interpreted as supporting the James-Lange theory. From the evidence just presented it should be clear that that interpretation is unwarranted. Since visceral processes are fortunately not a considerable source of sensation, since even extreme disturbances in them yield no noteworthy emotional experience, we can further understand now why these disturbances cannot serve as a means for discriminating between such pronounced emotions as fear and rage, why chilliness, asphyxia, hyperglycemia and fever, though attended by these disturbances, are not attended by emotion, and also why total exclusion of visceral factors from emotional expression makes no difference in emotional behavior. It is because the returns from the thoracic and abdominal "sounding-board," to use James's word, are very faint indeed, that they play such a minor rôle in the affective complex. The processes going on in the thoracic and abdominal organs in consequence of sympathetic activity are truly remarkable and various; their value to the organism, however, is not to add richness and flavor to experience, but rather to adapt the internal economy so that in spite of shifts of outer circumstance the even tenor of the inner life will not be profoundly disturbed.



JOHN DEWEY

(1859–1952)

Introduction

An outstanding American philosopher, John Dewey, like William James, was associated with the pragmatist movement in philosophy. And also like James, his interests included theoretical and applied psychology. Beginning his career as a schoolteacher, Dewey continued his interest in education, formulating an enormously influential theory of education, which stressed the importance of problem-solving situations in developing the child's intelligence. For ten years he headed the Dewey School, where he tested his psychological and educational theories.

Dewey obtained his degree in philosophy in 1884 and went on to teach philosophy at the University of Michigan, the University of Chicago, and Columbia University. Central to his philosophical thought was the notion of experience, and two of his major works are *Experience and Nature* (1925) and *Art as Experience* (1934). Dewey discounted earlier accounts of human experience that focused primarily on thinking and knowing. For Dewey, experience was primarily an interaction with one's environment; and thus, doing and feeling were also significant experiences. Dewey analyzed experience in terms of conflict and harmony: we constantly confront conflict, doubt, and indeterminateness, which we then resolve. This is as true of the scientist who explains an indeterminate body of data by means of a hypothesis as of the person who deliberates and decides on a course of action when faced with a moral conflict. Also central to his account of experience is a denial of any radical distinction between the subjective and the objective. A frightened person, for example, experiences his situation as frightening; this emotional quality is a real quality of the situation.

This view of experience lies at the heart of Dewey's theory of emotion and his criticisms of Darwin and James. In "The Theory of Emotion," published in 1894 and reprinted here, Dewey attacks Darwin for thinking that behavior *expresses* emotions. The person who jumps when startled does not, in fact, experience his jumping as an expression of fear; to him, it is a purposeful movement of avoiding a threatening object. Had Darwin paid more attention to the experience of emotion itself, he would not have made this mistake. Dewey also sharply criticizes James's theory (which equates emotion with the perception of physiological disturbances) for not explaining why emotions are so significant in our lives. To account for this, Dewey argues that emotions are experiences of the world—they are directed toward things in the environment that

possess such emotional qualities as frightening, cheering, and saddening. In spite of these objections, Dewey incorporates elements from James's and Darwin's theories into his own theory. He adds Darwin's emphasis on the survival value of emotional behavior and James's emphasis on physiological disturbances to his own emphasis on the role of problem solving in our experience of the world. As a result, Dewey argues that the physiological disturbances and overt behaviors that characterize a particular emotion are necessary in our dealing purposefully with an emotional situation. Thus, for instance, holding the breath, straining the attention, and preparing for flight are all movements of judicious caution in dealing with a frightening situation.

Dewey offers a three-part definition of emotion. Emotions include (1) a "qualé" or "feel" (the *feeling* of fear, joy, sadness, etc.), (2) purposeful behavior, and (3) an object that has an emotional quality. Although his explanation of these features is sometimes unclear, Dewey's theory of emotion is surprisingly sophisticated and complex and worthy of serious attention.

From The Theory of Emotion

1. *Emotional Attitudes*

In the following pages I propose, assuming Darwin's principles as to the explanation of emotional attitudes, and the James-Lange theory of the nature of emotion, to bring these two into some organic connection with each other, indicating the modifications of statement demanded by such connection. . . .

The necessity of bringing the two theories together may be seen from the fact that the very phrase "expression of emotion," as well as Darwin's method of stating the matter, begs the question of the relation of emotion to organic peripheral action, in that it assumes the former as prior and the latter as secondary.

1. Now this assumption, upon the basis of the discharge theory (as I shall call the James-Lange theory), is false. If one accept the latter theory, it is incumbent upon him to find the proper method of restating Darwin's principles, since there is no doubt of their substantial significance, however erroneous may be their underlying assumption as to the relation of emotion and peripheral disturbance.

2. One does not, however, need to be committed to James's theory to feel the need of a different way of stating the particular undoubted facts discovered by Darwin. Physiologists agree that there are no muscles intended primarily for purposes of expression. A psychological translation of this would be that there is no such thing (from the standpoint of the one having the experience) as expression. We call it expression when looking at it from the standpoint of an observer—whether a spectator or the person himself as scientifically reflecting upon his movements, or aesthetically enjoying them. The very word "expres-

sion" names the facts not as they are, but in their second intention. To an onlooker my angry movements are expressions—signs, indications; but surely not to me. To rate such movements as primarily expressive is to fall into the psychologist's fallacy: it is to confuse the standpoint of the observer and explainer with that of the fact observed. Movements *are*, as matter of fact, expressive, but they are also a great many other things. In themselves they are movements, acts, and must be treated as such if psychology is to take hold of them right end up.

3. I shall attempt to show, hereafter, that this standpoint of expression of pre-existent emotion complicates and aborts the explanation of the relevant facts in the cases of "antithesis" and "direct nervous discharge." At this stage I wish to point out that in the case of "serviceable associated habits," the principle of explanation *actually* used, whatever the form of words employed, is that of survival, in the form of attitudes, of acts originally useful not *qua* expressing emotion, but *qua* acts—as serving life. In the discussion of movements in animals (*Expression*, pp. 42–48) the reference to emotion is not even nominal. It is a matter of "satisfaction of desire" and "relieving disagreeable sensations"—practical ends. The expressions of grief and of anxiety are explained, in their detail, whatever the general phraseology employed, by reference to acts useful in themselves. . . . *The reference to emotion in explaining the attitude is wholly irrelevant; the attitude of emotion is explained positively by reference to useful movements.*

An examination of one apparent exception may serve to clear up the principle. Of laughter, Mr. Darwin says, "We can see in a vague manner how the utterance of sounds of some sort would naturally become associated with a pleasurable state of mind" (*Expression*, p. 207). But Darwin does not use this idea, even in a "vague" way. With his inevitable candor he goes on, "But why the sounds which man utters when he is pleased have the peculiar reiterated character of laughter we do not know."

Now I am not so rash as to attempt to deal in detail with laughter and its concomitant features, but I think something at least a little less vague than Mr. Darwin's account may be given. I cannot see, even in the vaguest way, why pleasure *qua* feeling (emotion?) should express itself in uttering sounds. As matter of fact it does not, nor even in smiles; it is pleasure of a certain qualitative excitement or vivacity which breaks out in laughter, and what we can see, in a "vague way," is why excitement affecting the entire organism should discharge in the vocal apparatus.

Why should the excitement, admitting that it affects the vocal organs, manifest itself in this form? While I feel pretty sure of the following explanation, I cannot hope that it will convince many. Though the result of considerable observation, it can be briefly summed up. The laugh is by no means to be viewed from the standpoint of humor; its connection with humor is secondary. It marks the ending (that is, the attainment of a unity) of a period of suspense, or expectation, an ending which is sharp and sudden. Rhythmical activities, as peek-a-boo, call out a laugh at every culmination of the transition, in an infant. A child of from one and a half to two years uses the laugh as a sign of assent; it is his emphatic "I do" or "yes" to any suggested idea to which he agrees or which suddenly meets his expectations.

A very moderate degree of observation of adults will convince one that a large amount of laughter is wholly irrelevant to any joke or witticism whatever. It is a constant and repeated "sign" of attaining suddenly to a point. Now all expectancy, waiting, suspended effort, etc., is accompanied, for obvious teleological reasons, with taking in and holding a full breath, and the maintenance of the whole muscular system in a state of considerable tension. It is a divided activity, part of the kinaesthetic images being fixed upon the immediately present conditions, part upon the expected end. Now let the end suddenly "break," "dawn," let one see the "point" and this energy discharges—the getting the point is the unity, the discharge. This sudden relaxation of strain, so far as occurring through the medium of the breathing and vocal apparatus, is laughter. Its rhythmic character seems to be simply a phase of the general teleological principle that all well-arranged or economical action is rhythmical.

[On this interpretation] the phenomena of matured grief become easily explainable. They are phenomena of *loss*. Reactions surge forth to some stimulus, or phase of a situation; the object appropriate to most of these, the factor necessary to co-ordinate all the rising discharges, is gone; and hence they interfere with one another—the expectation, or kinæsthetic image, is thrown back upon itself.

4. In dealing with grief we have unconsciously entered upon a new field. The point of our third head is that the principle which Darwin calls that of "movements useful in expressing an emotion" explains the relevant facts only when changed to read "useful as parts of an act which is useful as movement." In dealing with grief we have passed over into the phenomena of the breakdown of a given teleological coordination, and the performance of acts which, therefore, objectively viewed, are not only useless but may be harmful. My proposition at this point is that the phenomena referred to the principle of direct nervous discharge (the response to an idiopathic* stimulus) are cases of the failure of habitual teleological machinery, through some disturbance in one or more of the adjusted members of the habit.

In order to avoid misconception, let me point out a great ambiguity in the use of the term idiopathic. In one sense even the "associated useful" movements are idiopathic, provided, that is, they originally were useful in reaching an end, and not simply in expressing an emotion. They are the reactions to their appropriate stimuli, and the sole difference between them and the liver changes, nausea, palpitation of heart, etc., usually classed as idiopathic, is that in them stimuli and reaction are more definitely limited to certain particular channels than in the latter cases; there is a defined, as against a vague and diffuse, direct nervous discharge.

Admitting, then, that all emotional attitudes whatever are idiopathic in the broad sense, the sole difference being in the definiteness or limitation of the stimulus and its response, what are we to do with the cases now disposed of as "idiopathic" in the narrower sense?—such phenomena as Mr. James briefly but

*Spontaneous, peculiar, cause(s) unknown.

excellently sums up (*Psychology*, Vol. II). My proposition, I repeat, is that all such idiopathic discharges, possessing emotional quality, are in reality disturbances, defects, or alienations of the *adjusted* movements. While not immediately teleological in the sense that they themselves are useful, they are teleologically conditioned. They are cases of the disintegration of associations (co-ordinations) which are serviceable, or are the use of means under circumstances in which they are totally inappropriate.

Idiopathic discharges which are not themselves adjusted movements or the disturbances of such adjusted movements do not appear to me to have any *emotional* quality at all. The trembling with cold or sheer fatigue is certainly qualitatively different from the tremble of rage or fear. . . . The change from mere cachinnation to mirthful emotion is a distinct change in psychical quality, and this change of quality does not seem to be adequately *accounted* for by mere addition of more discharges. . . .

This is but to say, from the psychological side, that all normal emotion of terror has an *object*, and involves an attitude *towards* that object; this attitude, under the given circumstances, perhaps not being useful, nay, being harmful, but yet the reproduction of an attitude or, rather, a mixture of attitudes which have been useful in the past. The uselessness of the attitude is due to the fact that some feature in the stimulus (the situation or object) awakens its appropriate reactions, but these do not co-ordinate with the reactions aroused by other features of the situation. The pathological emotion is, as Mr. James calls it, the *objectless* emotion, but its content is controlled by the active attitudes previously assumed towards objects, and, *from its own standpoint*, it is not objectless; it goes on at once to supply itself with an object, with a rational excuse for being. This immediate correlation of the emotion with an "object," and its immediate tendency to assume the "object" when it is not there, seem to me mere tautology for saying that the emotional attitude is normally rational in content (i.e., adjusted to some end), and, even in pathological cases, sufficiently teleological in form to subsume an object for itself.

Coming a little more to details, it is obvious that the teleological principle carries within itself a certain limitation. Normal and usual are identical; the habit is based upon the customary features of the situation. The very meaning of habit is limitation to a certain average range of fluctuation. Now if an entirely strange (forgive the contradiction in terms) stimulus occurs, there will be no disturbance of function, though the organism may be destroyed by the impact of the foreign force. But let some of the features of a situation habitually associated in the past with other features be present while these others fail, or let the ordinary proportion or relative strength of stimuli be changed, or let their mode of connection be reversed, and there is bound to be a disturbance and a resulting activity which, *objectively viewed*, is non-teleological. We thus get an *a priori* canon, as it were, for determining when, in a given emotion, we shall get symptoms falling under the "serviceable associated habit" principle and when under the idiopathic. Whenever the various factors of the act, muscular movement, nutritive, respiratory, and circulatory changes, are co-ordinated and reinforce each other, it is the former; whenever they interfere (the "idiopathic"), the "feel"

of this interference *is* (applying the general principle of James) the pathological rage, or terror, or expectation.

Once more, we work in a wrong, a hopeless direction when we start from the emotion and attempt to derive the movements as its expression; while the situation clears itself up when we start from the character of the movement, as a completed or disturbed co-ordination, and then derive the corresponding types of normal and pathological emotion. We can understand why the so-called idiopathic principle comes into play in all cases of extreme emotion, the maximum limit seeming to be the passage into spasm when it assumes a rigid type, of hysteria when it involves complete breakdown of co-ordination.

The attitude of normal fear may be accounted for upon direct teleological principles; the holding of breath marks the effort; the opening of mouth, the act arrested half-ways; the opening of eyes, the strained attention; the shiver, of retraction; the crouching down, the beginning of escape; the rapid beating of heart, the working up of energy for escape, etc. Now if these activities go on to complete themselves, if, that is, they suggest the further reaction which will co-ordinate into a definite response, we get judicious fear—that is, caution. Now if these do not suggest a further movement which completes the act, some or all of these factors begin to assert themselves in consciousness, isolatedly or in alternation—there is confusion. Moreover, each particular phase of the act which is normal in co-ordination, as the more rapid beating of the heart, being now uncontrolled by lack of its relevant motor associates, is exaggerated and becomes more and more violent. The response to the normal demand for more nutrition finds no regular outlet in supplying the motor-energy for the useful act, and the disturbances of viscera and associated organs propagate themselves. The trembling marks, so far as I can see, simply this same discoordination on the side of the muscular system. It is the extreme of vacillating indecision; we start to do this, and the other thing, but each act falls athwart its predecessor.

The pathological emotion is, then, simply a case of morbid self-consciousness. Those factors of the organism which relate most immediately to the welfare of the organism, the vegetative functions, absorb consciousness, instead of being, as they normally are, subsidiary to the direction of muscular activity with reference to the "object." This is equally true in extreme terror, and in being "beside one's self" with anger. The cases in which sanguine excitement and apprehension affect the bladder will be found, I believe, to be almost uniformly cases where it is not possible to do anything at once with the aroused activities; they cannot be controlled by being directed towards the putting forth of effort upon the "object," that being too remote or uncertain. . . .

All these facts taken cumulatively seem to me to render it fairly certain that the "idiopathic" cases, as a rule, are to be conceived of as the starting of activities formerly useful for a given end, but which now, for some reason, fail to function, and therefore stand out in consciousness apart from the needed end.

5. I come now to the principle of antithesis. According to Mr. Darwin, when certain movements have been habitually of service in connection with certain emotions, there is a tendency, when a directly opposite state of mind is induced,

to the performance of movements of a directly opposite nature, "*though these have never been of any use*" (*Expression*, italics mine). Here we have a crucial case; if the antithesis of the emotion determines the antithesis of expression, James's theory is, in so far, overthrown; if, on the other hand, the antithesis of "expression" goes back to activities having their own ends, the ground is at least cleared for the discharge theory.

Beginning with animals, Mr. Darwin illustrates his principle of antithesis from the cat and dog. No one can read his account or examine the pictures without being convinced that the movements *are* antithetical. But there is something intolerable to the psychologist in the supposition that an opposite emotion can somehow select for itself channels of discharge not already used for some specific end, and those channels such as give rise to directly opposed movements. Antithesis is made a causal force. Such an idea is not conceivable without some presiding genius who opens valves and pulls strings. . . .

If, again, the matter be treated as a case of the connection of movements with reference to certain acts, the mystery vanishes. Mr. Darwin's cases are taken from domestic animals. Now wild animals have, speaking roughly, just two fundamental characteristic attitudes—those connected with getting food, including attack upon enemies, and those of defense, including flight, etc. A domestic animal, by the very fact that it is domestic, has another characteristic attitude, that of reception—the attitude of complete adaptation to something outside itself. This attitude is constituted, of course, by a certain co-ordination of movements; and these are antithetical to those movements involved in the contrary attitude, that of resistance or opposition. . . . The attitude of "humility" and "affection" consists, as Mr. Darwin well says, in continuous, flexuous movements. These movements are precisely those of response and adaptation. The centre of gravity is, as it were, in the master, and the lithe and sinuous movement is the solution of the problem of maintaining balance with respect to every change in this external centre of gravity. It is the attitude of receiving favor and food from another. The dependence is actual, not symbolic. . . .

Summing up, we may say that all so-called expressions of emotions are, in reality, the reduction of movements and stimulations originally useful into attitudes. But we note a difference in the form and nature of the reduction, and in the resulting attitudes, which explain the apparent diversity of the four principles of "serviceable associated habits," of "analogous stimuli," of "antithesis," and of "direct nervous discharge." A given movement or set of movements may be useful either as preparatory to, as leading up to, another set of acts, or in themselves as accomplished ends. Movements of effort, of bracing, of reaching, etc., evidently come under the former head. Here we have the case of useful associated movements in its strict sense. The culmination of all these preparatory adjustments is the attainment of food, or of the sexual embrace. In so far as we have attitudes which reflect these acts, satisfying in themselves, we get cases of so-called analogous stimuli. The antithetical attitudes of joy and grief, and all that is differentiated from them, mark the further development of actual attainment of an end (or failure to get it), occurring when the activity specially appropriate to the particular end reached (or missed) is reinforced and expanded by

a wide range of contributory muscular and visceral changes. The cases of failure bring us to the breakdown of co-ordinations habitually useful, to their alienation, or to reciprocal disturbance of their various factors, and thus to the facts usually subsumed under the idiopathic principle. In this progression we have a continually changing ratio of the vegetative to the motor functions. In the preparatory adjustments the latter has the highest exponent, and the strictly emotional *quale* of feeling is at its minimum. In joy and grief, as in less degree with "sweetness," disgust, etc., the organic resonance is at its height, but strictly subservient to the motor performances. In the idiopathic these vegetative functions break loose and run away, and thus, instead of reinforcing the efficiency of behavior, interfere by their absorption of consciousness.

In the following I shall take up the discharge theory of the nature of emotion, and discuss it in the light of the conclusions now reached.

II. *The Significance of Emotions*

In [the] preceding I endeavored to show that all the so-called expressions of emotion are to be accounted for not by reference to emotion, but by reference to movements having some use, either as direct survivals or as disturbances of teleological co-ordinations. I tried to show that, upon this basis, the various principles for explaining emotional attitudes may be reduced to certain obvious and typical *differentiæ* within the teleological movements. In the present paper I wish to reconsider the James-Lange, or discharge, theory of the nature of emotion from the standpoint thus gained; for if all emotions (considered as "emotional seizures," *Affect* or "feel," as I may term it) are constituted by the reflexion of the teleological attitude, the motor and organic discharges, into consciousness, the same principle which explains the attitude must serve to analyze the emotion.

The fact, if it be a fact, that all "emotional expression" is a phase of movements teleologically determined, and not a result of pre-existent emotion, is itself a strong argument for the discharge theory. I had occasion to point out in my previous article that the facts brought under the head of "antithesis" and "analogous stimuli" are absolutely unaccountable upon the central theory, and are matters of course upon the James theory. But this statement may be further generalized. If every emotional attitude is referred to useful acts, and if the emotion is *not* the reflex of such an act, where does it come in, and what is its relation to the attitude? The first half of the hypothesis prevents its being the antecedent of the attitude; the latter half of the hypothesis precludes its being the consequent. . . . I think, then, that logic fairly demands either the surrender of the "central" theory of emotion or else a refutation of the argument of the preceding paper, and a proof that emotional attitudes are to be explained by reference to emotion, and not by reference to acts.

More positively, this reference to serviceable movement in explanation of emotional attitudes, taken in connection with the hypothesis that the emotional "feel" is always due to the return wave of this attitude, supplies a positive tool for the analysis of emotion in general and of particular emotions in especial. . . . The general conclusion indicated regarding the nature of emotion is that:

Emotion in its entirety is a mode of behavior which is purposive, or has an intellectual content, and which also reflects itself into feeling or Affects, as the subjective valuation of that which is objectively expressed in the idea or purpose.

This formula, however, is no more than a putting together of James's theory with the revision of Darwin's principles attempted in the last number. If an attitude (of emotion) is the recurrence, in modified form, of some teleological movement, and if the specific differentia of emotional consciousness is the resonance of such attitude, then emotional excitation is the felt process of realization of ideas. The chief interest lies in making this formula more specific.

In the first place, this mode of getting at it relieves Mr. James's statement of the admittedly paradoxical air which has surrounded it. . . . He expressly refers to his task as "subtracting certain *elements of feeling* from an emotional state supposed to exist *in its fulness*" (italics mine). And in his article, he definitely states that he is speaking of an *Affect*, or emotional seizure. By this I understand him to mean that he is not dealing with emotion as a concrete whole of experience, but with an abstraction from the actual emotion of that element which gives it its differentia—its feeling *quale*, its "feel." As I understand it, he did not conceive himself as dealing with that state which we term "being angry," but rather with the peculiar "feel" which any one has when he is angry, an element which may be intellectually abstracted, but certainly has no existence by itself, or as full-fledged emotion-experience. . . .

What the whole condition of *being* angry, or hopeful or sorry may be, Mr. James nowhere says, nor does he indicate why or how the "feel" of anger is related to them. Hence the inference either that he is considering the whole emotion-experience in an inadequate way, or else—as Mr. Irons took it—that he is denying the very existence of emotion, reducing it to mere consciousness of bodily change as such. Certainly, even when we have admitted that the emotional differentia, or "feel," is the reverberation of organic changes following upon the motor response to stimulus, we have still to *place* this "feel" with reference to the other phases of the concrete emotion-experience. . . .

If, preparatory to attempting such a placing, we put before us the whole concrete emotional experience, we find, I think, that it has two phases beside that of *Affect*, or seizure. (1) It is a disposition, a mode of conduct, a way of behaving. Indeed, it is this practical aspect of emotion which common speech mainly means to refer to in its emotional terms. When we say that John Smith is very resentful at the treatment he has received, or is hopeful of success in business, or regrets that he accepted a nomination for office, we do not simply, or even chiefly, mean that he has a certain "feel" occupying his consciousness. We mean he is in a certain practical attitude, has assumed a readiness to act in certain ways. I should not fear a man who had simply the "feel" of anger, nor should I sympathize with one having simply the "feel" of grief. Grief means *unwillingness* to resume the normal occupation, practical discouragement, breaking-up of the normal reactions, etc., etc. Just as anger means a tendency to explode in a sudden attack, not a mere state of feeling. We certainly do not deny nor overlook the "feel" phase, but in ordinary speech the behavior side of emotion is, I think, always uppermost in consciousness. The connotation of emotion is primarily ethical, only secondarily psychical. Hence our insulted feeling

a wide range of contributory muscular and visceral changes. The cases of failure bring us to the breakdown of co-ordinations habitually useful, to their alienation, or to reciprocal disturbance of their various factors, and thus to the facts usually subsumed under the idiopathic principle. In this progression we have a continually changing ratio of the vegetative to the motor functions. In the preparatory adjustments the latter has the highest exponent, and the strictly emotional *quale* of feeling is at its minimum. In joy and grief, as in less degree with "sweetness," disgust, etc., the organic resonance is at its height, but strictly subservient to the motor performances. In the idiopathic these vegetative functions break loose and run away, and thus, instead of reinforcing the efficiency of behavior, interfere by their absorption of consciousness.

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What the whole condition of *being angry*, or hopeful or sorry may be, Mr. James nowhere says, nor does he indicate why or how the "feel" of anger is related to them. Hence the inference either that he is considering the whole emotion-experience in an inadequate way, or else—as Mr. Irons took it—that he is denying the very existence of emotion, reducing it to mere consciousness of bodily change as such. Certainly, even when we have admitted that the emotional differentia, or "feel," is the reverberation of organic changes following upon the motor response to stimulus, we have still to *place* this "feel" with reference to the other phases of the concrete emotion-experience. . . .

If, preparatory to attempting such a placing, we put before us the whole concrete emotional experience, we find, I think, that it has two phases beside that of *Affect*, or seizure. (1) It is a disposition, a mode of conduct, a way of behaving. Indeed, it is this practical aspect of emotion which common speech mainly means to refer to in its emotional terms. When we say that John Smith is very resentful at the treatment he has received, or is hopeful of success in business, or regrets that he accepted a nomination for office, we do not simply, or even chiefly, mean that he has a certain "feel" occupying his consciousness. We mean he is in a certain practical attitude, has assumed a readiness to act in certain ways. I should not fear a man who had simply the "feel" of anger, nor should I sympathize with one having simply the "feel" of grief. Grief means *unwillingness* to resume the normal occupation, practical discouragement, breaking-up of the normal reactions, etc., etc. Just as anger means a tendency to explode in a sudden attack, not a mere state of feeling. We certainly do not deny nor overlook the "feel" phase, but in ordinary speech the behavior side of emotion is, I think, always uppermost in consciousness. The connotation of emotion is primarily ethical, only secondarily psychical. Hence our insulted feeling

when told (as we hastily read it—our interpretation is “slap-dash” rather than the sentence itself) that we are not angry until we strike, for the sudden readiness to injure another is precisely what we mean by anger. Let the statement read that we do not have the emotional seizure, the “feel” of anger, till we strike, or clench our fist, or have our blood boil, etc., and the statement not only loses its insultingly paradoxical quality, but (unless my introspection meets a different scene from that of others) is verified by every passing emotion. (2) But the full emotional experience also always has its “object” or intellectual content. The emotion is always “about” or “toward” something; it is “at” or “on account of” something, and this prepositional reference is an integral phase of the single pulse of emotion; for emotion, as well as the idea, comes as a whole carrying its distinctions of value within it. The child who ceases to be angry *at* something—were it only the floor at last—but who keeps up his kicking and screaming, has passed over into sheer spasm. It is then no more an emotion of anger than it is one of æsthetic appreciation. Disgust, terror, gratitude, sulkiness, curiosity—take all the emotions seriatim and see what they would be without the intrinsic reference to idea or object. Even the pathological or objectless emotion is so only to the rational spectator. To the experiencer (if I may venture the term) it subsumes at once its own object as source or aim. This feeling of depression must have its reason; the world is dark and gloomy; no one understands me; I have a dread disease; I have committed the unpardonable sin. This feeling of buoyancy must have its ideal reference; I am a delightful person, or one of the elect or have had a million dollars left me.

It is perhaps at this point that the need of some reconstruction which will enable us to place the phases of an entire emotional experience becomes most urgent. In Mr. James's statement the experience is apparently (apparently, I say; I do not know how much is due to the exigency of discussion which necessitates a seeming isolation) split up into three separate parts: First comes the object or idea which operates only as stimulus; secondly, the mode of behavior taken as discharge of this stimulus; third, the *Affect*, or emotional excitation, as the repercussion of this discharge. No such seriality or separation attaches to the emotion as an experience. Nor does reflective analysis seem to establish this order as the best expression of the emotion as an object of psychological abstraction. We might almost infer from the way Mr. James leaves it that he is here a believer in that atomic or mosaic composition of consciousness which he has so effectively dealt with in the case of intellectual consciousness. However this may be, Mr. James certainly supplies us, in the underlying *motif* of this “chapter” on emotion, with an adequate instrument of reconstruction. This is the thought that the organic discharge is an *instinctive* reaction, not a response to an idea as such.

Following the lead of this idea, we are easily brought to the conclusion that *the mode of behavior is the primary thing, and that the idea and the emotional excitation are constituted at one and the same time; that, indeed, they represent the tension of stimulus and response within the co-ordination which makes up the mode of behavior.*

It is sheer reflective interpretation to say that the activity in anger is set up by the object, if we by object mean something consciously apprehended as object. This interpretation, if we force it beyond a mere way of speaking into the facts themselves, becomes a case of the psychological fallacy. If my bodily

changes of beating heart, trembling and running legs, sinking in stomach, looseness of bowels, etc., follow from and grow out of the conscious recognition, *qua conscious recognition*, of a bear, then I see no way for it but that the bear is already a bear of which we are afraid—our idea must be of the bear as a fearful object. But if (as Mr. James's fundamental idea would imply, however his language may read at times) this reaction is not to the bear as *object*, nor to the *idea* of bear, but simply expresses an instinctive co-ordination of two organic tendencies, then the case is quite different. It is not the idea of the bear, or the bear as object, but a certain *act of seeing*, which by habit, whether inherited or acquired, sets up other acts. It is the kind of *co-ordination of acts* which, brought to sensational consciousness, constitutes the bear a fearful or a laughable or an indifferent object. The following sentence, for example, from James seems to involve a mixture of his own theory with the one which he is engaged in combatting: "Whatever be our reaction on the situation, in the last resort it is an *instinctive reaction* on that one of its elements which strikes us for the time being *as most vitally important*." The conception of an instinctive reaction is the relevant idea; that of reaction upon an element "which strikes us as important" the incongruous idea. Does it strike us, *prior* to the reaction, as important? Then, most certainly, it already has emotional worth; the situation is already delightful and to be perpetuated, or terrible and to be fled, or whatever. What does recognition of importance mean aside from the ascription of worth, value—that is, aside from the projection of emotional experience? But I do not think James's expression in this and other similar passages is to be taken literally. The reaction is not made on the basis of the apprehension of some quality in the object; it is made on the basis of an organized habit, of an organized co-ordination of activities, one of which instinctively stimulates the other. The outcome of this co-ordination of activities constitutes, for the first time, the object with such and such an import—terrible, delightful, etc.—or constitutes an emotion referring to such and such an object. For, we must insist once more, the frightful object and the emotion of fear are two names for the same experience.

Here, then, is our point of departure in placing the "feel," the "idea," and the "mode of behavior" in relation to one another. The idea or object which precedes and stimulates the bodily discharge is in no sense the idea or object (the intellectual content, the "at" or "on account of") of the emotion itself. The particular idea, the specific quality or object to which the seizure attaches, is just as much due to the discharge as is the seizure itself. More accurately and definitely, the idea or the object is an abstraction from the activity just as much as is the "feel" or seizure. We have certain organic activities initiated, say in the eye, stimulating, through organized paths of association in the brain, certain activities of hands, legs, etc., and (through the co-ordination of these motor activities with the vegetative functions necessary to maintain them) of lungs, heart, vasomotor system, digestive organs, etc. The "bear" is, psychologically, just as much a discrimination of certain values, within this total pulse or co-ordination of action, as is the feeling of "fear." The "bear" is constituted by the excitations of eye and co-ordinated touch centres, just as the "terror" is by the disturbances of muscular and glandular systems. The reality, the co-ordination of these partial activities, is that whole activity which may be described equally well as

"that terrible bear," or "Oh, how frightened I am." It is precisely and identically the same actual concrete experience; and the "bear," considered as one experience, and the "fright," considered as another, are distinctions introduced in reflection upon this experience, not separate experience. It is the psychological fallacy again if the differences which result from the reflection are carried over into the experience itself. If the fright comes, then the bear is not the bear of that particular experience, is not the object to which the feeling attaches, *except* as the fright comes. Any other supposition is to confuse the abstract bear of science with the concrete (*just this*) bear of experience.

If, then, I may paraphrase Mr. James's phraseology, the statement would read as follows: Our customary analysis, reading over into the experience itself what we find by interpreting it, says we have an idea of the bear as something to be escaped, and so run away. The hypothesis here propounded is that the factors of a co-ordination (whether due to inherited instinct or to individually acquired habit) begin to operate and we run away; running away, we get the idea of "running-away-from-bear," or of "bear-as-thing-to-be-run-from." I suppose every one would admit that the complete, mature idea came only in and through the act of running, but might hold that an embryonic suggestion of running came before the running. I cannot disprove this position, but everything seems to point the other way. It is more natural to suppose that as the full idea of running away comes in from the full execution, so the vague suggestion comes through the vague starting-up-of the system, mediated by discharge from the centres. . . .

We return, then, confirmed, to our belief that the mode of behavior, or co-ordination of activities, constitutes the ideal content of emotion just as much as it does the *Affect* or "feel," and that the distinction of these two is not given in the experience itself, but simply in reflection upon the experience. The mode of action constituted by the organic co-ordination of certain sensori-motor (or ideo-motor) activities, on one side, and of certain vegetative-motor activities on the other, is the reality, and this reality has a value, which, when interpreted, we call intellectual, and a value which, when interpreted we call *Affect*, or "feel." In the terms of our illustration, the mode of behavior carried with it the concept of the bear as a thing to be acted towards in a certain way, and of the "feel" of our reaction. It is brown and chained—a "beautiful" object to be looked at. It is soft and fluffy—an "aesthetic" object to be felt of. It is tame and clumsy—an "amusing" object to while away time with. It is hungry and angry—and is a "ferocious" object to be fled. The consciousness of our mode of behavior as affording data for other possible actions constitutes the bear an objective or ideal content. The consciousness of the mode of behavior as something in itself—the looking, petting, running, etc.—constitutes the emotional seizure. In all concrete experience of emotion these two phases are organically united in a single pulse of consciousness.

It follows from this that all emotion, as excitation, involves inhibition. This is not absolute inhibition; it is not suppression or displacement. It is incidental to the co-ordination. The two factors of the co-ordination, the "exciting stimulus" and the excited response, have to be adjusted, and the period of adjustment required to affect the co-ordination, marks the inhibition of each required to

effect its reconstruction as an integral part of the whole act. Or, since we have recognized that the exciting stimulus does not exist as fact, or object, until constituted such by the co-ordination in the final act, let us say that the activities needing adjustment, and so partial inhibition, are the kinæsthetic (sensori-motor or ideo-motor) activities which translate themselves into the "object," and the vegetative-motor activities which constitute the "reaction" or "response" to the "object."

But here, again, in order to avoid getting on the wrong track it must be noted that this distinction of "object" and "response" is one of interpretation, or value, and not a plain matter of course difference in the experiencing. I have already tried to show that the "object" itself is an organic excitation on the sensori-motor, or, mediately, ideo-motor side, and that it is not *the* peculiar object of the emotion until the mode of behavior sets in, and the diffusive wave repercussates in consciousness. But it is equally necessary to recognize that the very distinction between exciting or stimulating sensori-motor activity and excited or responding vegetative-motor activity is teleological and not merely factual. It is because these two activities have to be co-ordinated in a single act, to accomplish a single end, and have therefore to be so adjusted as to co-operate with each other, that they present themselves as stimulus and response. . . .

In psychological terms, this tension is always between the activity which constitutes, when interpreted, the object as an intellectual content, and that which constitutes the response or mode of dealing with it. There is the one phase of organic activity which constitutes the bear as object; there is the other which would attack it, or run away from it, or stand one's ground before it. If these two co-ordinate *without friction*, or if one immediately displaces the other, there is no emotional seizure. If they co-exist, both pulling apart as complete in themselves and pulling together as parts of a new whole, there is great emotional excitement. It is this tension which makes it impossible to describe any emotion whatever without using dual terms—one for the *Affect* itself, the other for the object "at," "towards," or "on account of," which it is.

We may now connect this analysis with the result of the consideration of the emotional attitudes. The attitude is precisely that which was a complete activity once, but is no longer so. The activity of seizing prey or attacking an enemy, a movement having its meaning in itself, is now reduced or aborted; it is an attitude simply. As an instinctive reaction it is thoroughly ingrained in the system; it represents the actual co-ordinations of thousands and thousands of ancestors; it tends to start into action, therefore, whenever its associated stimulus occurs. . . . There is no reason to suppose that the original activity of attack or seizure was emotional, or had any *quale* attached to it such as we now term "anger." The animal of our ancestor so far as it was given up without restraint to the full activity undoubtedly had a feeling of activity; but just because the activity was undivided, it was not "emotion"; it was not "at," or "towards" an object held in tension against itself. This division could come in only when there was a need of co-ordinating the activity which corresponded to the perception and that which corresponded to the fighting, as means to an activity which was neither perceiving nor fighting. . . . Certainly, so far as I can trust my own intro-

spection, whenever my anger or any strong emotion has gained complete possession of me, the peculiar *Affect quale* has disappeared. I remember well a youthful fight, with the emotions of irritation and anger before, and of partial fear and partial pride afterwards, but as to the intervening period of the fight nothing but a strangely vivid perception of the other boy's face as the hypnotizing focus of all my muscular activities. On the other side, my most intense and vengeful feelings of anger are associated with cases where my whole body was so sat on as to prevent the normal reaction. Every one knows how the smart and burn of the feeling of injustice increases with the feeling of impotency; it is, for example, when strikes are beginning to fail that violence from anger or revenge, as distinct from sheer criminality, sets in. It is a common-place that the busy philanthropist has no occasion to feel the extreme emotion of pathos which the spectator or reader of literature feels. Cases might be multiplied *ad libitum*.

It is then in the reduction of activities once performed for their own sake, to attitudes now useful simply as supplying a contributory, a reinforcing or checking factor, in some more comprehensive activity, that we have all the conditions for high emotional disturbance. The tendency to large diffusive waves of discharge is present, and the inhibition of this outgoing activity through some perception or idea is also present. The need of somehow reaching an adjustment of these two sides is urgent. The attitude stands for a recapitulation of thousands of acts formerly done, ends formerly reached; the perception or idea stands for multitudes of acts which may be done, ends which may be acted upon. But the immediate and present need is to get this attitude of anger which reflects the former act of seizing into some connection with the act of getting-even or of moral control, or whatever the idea may be. The conflict and competition, with incidental inhibition and deflection, is the disturbance of the emotional seizure.

Upon this basis, the apparent strangeness or absurdity in the fact that a mere organic repercussion should have such tremendous values in consciousness disappears. This organic return of the discharge wave stands for the entire effort of the organism to adjust its formed habits or co-ordinations of the past to present necessities as made known in perception or idea. The emotion is, *psychologically, the adjustment or tension of habit and ideal*, and the organic changes in the body are the literal working out, in concrete terms, of the struggle of adjustment. We may recall once more the three main phases presented in this adjustment as now giving us the basis of the classification of the emotions. There may be a failure to adjust the vegetative-motor function, the habit, to the sensori- (or ideo-) motor; there may be the effort, or there may be the success. The effort, moreover, also has a double form according as the attempt is in the main so to use the formed reactions as to avoid or exclude the idea or object, setting up another in its place, or to incorporate and assimilate it—e.g., terror and anger, dread and hope, regret and complacency, etc.



SIGMUND FREUD

(1856-1939)

Introduction

Freud did not develop a theory of emotion as such, but his psychoanalytical theories radically changed the whole idea of emotions and sorts of phenomena that theories of emotion are supposed to explain. With his concept of "the Unconscious," Freud recast our entire "topography" of the mind. Mental events, including emotions, were no longer assumed to be "in consciousness"; they could also undergo a variety of dynamically caused "vicissitudes," which sometimes prevented us from being aware of them. And yet, as Freud amply demonstrated in his meticulous case histories, an emotion, although unconscious, could still influence a person's behavior just as dramatically and in much the same way that it would if it were fully conscious. This, in turn, required a new way of thinking about emotions in general. For one thing, it meant that psychologists would pay less attention and give less credence to the conscious reports of a person; what was "going on" in his or her mind was not always a matter which he or she was most competent to discuss.

In all of Freud's theories of the mind, there were the same assumptions: the ultimate cause of the emotion is "psychic energy"; there are unconscious processes of which a person may not or cannot be aware; the mind is separated into different parts or "agencies," which come into conflict; and infantile experiences, especially those of a sexual nature, profoundly influence adult behavior and psychology. In the first part of his career, Freud divided the mind into three components, which he sometimes described as "chambers." There is the Conscious, a Preconscious, which can emerge into consciousness at any time, and the Unconscious, which cannot become conscious because of repression, which "censors" ideas and information too threatening or obscene or embarrassing. The first selection here, written in 1915, presents this system of thought. After 1923 Freud developed his better-known "agency" view of the mind, dividing it into the Id (the source of instincts), the Ego (the rational self), and the Superego (the internalization of the rules and restrictions learned from one's parents and other authorities). But in both theories, the notion of unconscious emotions played an important, but ambiguous role.

In fact, Freud never developed an adequate or consistent view of emotions and the Unconscious. He often referred to emotions as "affects," by which he usually meant a sensation, a "felt feeling" or "the conscious subjective aspect of an emotion"; as such, he denied

that an emotion can be unconscious. But throughout his career, he referred without hesitation to such emotions as "unconscious guilt" and "repressed hostility." Thus, Freud ambiguously describes an emotion as just a "feeling-tone" or as a complex that includes not only a feeling (an affect), but also an *instinct* that motivates it and an *idea* that directs it towards an object. (Freud learned this terminology from Brentano, who was once his teacher. See Part III.)

It is possible to distinguish three different views of emotion in Freud's work, based on the three components instinct, idea, and affect:

1. An emotion is itself an instinct or an innate drive, which is essentially unconscious.
2. An emotion is an instinct plus an idea—a drive from within the unconscious, but aimed at a conscious object. In this analysis, an emotion becomes unconscious when the idea is separated from its instinct, so that one might experience it without knowing what or why.
3. An emotion is just an affect, just a feeling, or what William James called an "epiphenomenon," a by-product of the processes of the mind. In this analysis, an emotion cannot be unconscious, although its causes may be. The most common symptom in psychoanalytical studies, "free-floating anxiety," is an affect that is no longer connected to any known cause or object.

Born in Freiburg, Freud lived in Vienna almost the whole of his life, until he was forced to flee the Nazis as an old man. He was always interested in philosophy, but entered a career in medicine, however, and became a clinical neurologist. In 1884, he collaborated with Joseph Breuer on studies of hysterical patients who had been cured by allowing them to express fears and feelings through hypnosis. In 1885, he continued these studies with Charcot in Paris, and in the next decade, he developed the theory of "free association" and analysis that would become "psychoanalysis." In 1900, he published his classic *Interpretation of Dreams*, and in 1905, his *Three Studies in Sexuality*. The two selections that follow are from his 1915 essay "The Unconscious" and his *General Lectures on Psychoanalysis* of the same period.

From The Unconscious



We have learnt from psycho-analysis that the essence of the process of repression lies, not in putting an end to, in annihilating, the idea which represents an

instinct, but in preventing it from becoming conscious. When this happens we say of the idea that it is in a state of being "unconscious" and we can produce good evidence to show that even when it is unconscious it can produce effects, even including some which finally reach consciousness. Everything that is repressed must remain unconscious; but let us state at the very outset that the repressed does not cover everything that is unconscious. The unconscious has the wider compass: the repressed is a part of the unconscious.

How are we to arrive at a knowledge of the unconscious? It is of course only as something conscious that we know it, after it has undergone transformation or translation into something conscious. Psycho-analytic work shows us every day that translation of this kind is possible. In order that this should come about, the person under analysis must overcome certain resistances—the same resistances as those which, earlier, made the material concerned into something repressed by rejecting it from the conscious.

Justification for the Concept of the Unconscious

Our right to assume the existence of something mental that is unconscious and to employ that assumption for the purposes of scientific work is disputed in many quarters. To this we can reply that our assumption of the unconscious is *necessary* and *legitimate*, and that we possess numerous proofs of its existence.

It is *necessary* because the data of consciousness have a very large number of gaps in them; both in healthy and in sick people psychical acts often occur which can be explained only by presupposing other acts, of which, nevertheless, consciousness affords no evidence. These not only include parapraxes and dreams in healthy people, and everything described as a psychical symptom or an obsession in the sick; our most personal daily experience acquaints us with ideas that come into our head we do not know from where, and with intellectual conclusions arrived at we do not know how. All these conscious acts remain disconnected and unintelligible if we insist upon claiming that every mental act that occurs in us must also necessarily be experienced by us through consciousness; on the other hand, they fall into a demonstrable connection if we interpolate between them the unconscious acts which we have inferred. A gain in meaning is a perfectly justifiable ground for going beyond the limits of direct experience. When, in addition, it turns out that the assumption of there being an unconscious enables us to construct a successful procedure by which we can exert an effective influence upon the course of conscious processes, this success will have given us an incontrovertible proof of the existence of what we have assumed. This being so, we must adopt the position that to require that whatever goes on in the mind must also be known to consciousness is to make an untenable claim.

We can go further and argue, in support of there being an unconscious psychical state, that at any given moment consciousness includes only a small content, so that the greater part of what we call conscious knowledge must in any case be for very considerable periods of time in a state of latency, that is to say, of being psychically unconscious. When all our latent memories are taken into consideration it becomes totally incomprehensible how the existence of the unconscious can be denied. But here we encounter the objection that these latent

recollections can no longer be described as psychical, but that they correspond to residues of somatic processes from which what is psychical can once more arise. The obvious answer to this is that a latent memory is, on the contrary, an unquestionable residuum of a *psychical* process. But it is more important to realize clearly that this objection is based on the equation—not, it is true, explicitly stated but taken as axiomatic—of what is conscious with what is mental. This equation is either a *petitio principii* which begs the question whether everything that is psychical is also necessarily conscious; or else it is a matter of convention, of nomenclature. In this latter case it is, of course, like any other convention, not open to refutation. The question remains, however, whether the convention is so expedient that we are bound to adopt it. To this we may reply that the conventional equation of the psychical with the conscious is totally inexpedient. It disrupts psychical continuities, plunges us into the insoluble difficulties of psycho-physical parallelism, is open to the reproach that for no obvious reason it overestimates the part played by consciousness, and that it forces us prematurely to abandon the field of psychological research without being able to offer us any compensation from other fields.

It is clear in any case that this question—whether the latent states of mental life, whose existence is undeniable, are to be conceived of as conscious mental states or as physical ones—threatens to resolve itself into a verbal dispute. We shall therefore be better advised to focus our attention on what we know with certainty of the nature of these debatable states. As far as their physical characteristics are concerned, they are totally inaccessible to us: no physiological concept or chemical process can give us any notion of their nature. On the other hand, we know for certain that they have abundant points of contact with conscious mental processes; with the help of a certain amount of work they can be transformed into, or replaced by, conscious mental processes, and all the categories which we employ to describe conscious mental acts, such as ideas, purposes, resolutions and so on, can be applied to them. Indeed, we are obliged to say of some of these latent states that the only respect in which they differ from conscious ones is precisely in the absence of consciousness. Thus we shall not hesitate to treat them as objects of psychological research, and to deal with them in the most intimate connection with conscious mental acts.

The assumption of an unconscious is, moreover, a perfectly *legitimate* one, inasmuch as in postulating it we are not departing a single step from our customary and generally accepted mode of thinking. Consciousness makes each of us aware only of his own states of mind; that other people, too, possess a consciousness is an inference which we draw by analogy from their observable utterances and actions, in order to make this behaviour of theirs intelligible to us. (It would no doubt be psychologically more correct to put it in this way: that without any special reflection we attribute to everyone else our own constitution and therefore our consciousness as well, and that this identification is a *sine qua non* of our understanding.) This inference (or this identification) was formerly extended by the ego to other human beings, to animals, plants, inanimate objects and to the world at large, and proved serviceable so long as their similarity to the individual ego was overwhelmingly great; but it became more

untrustworthy in proportion as the difference between the ego and these "others" widened. To-day, our critical judgement is already in doubt on the question of consciousness in animals; we refuse to admit it in plants and we regard the assumption of its existence in inanimate matter as mysticism. But even where the original inclination to identification has withstood criticism—that is, when the "others" are our fellow-men—the assumption of a consciousness in them rests upon an inference and cannot share the immediate certainty which we have of our own consciousness.

Psycho-analysis demands nothing more than that we should apply this process of inference to ourselves also—a proceeding to which, it is true, we are not constitutionally inclined. If we do this, we must say: all the acts and manifestations which I notice in myself and do not know how to link up with the rest of my mental life must be judged as if they belonged to someone else: they are to be explained by a mental life ascribed to this other person. Furthermore, experience shows that we understand very well how to interpret in other people (that is, how to fit into their chain of mental events) the same acts which we refuse to acknowledge as being mental in ourselves. Here some special hindrance evidently deflects our investigations from our own self and prevents our obtaining a true knowledge of it.

In psycho-analysis there is no choice for us but to assert that mental processes are in themselves unconscious, and to liken the perception of them by means of consciousness to the perception of the external world by means of the sense-organs. We can even hope to gain fresh knowledge from the comparison. The psycho-analytic assumption of unconscious mental activity appears to us, on the one hand, as a further expansion of the primitive animism which caused us to see copies of our own consciousness all around us, and, on the other hand, as an extension of the corrections undertaken by Kant of our views on external perception. Just as Kant warned us not to overlook the fact that our perceptions are subjectively conditioned and must not be regarded as identical with what is perceived though unknowable, so psycho-analysis warns us not to equate perceptions by means of consciousness with the unconscious mental processes which are their object. Like the physical, the psychical is not necessarily in reality what it appears to us to be. We shall be glad to learn, however, that the correction of internal perception will turn out not to offer such great difficulties as the correction of external perception—that internal objects are less unknowable than the external world.

Unconscious Emotions

We have limited the foregoing discussion to ideas; we may now raise a new question, the answer to which is bound to contribute to the elucidation of our theoretical views. We have said that there are conscious and unconscious ideas; but are there also unconscious instinctual impulses, emotions and feelings, or is it in this instance meaningless to form combinations of the kind?

I am in fact of the opinion that the antithesis of conscious and unconscious is not applicable to instincts. An instinct can never become an object of con-

sciousness—only the idea that represents the instinct can. Even in the unconscious, moreover, an instinct cannot be represented otherwise than by an idea. If the instinct did not attach itself to an idea or manifest itself as an affective state, we could know nothing about it. When we nevertheless speak of an unconscious instinctual impulse or of a repressed instinctual impulse, the looseness of phraseology is a harmless one. We can only mean an instinctual impulse the ideational representative of which is unconscious, for nothing else comes into consideration.

We should expect the answer to the question about unconscious feelings, emotions and affects to be just as easily given. It is surely of the essence of an emotion that we should be aware of it, i.e. that it should become known to consciousness. Thus the possibility of the attribute of unconsciousness would be completely excluded as far as emotions, feelings and affects are concerned. But in psycho-analytic practice we are accustomed to speak of unconscious love, hate, anger, etc., and find it impossible to avoid even the strange conjunction, "unconscious consciousness of guilt," or a paradoxical "unconscious anxiety." Is there more meaning in the use of these terms than there is in speaking of "unconscious instincts?"

The two cases are in fact not on all fours. In the first place, it may happen that an affective or emotional impulse is perceived, but misconstrued. Owing to the repression of its proper representative it has been forced to become connected with another idea, and is now regarded by consciousness as the manifestation of that idea. If we restore the true connection, we call the original affective impulse an "unconscious" one. Yet its affect was never unconscious; all that had happened was that its *idea* had undergone repression. In general, the use of the terms "unconscious affect" and "unconscious emotion" has reference to the vicissitudes undergone, in consequence of repression, by the quantitative factor in the instinctual impulse. We know that three such vicissitudes are possible: either the affect remains, wholly or in part, as it is; or it is transformed into a qualitatively different quota of affect, above all into anxiety; or it is suppressed, i.e. it is prevented from developing at all. (These possibilities may perhaps be studied even more easily in the dreamwork than in neuroses.) We know, too, that to suppress the development of affect is the true aim of repression and that its work is incomplete if this aim is not achieved. In every instance where repression has succeeded in inhibiting the development of affects, we term those affects (which we restore when we undo the work of repression) "unconscious." Thus it cannot be denied that the use of the terms in question is consistent; but in comparison with unconscious ideas there is the important difference that unconscious ideas continue to exist after repression as actual structures in the system *Ucs.*, whereas all that corresponds in that system to unconscious affects is a potential beginning which is prevented from developing. Strictly speaking, then, and although no fault can be found with the linguistic usage, there are no unconscious affects as there are unconscious ideas. But there may very well be in the system *Ucs.* affective structures which, like others, become conscious. The whole difference arises from the fact that ideas are cathexes—basically of memory-traces—whilst affects and emotions correspond to processes of discharge, the final manifestations of which are perceived as feelings. In the pres-

ent state of our knowledge of affects and emotions we cannot express this difference more clearly.

It is of especial interest to us to have established the fact that repression can succeed in inhibiting an instinctual impulse from being turned into a manifestation of affect. This shows us that the system *Cs.* normally controls affectivity as well as access to motility; and it enhances the importance of repression, since it shows that repression results not only in withholding things from consciousness, but also in preventing the development of affect and the setting-off of muscular activity. Conversely, too, we may say that as long as the system *Cs.* controls affectivity and motility, the mental condition of the person in question is spoken of as normal. Nevertheless, there is an unmistakable difference in the relation of the controlling system to the two contiguous processes of discharge. Whereas the control by the *Cs.* over voluntary motility is firmly rooted, regularly withstands the onslaught of neurosis and only breaks down in psychosis, control by the *Cs.* over the development of affects is less secure. Even within the limits of normal life we can recognize that a constant struggle for primacy over affectivity goes on between the two systems *Cs.* and *Ucs.*, that certain spheres of influence are marked off from one another and that intermixtures between the operative forces occur.

The importance of the system *Cs.* (*Pcs.*) as regards access to the release of affect and to action enables us also to understand the part played by substitutive ideas in determining the form taken by illness. It is possible for the development of affect to proceed directly from the system *Ucs.*; in that case the affect always has the character of anxiety, for which all "repressed" affects are exchanged. Often, however, the instinctual impulse has to wait until it has found a substitutive idea in the system *Cs.* The development of affect can then proceed from this conscious substitute, and the nature of that substitute determines the qualitative character of the affect. We have asserted that in repression a severance takes place between the affect and the idea to which it belongs, and that each then undergoes its separate vicissitudes. Descriptively, this is incontrovertible; in actuality, however, the affect does not as a rule arise till the breakthrough to a new representation in the system *Cs.* has been successfully achieved.

Anxiety (From General Lectures on Psychoanalysis)

Anxiety (or *dread*) itself needs no description; everyone has personally experienced this sensation, or to speak more correctly this affective condition, at some time or other. But in my opinion not enough serious consideration has been given to the question why nervous persons in particular suffer from anxiety so much more intensely, and so much more altogether, than others. Perhaps it has been taken for granted that they should; indeed, the words "nervous" and "anxious" are used interchangeably, as if they meant the same thing. This is not justifiable, however; there are anxious people who are otherwise not in any way

nervous and there are, besides, neurotics with numerous symptoms who exhibit no tendency to dread.

However this may be, one thing is certain, that the problem of anxiety is a nodal point, linking up all kinds of most important questions; a riddle, of which the solution must cast a flood of light upon our whole mental life. I do not claim that I can give you a complete solution; but you will certainly expect psychoanalysis to have attacked this problem too in a different manner from that adopted by academic medicine. Interest there centres upon the anatomical processes by which the anxiety condition comes about. We learn that the medulla oblongata is stimulated, and the patient is told that he is suffering from a neurosis in the vagal nerve. The medulla oblongata is a wondrous and beautiful object; I well remember how much time and labour I devoted to the study of it years ago. But today I must say I know of nothing less important for the psychological comprehension of anxiety than a knowledge of the nerve-paths by which the excitations travel.

One may consider anxiety for a long time without giving a thought to nervousness. You will understand me at once when I describe this form of anxiety as OBJECTIVE ANXIETY, in contrast to neurotic anxiety. Now *real* anxiety or dread appears to us a very natural and rational thing; we should call it a reaction to the perception of an external danger, of an injury which is expected and foreseen; it is bound up with the reflex of flight, and may be regarded as an expression of the instinct of self-preservation. The occasions of it, i.e., the objects and situations about which anxiety is felt, will obviously depend to a great extent upon the state of the person's knowledge and feeling of power regarding the outer world. It seems to us quite natural that a savage should be afraid of a cannon or of an eclipse of the sun, while a white man who can handle the weapon and foretell the phenomenon remains unafraid in the same situation. At other times it is knowledge itself which inspires fear, because it reveals the danger sooner; thus a savage will recoil with terror at the sight of a track in the jungle which conveys nothing to an ignorant white man, but means that some wild beast is near at hand; and an experienced sailor will perceive with dread a little cloud on the horizon because it means an approaching hurricane, while to a passenger it looks quite insignificant.

The view that objective anxiety is rational and expedient, however, will on deeper consideration be admitted to need thorough revision. In face of imminent danger the only expedient behaviour, actually, would be first a cool appraisal of the forces at disposal as compared with the magnitude of the danger at hand, and then a decision whether flight or defence, or possibly attack, offered the best prospect of a successful outcome. Dread, however, has no place in this scheme; everything to be done will be accomplished as well and probably better if dread does not develop. You will see too that when dread is excessive it becomes in the highest degree inexpedient; it paralyses every action, even that of flight. The reaction to danger usually consists in a combination of the two things, the fear-affect and the defensive action; the frightened animal is afraid *and* flees, but the expedient element in this is the "flight," not the "being afraid."

One is tempted therefore to assert that the development of anxiety is never expedient; perhaps a closer dissection of the situation in dread will give us a better insight into it. The first thing about it is the "readiness" for danger, which

expresses itself in heightened sensorial perception and in motor tension. This expectant readiness is obviously advantageous; indeed, absence of it may be responsible for grave results. It is then followed on the one hand by a motor action, taking the form primarily of flight and, on a higher level, of defensive action; and on the other hand by the condition we call a sensation of "anxiety" or dread. The more the development of dread is limited to a flash, to a mere signal, the less does it hinder the transition from the state of anxious readiness to that of action, and the more expediently does the whole course of events proceed. The *anxious readiness* therefore seems to me the expedient element, and the *development* of anxiety the inexpedient element, in what we call anxiety or dread.

I shall not enter upon a discussion whether the words anxiety, fear, fright, mean the same or different things in common usage. In my opinion, *anxiety* relates to the condition and ignores the object, whereas in the word *fear* attention is directed to the object; *fright* does actually seem to possess a special meaning—namely, it relates specifically to the condition induced when danger is unexpectedly encountered without previous anxious readiness. It might be said then that anxiety is a protection against fright.

It will not have escaped you that a certain ambiguity and indefiniteness exists in the use of the word "anxiety." It is generally understood to mean the subjective condition arising upon the perception of what we have called "developed" anxiety; such a condition is called an affect. Now what is an affect, in a dynamic sense? It is certainly something very complex. An affect comprises first of all certain motor innervations or discharges; and, secondly, certain sensations, which moreover are of two kinds—namely, the perceptions of the motor actions which have been performed, and the directly pleasurable or painful sensations which give the affect what we call its dominant note. But I do not think that this description penetrates to the essence of an affect. With certain affects one seems to be able to see deeper, and to recognize that the core of it, binding the whole complex structure together, is of the nature of a *repetition* of some particular very significant previous experience. This experience could only have been an exceedingly early impression of a universal type, to be found in the previous history of the species rather than of the individual. In order to be better understood I might say that an affective state is constructed like an hysterical attack, i.e. is the precipitate of a reminiscence. An hysterical attack is therefore comparable to a newly formed individual affect, and the normal affect to a universal hysteria which has become a heritage.

Do not imagine that what I am telling you now about affects is the common property of normal psychology. On the contrary, these conceptions have grown on the soil of psycho-analysis and are only indigenous there. What psychology has to say about affects—the James-Lange theory, for instance—is utterly incomprehensible to us psycho-analysts and impossible for us to discuss. We do not however regard what we know of affects as at all final; it is a first attempt to take our bearings in this obscure region. To continue, then: we believe we know what this early impression is which is reproduced as a repetition in the anxiety affect. We think it is the experience of *birth*—an experience which involves just such a concatenation of painful feelings, of discharges of excitation, and of bodily sensations, as to have become a prototype for all occasions on which life is

endangered, ever after to be reproduced again in us as the dread or "anxiety" condition. The enormous increase in stimulation effected by the interruption of the renewal of blood (the internal respiration) was the cause of the anxiety experience at birth—the first anxiety was therefore toxically induced. The name *Angst* (anxiety)—*angustia*, *Enge*, a narrow place, a strait—accentuates the characteristic tightening in the breathing which was then the consequence of a real situation and is subsequently repeated almost invariably with an affect. It is very suggestive too that the first anxiety state arose on the occasion of the separation from the mother. We naturally believe that the disposition to reproduce this first anxiety condition has become so deeply ingrained in the organism, through countless generations, that no single individual can escape the anxiety affect; even though, like the legendary Macduff, he "was from his mother's womb untimely ripped" and so did not himself experience the act of birth. What the prototype of the anxiety condition may be for other animals than mammals we cannot say; neither do we know what the complex of sensations in them is which is equivalent to fear in us.

It may perhaps interest you to know how it was possible to arrive at such an idea as this—that birth is the source and prototype of the anxiety affect. Speculation had least of all to do with it; on the contrary, I borrowed a thought from the naïve intuitive mind of the people. Many years ago a number of young house-physicians, including myself, were sitting round a dinner-table, and one of the assistants at the obstetrical clinic was telling us all the funny stories of the last midwives' examination. One of the candidates was asked what it meant when the meconium (child's excreta) was present in the waters at birth, and promptly replied: "That the child is frightened." She was ridiculed and failed. But I silently took her part and began to suspect that the poor unsophisticated woman's unerring perception had revealed a very important connection.

Now let us turn to neurotic anxiety; what are the special manifestations and conditions found in the anxiety of nervous persons? There is a great deal to be described here. First of all, we find a general apprehensiveness in them, a "free-floating" anxiety, as we call it, ready to attach itself to any thought which is at all appropriate, affecting judgements, inducing expectations, lying in wait for any opportunity to find a justification for itself. We call this condition "*expectant dread*" or "anxious expectation." People who are tormented with this kind of anxiety always anticipate the worst of all possible outcomes, interpret every chance happening as an evil omen, and exploit every uncertainty to mean the worst. The tendency to this kind of expectation of evil is found as a character-trait in many people who cannot be described as ill in any other way, and we call them "over-anxious" or pessimistic; but a marked degree of expectant dread is an invariable accompaniment of the nervous disorder which I have called anxiety-neurosis and include among the actual neuroses.

In contrast to this type of anxiety, a second form of it is found to be much more circumscribed in the mind, and attached to definite objects and situations. This is the anxiety of the extraordinarily various and often very peculiar phobias. Stanley Hall, the distinguished American psychologist, has recently taken the trouble to designate a whole series of these phobias by gorgeous Greek titles; they sound like the ten plagues of Egypt, except that there are far more than ten

of them. Just listen to the things that can become the object or content of a phobia: darkness, open air, open spaces, cats, spiders, caterpillars, snakes, mice, thunder, sharp points, blood, enclosed places, crowds, loneliness, crossing bridges, travelling by land or sea, and so on. As a first attempt to take one's bearings in this chaos we may divide them into three groups. Many of the objects and situations feared are rather sinister, even to us normal people, they have some connection with danger; and these phobias are not entirely incomprehensible to us, although their intensity seems very much exaggerated. Most of us, for instance, have a feeling of repulsion upon encountering a snake. It may be said that the snake-phobia is universal in mankind. Charles Darwin has described most vividly how he could not control his dread of a snake that darted at him, although he knew that he was protected from it by a thick plate of glass. The second group consists of situations that still have some relation to danger, but to one that is usually belittled or not emphasized by us; most situation-phobias belong to this group. We know that there is more chance of meeting with a disaster in a railway train than at home—namely, a collision; we also know that a ship may sink, whereupon it is usual to be drowned; but we do not brood upon these dangers and we travel without anxiety by train and boat. Nor can it be denied that if a bridge were to break at the moment we were crossing it we should be hurled into the torrent, but that only happens so very occasionally that it is not a danger worth considering. Solitude too has its dangers, which in certain circumstances we avoid, but there is no question of never being able to endure it for a moment under any conditions. The same thing applies to crowds, enclosed spaces, thunderstorms, and so on. What is foreign to us in these phobias is not so much their content as their intensity. The anxiety accompanying a phobia is positively indescribable! And we sometimes get the impression that neurotics are not really at all fearful of those things which can, under certain conditions, arouse anxiety in us and which they call by the same names.

There remains a third group which is entirely unintelligible to us. When a strong full-grown man is afraid to cross a street or square in his own so familiar town, or when a healthy well-developed woman becomes almost senseless with fear because a cat has brushed against her dress or a mouse has scurried through the room, how can we see the connection with danger which is obviously present to these people? With this kind of animal-phobia it is no question of an increased intensity of common human antipathies; to prove the contrary, there are numbers of people who, for instance, cannot pass a cat without attracting and petting it. A mouse is a thing that so many women are afraid of, and yet it is at the same time a very favourite pet name; many a girl who is delighted to be called so by her lover will scream with terror at the sight of the dainty little creature itself. The behaviour of the man who is afraid to cross streets and squares only suggests one thing to us—that he behaves like a little child. A child is directly taught that such situations are dangerous, and the man's anxiety too is allayed when he is led by someone across the open space.

The two forms of anxiety described, the "free-floating" expectant dread and that attached to phobias, are independent of each other. The one is not the other at a further stage; they are only rarely combined, and then as if fortuitously. The most intense general apprehensiveness does not necessarily lead to a phobia;

people who have been hampered all their lives by agoraphobia may be quite free from pessimistic expectant dread. Many phobias, e.g. fear of open spaces, of railway travelling, are demonstrably acquired first in later life; others, such as fear of darkness, thunder, animals, seem to have existed from the beginning. The former signify serious illness, the latter are more of the nature of idiosyncrasies, peculiarities; anyone exhibiting one of these latter may be suspected of harbouring others similar to it. I must add that we group all these phobias under *anxiety-hysteria*, that is, we regard them as closely allied to the well-known disorder called conversion-hysteria.

The third form taken by neurotic anxiety brings us to an enigma; there is no visible connection at all between the anxiety and the danger dreaded. This anxiety occurs in hysteria, for instance, accompanying the hysterical symptoms; or under various conditions of excitement in which, it is true, we should expect some affect to be displayed, but least of all an anxiety-affect; or without reference to any conditions, incomprehensible both to us and to the patient, an unrelated anxiety-attack. We may look far and wide without discovering a danger or an occasion which could even be exaggerated to account for it.



STANLEY SCHACHTER JEROME E. SINGER

Introduction

Schachter and Singer, two experimental psychologists, believe that James's theory should be supplemented by another, more "cognitive" theory of emotions. The emotion may be a bodily state of excitation, but there must also be other factors to account for the variety of our emotions and our ability to tell them apart. In particular, there is the simple act of "labeling" our emotions, naming them, whether correctly or incorrectly. Thus, it may be one and the same state of "arousal" that is anger, fear, or jealousy, but the label we give these emotions makes them distinct. How do we know which label to give an emotion? The physiological excitation experienced when greeting a man with a gun in an alley is fear, not love.

The Schachter-Singer theory of emotion has two elements—the Jamesian physiological component of arousal and a "cognitive" component that determines how emotions are labeled and discriminated among. (The theory is sometimes called "the two-component" theory of emotion.) The first component can be measured quite precisely, which was not the case in James's day. The second component, however, is complex and difficult to quantify. The Schachter-Singer experiments were designed primarily to distinguish between these two components and to identify the factors involved in the second, "cognitive" component of emotion.

In these experiments, subjects were injected with different amounts of epinephrine (adrenalin) or saline solution, for a placebo effect, and the circumstances were manipulated such that the subjects found themselves in certain defined situations in which one emotion label would be more "appropriate" than another, and also in ill-defined situations in which no particular emotion-label would be appropriate. It was hypothesized that emotions are a combination of physiological and cognitive factors; and it was concluded that a subject identifies physiological arousal states in terms of "the cognitions offered to him" and that a "completely satisfactory explanation" obviates the need to identify one's state in emotional terms. But Schachter and Singer also reiterate the basic Jamesian thesis, that "an individual will react emotionally only to the extent that he experiences a state of physiological arousal." The James-Lange theory is thus modified and amended, but not rejected in its most basic formulation.

From Cognitive, Social, and Physiological Determinants of Emotional State



The problem of which cues, internal or external, permit a person to label and identify his own emotional state has been with us since the days that James first tendered his doctrine that "the bodily changes follow directly the perception of the exciting fact, and that our feeling of the same changes as they occur is the emotion." Since we are aware of a variety of feeling and emotion states, it should follow from James' proposition that the various emotions will be accompanied by a variety of differentiable bodily states. Following James' pronouncement, a formidable number of studies were undertaken in search of the physiological differentiators of the emotions. The results, in these early days, were almost uniformly negative. All of the emotional states experimentally manipulated were characterized by a general pattern of excitation of the sympathetic nervous system but there appeared to be no clear-cut physiological discriminators of the various emotions. This pattern of results was so consistent from experiment to experiment that Cannon offered, as one of the crucial criticisms of the James-Lange theory, the fact that "the same visceral changes occur in very different emotional states and in non-emotional states."

More recent work, however, has given some indication that there may be differentiators. Ax and Schachter studied fear and anger. On a large number of indices both of those states were characterized by a similarly high level of autonomic activation but on several indices they did differ in the degree of activation. Wolf and Wolff studied a subject with a gastric fistula and were able to distinguish two patterns in the physiological responses of the stomach wall. It should be noted, though, that for many months they studied their subject during and following a great variety of moods and emotions and were able to distinguish only two patterns.

Whether or not there are physiological distinctions among the various emotional states must be considered an open question. Recent work might be taken to indicate that such differences are at best rather subtle and that the variety of emotion, mood, and feeling states are by no means matched by an equal variety of visceral patterns.

This rather ambiguous situation has led Ruckmick, Hunt, Cole, and Reis, Schachter and others to suggest that cognitive factors may be major determinants of emotional states. Granted a general pattern of sympathetic excitation as characteristic of emotional states, granted that there may be some differences in pattern from state to state, it is suggested that one labels, interprets, and identifies this stirred-up state in terms of the characteristics of the precipitating situation and one's apperceptive mass. This suggests, then, that an emotional state may be considered a function of a state of physiological arousal and of a cognition appropriate to this state of arousal. The cognition, in a sense, exerts a steer-

ing function. Cognitions arising from the immediate situation as interpreted by past experience provide the framework within which one understands and labels his feelings. It is the cognition which determines whether the state of physiological arousal will be labeled as "anger," "joy," "fear," or whatever.

In order to examine the implications of this formulation let us consider the fashion in which these two elements, a state of physiological arousal and cognitive factors, would interact in a variety of situations. In most emotion inducing situations, of course, the two factors are completely interrelated. Imagine a man walking alone down a dark alley, a figure with a gun suddenly appears. The perception-cognition "figure with a gun" in some fashion imitates a state of physiological arousal; this state of arousal is interpreted in terms of knowledge about dark alleys and guns and the state of arousal is labeled "fear." Similarly a student who unexpectedly learns that he has made Phi Beta Kappa may experience a state of arousal which he will label "joy."

Let us now consider circumstances in which these two elements, the physiological and the cognitive, are, to some extent, independent. First, is the state of physiological arousal alone sufficient to induce an emotion? Best evidence indicates that it is not. Marañon, in a fascinating study . . . injected 210 of his patients with the sympathomimetic agent adrenalin and then simply asked them to introspect. Seventy-one percent of his subjects simply reported their physical symptoms with no emotional overtones; 29 percent of the subjects responded in an apparently emotional fashion. Of these the great majority described their feelings in a fashion that Marañon labeled "cold" or "as if" emotions, that is, they made statements such as "I feel *as if* I were afraid" or "*as if* I were awaiting a great happiness." This is a sort of emotional "d $\acute{e}$ jà vu" experience; these subjects are neither happy nor afraid, they feel "as if" they were. Finally a very few cases apparently reported a genuine emotional experience. However, in order to produce this reaction in most of these few cases, Marañon points out:

One must suggest a memory with strong affective force but not so strong as to produce an emotion in the normal state. For example, in several cases we spoke to our patients before the injection of their sick children or dead parents and they responded calmly to this topic. The same topic presented later, during the adrenal commotion, was sufficient to trigger emotion. This adrenal commotion places the subject in a situation of "affective imminence."

Apparently, then, to produce a genuinely emotional reaction to adrenalin, Marañon was forced to provide such subjects with an appropriate cognition.

Though Marañon is not explicit on his procedure, it is clear that his subjects knew that they were receiving an injection and in all likelihood knew that they were receiving adrenalin and probably had some order of familiarity with its effects. In short, though they underwent the pattern of sympathetic discharge common to strong emotional states, at the same time they had a completely appropriate cognition or explanation as to why they felt this way. This, we would suggest, is the reason so few of Marañon's subjects reported any emotional experience.

Consider now a person in a state of physiological arousal for which no immediately explanatory or appropriate cognitions are available. Such a state could

result were one covertly to inject a subject with adrenalin or, unknown to him, feed the subject a sympathomimetic drug such as ephedrine. Under such conditions a subject would be aware of palpitations, tremor, face flushing, and most of the battery of symptoms associated with a discharge of the sympathetic nervous system. In contrast to Marañón's subjects he would, at the same time, be utterly unaware of why he felt this way. What would be the consequence of such a state?

Schachter has suggested that precisely such a state would lead to the arousal of "evaluative needs" (Festinger), that is, pressures would act on an individual in such a state to understand and label his bodily feelings. His bodily state grossly resembles the condition in which it has been at times of emotional excitement. How would he label his present feelings? It is suggested, of course, that he will label his feelings in terms of his knowledge of the immediate situation.¹ Should he at the time be with a beautiful woman he might decide that he was wildly in love or sexually excited. Should he be at a gay party, he might, by comparing himself to others, decide that he was extremely happy and euphoric. Should he be arguing with his wife, he might explode in fury and hatred. Or, should the situation be completely inappropriate he could decide that he was excited about something that had recently happened to him or, simply, that he was sick. In any case, it is our basic assumption that emotional states are a function of the interaction of such cognitive factors with a state of physiological arousal.

This line of thought, then, leads to the following propositions:

1. Given a state of physiological arousal for which an individual has no immediate explanation, he will "label" this state and describe his feelings in terms of the cognitions available to him. To the extent that cognitive factors are potent determiners of emotional states, it could be anticipated that precisely the same state of physiological arousal could be labeled "joy" or "fury" or "jealousy" or any of a great diversity of emotional labels depending on the cognitive aspects of the situation.

2. Given a state of physiological arousal for which an individual has a completely appropriate explanation (e.g., "I feel this way because I have just received an injection of adrenalin") no evaluative needs will arise and the individual is unlikely to label his feelings in terms of the alternative cognitions available.

Finally, consider a condition in which emotion inducing cognitions are present but there is no state of physiological arousal. For example, an individual might be completely aware that he is in great danger but for some reason (drug or surgical) remain in a state of physiological quiescence. Does he experience the emotion "fear"? Our formulation of emotion as a joint function of a state of physiological arousal and an appropriate cognition, would, of course, suggest that he does not, which leads to our final proposition.

¹This suggestion is not new for several psychologists have suggested that situational factors should be considered the chief differentiators of the emotions. Hunt, Cole, and Reis probably make this point most explicitly in their study distinguishing among fear, anger, and sorrow in terms of situational characteristics.

3. Given the same cognitive circumstances, the individual will react emotionally or describe his feelings as emotions only to the extent that he experiences a state of physiological arousal.

PROCEDURE

The experimental test of these propositions requires (a) the experimental manipulation of a state of physiological arousal, (b) the manipulation of the extent to which the subject has an appropriate or proper explanation of his bodily state, and (c) the creation of situations from which explanatory cognitions may be derived.

In order to satisfy the first two experimental requirements, the experiment was cast in the framework of a study of the effects of vitamin supplements on vision. As soon as a subject arrived, he was taken to a private room and told by the experimenter:

In this experiment we would like to make various tests of your vision. We are particularly interested in how certain vitamin compounds and vitamin supplements affect the visual skills. In particular, we want to find out how the vitamin compound called "Suproxin" affects your vision.

What we would like to do, then, if we can get your permission, is to give you a small injection of Suproxin. The injection itself is mild and harmless; however, since some people do object to being injected we don't want to talk you into anything. Would you mind receiving a Suproxin injection?

If the subject agrees to the injection (and all but 1 of 185 subjects did) the experimenter continues with instructions we shall describe shortly, then leaves the room. In a few minutes a physician enters the room, briefly repeats the experimenter's instructions, takes the subject's pulse and then injects him with Suproxin.

Depending upon condition, the subject receives one of two forms of Suproxin—epinephrine or a placebo.

Epinephrine or adrenalin is a sympathomimetic drug whose effects, with minor exceptions, are almost a perfect mimicry of a discharge of the sympathetic nervous system. Shortly after injection systolic blood pressure increases markedly, heart rate increases somewhat, cutaneous blood flow decreases, while muscle and cerebral blood flow increase, blood sugar and lactic acid concentration increase, and respiration rate increases slightly. As far as the subject is concerned the major subjective symptoms are palpitation, tremor, and sometimes a feeling of flushing and accelerated breathing. With a subcutaneous injection (in the dosage administered to our subjects), such effects usually begin within 3–5 minutes of injection and last anywhere from 10 minutes to an hour. For most subjects these effects are dissipated within 15–20 minutes after injection.

Subjects receiving epinephrine received a subcutaneous injection of 1/2 cubic centimeter of a 1:1000 solution of Winthrop Laboratory's Suprarenin, a saline solution of epinephrine bitartrate.

Subjects in the placebo condition received a subcutaneous injection of 1/2 cubic centimeter of saline solution. This is, of course, completely neutral material with no side effects at all.

Manipulating an Appropriate Explanation

By "appropriate" we refer to the extent to which the subject has an authoritative, unequivocal explanation of his bodily condition. Thus, a subject who had

been informed by the physician that as a direct consequence of the injection he would feel palpitations, tremor, etc. would be considered to have a completely appropriate explanation. A subject who had been informed only that the injection would have no side effects would have no appropriate explanation of his state. This dimension of appropriateness was manipulated in three experimental conditions which shall be called: Epinephrine Informed. (Epi Inf), Epinephrine Ignorant (Epi Ign), and Epinephrine Misinformed (Epi Mis).

Immediately after the subject had agreed to the injection and before the physician entered the room, the experimenter's spiel in each of these conditions went as follows:

Epinephrine Informed. I should also tell you that some of our subjects have experienced side effects from the Suproxin. These side effects are transitory, that is, they will only last for about 15 or 20 minutes. What will probably happen is that your hand will start to shake, your heart will start to pound, and your face may get warm and flushed. Again these are side effects lasting about 15 or 20 minutes.

While the physician was giving the injection, she told the subject that the injection was mild and harmless and repeated this description of the symptoms that the subject could expect as a consequence of the shot. In this condition, then, subjects have a completely appropriate explanation of their bodily state. They know precisely what they will feel and why.

Epinephrine Ignorant. In this condition, when the subject agreed to the injection, the experimenter said nothing more relevant to side effects and simply left the room. While the physician was giving the injections, she told the subject that the injection was mild and harmless and would have no side effects. In this condition, then, the subject has no experimentally provided explanation for his bodily state.

Epinephrine Misinformed. I should also tell you that some of our subjects have experienced side effects from the Suproxin. These side effects are transitory, that is, they will only last for about 15 or 20 minutes. What will probably happen is that your feet will feel numb, you will have an itching sensation over parts of your body, and you may get a slight headache. Again these are side effects lasting 15 or 20 minutes.

And again, the physician repeated these symptoms while injecting the subject.

None of these symptoms, of course, are consequences of an injection of epinephrine and, in effect, these instructions provide the subject with a completely inappropriate explanation of his bodily feelings. This condition was introduced as a control condition of sorts. It seemed possible that the description of side effects in the Epi Inf condition might turn the subject introspective, self-examining, possibly slightly troubled. Differences on the dependent variable between the Epi Inf and Epi Ign conditions might, then, be due to such factors rather than to differences in appropriateness. The false symptoms in the Epi Mis condition should similarly turn the subject introspective, etc., but the instructions in this condition do not provide an appropriate explanation of the subject's state.

Subjects in all of the above conditions were injected with epinephrine. Finally, there was a placebo condition in which subjects who were injected with saline solution, were given precisely the same treatment as subjects in the Epi Ign condition.

Producing an Emotion Inducing Cognition

Our initial hypothesis has suggested that given a state of physiological arousal for which the individual has no adequate explanation, cognitive factors can lead the individual to describe his feelings with any of a diversity of emotional labels. In order to test this hypothesis, it was decided to manipulate emotional states which can be considered quite different—euphoria and anger.

There are, of course, many ways to induce such states. In our own program of research, we have concentrated on social determinants of emotional states and have been able to demonstrate in other studies that people do evaluate their own feelings by comparing themselves with others around them (Schachter 1959; Wrightsman 1960). In this experiment we have attempted again to manipulate emotional state by social means. In one set of conditions, the subject is placed together with a stooge who has been trained to act euphorically. In a second set of conditions the subject is with a stooge trained to act in an angry fashion.

Measurement

Two types of measures of emotional state were obtained. Standardized observation through a one-way mirror was the technique used to assess the subject's behavior. To what extent did he act euphoric or angry? Such behavior can be considered in a way as a "semiprivate" index of mood for as far as the subject was concerned, his emotional behavior could be known only to the other person in the room—presumably another student. The second type of measure was self report in which, on a variety of scales, the subject indicated his mood of the moment. Such measures can be considered "public" indices of mood for they would, of course, be available to the experimenter and his associates.

Evaluation of the Experimental Design

The ideal test of our propositions would require circumstances which our experiment is far from realizing. First, the proposition that: "A state of physiological arousal for which an individual has no immediate explanation will lead him to label this state in terms of the cognitions available to him" obviously requires conditions under which the subject does not and cannot have a proper explanation of his bodily state. Though we toyed with such fantasies as ventilating the experimental room with vaporized adrenalin, reality forced us to rely on the disguised injection of Suproxin—a technique which was far from ideal for no matter what the experimenter told them, some subjects would inevitably attribute their feelings to the injection. To the extent that subjects did so, differences between the several appropriateness conditions should be attenuated.

Second, the proposition that: "Given the same cognitive circumstances the individual will react emotionally only to the extent that he experiences a state of physiological arousal" requires for its ideal test the manipulation of states of physiological arousal and of physiological quiescence. Though there is no question that epinephrine effectively produces a state of arousal, there is also no question that a placebo does not prevent physiological arousal. To the extent that the experimental situation effectively produces sympathetic stimulation in placebo subjects, the proposition is difficult to test, for such a factor would attenuate differences between epinephrine and placebo subjects.

Both of these factors, then, can be expected to interfere with the test of our several propositions. In presenting the results of this study, we shall first present condition by condition results and then evaluate the effect of these two factors on experimental differences.

[Results: the experiment did indeed confirm the hypothesis that epinephrine injections produce "symptoms of sympathetic discharge," and that, as expected, the subjects who were so affected were observed and more or less reported experiencing the emotion appropriate to their respective experimental situations, and in proportion to the epinephrine injection and the lack of any alternative explanation for the consequent experiences.]

Discussion

Let us summarize the major findings of this experiment and examine the extent to which they support the propositions offered in the introduction of this paper. It has been suggested, first, that given a state of physiological arousal for which an individual has no explanation, he will label this state in terms of the cognitions available to him. This implies, of course, that by manipulating the cognitions of an individual in such a state we can manipulate his feelings in diverse directions. Experimental results support this proposition for following the injection of epinephrine, those subjects who had no explanation for the bodily state thus produced, gave behavioral and self-report indications that they had been readily manipulable into the disparate feeling states of euphoria and anger.

From this first proposition, it must follow that given a state of physiological arousal for which the individual has a completely satisfactory explanation, he will not label this state in terms of the alternative cognitions available. Experimental evidence strongly supports this expectation. In those conditions in which subjects were injected with epinephrine and told precisely what they would feel and why, they proved relatively immune to any effects of the manipulated cognitions. In the anger condition, such subjects did not report or show anger; in the euphoria condition, such subjects reported themselves as far less happy than subjects with an identical bodily state but no adequate knowledge of why they felt the way they did.

Finally, it has been suggested that given constant cognitive circumstances, an individual will react emotionally only to the extent that he experiences a state of physiological arousal. Without taking account of experimental artifacts, the evidence in support of this proposition is consistent but tentative. When the effects of "self-informing" tendencies in epinephrine subjects and of "self-arousing" tendencies in placebo subjects are partialled out, the evidence strongly supports the proposition.

Let us examine the implications of these findings and of this line of thought for problems in the general area of the physiology of the emotions. We have noted in the introduction that the numerous studies on physiological differentiators of emotional states have, viewed en masse, yielded quite inconclusive results. Most, though not all, of these studies have indicated no differences among the various emotional states. Since as human beings, rather than as scientists, we have no difficulty identifying, labeling, and distinguishing among our feelings, the results of these studies have long seemed rather puzzling and paradoxical. Perhaps because of this, there has been a persistent tendency to discount such results as due to ignorance or methodological inadequacy and to pay

far more attention to the very few studies which demonstrate *some* sort of physiological differences among emotional states than to the very many studies which indicate no differences at all. It is conceivable, however, that these results should be taken at face value and that emotional states may, indeed, be generally characterized by a high level of sympathetic activation with few if any physiological distinguishers among the many emotional states. If this is correct, the findings of the present study may help to resolve the problem. Obviously this study does *not* rule out the possibility of physiological differences among the emotional states. It is the case, however, that given precisely the same state of epinephrine-induced sympathetic activation, we have, by means of cognitive manipulations, been able to produce in our subjects the very disparate states of euphoria and anger. It may indeed be the case that cognitive factors are major determiners of the emotional labels we apply to a common state of sympathetic arousal.

Summary

It is suggested that emotional states may be considered a function of a state of physiological arousal and of a cognition appropriate to this state of arousal. From this follows these propositions:

1. Given a state of physiological arousal for which an individual has no immediate explanation, he will label this state and describe his feelings in terms of the cognitions available to him. To the extent that cognitive factors are potent determiners of emotional states, it should be anticipated that precisely the same state of physiological arousal could be labeled "joy" or "fury" or "jealousy" or any of a great diversity of emotional labels depending on the cognitive aspects of the situation.
2. Given a state of physiological arousal for which an individual has a completely appropriate explanation, no evaluative needs will arise and the individual is unlikely to label his feelings in terms of the alternative cognitions available.
3. Given the same cognitive circumstances, the individual will react emotionally or describe his feelings as emotions only to the extent that he experiences a state of physiological arousal.

An experiment is described which, together with the results of other studies, supports these propositions.



PAUL EKMAN

Introduction

Paul Ekman began his research on the facial expressions of emotion by trying to refute Darwin, who had argued that these are universal. Ekman, in opposition, hypothesized that they were largely cultural in origin (a hypothesis that was prevalent at the time). But as he explored the subject, Ekman discovered that Darwin had been right, and he boldly altered his own views. In subsequent years, Ekman has expanded and perfected his studies on facial expression, establishing a precise observation and measurement system that has become standard in psychology establishing the universality of facial recognition. What is less clear is the connection between facial recognition and facial production. So Ekman has refined his theory, now following Darwin and insisting that facial expressions are essentially biological syndromes accompanying emotion (although he sometimes suggests that the expressions *are* the emotion) which serve the twin evolutionary purposes of expression and communication of emotion. He has thus developed a theory of "basic emotions" in terms of what he calls "affect programs" (a term borrowed from Sylvan Tompkins). A basic emotion is an emotion that can be identified in terms of a biologically based, evolutionary syndrome of neurological, hormonal, and muscular expression, especially facial expressions. In his search for basic emotions, Ekman thus revives the classic efforts of Descartes and Spinoza, who defended their own conceptions of "primitive" and universal emotions.

From Biological and Cultural Contributions to Body and Facial Movement in the Expression of Emotions



Emotional Expressions

Emotional expressions have received the most attention of all the nonverbal behaviors, and are the subject of continuing controversy. Most of the discussion has been of facial movements (facial expressions), with less attention to body

Paul Ekman, "Biological and Cultural Contributions to Body and Facial Movement in the Expression of Emotions" is an excerpt from a longer paper, "Biological and Cultural Contributions to Body and Facial Movement," published in *The Anthropology of the Body*, edited by John Blacking, London: Academic Press, 1977.

movement. At issue is whether there are universals in facial expression or whether that which is signified by each facial movement varies from culture to culture. There have been persuasive but contradictory reports from the two sides: those claiming universals (e.g., Darwin 1872; Eibl-Eibesfeldt 1972; Izard 1971; Tomkins 1961) and those claiming cultural differences (Birdwhistell 1970; Klineberg 1938; LaBarre 1947; Leach 1972; Mead 1975). The difference in what has been found may have been owing in part to differences in what has been examined. Facial movements can be recruited into a variety of quite different activities, which may have little to do with emotion. For example, such a symbolic gesture as a wink can be made with the face; or a brow movement can be made to punctuate speech.

The contradictory observations of the relativists and universalists can be resolved, in part, if we presume that the relativists were describing the cultural variations in the nonemotional facial activities and not distinguishing these from the universals in emotional expression. Conversely, the universalists may have focused on the emotional expressions to the exclusion of recognizing cultural variations in other facial actions unrelated to emotion.

Avoiding such confusions not only requires a conceptualization that allows for a number of differently organized facial activities but also much more careful description of facial movement itself. The facial musculature allows for an extraordinary number of visibly and anatomically different movements which may on first impression seem similar to the untutored eye. Terms like frown, smile, play-face, and even brow-raise are much too gross. Each could cover dozens of different behaviors that may or may not have the same function. Such imprecise descriptions increase the likelihood that two observers would needlessly argue because their descriptive language does not reveal that they are each talking about a different facial action.

The Facial Action Coding System that Friesen and I have devised to describe anatomically based facial movement offers more precision and distinctions than may actually be needed, so that empirical results can determine which visible distinctions should be disregarded. The Facial Action Coding System allows description of both the configuration (the "expression") and the timing of facial movement. Even when exactly the same muscles were to be involved in two facial actions, they may differ in the onset of movement, in the duration at apex, and in the time it takes to disappear.

The contradictory reports on facial expression have not just been due to a difference in focus, abetted by reliance on imprecise descriptions of the face. It reflects a fundamental difference in interests. One side has been primarily interested in evolutionary explanations, in the biological contributions to behavior. While cultural influence is acknowledged, it is seen as an overlay, and only lip-service is paid. The other side has been interested in the power of culture in determining social behavior. It borrows from a linguistic model and emphasizes what is different in each culture. While biological contributions were acknowledged, biology was seen as only providing the equipment that was shaped by culture.

The core of the confusion about facial expression is probably the failure by both sides to specify what they have meant by emotion. Most shied away from

describing internal processes or even distinguishing emotional from nonemotional behavior or situations. Each side took for granted that others knew what they meant by emotion. Such vagueness concealed oversimplified models about the biological and social influences on emotional behavior. It allowed each side to gather evidence that failed to change the other side's view or force revision or expansion of their theoretical model. Instead, contradictory evidence has fueled the argument, which has spilled over into false disputes about what counts as evidence and what credentials are required to investigate.

To resolve the dispute, or at least clarify its basis, I will go out on a limb, describing different aspects of the phenomenon we term *emotion*. What follows is not a theory of emotion, but only a discussion of those matters that need to be considered to deal with the contradictory evidence and to show where both relativists and universalists have been right, and wrong, in their claims. Many issues central to a theory of emotion are not discussed here but left for presentation elsewhere.

A Neurocultural Account of Emotion

The term *neurocultural* emphasized our interest in both biological and social determinants of emotion. I will start with a characterization of emotional responses, both observable and nonobservable responses. This characterization will require that I hypothesize internal mechanisms—an *affect program* that directs emotional responses, and an *appraisal system* that determines when the affect program becomes operative. *Elicitors* will be described as those events that are appraised quickly as the occasion for one or another emotion. *Display rules* for managing the appearance of the face in various social contexts, and efforts to cope with the source of emotion will also be described. This account will allow one answer to the question of what is emotion, and how we know when emotion is occurring. It will provide the basis for discussing pitfalls in cross-cultural research on emotion, for integrating seemingly contradictory findings, and for describing the many ways emotional expressions vary with culture.

This account of emotion, however, risks a good deal. It is too long, perhaps, for this paper, and certainly too short to be complete. It deals with nonobservables reaching beyond data to explanatory mechanisms that may help in understanding the data. It may seem wrong, misguided, mechanistic, full of jargon, and the like. Nevertheless, it should provide the terms and raise the issues for exposing the *variety* of points for possible disagreement which have too long laid hidden.

Emotional Responses are brief, often quick, complex, organized, and difficult to control. Let us consider each of these characteristics. Emotions can be very brief. It is not uncommon to be angry or afraid or happy for only a few seconds. Surprise is always brief, while the other emotions vary in duration depending upon the circumstances. If an emotion lasts for many hours, or days, the language of everyday life would utilize mood terms rather than those of an emotion. The person is said to be irritable or hostile, not just angry; blue, not just sad, and so on. A full discussion of the difference between mood and emotion would take us far afield, yet there is probably some merit in the notion that typically

emotions have fairly brief durations, shorter than moods, attitudes, traits, or many beliefs or values.

Quickness refers just to the onset of an emotion. Emotions can become aroused in a fraction of a second. Not that they always must be aroused so quickly, but as will become apparent later, the potential for speed in onset time, for a very quick response, is important in explaining and distinguishing emotional from other kinds of behavior.

Emotion is complex, entailing a number of different response systems. Only some of them can be directly observed. There are skeletal muscle responses such as flinching, thrusting forward, turning away, overall relaxation, and others. Facial responses include the expressions I will describe in detail later, as well as vascular and muscle tonus changes. Vocal responses include sounds such as screams or groans, as well as a tensing of the vocal apparatus, with consequent changes in voice quality. These are all likely to be very quick, initial responses. Somewhat longer and more elaborated are the coping behaviors directed at whatever has set off the emotion. Included would be fighting, fleeing, denying, apologizing, and so on. Specific changes in the autonomic and central nervous system are also involved, in ways I will not detail here.

The subjective experience of the emotion, usually neglected by modern psychology, is another important emotion response system. The subjective experience includes—but may not be limited to—sensations that are the result of feedback from changes occurring in the already named response systems. Also subsumed are memories, images, and expectations associated with one or another emotion, and with the very specific circumstances of the occasion for an emotion. One important characteristic of the subjective experience of emotion is the awareness that the changes occurring are not easy to control consciously. I will return to this point later.

The various response systems mentioned are organized in two ways. The activity in each response system is interrelated rather than independent. *And* the changes occurring within each (or most) response systems are distinctive for one as compared with another emotion. In a preliminary study we (Ekman, Malmstrom, and Friesen, 1971) found different patterns of heart rate acceleration and deceleration to occur simultaneously with different patterns of facial movement. This study showed organization within each response system and in the interrelationship between response systems. Admittedly, there is little evidence one way or another for such interrelationships among all the response systems we propose. And the evidence for distinctive patterns for each emotion is presently limited to facial expression.

AFFECT PROGRAM

For there to be such complexity and organization in various response systems, there must be some central direction. The term *affect program* refers to a mechanism that stores the patterns for these complex organized responses, and which when set off directs their occurrence. I am not concerned with where in the brain this program is located. (Lower areas must be involved, but I do not presume either a single location or involvement of only one neural mechanism.) Instead, I will describe what is assumed about how such an affect program must operate.

The organization of response systems dictated by the affect program has a genetic basis but is influenced also by experience. The skeletal, facial, vocal, autonomic, and central nervous system changes that occur initially and quickly for one or another emotion, we presume to be in largest part given, not acquired. For example, habits would be unlikely to determine just which pattern of impulses are transmitted to the facial nerve, although we will later describe how habits, what we term display rules, develop to interfere with the operation of these responses dictated by the affect program. Experience of course plays an important role. The emotional response systems change with growth, disease, injury, and the like. They are not constant through life.

Through experience, with sufficient time and learning, habits become established for how to cope with each emotion. I do not believe that such coping behaviors are part of the given affect program. These habitual ways of coping may become so well learned that they operate automatically and quickly in conjunction with specific emotions. Given our lack of knowledge about the operation of the central nervous system, it matters little whether I say that those habitual ways of coping become governed by the affect program, or that they operate automatically in conjunction with it. Memories, images, expectations associated with one or another emotion are, like coping, not given but acquired, and can similarly become habitual, automatically involved when the affect program is set off.

Thus, I postulate that when the affect program is set off, a number of other things happen in addition to the responses immediately governed by the program. Memories, images, and expectations associated with the emotion and the circumstance come into play. Coping behaviors associated with the emotion begin, and habits directed at managing emotional behavior may become operative. All these related changes can occur automatically with great speed, rather than deliberately.

Management of the responses governed by the affect program is usually not easy and not always entirely successful. Some of the responses under the command of the affect program begin to change in fractions of a second. Deliberate or habitual interference is more successful with some of the emotional responses governed by the affect program than with others. For example, it is far easier to inhibit or squelch a facial movement than to change respiration or heart rate. The difficulty experienced when trying to interfere with the operation of the affect program, the speed of its operation, its capability to initiate responses that are hard to halt voluntarily is what is meant by the out-of-control quality to the subjective experiences of some emotions. . . .

WHAT IS EMOTION?

It certainly is not any one of the elements I have described: response systems, appraiser, program, or elicitors. Nor is emotion just the combination. Instead emotion refers to the process whereby an elicitor is appraised automatically or in a ponderous fashion, an affect program may or may not be set off, organized responses may occur, albeit more or less managed by attempts to control emotional behavior. What gives an emotion its particular flavor, is the particulars of the elicitor, the appraisal, the part of the affect program set off, and those parts of the response systems which go unmanaged or managed.

Is there a *sine qua non* for emotion? I disagree with past theorists who would say it is visceral reactions, or cognitive appraisal, or facial responses. My answer that there must be an appraiser, a program, and response systems more or less capable of action for emotion to occur, is only to say that the organism is alive. If the affect program is not set off, if the appraisal is only of the ponderous not of the automatic kind, it is still emotion but not the same as when those things do happen. If the anger part of the affect program is set off, for example, but there is interference with the activity of the facial muscles, it is still anger, but not the same anger as when facial activity is not so squelched.

Quite apart from which way biology contributes, the evidence I will now describe of a universal association between emotion and particular facial expressions can only be explained by acknowledging a major substantial biological basis to facial expression of emotion.

Evidence of universals in facial expression. One type of evidence is based on studies in which people in different cultures were shown faces and were asked to interpret the emotion shown in each face. If what a facial expression signifies is totally arbitrary, variable from culture to culture, then the interpretations so obtained should also be variable. This type of study has been carried out by more than a half dozen investigators, the majority of whom were trying to prove that facial expression is culture specific. In thirteen different countries, where nine languages were used, the same emotional interpretation was obtained for the emotional expressions.

One problem with this evidence is that all the people who interpreted the facial expressions were members of literate cultures subject to mass media influences. It was possible to argue that these people might have totally different facial expressions but had learned how to interpret one another's unique expressions. Or, they have different expressions but had all learned to recognize the stereotyped expressions shown in the theater, or, they have the same facial expression because they had all learned their facial expressions from cinema, television, and magazines.

To meet this criticism we carried out studies with more visually isolated people in the South Fore of New Guinea (Ekman, Sorenson and Friesen, 1969). Studying only those who had not seen any mass media and few outsiders, we found that they interpreted faces as showing the same emotions as did the people from the literate cultures. The one exception was that fear and surprise faces were not distinguished from each other, although they were each distinguished from anger, sadness, happiness, or disgust. Another type of study was conducted with the South Fore in which members of this culture were asked to show on their own face how they would look if they felt one or another emotion. The expressions they showed were once again the common universal expressions, with the exception of surprise and fear which showed elements of both emotions.



RICHARD LAZARUS

Introduction

Richard Lazarus is largely responsible for the most prevalent form of theory of emotions in psychology, appraisal theory, according to which an emotion is an appraisal of the world. Appraisal theory was first initiated by psychologist Magda Arnold, and it is uncompromisingly committed to the conceptual nature of emotions. This is not to say, however, that the appraisals that constitute emotion are "conscious," that is, that they need be acknowledged or articulated by the subject. Often, these appraisals are quick and more or less automatic, but this should not be taken to prove the point (argued by Robert Zajonc, for instance) that emotions are not cognitive at all, that emotions are separate from and precede cognition. (This can be argued, for instance, by appeal to experiments with subliminal perception.) But even in such cases, there is recognition and appraisal, despite the fact that it is in no way conscious. Here, in a relatively recent piece, Lazarus asks the question, what are the minimal cognitive contents of emotion?

From Appraisal: The Minimal Cognitive Prerequisites of Emotion

There are at least two ways of thinking of minimal cognitive prerequisites. The first concerns the cognitive *content* for the occurrence of any emotion, and I deal with this by considering the relational meaning and the appraisal components crucial to emotion, especially anger. The second way of thinking concerns the cognitive *process* whereby the relational meaning of the emotion is constructed in an adaptational encounter. I contrast evaluations that are automatic and unconscious with deliberate evaluations, which involve effortful, complex symbolic and conscious cognitive activity. These two ways lead to very different kinds of answers about minimal cognitive prerequisites.

The Cognitive Contents of Relational Meaning

To speak of minimal cognitive prerequisites directs our search to the question of how much information—and what kinds—is required about the person-environment relationship for an emotion to occur. An emotion is always about

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certain substantive features of the relationship between a person and an environment. Although this relationship can occur with the physical world, most emotions involve two people who are experiencing either a transient or stable interpersonal relationship of significance.

What makes the relationship personally significant, and hence worthy of an emotion, is that what happens is relevant to the well-being of one or both parties; in effect, each has personal goals at stake. The relationship involves either harm (i.e., thwarting of or threat to goal attainment) or benefit. The particular harms or benefits provide the details of the relational meaning, which must be sensed by one or both of the parties for an emotion to occur.

Notice that harm and benefit are fairly simple ideas predicated on what is important to one or both of the two persons—that is, a goal commitment. However, relational meaning refers to the juxtaposition of two conditions, the goal that is at stake in the encounter and the action or inaction of the other person that bears on the fate of that goal. Both events must be united in terms of a meaning, which must be appraised by the person as either a relational harm, potential or actual, or a benefit to produce an emotion. This is what relational meaning is all about.

A distinction must also be made by the person reacting with an emotion between an environmental condition that is harmful and one that is beneficial. If the relationship is appraised as harmful, the basis of a negative emotion is present, say, anger, anxiety, guilt, shame, sadness, envy, jealousy, or disgust. If the relationship is appraised as beneficial, the basis of a positive emotion is present, say, happiness, pride, relief, or love. The harm is different for each negative emotion and the benefit is different for each positive emotion. Both sets of information, the condition of the environment and the person's goals, are juggled—appraisal negotiates between them—in appraisal at the same time providing the cognitive basis of an emotion, that is, the relational meaning.

I have proposed that each emotion involved a special, and different relational meaning, which I referred to as *core relational themes*. For example, anger is the result of a demeaning offense against me and mine, anxiety is facing uncertain, existential threat, sadness is having experienced an irrevocable loss, pride is enhancement of one's ego-identity by taking credit for a valued object or achievement, and relief is a change of a negative condition for the better. If a core relational theme is sensed by a person as applicable in an encounter, the experience of the emotion associated with that theme is inevitable.

The Cognitive Contents of Appraisal

I believe the previous discussion expresses the minimal cognitive content for each emotion at a *molar* level of analysis. This content is arrived at through a set of separate appraisal decisions on a more *molecular* level, which, when combined, provides the cognitive pattern for each core relational theme. I (Lazarus, 1991) specify six appraisal components, three primary and three secondary, that produce the cognitive patterns for each of the emotions. The primary appraisal components are all about *motivational* variables, the secondary appraisal questions all about *available coping options*. The core relational themes synthesize the separate appraisal components into a relational meaning.

If we think of the appraisal process as a decision tree, we proceed from the

most general to the particular emotion; for example, whether or not there will be an emotion, which is defined by the presence of a goal at stake, or whether it will be a negative or positive emotion, which is defined by the presence of either goal *incongruence* or *congruence*. Ultimately, by adding further appraisal components, we get to a particular negative or positive emotion. I note, parenthetically, that I don't believe appraisal follows a sequential pattern, as Scherer (1984) argues. I speak of a decision tree for didactic reasons, not to describe how people actually review and synthesize each appraisal component into a pattern.

Thus, the bottom cognitive line that must prevail for an emotion to occur is that a goal is judged at stake in the encounter, which is called goal relevance. If there is no goal at stake, and none emerges from the encounter, there is no possibility of an emotion taking place. At some level, whether conscious or not, the person must sense goal relevance for an emotion to be aroused. Use of the language of goals rather than drives implies a concern with the means of goal attainment and defines this primary appraisal component as a cognitive one.

If a person terminates the appraisal inquiry short of the full deployment of the components necessary for a particular emotion, the reason why we must specify the particular emotion involved becomes apparent. The emotion could be a negative one, for example, anger, anxiety, or guilt, or a positive one, for example, happiness, relief, or pride. Which one it will be cannot be stated without taking into account more than goal relevance, namely, whether the encounter is goal incongruent or congruent. If it is goal incongruent, implying thwarting or conflict, the emotion will be negative, reflecting an unfavorable condition for goal attainment. If it is goal congruent, implying a favorable condition for goal attainment, the emotion will be positive. To narrow the choice of the emotion further requires additional appraisal components in the decision tree to distinguish the particular emotion that will be experienced.

So, the answer to the basic question posed here—at the level of separate appraisal components of cognitive content—is that the minimal cognitive prerequisite for an emotion, any emotion, is that one senses a goal-related stake in the encounter. However, if we are to predict whether the emotion will be positive or negative rather than just any emotion, we need to know whether conditions are appraised as favorable or unfavorable. And finally, to narrow down to one or another particular emotion requires additional cognitive prerequisites, for example, the type of ego-involvement, whether and where blame or credit is assigned, coping potentials, and future expectations. In other words, depending on the particular emotion predicted, the minimal requirements grow progressively more complex as one goes from an emotion, that is, any emotion, to a particular emotion.

I don't have the space here to present a complete appraisal-related account for each emotion as I did in Lazarus (1991c). I will, however, relate the case for anger in more detail to illustrate some of the nuances involved in cognitively more complex emotions.

The Appraisal Contents for Anger

I said previously that the appraisal pattern for some emotions is more complicated than for others, depending perhaps on whether we are dealing with an infant or an adult. Since this point is crucial for the argument about minimal and

maximal cognitive prerequisites, allow me to present the key appraisals for prototypical anger in an adult, which I believe is cognitively quite complex, after which I will speculate about the same emotion in infants.

As with all other emotions, anger depends at the outset on there being goal relevance and goal incongruence, the latter implying that a relevant goal in the encounter has been thwarted or threatened. I think that a special type of *ego-involvement* is also crucial to adult anger, namely, the protection or enhancement of self-esteem. Remember that the core relational theme for anger is said to be "a demeaning offense against me and mine." What makes us angry is that we have been taken for less than we want to be by someone who is being either inconsiderate or malevolent.

To make such an appraisal requires that we *blame* someone other than ourselves for the personal slight, blame being the most important secondary appraisal component of anger. Blame depends on two attributes, namely, external accountability and the imputation that the person accountable could have controlled the demeaning actions if he or she wished. If the accountability is internal, the emotion will be either anger at oneself, guilt, or shame. If the accountable person could not have acted differently, the reasons for appraising blame are undermined. Anger is also facilitated if an attack on whomever we blame is viable and there are grounds for expecting the retaliation to repair one's wounded self-esteem (see Lazarus, 1991, for a more complete account).

Imagine that you have gone to a department store to buy something, but you are made to wait for a long time by a clerk who seems intent on a personal telephone conversation. You become increasingly irate and ultimately make a caustic remark, only to discover that the clerk has been talking to the school nurse because the clerk's child has had an accident and was taken to a hospital emergency room. The anger suddenly dissipates and in its place may be guilt or shame. You have discovered that the clerk could not reasonably have acted differently, and so is not blameworthy for what seemed like a social slight.

There is, in effect, no slight at all, though the frustration remains. This frustration of having to wait must still be dealt with, for example, by seeking some other agent who is blameworthy. One can, for example, assign blame to oneself for leaving shopping for an inconvenient time, to the store management for having too few personnel available, or to the system, which assigns blame almost abstractly but in a way that may protect or repair many a person's shaky self-esteem. The psychosocial processes whereby one senses a slight, assigns someone to blame, and chooses to express it overtly or regulate it are extremely complex in human social encounters, despite the fact that anger can also be phylogenetically and ontogenetically simple and elemental.

Aside from the controversial role of imputed control or intent in the generation of anger (cf. Berkowitz, 1989), the most serious problem to be dealt with in this account of anger is developmental. If we are to argue that roughly four appraisal components are crucial to anger, then for anger to be generated in an infant requires that these appraisal components are within an infant's cognitive capacity and are, indeed, active components of their appraisals.

Stenberg and Campos (1990) have generated what seems like anger in babies at three to seven months old by restraining the baby's arm. At three

months the baby seems to show distress, but at four months the baby displays unmistakable anger. It struggles to free itself, suggesting that it is capable of grasping that its goal of free movement is being thwarted. At four months it also looks at the wrist that is restraining it, suggesting that it is capable of grasping that the *offending agent is external*. At seven months, it looks at the face of the person who is restraining it, and even at the mother if she is present, suggesting that it recognizes that the *offending agent is a particular person* and that it wants or expects help from the mother.

Does a baby in this situation sense that its self-esteem has been slighted? What of the equally important components of accountability and imputed control, which I said was crucial for adult blaming? With respect to *self-esteem*, when a self or ego-identity emerges in an infant is an unsettled question. Stern (1985) argues that this is a gradual process that begins almost right away; Lewis and Michalson (1983) suggest that a sense of self comes much later; Bahrick and Watson's research implies that a baby at five months is aware of the contingency between its movements and what is shown of these movements on a TV monitor, so it must have an emerging sense of a self that is distinguishable from another (see also Papousek & Papousek, 1974, for discussions of this). Although a primitive sense of self does not necessarily imply anything as sophisticated as a self-esteem that is used in social comparison, it may not be totally fanciful to suggest that a four-month-old baby might somehow sense that it is being treated badly when restrained. I have difficulty conceiving, however, that arbitrariness and intent are understood at this stage of life.

And what about accountability and imputed control? If adult blaming depends on the attribution of *accountability*, the four-month-old baby shows the capacity to make this judgment (it looks at the restraining wrist), and at seven months looks at the face of the person restraining it. I doubt very much, somehow, that the baby at this age is capable of an inference about the intent of that person, or about the control that person might have over actions.

What does all this mean concerning anger in the four-month-old baby compared with adult anger? We probably should conclude that, in the absence of clear evidence of its ability to sense damage to self-esteem or to assign blame (as a result of an inference of imputed control) rather than merely accountability, the anger shown by these babies is probably not the same as it is in the adult version. Certain key processes of appraisal-related inference seem still to be missing.

Should we call the baby's reaction anger? Probably, as long as one also recognizes that there are many forms of anger, some more cognitively complex and prototypic than others. I believe that it is important to recognize more than one kind of anger, the variations having to do with the activity of certain appraisal components. Elsewhere (Lazarus, 1991c) I gave considerable attention to two particular forms, which I believe depend on secondary appraisal components related to coping. These forms are pouting and gloating, and they serve nicely to illustrate the subtle nuances of meaning, which different forms of anger may reflect.

A person who *pouts* feels that someone on whom he or she depends for succorance has not been paying sufficient attention. Pouting is a mild reproach, which expresses disappointment with the other from whom more was expected

or needed. A needy person cannot afford an outright attack on the other but must blunt it in order to preserve succor.

A person who *gloats*, on the other hand, seems to be savoring another person's comeuppance, enjoying his or her bad fate. Such a person obtains a well-deserved vindication, which serves to repair self-esteem damage at the hands of the other. Gloaters mock the other person with malignant scorn and smiling satisfaction. They can afford an overt attack because of their sense of being in a one-up position with respect to the other.

On the surface, the difference between a pouter and a gloater would seem to depend on being either powerful or needy, expressed in the secondary appraisal component, *coping potential*. The pouter feels weak and needy; the gloater feels superior. I say on the surface because Whitman and Alexander (1968) have characterized gloaters as "sore winners" from a psychoanalytic perspective. They consider gloating to arise from a childhood history of envy of more successful siblings. Thus, gloating preserves the illusion that one is superior, but—in the psychoanalytic tradition that everything expresses its unconscious opposite—it is really a defensive maneuver against the opposite construal, namely, that one is inadequate or in a one-down position. Although pouters and gloaters may have more in common than may appear on the surface, the pouter seems, nevertheless, to accept his or her dependency while the gloater covers it up with a defense. We should be able to find personality correlates and personal history variables that explain these diverse anger-related traits.

Notice that in this example, involving multiple goals, perceptions, and unconscious defenses, I have moved from a perspective of minimal cognitive content prerequisites to that of near maximal. The examples are rich and full of subtle distinctions, both about the other person, one's own resources, the ongoing relationship between the two people involved, and the contradictory tendencies (including defenses) within the person experiencing the emotion. Solely to seek the minimal cognitive prerequisites of emotion would be to also overlook all this rich cognitive activity, filled with complex relational meanings and personal histories.

It is also important to recognize that the processes involved are apt to be overlearned and repeat prior struggles involving appraisal. The overlearning serves to simplify and automatize the appraisal process and makes it respond to minimal cues. Thus, when major adaptational problems recur, as they are apt to over our lifetime, we need not engage in an elaborate set of cognitive decisions to reach the appropriate core relational theme. Since we have made the same decisions in the past, we now need a very limited cue about the meaning of what is happening. This is tantamount to saying that we constantly simplify and automatize recurrent appraisals, which makes them simpler in process though rich and symbolic in content.



NICO FRIJDA

Introduction

Nico Frijda has followed in the footsteps of his fellow countryman Baruch Spinoza, both in his passionate interest in emotions and in his overriding concern for the practical questions of living a good life. But whereas Spinoza followed Descartes and developed a rationalistic system for talking about emotions and their role in life, Frijda has followed empirical psychology, and Darwin, to the same end. Frijda has also proven to be one of the most sensitive "phenomenologists" investigating emotion, supplementing his broad knowledge of the literature and his experimental efforts with a keen awareness of his own emotions and how they relate to not only general psychology but to ethics and politics as well. Following Darwin as well as Spinoza, he has argued that emotions are functional (at least "most of the time"), and serve the functions of preserving and enhancing life. In terms of his analysis of emotion, Frijda puts heavy emphasis (in contrast with the Jamesian emphasis on primitive physical responses and feelings) on the "action tendencies" that define most emotions in his *Emotions* (1986).

Emotions Are Functional, Most of the Time

That emotions fulfill some sort of function is a basic Darwinian presupposition that psychologists probably all share. It may be useful to remember, though, that this is not the only possible view. One can see emotions as disruptions of behavior and cognitive functioning caused by information overload, for instance, or to the absence of meaningful response options in the given situation (Hebb, 1949). Alternatively, emotions might be regarded as mere hereditary remnants of past adaptive responses, or as primitive adaptive responses whose purpose is much better served by more recent and advanced mental capacities. More fundamentally, emotions can be argued as expressing the individual's awareness of his or her position in the world, rather than serving as adaptations to that world.

I adhere to the Darwinian, functionalist position, in that I think that, indeed, emotions serve an adaptive purpose, and that they do so now, even in present-day human adults. At the same time, I think that not all occurrences of emotions, nor all their manifestations, serve a useful purpose. It is, I believe, necessary to distinguish sharply between the overall usefulness of a particular psychological

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function and the usefulness of each of its individual manifestations. Take language. The primary purpose of language is communication. However, not every sentence spoken serves that purpose, nor do all aspects of speech, as, for example, the faltering of someone out of breath after running.

In any case, and whatever our overall view, when we think that emotions do have a function, the problem remains of specifying that function. We must also validate the corresponding functional use for each emotional occurrence and each aspect of emotion manifestation or else account for the fact that emotions are sometimes useful and sometimes not.

Emotions possess two major aspects: that events are appraised as relevant, as pleasant or unpleasant, and that some experiential, behavioral, and physiological response is elicited. These two aspects require separate functional explanations.

The Function of Emotional Responsivity

The occurrence of emotions, whatever the emotion aroused, presupposes sensitivities for particular types of events. Emotions give evidence of dispositions in the individual that allow those events to be appraised as pleasant or unpleasant—that is, to elicit positive or negative affect. Emotional sensitivity represents a very fundamental and general process of evaluation, and emotions can be understood to represent a process of relevance signaling: of signaling events that are relevant to the individual's well-being or concerns to the cognitive and action systems. Emotions, from this angle, appear to serve that function. They can be considered the mechanism whereby the organism signals to its cognitive and action systems that events are favorable or harmful to its ends. It is the relevance signaling mechanism.

Indeed, how else could such relevance be detected, transmitted, and taken care of? It is true that Nature shows other options. One of those is by means of localized stimulus-response connections. With such stimulus-response connections, the "ends" of the system are not represented in a way that is accessible to the entire organism, but only to the localized provisions. This is how plants change their sap flow under shortages in available liquid and our wounds heal. Another similar provision is the reflex that, again, couples local sensitivities (e.g., irritation of the nasal cavity) to fairly specific prewired action programs (e.g., sneezing).

However, some more centralized signaling provision, producing more general shifts in action control and commanding action plans rather than specific actions, appears to be vastly more flexible and, indeed, indispensable for ensuring the safeguarding of its ends in systems that can respond to complex information in a variable environment. In such a provision, "ends" and "means" are separated. "Ends" are given independent representation (as desirable states of affairs, and as states of satisfaction or dissatisfaction), actions are flexibly guided by action plans or programs, and harmony and disharmony between "end" and "current state" are centrally signaled to the action system. Affects are just those signals. In the formulation by Oatley and Johnson-Laird (1987; Oatley, 1992), they represent "nonpropositional signals," which are elicited by the detection of "goal junctures."

In this interpretation of emotion (or at least of affect), the "ends" are what give the emotional event its emotional valence. Personal loss produces sadness because it conflicts with one's attachment to the lost person, frustrations madden because we desire to complete progress toward our goals, and so on. In the emotion literature the ends are referred to as motives, major goals, or well-being; I prefer to use the word *concerns*. Emotions signal the relevance of events to concerns. This interpretation implies that in each emotion-eliciting event some concern can be identified, and it can be argued that detecting concern-relevant events is useful for ensuring satisfaction or protection of these concerns.

This interpretation can be easily substantiated for a large number of emotions, given the events that elicit them. To a large extent, positive emotions are elicited by events that satisfy some motive, that enhance one's power of survival, or demonstrate the successful exercise of one's capabilities. Positive emotions tend to result from achieving such conditions of satisfaction, in which case they signal that activity toward the goal can terminate, consummatory behavior can be initiated, or resources freed for other exploits. "Enjoyment" quite often is the name given to the emotion that follows achievement. Other positive emotions result from increased likelihood of satisfaction: a desired object presents itself, or appears obtainable. Emotions signal that continuing on one's track is appropriate; they have reinforcement value.

Similarly, many negative emotions result from painful sensations and from threat or harm to some concern. These negative emotions alert the action system that some action should be undertaken to set things right or prevent unpleasant things from actually occurring. Different negative emotions result from different contingencies within this general frame. All this is plausible, and currently fairly widely accepted theory.

There is a class of emotion-eliciting events in which emotions clearly have an action-guiding, monitoring function: the vicissitudes of progress toward a valued goal. Goal-achievement represents a concern by itself; almost any goal, once we are committed to it, gives rise to emotions when relevant events are met on the road: when it is thwarted, when it is achieved if there has been some uncertainty about achieving it, and so on. Hope and fear, disappointment, anger (including self-directed anger), and dejection are emotions that signal the relationship between progress and expectations regarding one's rate of progress (Carver & Scheier, 1990), and that have implications for energy investments and ultimately for action termination or goal abandonment.

The Functions of Emotional Response

The second aspect of emotions consists of the emergence of emotional response: experiential, behavioral, and physiological reaction. Part of the experiential reaction has already been dealt with: affect, the experience of pleasure or pain, or the experience of the eliciting event as pleasant or unpleasant. Other aspects of experience reflect either awareness of the eliciting event and its meaning, or the impulses toward the behavioral response, and thus share in their meaning.

Emotions can roughly be regarded as motivators for the behavior meant to deal with the emotional events. Many emotions have a function in directly dealing with these events. Fear, presumably, motivates actions to protect oneself

from the event that caused it, or to prevent the event from actually materializing, or to suppress activity until the threat has passed (as in anxious freezing). Anger serves to discourage the offender from doing what causes one's anger, or to mend one's ways. These emotions, in other words, have a function within the actual individual-environment interaction, or one's immediate goal achievement. The best characterization of what they aim at is the production of relational behavior; that is, they motivate behavior meant to maintain or modify a particular kind of relationship with the environment. They aim to change (or maintain) the relationship, not the environment itself. In addition, emotions adjust the energy resources brought into play in the interaction, or in interaction with the environment as a whole—the changes in level of activation.

Such a functional interpretation quite clearly does not easily apply to all emotions or their occurrences. It is hard to discern such a function in sadness and in joy, and, in particular, to discern a function that accounts for the behavioral manifestations tied to these emotions. True enough, sadness has been interpreted as the emotion that motivates calling for help; crying can be seen as a distress call. However, crying is only one of the manifestations of sadness, and calling for help does not impress as the most meaningful responses to the primary elicitor of sorrow, loss of an attachment figure.

Why should loss produce an emotion? One possible answer is that there is no real answer; sorrow might just happen to be there, as the painful outcome of thwarted desire and broken attachment. This, of course, is a nonfunctional interpretation and I will come back to it. It may be the appropriate one. However, functional interpretations are in fact possible and have indeed been advanced. One interpretation suggests a direct-dealing function. Klinger (1975) took his cue not from crying but from the apathy of grief. Apathy might serve the goals of emotional processing, which in this case would mean facilitating one's disengagement from the broken attachment. Passivity saves energy during recuperation and allows meaning change to take place; it is a mode of what has been called "secondary coping" (Rothbaum, Weisz, & Snyder, 1982). The hypothesis is plausible in part because grief is often filled with painful recollections that may serve as extinction stimuli, and in part because a similar hypothesis has been advanced to explain deep body pain—such pain motivates immobility that helps recuperation from illness (Bolles & Fanselow, 1980).

Quite a different hypothesis has been proposed by Averill (1968). The function of grief might not be situated in the direct dealings with the emotional event, the loss. It might instead be of an anticipatory and preventive nature. Not loss, but absence or probable loss could be the major elicitor of grief; grief might serve to motivate search for the lost object. More important, the anticipated possibility of grief might anticipatorily motivate effort not to lose the object of attachment; incipient grief might motivate efforts to prevent it from occurring. It might be, figuratively speaking, a rising sorrow that lets the stray lamb run back to the herd of sheep. Sorrow as the motivator of recuperation efforts is, of course, known from attachment theory (e.g., Bowlby, 1980).

Joy is not difficult to understand as the signal that is contingent on the various contingencies mentioned: goal achievement, increased trust in obtaining satisfaction, actual satisfaction. The problem lies more in explaining the increase in activation, that is, the manifestations of exuberance, the more upright stance,

and the like—and, of course, laughter. Yet, the explanation may not be so difficult once we realize that the contingencies leading to joy, or other positive emotions, include more than just achievement of satisfaction. The other contingencies, indeed, make activation increase highly appropriate. The emotions of enjoyment sustain eating, obtaining sexual gratification, absorbing aesthetic impressions, or whatever is involved. They provide the motivations for consummatory behavior. In addition, the exuberance of joy to a large extent manifests activation that has become freely available after a problematic or strenuous interaction has ended successfully. The high activation can be understood either as a leftover from the activation mobilized by the preceding interaction (the arousal-safety sequence in the theories of laughter by Rothbart, 1973, and Sroufe & Waters, 1976) or, alternatively, as mobilized by the appraisal of increased competence and accessibility of the environment, caused by the success.

In the examples given of the functions of emotional behavior, those functions involved directly dealing with that environment: establishing or breaking relationships, and the like. Much of that relational activity is social in nature—emotions motivate proximity seeking, social avoidance, chasing-off offenders. The functions in dealing with the emotion-arousing event may also be more purely social. Shyness, for instance, can be seen as the emotion aroused by social situations that require status- and role-conforming behavior. It can be understood as the emotion that signals such requirements and motivates corresponding submissive, respectful, or role-respecting behaviors, that is, recognition-of-social-distinctions displays. This hypothesis has been plausibly argued by Gomperts (1992) from the positive evaluation that shyness receives in cultures that value social status and sex-role distinctions (e.g., Oriental cultures, see Shweder, this volume; European culture before World War II (Gomperts, (1992))), and the emergence of negative evaluation (including the new diagnostic category “social phobia”) in parallel with the abolishment of social distinctions and distinctiveness. The behaviors in shyness are in line with their interpretation as recognition-of-social-distinctions displays. Shyness is characterized by anxiety behavior, that is, by response inhibition (Gray, 1982). Movements are awkward, speech halts, thought stops. As with anxiety displays generally, these manifestations can be understood as “inconspicuousness behaviors.” They fit with the more specifically social inconspicuousness behaviors like gaze avoidance and the posture with eyes slanted downward, head drooping.

A number of other emotions can be understood in a similar way. Shame and guilt, for instance, serve as social regulators by motivating certain pro-social behaviors that prevent their occurrence. Recognizing events that *might* evoke shame leads to group-conforming or self-conforming behavior; recognizing situations that might evoke guilt if certain precautions or actions were neglected leads to taking these precautions or executing these actions. The actions and precautions are those geared to being careful with respect to other people, or to not losing *their* love, in the case of guilt, and to conform with group- or self-standards, and not losing their love, in the case of shame. The functions of shame and guilt are, it seems, first anticipatory and preventive; they are corrective only when one has not heeded their signals. Their functions appear to promote group coherence and interpersonal prudence (or to avoid punishments after transgressions), respectively.

Afunctional and Dysfunctional Emotions

The functional interpretations in these last sections are theoretically interesting. They suggest that emotions might not merely be functional because they watch the individual's interests, but also because they may serve as social regulators. Emotions belong to the fabric that keeps social interaction in shape, and they do so not merely through the joys of affection that are part of them or through the fear of uncontrolled emotion display. These interpretations also show that emotions which at first sight are merely dysfunctional disturbances may not on second thought appear to be so. Stage fright, for instance, may not so much be (or not merely be) fear of social ridicule, but a mode of control of social presumption; guilt emotion (or its precursor, being aggrieved by having harmed someone else) is not merely an internal pain but a prime mover for constructive social behavior.

These interpretations decrease the domain of dysfunctional and afunctional emotion manifestations but they do not make that domain disappear. Some emotions resist functional interpretation and, more important, many emotion occurrences appear to have no function within the context in which they arise.

Concerning afunctional emotions, I mentioned that grief and sorrow may be given functional interpretations; but these interpretations are not too convincing, at least not for everything included under the emotion labels. To the extent that apathetic sorrow is comparable to "learned helplessness," there is little that is functional about it. Conserving energy resources would be better served by calmly sitting it out. The deep activation decreases in many states of sorrow and depression would just seem to reflect the mode of operation of the organism under unmodifiable aversive circumstances.

Concerning clearly dysfunctional emotions, there are phobic fears and panics, guilt emotions without clear causes in social transgression or neglect, panics and states of desperation in clinical depressions, and unfounded jealousies. Much simpler examples come from a normal emotion like nostalgia. Nostalgia has a double meaning, and in other languages these meanings are separated (*Heimweh* and *Wehmut* in German, *homesickness* and *nostalgia* perhaps in English). The first meaning refers to a painful longing for home; the second to a bittersweet craving for things that have gone by—it is evoked by memories of childhood or other pleasurable past events (Bellelli, 1991). I can find no possible use in that emotion. Of course, it signals that the longing is alive, but that statement is a confused one since the longing has no existence or consequence beyond the nostalgic longing: It signals to what? It is true that this emotion enriches life, but that can hardly be considered its function. Like sorrow, it just is there, useless as it is.

Phobic fears have a somewhat similar nature. They are fears for objects or situations that the individual knows are harmless. Certainly, some unconscious or automatic appraisal process does make the object appear dangerous, but again this does no more than repeat that there is an unfounded, nonfunctional emotion; unfounded not in a historical sense, but having no contemporary meaning in dealing with problems and opportunities in the environment. Nothing would be lost by not having it.

The examples of sorrow, nostalgia, and panic indicate where the theoretical solution lies. If emotion manifests the operation of useful relevance-detection system, this need not imply that every manifestation of that system is useful. A burglar alarm is a useful contraption even if on occasion it goes off because a broken branch hits the windows, or if it sounds even when the police are too far away to hear. The first comparison applies to nostalgia, the second to grief with irretrievable loss. In other words, emotion, as a phenomenon and a provision, is useful; not every individual emotion necessarily is. Grief is not useful; the capacity that enables grief is. The same applies to the other emotions. How often emotion is useless and nonfunctional, one may say, is determined by how finely the system has been tuned. In the end, the usefulness of a provision depends on the proportion of hits to misses and to false alarms, and on the costs of the alarms.

Emotions as the Servants of Concerns

We have argued that the function of emotion is very general, even if the utility of individual emotions may be doubtful. Emotion—actual emotion, affective response, anticipation of future emotion—can be regarded as the primary source of decisions and, thus, of control of behavior. Preferences can be viewed as latent dispositions that determine whether behavior will go one way or another, but they actually affect behavior only by way of emotions or of anticipation of those emotions. What does “survival” mean to the individual besides the distress of pain or the horror at the idea of death?

Some remarks are needed to round off the perspective given here. First, in this view of emotions, emotional mechanisms are unspecific with regard to concerns. Anger occurs after frustration (among other things), whatever the goal that is frustrated, and sadness results from loss, whatever the kind of loss involved (an attachment person, a possession, an ideal, self-esteem). This is not true for all emotions, because some emotions (i.e., some emotion categories or labels) are defined by particular concerns; “lust” is an example. Furthermore, the social functions of some emotions suggest that these emotions are of a fairly special-purpose nature; for instance, the corrective function of anger, or the self-corrective function of guilt. That of others appears much more general—to discourage interfering agents, as a goal for so much anger, and self-protection against threats, for fear. It is unclear whether this difference is more apparent than real, or whether it can be fitted into the general analysis presented, which views emotions as the general-purpose servants of concerns.

A theoretically tricky issue regards the definition of “concerns” (or of motives or self-generated goals). The statement that emotions serve satisfaction or protection of one’s concerns is meaningful only to the extent that concerns (or, again, motives or goals) can be defined or ascertained independently from emotions. This is not always without problems. Does evidence exist for attachment that is independent from the pleasure of being with a given person, or from the sadness on losing him or her? Some concerns can be defined in terms of underlying mechanisms (e.g., the need for heroin in heroin addiction, the need for food in ordinary hunger), or in terms of adaptive advantages (e.g.,

curiosity). For many concerns, however, this does not seem possible. It would seem particularly difficult for "hedonic concerns" (Frijda, 1986)—those that have getting pleasure as their primary motive, such as gluttony, sensation-seeking, and even sex. It would be odd to say that the joys of drinking champagne serve the concern of desiring champagne; it would be tautological. I think the following arguments meet this issue and I repeat them from Frijda (1986). The most important is that many concerns consist of representations of states of affairs that evoke pleasant or unpleasant affect. These concerns include hedonic concerns, but also what I call "surface concerns," those defined in terms of a particular object, such as the attachment to a particular person, the fear for a particular type of object, or the value attached to a particular abstract notion (e.g., the self ideal). The origin of surface concerns may be conditioning to other situations that had affective valence, or it may be specification of more basic concerns (like particular attachments being rooted in a general need for proximity). *Affect* elicited by objects or events defining such concerns cannot be said to "serve" these concerns; it merely expresses them. *Emotions* (affects plus some mode of action-readiness change) elicited by such objects do serve these concerns, by involving signals to the action system, and subsequent changes in action readiness.

"Set-points," or reference values that are to be attained, must logically be supposed to explain the emergence of both affect and emotion. Several of these set-points have been more or less clearly identified in a way that is independent of emotion arousal; optimal stimulation of opoid receptors, in the case of need for heroin, is an example. Beyond that, positing a concern means issuing the promissory note that some such set-point will one day be identified, or else something that is functionally equivalent. One can specify what such functionally equivalent entities might consist of. It can be argued that what we call concerns (that which underlies emotions as well as striving) are rooted in capabilities that the individual possesses. Affects can be viewed, not as contingent on particular stimulus events, but resulting from the optimal or non-optimal functioning of these capabilities. We like, and strive for, what we are capable of doing when that capability is not self-evident. Sex can be said to be pleasant because we can do it (we have the provisions for it), but to use these functions we have to be set for it. This also applies to cognitive assimilation (which is what curiosity achieves): We are capable of cognitive assimilation, and assimilating something gives pleasure when we did not already know it, or when assimilation is trivially simple. Affect monitors optimal functioning; emotion (affect plus a command to the action system with control precedence) goads or regulates action.

Emotional Behavior Patterns

I have discussed the function of emotions in general, not the functionality of their particular behavioral, psychological, physiological, and experiential manifestations. I will now briefly turn to this issue. Certain aspects of emotions appear extrinsic to the emotion process itself, and perhaps as nonfunctional or a hereditary remnant. Facial expressions and psychophysiological response, in

particular, are sometimes so regarded: They may have been useful in our evolutionary or historical past, but at present they are nonfunctional and may even be dysfunctional. The issue is also relevant for dysfunctional emotion manifestations such as blind panic, self-destructive depression, violent anger, paralyzing stage fright, and destructive or oppressive jealousy. All these emotions can be considered functional when they are of moderate intensity, but disruptive in certain contexts and at high intensities.

The functional nature of most emotional response components is, in principle, fairly obvious. Some facial expressions, for instance, are elements in affective overall action patterns aiming at self-protection, retreat, aggressive approach, and the like. The fear expression, as analyzed by Darwin, combines backward withdrawal with attention to the fearful object; the surprised face results from inhibitory behavioral interruption (which makes the mouth fall open) and unfocused visual orientation (these arguments come from Darwin, 1872; Dumas, 1948; and Piderit, 1867). Other expressive movements can be functionally understood in perhaps a somewhat less obvious fashion. Anxious paralysis can be viewed as cautionary response inhibition, an automatic passive avoidance response, in line with Gray's (1982) interpretation of anxiety. Frowning, the response in any endeavor to overcome an obstacle, appears to be actually instrumental in concentrated effort, in some unclear fashion (Darwin, 1872). Other features, such as movement characteristics, manifest current activation levels.

Many expressive activities, especially facial and vocal ones, are interpersonally effective—as requests, commands, or threats. The angry glance (eyes widened with eyebrows drawn downward) is best understood as a menace, as intimidating behavior, together with foot-stamping, shouting, and slamming doors; the smile is an appeasement signal; other facial expressions and voice intonation patterns can be understood along similar lines. The communication value of these expressions tends to be instrumental within the emotional action tendency; just as aggressive behavior in anger tends to remove an obstacle, so does intimidating behavior.

The adaptive nature of physiological responses—again, in principle—is hardly a point of discussion, since Cannon's (1929) introduction of the emergency response concept. However, several important response components are functionally opaque. The purpose of skin conductance response, for instance, is unclear, because it is most noticeable in skin areas that contribute little to thermoregulation. Diarrhea, although an epinephrine response, seems to have little adaptive value. In fact I suspect that our energy mobilization interpretation of physiological response in emotion is a gross simplification, and may in part even be erroneous. We do not know to what extent physiological changes are responses to actual or anticipated physical energy expenditure when coping with the external event, to suppression of emotional impulses in order to continue following task demands, to keep concentration, or to assist in the process of attention and information registration. It has been argued that physiological responses in emotions are atavistic responses, useful only in creatures that had to fight bears, and not in humans, who only have to invent insults. Whether or not this is true vitally depends on the kinds of interpretation given to the vari-

ous phenomena. In fact, the signal value of autonomic response in emotion has been emphasized by Mandler (1984) and by Wynne and Solomon (1955), and its role in event registration and subsequent habituation by Pribram and McGuinness (1975). It should be taken up in actual research.

To evaluate the functionality of emotions one must, I think, distinguish between their occurrence as such and their intensity. Intensity reflects two processes: those of emotion arousal and those of emotion control or inhibition. Any normal emotion is the result of their joint influence; inhibitory control processes are part and parcel of emotion mechanisms. Inhibitory control is the means whereby emotions get attuned to the seriousness of their cause. The attuning and moderating function of inhibitory control makes it likely that such control uses other and more information than what is used for emotional arousal. In fact, inhibition is primarily regulated by anticipation of the aversive consequences of the response to be controlled (Frijda, 1986; Gray, 1982). It may thus be inferred that inhibitory control occurs only when time for the additional processing of information is available, and that it is vulnerable to disturbance. Immoderately, dysfunctionally intense emotions may well reflect disturbance in the control mechanisms; the location may be in the cognitive apparatus triggering moderation, or in the effectiveness of the inhibition control resources.

What this amounts to, in the present discussion, is that functionally appropriate processes (restriction of attention allocation can be counted among them) may have dysfunctional consequences when the system is taxed beyond the limits of its capability.

This would seem to apply to many afunctional or dysfunctional aspects of emotions. The apathy of desperation and depression and the often severe disturbances of function in anxiety are probably best viewed as failures to meet unanswerable situations as well as disrupting consequences of coping mechanisms operating beyond their resources. States of exhaustion are examples. Exhaustion of energy resources leads to the irritability and anxiety bursts of the exhaustion syndrome; exhaustion of available coping modes results in the dysfunctional helplessness pattern. Another example where coping mechanisms work in vain involves conditions of conflict between action tendencies. The organism's means of operating under conflict are evidently limited. Inhibitory anxiety response in stage fright is incompatible with the responses needed for answering whatever goals underlie the stage performance. It is awkward to call the emotion itself dysfunctional, but its manifestations at that moment certainly are—not because of their very nature, but because of the state of conflict.

There is another category of nonfunctional responses, which we have already referred to when discussing nostalgia: responses that are useless under the given conditions, though meaningful under others. Their uselessness, in fact, appears under close scrutiny or, rather, could have appeared on close scrutiny by the subject him- or herself. Longing for something definitely lost is meaningless; so is vomiting after hearing morally disgusting information; so is freezing in anxiety when there is nobody to watch you or take advantage of your actions. However, if emotional response is to serve its purpose, it should be fast and work with minimal information. Whether that is functional or dysfunctional depends on the pay-off matrix: If risks are high, shoot before you ask

questions. This is in fact the reason behind what I said earlier regarding inhibition: Inhibition is useful as a secondary provision, to be put in operation when time suffices and, of course, when the efforts of discrimination serve a purpose. Emotions like nostalgia indeed are, in a sense, luxuries that one indulges in for the sweetness of their bittersweetness, *if* one indulges in them—which one does only infrequently.

Conclusion

Emotion is a functional provision, even if not all its occurrences are. I think that there is ample ground for this judgment. The function of emotions is to signal events that are relevant to the individual's concerns, and to motivate behavior to deal with those events. Detailed analysis of emotional phenomena, such as the morphological analysis of expressive behavior, tends to corroborate that function.

As far as I can see, no emotional phenomena can properly be regarded as atavisms that have no current use, in the circumstances that human beings today have to meet. That is, emotions and their various manifestations do not appear to be atavisms, nonfunctional, or mere phenomena of disturbance. What may well be nonfunctional, and perhaps even atavistic, are the concerns that give events their emotional significance. It is difficult to find an advantage for many attachments or likings. Nevertheless, many nonfunctional or even dysfunctional emotions and emotional phenomena occur. They can largely be understood as consequences of a functional provision when operating under taxing circumstances and at the limits of its resources, and on occasion manifesting a functionally appropriate lack of selectivity in its operation. Part of the dysfunctional aspects probably are consequences of breakdowns or malfunctions in emotion-controlling processes.



CATHERINE LUTZ

Introduction

Catherine Lutz is an anthropologist who did her field studies in the South Pacific on the island of Ifaluk in the Caroline Islands. In her efforts to get along with as well as understand the people she lived with and studied, she became keenly aware of the differences between their emotional lives and her own. In part, this became a problem with the language, of translating emotion terms in Ifaluk into American English and vice versa. But the translation problem was part of a more general problem of coming to understand the cultural context in which those emotions played different roles and served specific functions in Ifaluk society. This made Lutz all the more aware of the fact that not only emotion language but the emotions themselves are culturally shaped and "constructed." Thus, she rejected the Jamesian question that has served as our title, "What is an emotion?" and replaced it with a much more open-ended question about the variable roles and function of emotions in society. Thus, she rejects the notion of distinct, discreet "natural" emotions and insists instead on "unnatural emotions," which is not to deny that they are somehow based in biology but to insist that they are fundamentally cultural products. In this she follows at least two other researchers who opened up the way to such an understanding, of emotion, the psychologist James Averill, who was one of the first defenders of the view that emotions are "socially constructed," and anthropologist Jean L. Briggs, who had studied Eskimo (Utku) society years earlier and had come to similar conclusions about the cultural roles and significance of emotion.

From Unnatural Emotions



The Cultural Construction of Emotions

At first blush, nothing might appear more natural and hence less cultural than emotions, nothing more private and hence less amenable to public scrutiny, nothing more inchoate and less compatible with the logos of social science. These views can be treated, however, as items in a cultural discourse whose traditional assumptions about human nature and whose dualisms—body and

From Catherine Lutz, *Unnatural Emotions* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988).
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mind, public and private, essence and appearance, and irrationality and thought—constitute what we take to be the self-evident nature of emotion. This book uncovers some of the cultural assumptions found in Western thinking about the emotions and contrasts them with those I encountered during field-work on the one-half-square-mile atoll of Ifaluk in the southwest Pacific. I have two aims. The first is to deconstruct emotion, to show that the use of the term in both our everyday and social-scientific conversation rests on a network of often implicit associations that give force to statements that use it. The second is to describe my understanding of everyday life on Ifaluk, whose people speak about emotions in ways that reflect their values, their power struggles, and their unique atoll environment.

The concept of emotion plays a central role in the Western view of the world. While words like "envy," "love," and "fear" are invoked by anyone who would speak about the self, about the private, about the intensely meaningful, or about the ineffable, they are also used to talk about devalued aspects of the world—the irrational, the uncontrollable, the vulnerable, and the female. Both sides of what can be seen as an ambivalent Western view of emotion are predicated, however, on the belief that emotion is in essence a psychobiological structure and an aspect of the individual. The role of culture in the experience of emotion is seen as secondary, even minimal, from that perspective. Culture or society can do little more than highlight or darken particular areas of the given psychobiological structure of emotions by, for example, repressing the expression of anger in women, calling for smiles to mask natural feelings of fear in certain situations, or emphasizing shame in one society and guilt in another. And while emotions are often seen as *evoked* in communal life, they are rarely presented as an *index* of social relationship rather than a sign of a personal state.

Although the value of emotion as symbol is not dependent on some objective relationship to the body, my aim is not to cut the body out of emotions or simply to civilize them. It is to deconstruct an overly naturalized and rigidly bounded concept of emotion, to treat emotion as an ideological practice rather than as a thing to be discovered or an essence to be distilled. Michelle Rosaldo has suggested the felicitous notion that emotions be seen as "embodied thoughts" (1984:143); Scheper-Hughes and Lock (1987) talk of the "mindful body"—each suggesting possible routes around the difficulties presented by the dualisms of our traditional ways of thinking about issues of mind and body, of nature and culture, of thought and emotion. Those dualisms create our compulsion to ask for a strict accounting of what is biological in the emotions and what is cultural and to seek the essence of a psychobiological process behind the stage front of cultural and linguistic forms. Discourse about emotion constitutes it as a social object, however, and it is with conventions and uses of the term *emotion* that we have to start. With no privileged route to some underlying and unmediated psychophysical emotional reality, we might be not resigned to but intrigued by the task of elucidating our understandings of what we and others mean, intend, feel, and do when we traffic in "emotion."

After deconstruction, the word remains. By making emotion the focus of this study, I both deconstruct and reconstruct the term, both undermine its foundations and elevate it to a more central analytic place. Revealing some of the cul-

tural foundations and conceptual machinery behind the smooth, commonsense surface of the language of emotion does not mean that the term "emotion" can or should be jettisoned by those who study human behavior. My alternative view of emotion contests, but must of necessity maintain some dialogue with, an unreconstructed view of emotion. And so the reader will find a text that is not hermetically sealed but that to some degree simultaneously takes and undermines a position. After deconstruction, emotion retains value as a way of talking about the intensely meaningful as that is culturally defined, socially enacted, and personally articulated. It retains value also as a category more open than others to use as a link between the mental and the physical and between the ideal or desired world and the actual world. As the undervalued member of the dualism it participates in with "thought," emotion is also less likely to be taken, at least in its traditional forms, as the only important human capacity, and so might better provide a route by which these two capacities are reunited. And it retains value as a way of orienting us toward things that matter rather than things that simply make sense.

Although we may experience emotion as something that rises and falls within the boundaries of our bodies, the decidedly social origins of our understandings of the self, the other, the world, and experience draw our attention to the interpersonal processes by which something called emotion or some things like joy, anger, or fear come to be ascribed to and experienced by us. I will demonstrate that the use of emotion concepts, as elements of local ideological practice, involves negotiation over the meaning of events, over rights and morality, over control of resources—in short, involves struggles over the entire range of issues that concern human groups. As Clifford has noted of culture itself, emotion is "contested, temporal, and emergent" (1986:19). Once deessentialized, emotion can be viewed as a cultural and interpersonal process of naming, justifying, and persuading by people in relationship to each other. Emotional meaning is then a social rather than an individual achievement—an emergent product of social life.

This book attempts to demonstrate how emotional meaning is fundamentally structured by particular cultural systems and particular social and material environments. The claim is made that emotional experience is not precultural but *preeminently* cultural. The prevalent assumption that the emotions are invariant across cultures is replaced here with the question of how one cultural discourse on emotion may be translated into another. As I listened to people speak the language of emotion in everyday encounters with each other on Ifaluk atoll, it became clear to me that the concepts of emotion can more profitably be viewed as serving complex communicative, moral, and cultural purposes rather than simply as labels for internal states whose nature or essence is presumed to be universal. The pragmatic and associative networks of meaning in which each emotion word is embedded are extremely rich ones. The complex meaning of each emotion word is the result of the important role those words play in articulating the full range of a people's cultural values, social relations, and economic circumstances. Talk about emotions is simultaneously talk about society—about power and politics, about kinship and marriage, about normality and deviance. . . .

Like Foucault, I am interested in how the emotions—like other aspects of a culturally postulated psyche—are “the place in which the most minute and local social practices are linked up with the large scale organization of power” (Dreyfus and Rabinow 1983:xxvi).

The process of coming to understand the emotional lives of people in different cultures can be seen first and foremost as a problem of translation. What must be translated are the meanings of the emotion words spoken in everyday conversation, of the emotionally imbued events of everyday life, of tears and other gestures, and of audience reaction to emotional performance. The interpretive task, then, is not primarily to fathom somehow “what they are feeling” inside (Geertz 1976) but rather to translate emotional communications from one idiom, context, language, or sociohistorical mode of understanding into another.

If it is assumed that emotion is simply a biopsychological event and that each emotion is universal and linked neatly to a facial expression (of which even careful and intentional masking leaves unmistakable clues), the process of emotional understanding across cultural boundaries becomes a simple one of reading faces or looking for “leaks” from the inner pool of emotional experience; one looks for the occurrence or nonoccurrence of particular emotions whose meaning is considered unproblematic. If, however, emotion is seen as woven in complex ways into cultural meaning systems and social interaction, and if emotion is used to talk about what is culturally defined and experienced as “intensely meaningful,” then the problem becomes one of translating between two different cultural views and enactments of that which is real and good and proper.

It has commonly been observed that the process of translation involves much more than the one-to-one linking of concepts in one language with concepts in another. Rather, the process ideally involves providing the context of use of the words in each of the two languages between which translation is attempted. The shift from a concern with language as semantics to an emphasis on language as social action was heralded early on in the history of anthropology by Malinowski but has only recently been taken up widely.

Michelle Rosaldo first raised the issue of the translation of emotional lives across cultures in part by questioning the traditional anthropological assumption that the “symbolic” realms of ritual and art require translation, whereas the everyday words of commonsense and mundane conversation do not. This leads us, she pointed out, to “fail to see that common discourse as well as the more spectacular feats of poets and religious men requires an interpretive account” (1980:23) Rosaldo situated emotion talk within the language games that Wittgenstein and Ryle before her outlined, and demonstrated that the sense of emotion words for those who use them is as much to be found in how they work in social life as in any necessary resonance with a preverbal emotional experience.

This latter, pragmatic view of emotional and other language has had to struggle for acceptance against the implicit assumption, widespread in Western thinking, that words have labeling or reference as their primary function. . . . The referential view of language goes hand in hand, in the West, with a tendency toward reification, or the confusion of words with the objects about which they are used to talk. This confusion has been identified in marxist thought as a concomitant of social relations under capitalism. These two aspects of the Western approach to

language—as something which primarily *refers to* or even *is* a series of things—act together to predispose us toward a particular view of the words used to talk about emotion, such as “anger,” “fear,” “happiness,” or “emotion” itself. At best, these words are seen as labels for emotion “things”; at worst, the words *become* the things themselves rather than human, cultural, and historical inventions for viewing self and relations with others.

The problem of the referential and reified view of language is found in even more extreme form in the domain of emotion words than it is elsewhere in language. This is so because the Western approach to language reinforces the already existing view of emotions as primarily physical things. “Anger,” “fear,” and “happiness” are treated, through the process of reification, not as concepts used to do certain kinds of things in the world but as labels for concretized psychophysical states or objectivized internal “event-things.” When emotion words are confused with things, the tendency is to look at the emotion terminologies of other cultures as being either “accurate” or “inaccurate” labels for the presumably universal underlying things, which is to say, to look at the emotions as objective natural events.

The critique of reification in thinking about the emotions and the emphasis on translation are not meant to imply that we need only look at words (or the ideational) in order to understand any experience construed as emotional. The concept of emotion arose in part in response to the fact that the human body has the potential for being “moved,” and it has been used in part to talk about the force of events seen as “intensely meaningful.” The relationships among the physical, the mental, and the emotional are some of the thorniest tangles in our conceptual forest; . . .

The model used for discussing emotion words in this book differs in two fundamental ways from that which has predominated in social science. First, it is ethnopsychological, or concerned with indigenous models (also termed cultural models or folk models) used to understand and explain the person. Symbolic and psychodynamic as well as cognitive and linguistic concerns have driven the surge of interest in ethnopsychology . . . , but most researchers share an interest in the sociocultural processes by which such understandings are formed. Emotion words are treated here as coalescences of complex ethnotheoretical ideas about the nature of self and social interaction. Each emotion word evokes in the listener of shared cultural background some variant of an elaborate “scenario” or scene. To understand the meaning of an emotion word is to be able to envisage (and perhaps to find oneself able to participate in) a complicated scene with actors, actions, interpersonal relationships in a particular state of repair, moral points of view, facial expressions, personal and social goals, and sequences of events.

The translation of emotion concepts between languages, then, involves the comparison of these ethnotheoretical ideas and the scenes they are encoded in, in each of two cultures. While the Ifaluk term *song* may be translated as “anger,” because the scenarios that both *song* and “anger” evoke and the uses to which the terms are put in social interaction show some broad similarities, the scenes each call forth are at variance in important ways. In particular, the term *song* evokes in the Ifaluk listener a much more vivid and unambiguous scene of

moral transgression on the part of one person and of moral condemnation of that violation by the person who is *sang*.

Second, emotion words are treated not only as clusters of ethnotheoretical ideas but also as actions or ideological practices. In other words, the postulation of ethnopsychological structures is balanced with the observation that ideas and words are used, manipulated, misunderstood, reconstrued, and played with. In particular cultures and contexts, emotion words may be used to theorize about events, to moralize about or to judge them, and to advance one's interests by defining the situation in a particular way. Thus, the calling up of a scenario by the speaker of emotion words is done in particular contexts for particular ends, to negotiate aspects of social reality and to create that reality. Emotion words have force, then, both for the speaker who attributes emotion to him- or herself and for the listener who may be compelled to come to terms with the theory of events posited by the use of the word and the threat or promise of action embedded in the particular emotion term. To speak of one's feelings of "compassion," for example, is to attempt to portray an event as having an actor who is suffering rather than comfortable, and perhaps to suggest that actions ought to be taken to alleviate that condition. It is to attempt to characterize and to move events, not merely or even mainly to map them. . . .

Jean L. Briggs was the first anthropologist to demonstrate that learning about the emotional worlds of other societies involves more than the simple one-to-one matching of emotion vocabularies between language groups. Rather, the Utku Eskimo emotion terms that she encountered were an opening into an immense and elaborate ethnopsychological belief system that characterized both human nature and everyday interactions. She also demonstrated that coming to understand another emotional world is an often painful process of *self*-discovery as well. As she struggled to bring her own world, however truncated, into an Utku igloo—as she brought her typewriter and her ways of viewing anger into the system of a local family, she found not only an exotic Utku emotional world, in which anger was anathema but an exotic emotional self as well, a self which she recognizes (but does not explore) as American, middle class, and Protestant. Briggs's description of her reactions to the igloo ceiling's dripping onto her typewriter keys, and to the expectation that the resident child's "imperious" demands for her own carefully hoarded raisins be met, introduces a novel view of fieldwork. It is one that at least implies that the emotional worldview of the anthropologist merits as much attention as that of the culture we ostensibly go to "observe." For it is clearly to this emotional self that we implicitly compare the emotional lives of others. How, we necessarily ask as human observers, are they emotionally like me, and how different? The process of translating emotional worlds involves then an explication of the theories of self and emotion in two cultures (such as the American and the Ifaluk) and an examination of the use to which emotion terms are put in concrete settings in each society. . . .

Emotion as Natural Fact

Closely related to the Euramerican view of emotion as a physical event is the idea that emotions are more natural, and hence less cultural, than thought. This view of emotion is obviously dependent first upon the nonuniversal distinction,

elaborated in particular forms in the West, between nature and culture. Culture or civilization is seen predominantly as a conscious, cognitive process; emotion then takes its place as the natural complement to cultural processing—as material which culture may operate upon, but which is not culture. We speak of emotions as “raw,” as “wild,” and as “primitive forces”; they are the natural, aboriginally untouched by the cooking, taming, and civilizing of culture. Needham, for example, sees the diverse vocabularies of emotion developed in many societies as necessarily “wrong” about the feelings they purport to describe; this is so, he claims, because feelings, being natural and universal, exist at a level that is unaffected by the cultural modes of thought expressed in those vocabularies (Needham 1981:23). The emphasis on emotion as physical feeling means that the transformations wrought by culture on the affective base (as on the physical base) become “secondary,” as in Kleinman’s formulation (see also Levy 1984). An interest in the emotional aspects of culture—in raising the (for us, paradoxical) association of the two concepts—has necessitated the introduction by some anthropologists of the idea of “sentiment,” or culturalized emotion, and the sharp distinction between it and private, natural feeling or emotion (see, e.g., Fajans 1985).

The ambivalent or multivalent stances taken toward emotion in the West result in part from variation across individuals and across time in the conceptualized relationship between, and evaluation of, nature and culture. Strathern has noted about this variability that “at one point culture is a creative, active force which produces form and structure out of a passive, given nature. At another, culture is the end product of a process, tamed and refined, and dependent for energy upon resources outside itself. Culture is both the creative subject and the finished object; nature both resource and limitation, amenable to alteration and operating under laws of its own” (1980:178). Emotions are seen in fundamentally the same way. Thus, emotions are alternately the pliant material on which acculturative and cognitive forces have their way (e.g., in the theories of Beck 1967 and Hochschild 1983), or they are, almost literally in many theories of emotion (e.g., Zajonc 1980), the energy which animates otherwise lifeless cultural forms. These two possibilities may help account for the observation that emotions are “sometimes . . . treated [in the American folk model] as things ‘triggered’ by experience, and at other times as things ‘created’ by experience” (D’Andrade 1987:127).

It is the view of emotion as creative energy that is particularly drawn on when emotion is being discussed in contrast with alienation. Here, the unemotional or disengaged is seen as an unnatural or cultural mode of being. While emotional response is still taken to be natural, the evaluations attached to the natural have taken on a much more positive tone. In the Romantic tradition, the natural (including emotion) is depicted as synonymous with the uncorrupted, the pure, the honest, the original. Nature and emotion are seen as fountains of high truths, while culture, conscious thought, and disengagement are all viewed as disguise, artifice, or vise—as themselves the limitations which are more commonly seen as characteristic of nature and emotion. When emotion is seen as natural in this positive sense, thought and its offshoot, social speech, come to be seen

as less authentic and less "really real." It is only uncognized, unexpressed emotion that is truly natural, then, as it has not been reached and disturbed or warped by cultural conventions for the conscious experience or display of emotion. . . .

The culturally constructed "naturalness" of emotion has also had the effect of making Westerners less reticent about attributing universal emotional abilities to others than they have been about ascribing particular cognitive abilities to all humans. This tendency to infer more readily what non-Westerners are "really feeling" than to claim that they are really thinking something other than what they claim to think is in part the result of the belief that natural processes are more invariant than cultural ones and, therefore, that emotions are both more uniform cross-culturally, and less culturally malleable, than thought. This view is developed most fully by those universalists for whom emotion's naturalness has been further confirmed by such theories as the sociobiological or psychodynamic. Spiro (1953), for example, claims that the Ifaluk really feel anger or hostility, though they mask it with fear. Freeman (1983) sees the occasional angry displays of Samoan orators at the island's competitive speaking events as demonstrations of the natural rage that any creature feels after dominance attempts by others. Freeman's analysis of Samoan behavior makes use not only of this assumption of the invariance of the natural features of humanness but of the idea that emotion is both natural and ultimately uncontrollable. In speaking of Samoan aggression in warfare, Freeman approvingly quotes from the ethnologist Krämer, who, at the turn of the century described how the "violent passions" of the Samoans were "set recklessly free" in wartime (Krämer 1903, quoted in Freeman 1983:166), turns of phrase which obviously imply the naturalness—weakly controlled—of emotions. For Freeman, the natural (like the emotional) is the more active member of the nature/culture set; the following quotation makes evident his implicit use of the cultural idea that nature's emotions are also a dark, animalistic force.

On some occasions the chiefs I was observing would, when contending over some burning issue, become annoyed and then angry with one another. By intently observing their physiological states . . . I was able, as their anger mounted, to monitor the behavior of these chiefs in relation to their use of respect language. From repeated observations it became evident that as chiefs became angry they tended to become *more and more polite*. . . . Occasionally, however, the conventions of culture would fail completely, and incensed chiefs, having attained to pinnacles of elaborately patterned politeness, would suddenly lapse into violent aggression . . . [T]he conventional behavior is replaced, in an instant, by highly emotional and impulsive behavior that is animal-like in its ferocity. (Freeman 1983:300–301)

In sum, emotions are primarily conceived of as precultural facts, as features of our biological heritage that can be identified independently of our cultural heritage. Although there is variation in the *evaluation* of the effect of culture and the natural substrate of our emotions on each other, the element of natural emotion counterposes itself to either the civilization of thought or the social disease of alienation and forms the basis for much everyday and academic talk about

emotions. The questions that are then asked concern the relationship between a natural fact—the affective response—and the cultural facts, including cultural beliefs and social institutions.

The Emotion of Fago (Compassion/Love/Sadness)

The implicit poetry in Ifaluk emotional understandings is nowhere more evident than in the concept of *fago* (compassion/love/sadness). In their use of that word, people on Ifaluk communicate a central part of their view of human relationships; they impart their sense of the place of suffering in their lives, of the naturalness of interpersonal kindness in the face of that pain, and of their feeling that maturity consists, above all, in the ability to nurture others. *Fago* speaks to the sense that life is fragile, that connections to others both are precious and may be severed through death or travel, that love may equal loss. *Fago* is uttered in recognition of the suffering that is everywhere and in the spirit of a vigorous optimism that human effort, most especially in the form of caring for others, can control its ravages.

My sense of what people were saying when they used the term *fago* emerged only slowly over the course of my stay on the island. The concept required, more than did most other Ifaluk emotion concepts, an effort to disentangle my own native emotional understandings from theirs. From the perspective of the implicit notions entailed in the American-English terms—including compassion, love, and sadness—that together best translate *fago*, the concept involves some basic internal contradictions. In particular, love and sadness differ in valence, in behavioral consequences, in the sense of empowerment they bestow, and in feeling tone. Love is positive and activating, sadness negative and enervating; the loving person is strong, the sad person weak. The ethnotheoretical notions surrounding the emotions with which I had come to Ifaluk created the structure of bafflement that I felt at seeing the diverse contexts within which the term *fago* (compassion/love/sadness) was used. The following accounts of several events I either observed or participated in exemplify the problems encountered in translating *fago*.

Ilefagochang, a woman in her late twenties, walked with me past the church one early evening as the sounds drifted from a group of women singing at daily vespers. Ilelagochang recognized the voice of her younger friend Lauchepou in the chorus, and said in the sentimental tone that people typically use to express affection, "*Mawesh Lauchepou*" (sweetheart Lauchepou).

Ilefagomar asked me one day if I had ever seen a person who had no toes. I replied by describing the somewhat more horrible condition of a man I had seen in New York City some years before. This man, I explained, had no legs but propelled himself along the city streets on a low board outfitted with wheels. To this, another woman who was listening exclaimed, with much intensity in her voice, "I would *fago* him if I saw him." She then immediately asked me where his family was and why they were not "taking care of" (*gamwela*) him.

As we sat listening to a love song on the radio that was tuned to a Guam station that played American music, Ilelagochang indicated that she had goose

jumps and added that they are caused by, among other things, our "*fago* for the person who is singing."

A young married man, Gachipemar, became very ill. His relatives attributed the illness to his excessive drinking, which they had earlier advised him to limit for his health's sake. When his stomach swelled out and the problem appeared to be a serious one, the standard and elaborate scenario for caring for the sick (to be described in a moment) began. Several weeks later, the interisland ship came and took Gachipemar, in the care of Pakesowel, his older brother, to be treated at the hospital on Yap. The brothers returned on the next ship, because the younger's condition had improved. Pakesowel told his relatives on his arrival, however, that Gachipemar had, against his advice, begun drinking again as the illness had receded. Pakesowel reported that he had rebuked Gachipemar for this behavior on Yap, saying to him, "You do not *fago* my thoughts." He reminded Gachipemar, he went on, that he (Pakesowel) had taken him to Yap's hospital even though it meant leaving his young son, for whom his "*fago* is strong" and on whose account he was homesick on Yap. By way of final reprimand, he told Gachipemar, "You do not *fago* your own breath [or life]."

On another occasion, I was sipping early-morning coffee with Ilefagomar when she told me that she had heard her younger brother singing as he fished from his canoe in the lagoon the previous evening. As she heard him, she said, "I had a bit of *fago* for him."

The field ship was making a daylong stopover at Ifaluk. It had gotten dark and the time was nearing for the boat's departure. I was sitting near the shore with Getachimang, an older man, when his twenty-five-year-old classificatory son, who was to leave on the ship, came to bid him a formal goodbye. The two men spoke in especially serious and quiet voices, calling each other father and son, terms that are rarely used in addressing (rather than simply in referring to) one's relatives. They held hands for some time, as Getachimang said several times to his son, "Be careful." The younger man reciprocated by speaking of his *fago* for the father.

These episodes indicate that the translation of the concept of *fago* (compassion/love/sadness) requires an understanding of the way the Ifaluk conceptualize positive relationships with others. *Fago* is used to alert others to the strength of particular relationships, to talk about the pain involved in the severance of those relations by death or travel, and to signal a readiness to care for the other. To explore in more detail the daily events that set the stage for *fago* is to examine the relationships that matter to people on Ifaluk, *how* precisely they matter, and the kinds of action—including primarily nurturance—that the relationships with others are felt to demand.



ANTONIO DAMASIO

Introduction

Antonio Damasio is an American neurobiologist who has done extensive work with brain-damaged patients who suffer from a variety of emotional deficiencies, and on the basis of his observations has come up with some radical proposals which seriously threaten some traditional views of emotion. In *Descartes's Error* (1994), he argued that the age-old opposition of reason and emotion needs to be seriously challenged, that brain-damaged patients who suffered from emotional deficiency were also incapable of making rational decisions. And in *The Feeling of What Happens* (2000), a piece of which is reprinted here, he argues (updating and improving on William James) that an emotion is a neurological process with accompanying feelings, the feeling of what is happening in our brains.

From The Feeling of What Happens



Feeling Feelings

I began this book by describing an obstacle: emotions cannot be known to the subject having them before there is consciousness. Now, after presenting my views on the nature of consciousness, it is time to explain how we can know an emotion. Beginning at the beginning: We know that we have an emotion when the sense of a feeling self is created in our minds. Until there is the sense of a feeling self, in both evolutionary terms as well as in a developing individual, there exist well-orchestrated responses, which constitute an emotion, and ensuing brain representations, which constitute a feeling. But we only know that we feel an emotion when we sense that emotion is sensed as happening in our organism.

The sense of "happening in the organism" comes from representing the proto-self and its changes in second-order structures. The sense of the "emotion as object" comes from representing, in structures subserving second-order representations, the activity pattern in the induction sites of emotion. Following what was outlined for other objects, I propose that: (1) the inaugural proto-self is represented at second-order level; (2) the "object" that is about to change the proto-self (the neural-activity pattern in emotion-induction sites) is represented at second-order level; (3) the ensuing changes in proto-self (enacted by "body

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loop" or "as if body loop" mechanisms) are also represented at second-order level.

Feeling an emotion is a simple matter. It consists of having mental images arising from the neural patterns which represent the changes in body and brain that make up an emotion. But knowing that we have that feeling, "feeling" that feeling, occurs only *after* we build the second-order representations necessary for core consciousness. As previously discussed, they are representations of the relationship between the organism and the object (which in this case is an emotion), and of the causal effect of that object on the organism.

The process that I am outlining is precisely the same we discussed for an external object, but it is difficult to envision when the object in question is an emotion, because emotion occurs within the organism, rather than outside of it. The process can only be understood when we keep in mind some of the notions introduced in the chapters on emotion and on the organism, namely: (1) that there are several brain sites whose activity pattern induces the cortege of actions that become an emotion, and (2) that the activity pattern can be represented within second-order brain structures. Examples of emotion induction sites include nuclei in the hypothalamus, brain stem, basal forebrain, amygdala, and ventromedial prefrontal cortices. Examples of second-order structures include thalamus and cingulate cortices.

It may sound strange, at first, that feelings of emotion—which are steeped in the representation of body states, only come to be known after *other* representations of body state have been integrated to give rise to a proto-self. And it sounds strange, for certain, that the means to know a feeling is another feeling. The situation becomes understandable, however, when we realize that the proto-self, feelings of emotion, and the feelings of knowing feelings emerged at different points in evolution and to this day emerge at different stages of individual development. Proto-self precedes basic feeling and both precede the feeling of knowing that constitutes core consciousness.

The Substrate for Feelings of Emotion

The collection of neural patterns which constitute the substrate of a feeling arise in two classes of biological changes: changes related to body state and changes related to cognitive state. The changes related to body state can be achieved by two mechanisms. One mechanism involves what I call the "body loop." It uses both humoral signals (chemical messages conveyed via the bloodstream) and neural signals (electrochemical messages conveyed via nerve pathways). As a result of both types of signal, the body landscape is changed and is subsequently represented in somatosensory structures of the central nervous system, from the brain stem on up. The change in the representation of the body landscape can be partly achieved by another mechanism, which involves the "as if body loop." In this alternate mechanism, the representation of body-related changes is created directly in sensory body maps, under the control of other neural sites, for instance, in the prefrontal cortices. It is "as if" the body had really been changed, but it has not. The "as if body loop" mechanism bypasses the body proper, partially or entirely, and I have suggested that bypassing the

body saves both time and energy, something that may be helpful in certain circumstances. The "as if" mechanisms are not only important for emotion and feeling, but also for a class of cognitive processes one might designate as "internal simulation."

The changes related to cognitive state are generated when the process of emotion leads to the secretion of certain chemical substances in nuclei of the basal forebrain, hypothalamus, and brain stem, and to the subsequent delivery of those substances to several other brain regions. When these nuclei release neuromodulators in the cerebral cortex, thalamus, and basal ganglia, they cause a host of significant alterations of brain function. The most important alterations I envision include (1) the induction of particular behaviors (such as bonding and nurturing, playing and exploring); (2) a change in the ongoing processing of body states (as an example, body signals may be filtered or allowed to pass, selectively inhibited or enhanced, and their pleasant or unpleasant quality altered); and (3) a change in the mode of cognitive processing (an example of the latter, in relation to auditory or visual images, would be a change from a slow to a fast rate of image production or a change from sharply focused to vaguely focused images, a change which is an integral part of emotions as disparate as those of sadness or elation).

I suspect all three kinds of change are present in humans and in numerous nonhuman species. It is possible, however, that the third kind of change—the change in the mode of cognitive processing—is only made conscious in humans because it requires an especially high-level representation of neural events: the sort of metarepresentation of aspects of brain processing that only prefrontal cortices are likely to support.

In short, emotional states are defined by myriad changes in the body's chemical profile; by changes in the state of viscera; and by changes in the degree of contraction of varied striated muscles of the face, throat, trunk, and limbs. But they are also defined by changes in the collection of neural structures which cause those changes to occur in the first place and which also cause other significant changes in the state of several neural circuits within the brain itself.

To the simple definition of emotion as a specifically caused transient change of the organism state corresponds a simple definition for feeling an emotion: It is the representation of that transient change in organism state in terms of neural patterns and ensuing images. When those images are accompanied, one instant later, by a sense of self in the act of knowing, and when they are enhanced, they become conscious. They are, in the true sense, feelings of feelings.

There is nothing vague, elusive, or nonspecific about emotional responses, and there is nothing vague, elusive, or nonspecific about the representations which can become feelings of emotions. The substrate for emotional feelings is a very concrete set of neural patterns in maps of selected structures.

FROM EMOTION TO CONSCIOUS FEELING

In summary, the complete course of events, from emotion to feeling to feeling of feeling, may be partitioned along five steps, the first three of which were outlined in the chapter on emotion.

1. Engagement of the organism by an inducer of emotion, for instance, a particular object processed visually, resulting in visual representations of the object. The object may be made conscious or not, and may be recognized or not, because neither consciousness of the object nor recognition of the object are necessary for the continuation of the cycle.
2. Signals consequent to the processing of the image of the object activate neural sites that are preset to respond to the particular class of inducer to which the object belongs (emotion-induction sites).
3. The emotion-induction sites trigger a number of responses toward the body and toward other brain sites, and unleash the full range of body and brain responses that constitute emotion.
4. First-order neural maps in both subcortical and cortical regions represent changes in body state, regardless of whether they were achieved via "body loop," "as if body loop," or combined mechanisms. Feelings emerge.
5. The pattern of neural activity at the emotion-induction sites is mapped in second-order neural structures. The proto-self is altered because of these events. The changes in proto-self are also mapped in second-order neural structures. An account of the foregoing events, depicting a relationship between the "emotion object" (the activity at the emotion-induction sites) and the proto-self, is thus organized in second-order structures.

This perspective on emotion, feeling, and knowing is unorthodox. First, I am suggesting that there is no central feeling state before the respective emotion occurs, that expression (emotion) precedes feeling. Second, I am suggesting that "having a feeling" is not the same as "knowing a feeling," that reflection on feeling is yet another step up. Overall, this curious situation reminds me of E. M. Forster's words: "How can I know what I think before I say it?"

The inescapable and remarkable fact about these three phenomena—emotion, feeling, consciousness—is their body relatedness. We begin with an organism made up of body proper and brain, equipped with certain forms of brain response to certain stimuli and with the ability to represent the internal states caused by reacting to stimuli and engaging repertoires of preset response. As the representations of the body grow in complexity and coordination, they come to constitute an integrated representation of the organism, a proto-self. Once that happens, it becomes possible to engender representations of the proto-self as it is affected by interactions with a given environment. It is only then that consciousness begins, and only thereafter that an organism that is responding beautifully to its environment begins to discover that *it* is responding beautifully to its environment. But all of these processes—emotion, feeling, and consciousness—depend for their execution on representations of the organism. Their shared essence is the body.

What Are Feelings For?

It might be argued that emotions without feelings would be a sufficient mechanism to regulate life and promote survival. It might be argued that signaling the

results of that regulatory mechanism would hardly be necessary for survival. But that is simply not the case. Having feelings is of extraordinary value in the orchestration of survival. Emotions are useful in themselves, but the process of feeling begins to alert the organism to the problem that emotion has begun to solve. The simple process of feeling begins to give the organism *incentive* to heed the results of emoting (suffering begins with feelings, although it is enhanced by knowing, and the same can be said for joy). The availability of feeling is also the stepping stone for the next development—the *feeling of knowing that we have feelings*. In turn, knowing is the stepping stone for the process of planning specific and nonstereotyped responses which can either complement an emotion or guarantee that the immediate gains brought by emotion can be maintained over time, or both. In other words, “feeling” feelings extends the reach of emotions by facilitating the planning of novel and customized forms of adaptive response.

Now consider this: Knowing a feeling requires a knower subject. In looking for a good reason for the endurance of consciousness in evolution, one might do worse than say that consciousness endured because organisms so endowed could “feel” their feelings. I am suggesting that the mechanisms which permit consciousness may have prevailed because it was useful for organisms to know of their emotions. And as consciousness prevailed as a biological trait, it became applicable not just to the emotions but to the many stimuli which brought them into action. Eventually consciousness became applicable to the entire range of possible sensory events.

But we do experience other kinds of emotion, sometimes low grade, sometimes quite intense, and we do sense the general physical tone of our being. I have called the readout of this background perturbation “background feelings,” a term I first used in *Descartes’ Error*, because these feelings are not in the foreground of our mind. Sometimes we become keenly aware of them and can attend to them specifically. Sometimes we do not and attend, instead, to other mental contents. In one way or another, however, background feelings help define our mental state and color our lives. Background feelings arise from background emotions, and these emotions, although more internally than externally directed, are observable to others in myriad ways: body postures, the speed and design of our movements, and even the tone of our voices and the prosody in our speech as we communicate thoughts that may have little to do with the background emotion. For this reason, I believe it is important to broaden our notion of the source of feelings.

Prominent background feelings include: fatigue; energy; excitement; wellness; sickness; tension; relaxation; surging; dragging; stability; instability; balance; imbalance; harmony; discord. The relation between background feelings and drives and motivations is intimate: drives express themselves directly in background emotions and we eventually become aware of their existence by means of background feelings. The relation between background feelings and moods is also close. Moods are made up of modulated and sustained background feelings as well as modulated and sustained feelings of primary emotions—sadness, in the case of depression. Finally, the relation between background feelings and consciousness is just as close: background feelings and core consciousness are so closely tied that they are not easily separable.

It is probably correct to say that background feelings are a faithful index of momentary parameters of inner organism state. The core ingredients of that index are (1) the temporal and spatial shape of the operations of the smooth musculature in blood vessels and varied organs, and of the striated muscle of heart and chest; (2) the chemical profile of the milieu close to all those muscle fibers; and (3) the presence or absence of a chemical profile signifying either a threat to the integrity of living tissues or conditions of optimal homeostasis.

Thus, even a phenomenon as simple as background feelings depends on many levels of representation. For instance, some background feelings that have to do with internal milieu and viscera must depend on signals occurring as early as the substantia gelatinosa and intermediate zone of each segment of the spinal cord, and the pars caudalis of the trigeminal nerve nucleus. Other background feelings have to do with the cyclical operations of striated muscle in cardiac function and with patterns of contraction and dilation in smooth muscle which require representations in specific brain-stem nuclei such as the nucleus tractus solitarius and the parabrachial nucleus.

PART 3

THE CONTINENTAL TRADITION

The study of the emotions in European philosophy continued with a fervor that had died out in Anglo-American philosophy. It was inspired by one of the most prominent European philosophers of modern times—Immanuel Kant. Kant's theory was hardly sympathetic to the emotions. Indeed, his whole "practical" philosophy focused on the powers of Reason, relegating emotions to the realm of the "pathological" (from "*pathos*" = feeling). But Kant himself had argued that the key to morality is a sense of respect, which looked dangerously like a feeling (*Gefühl*), and his philosophical hero Rousseau had argued before him that ethics was largely a matter of "inner sentiment." Accordingly, it was not interest in emotions alone so much as the concern with ethics that lead many philosophers to a detailed study of the ethically relevant emotions, particularly love, hate, and sympathy.

A second major influence on the Continent, but again a philosopher who did not himself study the emotions, was the Czech-German "phenomenologist" Edmund Husserl. Husserl's method was greeted by many philosophers as a genuinely revolutionary insight into the nature and structures of knowledge and consciousness. Husserl was interested primarily in epistemology, but his most devoted followers carried his methods of "phenomenological description" into the "affective" realm, with intriguing results. Three of the philosophers represented here studied Husserl's work; two studied with Husserl; the fourth, Franz

Brentano, was Husserl's teacher and anticipated several of his major insights. Max Scheler, a pupil of Husserl, did most of his work in ethics, spending much of his time attacking and revising Kant to give the emotions a more central place in morality. Martin Heidegger, also a student of Husserl, became mighty critical of his teacher and returned phenomenology to the service of metaphysics but defended the importance of moods in our "being tuned" to the world. He subsequently attacked the entire Western philosophical "tradition." Jean-Paul Sartre studied Husserl and Heidegger in France; their work was the greatest single influence in his early philosophical writings, including his studies in philosophical psychology and emotion in particular in the late 1930s, and *Being and Nothingness*, written in 1943.



FRANZ BRENTANO

(1838–1917)

Introduction

A German philosopher and psychologist, Franz Brentano entered the Roman Catholic priesthood in 1864 while a professor of philosophy at Würzburg. When it became clear, in 1873 that the doctrine of papal infallibility, which he could not accept, would not be overturned, Brentano left the priesthood and took a position at the University of Vienna, where he lectured on both philosophy and psychology until 1895. Among his students were Edmund Husserl, the father of the phenomenological movement and Max Scheler, a prominent phenomenologist with a special interest in emotions (see the following selection). Brentano's development of the notion of intentionality laid the groundwork for Husserl's phenomenological approach to philosophical issues; his writings on love and hate stimulated Scheler's work on the emotions and their role in moral knowledge.

Dissatisfied with the plurality of psychological systems existing in his day, Brentano set for himself the task of completely revising the field of psychology in the hope of unifying it into one system. To this end, he embarked on what he called "descriptive psychology"—a description and clarification of basic psychological concepts, as well as a categorization of psychological phenomena. Both his *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint*, published in 1874, and *On the Classification of Psychical Phenomena*, published in 1911, deal with these issues.

In his descriptive psychology, Brentano distinguished mental phenomena from physical phenomena. Mental phenomena, he argues, "are uniquely characterized by the fact that they have an object, upon which . . . they are directed. Whoever thinks, thinks about something, whoever is angry is angry about something, and so on." His point is that no mental act, whether a thought or an emotion, is simply a mental act; rather, it always refers to something else, some object. Physical phenomena obviously lack this referential quality. Moreover, the objects of mental acts need not exist; when we think about unicorns, we are still thinking about something even though unicorns do not exist. This directedness toward, or reference to, an object is called "intentionality." In claiming that all mental phenomena, including emotions, are intentional, Brentano clearly rejects the traditional view of emotions, espoused by Descartes and Hume, which treats emotions as mere sensations. But Brentano's rejection of traditional views of emotion goes even

farther; he argues that many emotions, specifically a special kind of loving and hating, are neither irrational nor subjective.

Brentano believed that we can be intentionally directed toward objects in three basic ways—by having something in mind (a representation or an idea), by accepting or rejecting it (a judgment), or by adopting an emotional pro or con attitude toward it (loving and hating). Love and hate (which have a technical meaning for Brentano) are carefully analyzed in both his psychological and ethical writings. Reprinted here is an excerpt from *On the Origin of Our Knowledge of Right and Wrong*, originally presented in lecture form and published in 1889. Carrying on the moral sentiment tradition begun by Hutcheson and Hume, Brentano argues that we experience the self-evident truth of value-judgments through loves and hates felt to be “correct.” In defending this position, Brentano draws an analogy between judgment and emotion. Some of our judgments are mere opinions, which may be either true or false. Sometimes, however, as, for example, when we make mathematical and logical judgments (e.g., that a statement cannot be both true and false), we experience these judgments as being self-evidently true; there is no doubt about their truth. So too for lovings and hatings. Sometimes we love or hate things that do not necessarily deserve to be loved or hated; these feelings are like mere opinions. But sometimes we experience our love, e.g., our love of truth or honesty, as being a correct love. These sorts of emotions give us an insight into moral values. They are not subjective or irrational emotions.

Brentano distinguishes these “correct” lovings and hatings from those not giving us an insight into values, as well as from other emotions, such as fear, hope, and dread, which he says are “extraordinarily complex phenomena.” Although writing little on these other emotions, Brentano outlines in the following passage the direction he thinks an investigation of these emotions should take, a direction, in fact, that many subsequent theorists did take: (1) an analysis of individual emotions, (2) an investigation of the use of emotion terms, and (3) an outline of the genetic relations among different emotions (e.g., by distinguishing the emotional type illustrated by love, infatuation and, affection from that illustrated by envy, jealousy, and resentment).

Subsequent theories of emotion, most of which argue for the intentionality of emotions, were profoundly affected by Brentano’s theory of intentionality. Note, however, that moods do not seem to fit Brentano’s model. When we are depressed or anxious we are not necessarily depressed or anxious about anything. Most subsequent theorists argue that moods, unlike other emotions, are not intentional.

From On the Origin of Our Knowledge of Right and Wrong

Loving and Hating

How are we to *know* that a thing is good? Should we say that whatever is loved or is capable of being loved is something that is worthy of love and therefore good? Obviously this would not be right, and it is almost impossible to comprehend how it could be that some have fallen in to such an error. One person loves what another hates. And, in accordance with a well-known psychological law already touched upon in this lecture, it often happens as a result of habit that what is at first desired merely as a means to something else comes to be desired for itself alone. Thus the miser is reduced to heaping up riches irrationally and even to sacrificing himself in order to acquire them. And so we may say that the fact that a thing is loved is no indication that it is worthy of being loved—just as we may say that the fact that something is affirmed or accepted is no indication that it is true.

Indeed, of these two statements, the former is the more obvious. It is hardly possible for a man to accept or affirm something and at the same time hold it to be false. But it may frequently happen that one loves something that one admits to be unworthy of such love. . . . How then, are we to know that a thing is good?

The matter may now seem very puzzling, but there is a simple solution.

To prepare the answer, let us consider once again the analogy that holds between the good and the true.

The fact that we affirm something does not mean that it is true, for we often judge quite blindly. Many of the prejudices that we acquired in our infancy may take on the appearance of indubitable principles. And all men have by nature an impulse to trust certain other judgments that are equally blind—for example, those judgements that are based upon so-called external perception and those that are based upon memories of the recent past. What is affirmed in this way may often be true, but it is just as likely to be false. For these judgements involve nothing that manifests correctness.

But they may be contrasted with certain other judgements which are “insightful” or “evident.” The law of contradiction is one example. Other examples are provided by so-called inner perception, which tells me that I am now having such-and-such sound or colour sensations, or that I am now thinking or willing this or that.

What, then, is the essential distinction between these lower and higher forms of judgement? Is it a distinction with respect to degree of conviction or is it something else? It does not pertain to degree of conviction. Many of those blind, instinctive assumptions that arise out of habit are completely uninfected by doubt. Some of them are so firmly rooted that we cannot get rid of them even after we have seen that they have no logical justification. But they are formed under the influence of obscure impulses; they do not have the clarity that is

characteristic of the higher form of judgement. If one were to ask, "Why do you really believe that?" it would be impossible to find any rational grounds. Now if one were to raise the same question in connection with a judgement that is immediately evident, here, too, it would be impossible to refer to any grounds. But in this case the clarity of the judgement is such as to enable us to see that the question has no point; indeed, the question would be completely ridiculous. Everyone experiences the difference between these two classes of judgement. As in the case of every other concept, the ultimate explication consists only in a reference to this experience.

In its essentials, all this is universally recognized. Only a few have contested it, and then with great inconsistency. Less notice has been taken of the analogous distinction between the higher and lower types of activity in the emotional sphere, in the sphere of inclination and disinclination.

The feelings of inclination and disinclination often resemble blind judgement in being only instinctive or habitual. This is so in the case of the pleasure the miser takes in hoarding money as well as in those powerful feelings of pleasure and displeasure that men and animals alike connect with the appearance of certain sensuous qualities. Moreover, different species and even different individuals are often affected in contrary ways; this is obvious, of course, in connection with matters of taste.

Many philosophers, and among them very significant thinkers, have taken into account only that mode of pleasure that is peculiar to the lower types of activity within the sphere of the emotions. They have entirely overlooked the fact that there is a higher mode of being pleased or displeased. . . . But the fact is undeniable. We may elucidate it by a few examples.

As I have said, it is natural for us to take pleasure in certain tastes and to feel an antipathy toward others. In both cases, our feelings are purely instinctive. But it is also natural for us to take pleasure in the clarity of insight and to feel displeased by error or ignorance. "All men," Aristotle says in the beautiful introductory words to the *Metaphysics*, "naturally desire knowledge." This desire is an example which will serve our purpose. It is a pleasure of the highest form; it is thus the analogue of something being evident in the sphere of judgement. It is a pleasure that is common to all the members of our species. Imagine now another species quite different from ourselves; not only do its members have preferences with respect to sense qualities which are quite different from ours; unlike us, they also despise insight and love error for its own sake. So far as the feelings about sense qualities are concerned, we might say that these things are a matter of taste, and "*De gustibus non est disputandum*." But this is not what we would say of the love of error and the hatred of insight. We would say that such love and hatred are basically perverse and that the members of the species in question hate what is indubitably and intrinsically good and love what is indubitably and intrinsically bad. Why do we answer differently in the two cases when the feeling of compulsion is equally strong? The answer is simple. In the former case the feeling of compulsion is merely instinctive. But in the latter case the natural feeling of pleasure is a higher love that is experienced as being correct. When we ourselves experience such a love we notice not only that its object is loved and capable of being loved, and that its privation or contrary hated and

capable of being hated, but also that the one is worthy of love and the other worthy of hate, and therefore that the one is good and the other bad.

Our knowledge of what is truly and indubitably good arises from the type of experience we have been discussing, where a love is experienced as being correct—in all those cases where we are capable of such knowledge.¹

We should note, however, that there is no guarantee that every good thing will arouse in us an emotion that is experienced as being correct. When this does not occur, our criterion fails, in which case the good is absent so far as our knowledge and practical purposes are concerned.

The phenomena of inner perception show us to be substances having psychical accidents. Examples of psychical accidents are: seeing, hearing, conceptual thinking of various kinds, judging, emotional activity, desiring, pleasure, anger, etc. Descartes grouped these together as being “thinking” in the broadest sense of the term. They are uniquely characterized by the fact that they have an object, upon which, as we might say, they are directed. Whoever thinks, thinks about something, whoever is angry is angry about something, and so on. The property of psychical accidents distinguishes every object of inner perception from any object of so-called outer perception. . . .

We may distinguish three basic types of reference to an object: (1) thinking, or having the object before the mind; (2) judging; and (3) loving or hating. Thinking may be ranked first, as being the basic and most general type of reference. We cannot form judgements about a thing—we cannot affirm or deny—unless we think about the thing. And we cannot feel love or hate toward a thing unless we think about the thing. Which are we to rank second—judging, or loving and hating? Here the answer may seem less clear. On the one hand, we can love a thing or desire it, without having made any judgement as to whether or not the thing exists. And on the other hand, we can judge about it, without desiring or detesting it. Some would rank judging second—after thinking and before the emotions—on the ground that judging is more like thinking than are the

¹Love and hate may be directed upon entire classes as well as upon single individuals, as Aristotle had noted. We are angry, he said, only with the particular thief who has robbed us, or with the particular sycophant who has deceived us in our innocence, but we hate thieves and sycophants in general (*Rhetoric*, Book II, Chapter 4, 1382a). Acts of love and hate which are thus based upon some general concept are also frequently experienced as being correct. And then, along with the experience of the given act of love or hate, the goodness or badness of the entire class becomes obvious at a single stroke, so to speak, and without any induction from particular cases. This is the way, for example, that we attain to the general knowledge that insight as such is good. Since we have here the apprehension of a general truth without the induction from particular cases that is required to establish other empirical propositions, some philosophers have been tempted to look upon the universal judgement as a synthetic *a priori* form of immediate knowledge. The temptation is easy to understand. But it overlooks the fact that the apprehension of such a general truth is preceded by an emotion that is experienced as being correct.

emotions. But actually there does not seem to be this great similarity. Some would rank the emotions before judging, and would defend themselves by saying that the will determines whether we believe or do not believe. In general, however, this is not the case. Willing requires judging; and evident inner perception is certainly knowledge which is independent of any willing.

The following points would seem to be the ones that are significant in deciding how to order these phenomena:

- (1) Judging accompanies every act of inner perception; but it is possible to conceive of an act of inner perception which is not accompanied by any emotion.
- (2) The emotions carry with them a much greater degree of complexity and diversity than does judging.
- (3) Just as judging as such adds to the perfection of mere thinking, the emotions in turn appear to contribute a still greater degree of perfection, particularly by means of the feeling of happiness.

These three considerations warrant our saying that judging is the second of the three basic types of objective reference and loving and hating the third.

Let us turn, then, to the subspecies of this third type of reference. It is clear, first of all, that any differences in the thoughts or ideas which underlie our emotions will be carried over into the emotions themselves. . . .

Ideas themselves may be distinguished from several different points of view. (1) They may be distinguished by their objects. (2) And (what is connected in a certain way with the first point) they may be distinguished according to whether their objects are thought of in their individuality or only in general terms, and whether they are thought of absolutely or only relatively. (3) Ideas may be distinguished by reference to the temporal mode in which the object is thought. (4) They may be distinguished according to whether the object is thought of positively or negatively. . . . (5) We may distinguish between simple and compound ideas. Compound ideas, in turn, may have a greater or lesser degree of complication; for we can combine attributes in our thinking. Predication may be a matter of judging, as when we say "A tree is green"; but it may also be a matter just of thinking, or having ideas, as when we say "a green tree." And when we form the idea of numbers, such as 2, 3, 5, we compound ideas. We also think in a complex way when we distinguish the parts of a complex object and are able to say that we then have a clearer idea of the whole.

Each of these distinctions, so significant for the sphere of ideas, must correspond to a distinction within the sphere of *love and hate*.

- (1) First of all, love, and also hate, may be distinguished according to its object.
- (2) They may also be distinguished according to whether they are general or are directed upon some concrete particular, and so on.
- (3) They may be distinguished according to the temporal mode with respect to which the object is loved or hated. In this way, we distinguish the *regret* which pertains to the past, the *pain* or *sorrow* which is directed upon a present experience, and the *fear* of an evil to come.

- (4) The emotional relations may be distinguished as positive or negative; it is this distinction which finds expression in the terms "love" and "hate."
- (5) The distinction between simple and compound ideas, and of the ways of compounding ideas, should also have bearing upon the ways in which the emotions are directed upon their objects.

Distinctions with respect to judgement, like those with respect to ideas, carry over into the sphere of the emotions. Thus my emotion will differ markedly depending upon whether some future happiness, which I may picture for myself, appears certain or uncertain, probable or improbable, attainable or unattainable. Again there may be something which is in itself indifferent to me, but which pleases me as being a *sign* of some other thing, or as being *instrumental* to some other thing; such an emotion is quite obviously influenced by judging. Indeed the simplest pleasures of the senses are characterized by the fact that they are experiences which we love and which we apprehend with evidence. We see the same thing in connection with willing and intending or undertaking. No one can will a thing he believes to be beyond his power, however much he may desire it. And no one can form the intention of doing something if he believes that he will never have the opportunity to do it. In such cases, the essential nature of the reference of our emotions is affected by the particular characteristics of the judgements underlying them. The nature of these emotions may perhaps be compared with the particular characteristics of the evident, in virtue of which we are able to distinguish judgements which are evident from judgements which are blind.

There are other distinctions which hold exclusively within the sphere of the emotions.

One is the distinction between *loving*, simply, and *preferring*. The latter act involves comparison. If I prefer one thing to another, then I love the one thing more and the other less. Similarly for hating; if I hate one thing more than another, then the one thing could be called, if the expression were permitted, the "preferred object of hate," and the other thing "the less preferred object of hate." In the sphere of judging, there is a true and a false, but of things that are true none of them is *more* true than another, and nothing is *held* to be more true than anything else. . . .

Moreover, there is, in the sphere of the emotions, a *correct* loving or hating and an *incorrect* loving or hating. This may seem to be the analogue of correct acceptance or affirmation and correct rejection or denial, but it is essentially different. . . .

There is another analogy between the emotions and judgement—but it is only an analogy. Sometimes we have an insight into the correctness of love or hate (either simple love or hate or preference) and sometimes we do not. If we have an indirect insight into such correctness, then this presupposes some other direct insight. The logical connection is to be understood in accordance with the usual rules of judgement. When we do have a direct insight into the correctness of an emotion, then the emotion is experienced as being correct. Sometimes, but by no means always, we have such an insight when we love or hate something in itself.

Closer study of these instances of correct emotion shows that they are not only similar to directly evident judgements in general; they bear a specific resemblance to those directly evident judgements in which the truth of the judgement is clear from the *concepts* which the judgement involves. Such judgements are made when contemplation of the object causes an evident rejection or denial, a rejection or denial that is seen to be correct. Thus if we attempt to imagine a round square, we are forced to deny or reject it, for we see that it is impossible. In much the same way, contemplation of knowledge causes a love that is experienced as being correct and contemplation of a painful experience—this being an experience which hates itself, so to speak—causes a feeling of hatred that is experienced as being correct. Consequently our knowledge of the correctness of such love or hatred is *apodictic*; we know that *only* love or hatred can be correct in these cases. Such love and hatred is similar to the apodictic judgement. For apodictic judgements, like these emotions, arise out of the contemplation of their objects.

What are we to say of such emotions as fear, hope, dread, anxiety, agitation, jealousy, envy, anger, terror, horror, uneasiness, lust, disgust—and so on and so forth? In almost every one of these cases we are dealing with an extraordinarily complex phenomenon. Many of the terms are difficult to define; we cannot fix their range of application with any degree of exactness. We come to learn them, not by means of definitions, but by using them in a variety of actual situations. Compare the concept of a high mountain. No one is able to define it so precisely that he could say, of a mountain that was not high, that it *would* be high if only one foot were added. The question of what it is for one person to be angry is similar.

Can one be angry with a non-living thing, such as a chair? Can one be angry with a man who lived many centuries in the past? Or can one be angry with someone who is depicted on the stage or in a novel? If one *can* be angry in these cases, must one have forgotten, for the moment, that the chair is not a living thing, that the historical person belongs to the distant past, and that the person depicted by the poet is only a thing of the imagination?

Such questions readily lead to disputes that are merely verbal. But a scientific treatment could accomplish this much: (a) it could contribute toward the analysis of particular, individual phenomena; (b) by appeal to philology, it could set more or less definite limits to the use of certain ordinary expressions; and (c), what is of most importance for psychology, it could tell us what particular emotive phenomena, and what groups of such phenomena, are related genetically to each other. Since genetic laws are not exact, we would have to take into account the probability of various connections and relations. Psychological phenomena are connected genetically with physical phenomena, as well as with other psychological phenomena, and these connections can be indicated with some degree of probability for the complex cases we have mentioned. Thus it frequently happens that a frightened man becomes pale and trembles, whereas an angry man becomes both warm and red, "glowing" with anger. There may well be considerable doubt, therefore, about what essential mark of this class of cases really is.

Let us consider the angry man in more detail. It would seem that he wants to inflict evil upon a person toward whom he is hostile, a person who has interfered in some way with some of his own interests. But we cannot call him angry in virtue of this characteristic alone. He must also feel agitated and be seething with a rage which, like a kind of madness, is capable of overpowering him and carrying him away. He clenches his fist against the enemy, even though the enemy may be off in the distance entirely out of reach, and he grinds his teeth, as though he could tear the enemy into bits and then grind him into powder. Above all, the motive for his anger may disappear entirely from his memory, just as the danger to himself may go entirely unheeded; his wild excitement will continue to strengthen his hostile urge to inflict harm.

We know, of course, that animals are also capable of anger. The dog, for example, is easily made angry, because of his instincts, and his anger will quickly rise to a level of great vehemence. Anger in dogs is very much like fear in sheep; as soon as the sheep sees a wolf, he is instinctively overcome with fear. Similarly, other animals may be overcome by hunger, or by thirst, or during mating season by the sexual urge. The essential characteristic of the angry man is the overpowering urge to inflict harm, an urge which may have no clear motive and which is bound up with a great variety of passions and reflexes.

If one were able to excite all of these side-effects in a dog, then probably one could also create in him the urge to do harm, without his knowing what it is that he wishes to harm. Aristotle pointed out, similarly, that since fear makes one cold, people are often made fearful merely by becoming cold, without knowing what it is that they fear. If, therefore, the desire to inflict harm can induce a state of agitation and excitement, while, on the other hand, the state of agitation and excitement can create the desire to inflict harm, we may wonder whether the first or the second of these marks constitutes the essence of anger. We may do well in the meantime to regard the essence of anger as comprising, not only both of these things, but also a genetic relation to some prior experience which occasioned the whole hostile state. In the case of man, anger is commonly bound up with a desire for vengeance—a vengeance which is not merely a matter of receiving a just and proper compensation. The angry man would take out his vengeance on the enemy himself; he would cool off his anger by inflicting harm upon his enemy.

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MAX SCHELER

(1874–1928)

Introduction

Max Scheler lived through the advent and rise of the philosophical movement known as “phenomenology,” which was an attempt to get behind scientific and philosophical preconceptions to a description of the essences of things themselves, untainted by theoretical prejudices. Although the German philosopher Edmund Husserl is usually credited with fathering phenomenology, Scheler, who first met Husserl in 1901 and later corresponded with him, claimed to have arrived independently at some of the crucial insights of the phenomenological method of doing philosophy. In his day, Scheler was regarded as one of its leading exponents. He was one of the four original co-editors of Husserl’s *Jahrbuch*, which was devoted to phenomenological studies; his *Formalism in Ethics and Non-formal Ethics of Values* (excerpted here) first appeared in the *Jahrbuch*.

Like his contemporary, Martin Heidegger (excerpted in the following selection), who also falls within the phenomenological tradition, Max Scheler was preoccupied with the question “What is Man?” His work delves into the nature of man as an ethical, religious, cultural, historical, and natural being. For Scheler, the question can be answered only by investigating human emotional life. This is particularly clear in three major works, *Formalism*, *The Nature of Sympathy*, and *On the Eternal in Man*. *Formalism*, written in 1916, was Scheler’s first major work. It is an ethical treatise on the nature of values and valuing. In it Scheler introduces and defends the idea that there is a *logique du coeur*—a ranked order of values, spanning from the lower values of the agreeable and disagreeable, through ethical values, to the highest value of the holy, which are “felt” or known through different emotional acts. The later *The Nature of Sympathy* (1931) and *On the Eternal in Man* develop ideas latent in *Formalism*. In *On the Eternal in Man*, Scheler attempts to work out the essence of the divine or holy, whereas in *The Nature of Sympathy*, he analyzes sympathy phenomenologically, as well as love, hatred, pity, and other emotions. In this latter work, Scheler argues that our knowledge and understanding of other minds is not inferential, based on our understanding of ourselves, but rather is the result of an immediate emotional contact with others.

Max Scheler has been described as a passionate man who not only pursued a wide range of philosophical and anthropological issues from ethics to the sociology of knowledge to the evolutionary development of the human psyche, but who also actively participated in current political and moral issues. During World War I,

Scheler staunchly defended German involvement in the war in his *The Genius of War and the German War* and was sent on diplomatic missions by the German Foreign Office. (Toward the end of the war, however, Scheler made an about-face, defending pacifism on Christian grounds.) Throughout his life, Scheler wrestled with questions about the correct conception of religion and God. *On the Eternal in Man* is, in part, a defense of Christianity, particularly Catholicism. But only a year after its publication, Scheler left the Church, unable to reconcile his own views with Church dogmatism; and in *Formalism*, he claims he can no longer describe himself even as a theist.

Scheler held a number of academic positions. In 1901, he became a privatdozent at Jena; it was here that he first met Husserl. In 1907, he took a position at the University of Munich, where he met Brentano and a number of Husserl's students, resigning in 1910 to pursue philosophy on his own. And in 1919, Scheler received an academic appointment in philosophy and sociology at the University of Cologne.

The following selection is taken from Scheler's major work in moral philosophy, *Formalism in Ethics and Non-formal Ethics of Values*. Although heavily influenced by the ethical writings of Immanuel Kant, one of the great moral thinkers in the history of philosophy, Scheler repudiated the formality of Kant's ethics. For Kant, the moral value of any act resided solely in its conformity to a universal moral imperative, that is, in the fact that the act is the sort of act we could wish anyone to perform in similar circumstances. Thus, kindness, generosity, sincerity, and the like are not themselves moral values of actions. Rather, a kind act, for example, has value only insofar as it is one that can be universally commended. This, Scheler thought, is an overly formal conception of value. By contrast, Scheler argued that such qualities as kindness, beauty, grace, nobility, and vitality are themselves value-qualities. In *Formalism*, Scheler works out a value system that contrasts sharply with Kant's; as part and parcel of this work, Scheler developed a distinctive theory about how we recognize values in persons, things, and acts (a theory, which, although novel, has its roots in the moral sentiment theories of philosophers like Francis Hutcheson and David Hume, as well as in Brentano's later work). He argues that we experience special feelings, which he calls "value-feelings" or "feeling-functions," through which we feel the grace, generosity, vitality, and so on of persons, things, and acts. Thus, our original awareness of valuable features in the world around us occurs in our emotional responses to them.

If any one statement could summarize Scheler's general position in the *Formalism*, it is Blaise Pascal's aphorism "the heart has its reasons, which reason does not know." In other words, Scheler's central project was to show that feeling is a form of cognition that allows us to "see" values in the surrounding world of facts ("the heart has its reasons") and that feeling is a form of cognition utterly distinct from and irreducible to any rational or intellectual cognition ("which reason does not know"). It is crucial to Scheler that feeling be raised up from the level of "blind feel-

ing." He argues vehemently against Cartesian analyses of emotion that reduce emotions to irrational affects that happen to us and that do not, except accidentally, contribute anything to our knowledge of the world. Scheler's own analysis of emotion is diametrically opposed to this and represents an attempt to overcome the traditional dichotomy between emotion and reason. For Scheler, at least some emotions stand on a par with reason, being a kind of "intuition" or "insight" into what is valuable or not valuable; such emotions provide our only access to the world of values. (His theory, in short, is that were we not emotional beings, our whole intellectual life would be confined to purely factual observations about the world, and we would never be able to evaluate these facts.)

Scheler's monumental reconstruction of our idea of emotion grew directly out of Franz Brentano's work. Both construct intentional theories of emotion; both wrestle with the relation between emotion and our knowledge of values; and both elevate emotion to a place of prominence in what might loosely be called the intellectual life. But two critical innovations especially distinguish Scheler's work from Brentano's. First, Brentano had not, in Scheler's opinion, adequately distinguished values from emotions. Brentano had not, in Scheler's terms, seen that values are autonomous "value-facts," independent of our cognitive apparatus. For Brentano, to say that a painting is beautiful is simply to say that it is correctly loved. Beauty is not an independent "value-fact" that we can then know or intuit through feelings of love or aesthetic delight. Rather, the beauty of a painting resides simply in the fact that it evokes a feeling of love, which we experience as being "correct" or appropriate. What this means is that, for Brentano, emotions are not cognitive mental acts in a strict sense—they do not inform us of independent features (namely, values) of the world. (A similar criticism could be made of moral sentiment theories like David Hume's theory.) By contrast, Scheler argues that emotions are cognitive in a strict sense. Through our emotions we "see" values in much the way that through our sense of sight we see colors and shapes. And thus our emotions are genuinely informative mental acts.

Second, whereas Brentano thought that all emotions are intentional mental acts involving a pro or con attitude toward things in the world, Scheler argues that only a select group of emotions, which he calls "value-feelings" or "feeling-functions," is intentional. Although it is not always clear in *Formalism* which emotions count as value-feelings, the distinction itself between value-feelings and what Scheler calls "feeling-states" is clear. Value-feelings are intentional, "presentational" (i.e., they make us aware of values) and play just as important a role in intellectual life as does reason. By contrast, feeling-states are nonintentional, they happen to us and last for a more or less determinate period of time, and they are explained in causal terms. Anger, for example, is, in Scheler's theory, a feeling-state; Scheler claims that we are not immediately aware of anything in anger, but rather must seek for the causal origin of our anger after the fact. These two very different accounts of emotion exist in uneasy tension in *Formalism*. At times, for example,

he speaks of feelings of health or disease, disapproval and approval, bliss and despair as being feeling-states; at other times he calls them value-feelings. But even if he ultimately fails to explain why feeling-states and value feelings are both emotions, Scheler sees that there are two different, equally natural analyses of feeling—one of feelings as intentional cognitive acts and one of feelings as nonintentional and noncognitive phenomena caused by the appreciation of value.

From Formalism in Ethics and Non-Formal Ethics of Values



Feeling and Feeling-States

Until recent times philosophy was inclined to a prejudice that has its historical origin in antiquity. This prejudice consists in upholding the division between "reason" and "sensibility," which is completely inadequate in terms of the structure of the spiritual. This division demands that we assign everything that is not rational—that is not order, law, and the like—to sensibility. Thus our *whole emotional life*—and, for most modern philosophers, our conative life as well, even love and hate—must be assigned to "sensibility." According to this division, *everything* in the mind which is allogical, e.g., intuition, feeling, striving, loving, hating, is dependent of man's *psychophysical organization*. The formation of the allogical becomes here a function of real changes in organization during the evolution of life and history, and dependent on the peculiarities of the environment and all their effects. Whether there are original as well as essential differentiations in rank among the essences of acts and functions at the base of the allogical of our spiritual life, that is, whether these acts and functions have an "originality" comparable to that of the acts in which we comprehend objects in pure logic—in other words, whether there is also a *pure intuiting and feeling, a pure loving and hating, a pure striving and willing*, which are *as* independent of the psychophysical organization of man as pure thought, and which at the same time possess their own original laws that cannot be reduced to laws of empirical psychic life—this question is not even asked by those who share this prejudice. Since no one asks this question, no one asks whether or not there are a priori interconnections and oppositions among the objects and qualities to which those allogical acts are directed, or whether or not there is an a priori lawfulness of these acts which corresponds to such interconnections and oppositions.

The consequence of this prejudice is that ethics has in the course of its history been constituted either as absolute and a priori, and therefore rational, or as relative, empirical, and emotional. That ethics can and must be both absolute and emotional has rarely even been considered.

Very few thinkers have tried to undermine this prejudice (and then nothing more than that, for none has managed to elaborate an opposing viewpoint). Two

such thinkers are Augustine and Blaise Pascal. Throughout Pascal's works we find an idea which he calls *ordre du coeur* or *logique du coeur*; it runs through them like a golden thread. He says, "Le coeur a ses raisons." To him this means that there is an eternal and absolute lawfulness of feeling, loving, and hating which is as absolute as that of pure logic, but which is not reducible to intellectual lawfulness. . . .

It is strange to see how these remarks of Pascal have been misunderstood by so many of his interpreters! One of them thinks he means that "the heart, too, has its say when reason has spoken"! This is a well-known opinion, and it is held by philosophers, too. We are told, for example, that "philosophy's task is to furnish both reason and the heart with a satisfactory world view." That is, the word *reason* (*raisons*) is taken somewhat ironically. Supposedly Pascal does not mean to say that the heart *has* reasons or that there is anything which is *truly equivalent* to "reasons" in its rank and meaning, i.e., "*ses*" *raisons*, or its *own* reasons not borrowed from understanding: rather he means that one must not always seek "reasons" or their "equivalents," but must occasionally let the "heart" speak—blind feeling! But this is the exact *opposite* of what Pascal means. The stress of his proposition is on *ses raisons* and *ses raisons*. . . . [T]here is a type of experiencing whose "objects" are completely inaccessible to reason: reason is as blind to them as ears and hearing are blind to colors. It is a kind of experience that leads us to *genuinely* objective objects and the eternal order among them, i.e., to *values* and the order of ranks among them. And the order and laws contained in this experience are as exact and evident as those of logic and mathematics: that is, there are evident interconnections and oppositions among values and value-attitudes and among the acts of preferring, etc., which are built on them, and on the basis of these a genuine grounding of moral decisions and laws for such decisions is both possible and necessary.

We shall take up Pascal's idea at this point.

First, we must distinguish between the intentional "*feeling of something*" and mere *feeling-states*. This distinction in itself does not yet bear on the content given in intentional feelings, i.e., when we regard them as organs for comprehending values. *There is original* emotive intentionality. Perhaps this is most apparent when both a feeling and feeling it occur simultaneously, when a feeling is that toward which feeling is directed. Let us consider a feeling-state that is indubitably sensible, e.g., a sensible pain or state of pleasure, or a state of pleasure, or a state that corresponds to the agreeableness of a food, a scent, or a gentle touch, etc. Given such facts, such feeling-states, the kind and mode of feeling them is by no means yet determined. There are changing facts involved when I "suffer," "endure," "tolerate," or even "enjoy" "pain." What varies here in the functional quality of *feeling* it (which can also vary by degrees) is certainly not the *state of pain*. Nor is this variation to be found in general attention, with its levels of "noticing," "heeding," "noting," "observing," and "viewing." Pain observed is almost the opposite of pain suffered. In addition, all these kinds and levels of attention and interpretive viewings may freely vary to any extent within such qualities of feeling without any dissolution of the feeling itself. The limits of the feelable variations of the givenness of pain are quite different from those of a feeling-state in its relation to excitation and different also from the

degrees of such a state. For this reason the ability to suffer or to enjoy has nothing to do with sensitivity to sensible pleasure and pain. An individual can suffer the same degree of pain more or less than another individual.

Hence feeling-states and feeling are totally different. The former belong to contents and appearances; the latter, to the functions of reception. This becomes clear when we heed the differences that are obviously present.

All specifically sensible feelings are, by their nature, states. They may be "connected" with objects through the simple contents of sensing, representing, or perceiving; or they may be more or less "objectless." Whenever there is such a connection, it is always *mediate*. The subsequent acts of relating which follow the givenness of a feeling connect feelings with objects. This is the case, for instance, when I ask myself: "Why am I in this or that mood today?" "What is it that *causes* my sadness or joy?" Indeed, the causal object and the feeling-state can enter perception or memory in terms of quite different acts. I relate the object and the feeling-state in such cases through "thinking." The feeling itself is not *originally* related to an object, e.g., when I "feel the beauty of snow-covered mountains in the light of the setting sun." In some cases a feeling is connected with an object through association or through a perception or representation of it. Surely there are feeling-states which at first appear to be without any relation to an object. I must then find the cause that produces the state. But in none of these cases is a feeling related *of itself* to an object. It does not "take" anything, nor is there anything that "moves" toward it, nor is there anything in it that "approaches me." There is no "signifying" in it, nor is there any immanent directedness in it. Finally, a feeling can, after it has frequently occurred in my lived body in connection with outer objects, situations, or changing experiences, become a "token" of these changes. This is the case, for example, when I recognize the beginning of an illness by the presence of specific pains because I have learned that these are connected with the onset of such an illness. In this case also, a symbolic relation is mediated only through experience and thinking.

However, the connection between *intentional feeling* and *what* is therein felt is entirely different from the above connection. This connection is present in all feeling of values.¹ There is here an original relatedness, a directedness of feeling

¹Hence we distinguish: (1) The feeling of feelings in the sense of feeling-states and their modes, e.g., suffering, enjoying. Very strong affectations of fright (e.g., on the occasion of an earthquake) often produce a virtually complete absence of feeling. In these cases sensitivity remains intact, and there is no reason to assume that the feeling-states are not *present*. What occurs in extreme cases is a marked increase in the *intensity* of the feeling; there is complete fulfilment by it, which makes us for a moment "feelingless" with respect to this feeling. We are put into a state of rigid and convulsive "indifference" toward it. In this case it is only when the feeling goes away, or when our complete fulfilment by it begins to disappear, that the feeling becomes an object of feeling proper. (2) The feeling of objective emotional characteristics of the atmosphere (restfulness of a river, serenity of the skies, sadness of a landscape), in which there are emotionally qualitative characteristics that can also be given as qualities of feeling, but never as "feelings," i.e., as experienced in relatedness to an ego. (3) The feeling of *values*, e.g., agreeable, beautiful, good. It is *here* that feeling gains a cognitive function in addition to its intentional nature, whereas it does not do so in the first two cases.

toward something objective, namely, *values*. This kind of feeling is not a dead state or a factual state of affairs that can enter into associative connections or be related to them; nor is such feeling a "token." This feeling is a goal-determined movement, although it is by no means an *activity* issuing forth from a center (nor is it a temporally extended movement). It is a punctual movement, whether objectively directed from the ego or coming toward the ego as a movement in which something *is* given to me and in which it comes to "appearance." This feeling therefore has the same relation to its value-correlate as "representing" has to its "object," namely, an intentional relation. It is not *externally brought together* with an object, whether immediately or through a representation (which can be related to a feeling either mechanically and fortuitously or by mere thinking). On the contrary, feeling *originally* intends its *own* kind of objects, namely, "*values*." Feeling is therefore a meaningful occurrence that is capable of "fulfillment" and "non-fulfillment."² Consider an affect in contrast to this. An affect of anger "wells up within me" and then "takes its course in me." The connection of anger with the "about" of my anger is not intentional or original. A representation or a thought or, better, the objects in these that I first "perceived," "represented," or "thought" are what "cause my anger." And it is later—even though in normal cases very quickly—that I relate this anger to these objects, and then always through a representation. Surely I do not "comprehend" anything in this anger. Certain *evils* must be "comprehended" beforehand in *feeling* if anger is to be aroused. It is quite different when I "rejoice in something," or when I "am sad about something" or when I "am merry" or "despondent." The use of the words *in* and *about* shows that in this rejoicing and sadness the objects "about" which I am glad, etc., are not first of all comprehended. They already stand *before* me in that they are not only perceived but also charged with the value-predicates which are given *in* feeling. The value-qualities in value-affair-complexes *demand* certain qualities in emotional "reactions of response" of the same type, and these reactions in a certain sense "reach their goal" in the value-qualities. They form complexes of understanding and meaning, complexes of their own kind which are not simply empirically contingent or dependent on the individual psychic causality of individuals. If value-demands appear to remain unfulfilled, we suffer as a result, e.g., we are sad because we cannot be happy about an event to the degree that its felt value deserves, or we cannot be as sad as the death of a beloved person "demands." Such peculiar "manners of conduct" (we do not call them acts or functions) have "direction" in common with intentional feeling; but they are *not* intentional in the strict sense of this term, if we understand *intentional* to indicate only those experiences that can *mean* an object and in whose execution an objective content can *appear*. This occurs only in emotional experiences, which, in a strict sense, constitute value-feeling. For here we do not feel "about something"; we immediately feel *something*, i.e., a specific value-quality. In this case, i.e., *in* the execution of feeling, we are not objectively conscious of feeling itself. Only a value-quality comes "upon" us from within or without. A new act of reflection is required if this

²For this reason all "feeling of" is in principle "understandable," whereas pure feeling-states are subject only to observation and causal explanation.

"feeling of" is to become objective, thus enabling us to reflect subsequently on *what* we "feel" in the already objectively given value.

Let us call these feelings that receive values the class of *intentional functions of feeling*. It is not necessary for these functions to be connected with the objective sphere through the mediation of so-called objectifying acts of representation, judgment, etc. Such mediation is necessary *only* for feeling-states, *not* for genuine intentional feeling. During the process of intentional feeling, the world of objects "comes to the fore" by itself, but only in terms of its *value*-aspect. The frequent lack of pictorial objects in intentional feeling shows that feeling is originally an "objectifying act" that does not require the mediation of representation. . . . Of course one overlooks these facts—indeed even the task of setting them forth—if he assigns the entire sphere of feeling to psychology *originaliter*; and then he can never see that part of *the world and the value-content of world* which *comes forth in feeling, in preferring, in loving and hating*. He sees only what we find in inner perception, i.e., in "representational" comportment, *if we feel, if we prefer, if we love and hate, if we enjoy a work of art, if we pray to God*.

It is necessary to distinguish emotional functions from the experiences that are based on "*preferring*" and "*placing after*." The latter constitute a *higher* stage in our emotional and intentional life, and *in* them we comprehend the ranks of values, their being higher and lower. "Preferring" and "placing after" are not conative activities like, say, "choosing," which is based on acts of preferring. Nor is preferring (or placing after) a purely feeling comportment. It constitutes a special class of emotional act-experiences. The proof is that we can "choose," strictly speaking, only between actions, whereas we can "prefer" one good to another, good weather to bad, one food to another, etc. Moreover, this "preferring" occurs immediately on the basis of the felt value-material and independent of its thing-bearers. It does not presuppose pictorial goal-contents or contents of purposes, whereas choosing does. On the contrary, the contents of goals in conation—contents that are not contents of purposes, which, as we saw, presuppose a reflection on preceding contents of goals and belong only to willing within conation—are *formed* with the cocondition of preferring. Therefore, preferring belongs to the sphere of *value-cognition*, *not* to the sphere of striving. This class of experiences, experiences of preferring, is in the strict sense intentional; these experiences are "directed" and sense-giving, but we classify them with loving and hating as "emotional acts," in contrast to intentional functions of feeling.

Finally, *loving* and *hating* constitute the highest level of our intentional emotive life. Here we are farthest from all states. The difference between them and reactive responses is marked even in language: we speak not of loving or hating "about something" or "in something," but loving or hating *something*. The fact that we frequently hear people assert that love and hate, like anger, rage, and spite, belong to the "affects," or that love and hate belong to feeling-states, can be explained only by the peculiar lack of learning in our age and the complete lack of phenomenological investigations of these matters. . . . In love and hate our spirit does much more than "respond" to already felt and perhaps preferred values. Love and hate are acts in which the value-realm accessible to the feeling of a being (the value-realm with which preferring is also connected) is either

extended or *narrowed* (and this, of course, independent of the present world of *goods*, i.e., real valuable things, which are not presupposed in the plurality, fullness, and differentiation of felt values). In speaking of this "extension" or "narrowing" of the value-realm given to a being, I do not mean to imply in the least that values are created, made, or destroyed by love and hate. Values cannot be created or destroyed. They exist independent of the organization of all beings endowed with spirit. I do not mean to say that the nature of the act of love is such that it is directed in a "responding" fashion to a value *after* that value is felt or preferred; I mean, rather, that, strictly speaking, this act plays the *disclosing* role in our value-comprehensions, and that it is only this act which does so. This act is, as it were, a movement in whose execution ever *new* and *higher* values flash out, i.e., values that were wholly unknown to the being concerned. Thus this act does not *follow* value-feeling and preferring, but is ahead of them as a *pioneer* and a guide. And we must therefore attribute a "*creative*" role to this act to the extent that the range and nature of feelable and preferable values of a being, but not the existing values themselves, are concerned. Hence *all* of ethics would reach its completion in the discovery of the laws of love and hate, which, in regard to the degree of their absoluteness, apriority, and originality, go beyond the laws of preferring and those obtaining among their corresponding value-qualities.

Let us return to the discussion of intentional feeling. Allow me one historical observation. In my opinion there have been two major periods in the history of philosophy in which erroneous theories have been set forth on this point—though erroneous in very different ways. The first of these periods continued up to the nineteenth century. We find that the theory of intentional feeling was widely held until then. Spinoza, Descartes, and Leibniz shared this theory, though with modifications. None of these thinkers or their disciples identified the whole of the emotional life in its kind of givenness with, if I may use the expression, a pain in the stomach. If this is done, values of course cannot be found. It is likely that there never would have been an astronomy if the sun, the moon, and the stars that appear in the night skies had been regarded as statelike "complexes of sensations," i.e., as phenomena which are on the *same* level of givenness as a pain in the stomach, and which are "dependent" on the appearance of a pain in the stomach in different ways only to the extent that they differ from each other. Only in an age in which the confusion of hearts, the *désordre du coeur*, has reached the degree that it has in our own could the totality of our emotive life be considered a process of causally moved states which follow each other without meaning or ends, and only in such an age could our emotive life be denied "meaning" and intentional "contents." The error of these great thinkers was their assumption that feeling, loving, hating, etc., are nothing ultimate and original in spirit, and that values, on the other hand, are not ultimate and irreducible phenomena. Like Leibniz, they held that intentional feeling is simply "dark" and "confused" conceiving and thinking; the object of such confused and dark thought is constituted in evident and rational relations. According to Leibniz, for example, maternal love is a confused conception of the fact that it is good to love one's child. . . .

At the beginning of the nineteenth century the *irreducibility* of the emotional life was gradually recognized. But since the intellectualistic attitude of the eighteenth century was maintained, *everything* emotional was degraded to *states*.

If we compare these two basic conceptions with what we said earlier, we can see that each contains something correct as well as something incorrect. The first contains insight that there is an *intentional* "feeling of," and that there are, in addition to feeling-states, emotional functions and acts in which something is given and which underlie autonomous laws of meaning and understanding. What is erroneous here . . . is the assumption that feeling can be reduced to "understanding," and that there is only a difference in degree between feeling and understanding. In the second theory the assumption that emotive being and life cannot be "reduced" to "understanding" is correct, but the implicit denial of intentional feeling and the abandonment of the entire emotional life to a descriptive psychology and its causal explanations is wrong. It hardly needs to be said that the concession of some modern psychologists that feelings (e.g., of different kinds of pain, of fatigue, appetite, fear, etc.) possess a *purposeful* character for life's activity and its guidance, and that these function as *signs* of certain present or future states to be further enhanced or avoided, has nothing to do with their *intentional* nature or their cognitive functions. Nothing is "given" in a mere signal. The modes of the feeling of life must therefore be reinvestigated on the basis of our basic thesis. And in this it will be shown that mere emotional states are, strictly speaking, only sensible feelings, but that vital feelings and pure psychic and spiritual feelings *can* always exhibit an intentional character, and that the purely spiritual ones exhibit it essentially.



MARTIN HEIDEGGER

(1889–1976)

Introduction

Martin Heidegger is one of the most controversial—and difficult—philosophical authors of this century. His book *Being and Time*, published in 1927, was a major influence on the existentialist movement throughout Europe and, later on, in the Americas and even the Orient. The style of *Being and Time* is phenomenological, but with significant variations on the method Heidegger learned from his teacher, Edmund Husserl. Heidegger, unlike Husserl, was primarily interested in the woolier questions of metaphysics and the philosophical problems of life. Accordingly, where Husserl is concerned with questions about the foundations of knowledge and the nature of mathematics, *Being and Time* is filled with such concepts as “Being-unto-Death,” “*Angst*,” and “*Care*.” Heidegger’s ambition in *Being and Time* is to develop an “ontology” (a theory of being) of human existence, which he calls “*Dasein*” (being-there). But instead of beginning with human consciousness and knowledge, as do most authors of the Western philosophical tradition (including his teacher Husserl), Heidegger insists that human existence (or *Dasein*) is first of all practical and concerned. Our way of existence (or Being-in-the-World) is not so much to *know* the world as it is to *care* about our place in the world.

Consequently, one of the key concerns of *Being and Time* is the phenomenon of *moods*. Heidegger talks only occasionally about specific emotions, but moods are, for him, the very basis of human awareness, not at all the occasional interruptions or “states” in which we are sometimes gloomy or joyful. But because moods are so fundamental to his philosophy, it is also difficult if not impossible to discuss Heidegger’s theory of moods without also introducing the basic concepts of his very difficult system of philosophy. What Heidegger gives us is not just a new view of emotions and moods, but rather a new vision of ourselves and the world. It is the central importance of moods in Heidegger’s philosophy, as much as any theory he holds about their nature, that has made his philosophy so influential and controversial.

Adding to the difficulty of the text is the near impossibility of obtaining the right to reprint Heidegger’s work. Accordingly, I have tried to resolve both difficulties by asking Heidegger-scholar Charles Guignon to write an essay especially for this book, in which he both summarizes the basic intentions of Heidegger’s work and presents Heidegger’s theory of moods.

Moods in Heidegger's *Being and Time*

CHARLES GUIGNON*

Heidegger's discussion of moods in *Being and Time* is part of his wider project of working out "the question of the meaning of Being": that is, the attempt to articulate our most fundamental sense of what it is to be. In order to pose this "question of Being" in an appropriate way, Heidegger suggests, we should first get clear about ourselves, the questioners. The assumption is that if we can clarify the structure of the entity that *understands* what it is to be, then we will have clarified the region in which the question of the *meaning* of Being can be posed. The published parts of *Being and Time*, therefore, deal solely with an analysis of being human—a phenomenon called "*Dasein*" or "being-there." If this investigation is to be truly fundamental, however, it cannot uncritically take over traditional assumptions about the nature of being human. For this reason, Heidegger says that the inquiry into the being of *Dasein* must be rooted in a "basic experience of the 'object' to be disclosed" (232).¹ This experience is pre-cognitive: it turns up not in thought, but rather in moods. Moods, according to Heidegger, are "a primordial kind of Being for *Dasein*, in which *Dasein* is disclosed to itself *prior* to all cognition and volition, and *beyond* their range of disclosure" (136). The account of moods in *Being and Time* therefore has a dual role: (1) it is part of the overall elucidation of the human condition, and (2) it paves the way towards securing a "phenomenal basis" for the characterization of *Dasein* and hence for the question of Being.

Heidegger believes that the prevailing ways of understanding the nature of being human are infected by deep-seated presuppositions that give us a distorted view of ourselves. There is a tendency to think of ourselves as "things" or "substances" of some sort. At a theoretical level, we are inclined to think of the self as a mind or "subject of experiences," as a physical organism in the natural world, or as an odd mixture of both. These alternatives, in Heidegger's view, involve uncritical ontological assumptions that need to be grounded in a deeper understanding of man. In a letter written to his teacher, Edmund Husserl, in 1927, Heidegger says that "the 'one-sided' reflections of somatology [i.e., physiology] and pure psychology are only possible on the basis of the concrete totality of man." In particular, the conception of the "mental" as definitive of human being "has originated at the outset from *epistemological* considerations" and therefore cannot provide us with a basis for an "ontology of man in totality."²

Written by Charles Guignon especially for this volume and reprinted with his permission.

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¹Numbers in parentheses refer to the German edition of *Sein und Zeit*, 12th edition (Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1972). The German pagination is found in the margins of the English edition of *Being and Time*, translated by Macquarrie and Robinson (New York: Harper & Row, 1962).

²Letter to Husserl dated 22 October 1927, in E. Husserl, *Phänomenologische Psychologie*, ed. Walter Biemel, Husserliana, IX (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1962), p. 602.

If the question of Being is to have a secure foundation, it must set aside all traditional interpretations of human existence and start from a fresh perspective. Heidegger attempts to capture the "concrete totality of man" as *agency* in everyday situations prior to any of the philosophical splits into mind versus body, subject versus object, or consciousness versus thing. To be human, as the term Dasein suggests, is to be "there," caught up in the world, taking a stand on one's life, active and engaged in ordinary situations, with some overview of what is at stake in living. What characterizes human life in its most natural ways of being is not a relationship between mind and body but concrete "existing" in a world: "The 'substance' of man is not spirit as a synthesis of soul and body," Heidegger says, "rather, it is *existence*" (117). Our most natural experience of ourselves is described as "Being-in-the-world," where "world" refers not to the universe studied by physics, but rather to a life-world in the sense in which we speak of "the academic world" or "the world of theater." To be "in" such a world is not like a pencil's being "in" a drawer; it is more like being engaged or involved in something, as is someone who is "into" astrology.

Dasein as existence in a world is far from being a "subject" or "center of experiences and actions" in any sense. One of the chief aims of *Being and Time* is to overcome the tradition of subjectivism that has dominated so much of philosophical anthropology. In Heidegger's view, the tendency to see man as a subject is a product of some highly sophisticated philosophical abstraction and does not give us a good clue to the basic nature of being human. For this reason he attempts to fully describe Dasein without bringing in mentalistic vocabulary, or by recasting our ordinary psychological words to bring out a non-mentalistic root meaning (e.g., the idea of "taking a stand" in "understanding"). This is not to *deny* the subjective and mental side of life: indeed, a "formal phenomenology of consciousness" would be an interesting undertaking (115). But it does deny that the subjective or psychological has any privileged position in comprehending what it is to be human. We know ourselves not by inward-turning and introspection, but by catching sight of ourselves as we are engaged and preoccupied in everyday practical contexts. Heidegger says that

one's *own* Dasein becomes something that it can itself proximally "come across" only when it *looks away* from "experiences" and the "center of its actions," or does not yet "see" them at all. Dasein finds "itself" proximally in *what* it does, uses, expects, avoids—in those things environmentally on hand with which it is proximally *concerned*. (119)

True self-knowledge is reached not by "perceptually tracking down and inspecting a point called the 'self'" (146), but rather by catching a glimpse of ourselves when we are caught up in the flux and flow of living. Here the idea of a "mental" or "subjective" component of our lives simply has no role to play.

In order to bypass traditional objectifying views of the self, Heidegger characterizes Dasein as a "happening" or "event" of a life as a whole, "between birth and death" (233). According to this conception of Dasein as a happening, there are two aspects to human existence. On the one hand, we are "already-in" a world. Heidegger says that we are *delivered over* to ourselves: we are "thrown" into the task of living, and we find ourselves in a specific cultural and historical

context, which provides us with a determinate range of possible roles and self-interpretations. In our world, for instance, we can be consumers and producers, but not vassals and seigneurs. The concrete context in which we find ourselves, together with the choices we have made at the crossroads of our lives, makes up our "facticity." But, on the other hand, we are also already "ahead of" ourselves in taking a stand on our lives. As engaged and active in the world, we take over concrete roles and self-interpretations that express our sense of what life is all about. Heidegger sees life as structured by goal-directedness and purposiveness: we are always under way towards the culmination or realization of life, our "Being-a-whole" or "Being-towards-death." This purposive thrust towards our completion, which is accomplished in taking up specific possibilities, is called "projection." Whether we realize it or not, each of our actions projects some sense of what our lives will add up to as a final configuration of meanings.

This "formal" temporal structure of Dasein's being as a thrown projection only achieves its concrete realization as Being-in-the-world. To be human is to be situated in a worldly context: a workshop, study, supermarket, garden, or office. In our normal, everyday situations, prior to philosophical reflection or scientific abstraction, we find ourselves caught up in the swim, handling equipment in order to realize particular aims and goals. There is a reciprocal relationship between our purposive agency and the practical contexts in which we find ourselves. Our goals, interests, and needs structure the ways in which things will *count* for us in the context. The wary shopper, for instance, encounters a supermarket where the bargains stand out and the over-priced junk recedes. But the context also determines the range of possible *self-interpretations* one can have: in a supermarket one can be a wise shopper or an impulse buyer, but not a mutineer. Our everyday Being-in-the-world forms a holistic field in which the means/ends relations of smoothly functioning equipment are tied into the goal-directedness of our being. Here there is no room for a Cartesian "I" or an epistemological subject distinct from a mere collection of objects. Heidegger opposes the modern tendency to displace meanings and values into the realm of the "subjective." What is originally "given" is a meaningful totality of worldhood, a seamless whole of Being-in-the-world.

To be human, then, is to be contextualized in a world. But that world is not "private" in any sense. Heidegger also emphasizes the fact that we are contextualized in a culture and in history. In our everyday lives, our routine tasks follow the norms and conventions that are laid out for us in the social world in which we live. We do things as "anyone" would do them in that context, so that Heidegger says that in "everydayness" we are the "Anyone" (*das Man*). Who I am in my ordinary involvements is determined by the roles I take over from my historical culture. My self-interpretations are always a product of the social world I have grown into. In Heidegger's view, then, the "self" of everydayness is not so much an isolable unit as it is a crossing-point of cultural and historical forces that locate it in a communal context. For the most part, we are just place-holders in the social world.

The analysis of moods occurs in the context of Heidegger's attempt to identify the essential structures that make possible our everyday Being-in-the-world. There are three such structures: understanding, which opens a field of

purposive activities in which equipment comes to appear in its functionality; discursiveness, which articulates our shared ways of encountering things; and situatedness (*Befindlichkeit*), which discloses our mode of being contextualized at any given time.

Heidegger's neologism *Befindlichkeit*, which I have translated as "situatedness," is drawn from such ordinary German ways of speaking as "*Wie befinden Sie sich?*" meaning "How are you?" or "How are things going?" Literally, the question means "How do you find yourself?" Like our English "How is it going?" it asks not for a description of some inner psychic condition or frame of mind, but rather for a more general overview of how things stand with a person. It is therefore completely misleading to translate this term as "state-of-mind" (as is found in the English translation of *Being and Time*), for it is neither a "state" nor does it pertain to a "mind." Instead, the technical term is designed to capture the often inchoate background sense of "where we are at" or "where we find ourselves" that accompanies and pervades our involved agency in the world. The different modes of situatedness "make manifest 'how one is and how one is faring'" (134).

Situatedness is always manifested in some mood or other. The German word for "mood" (*Stimmung*) stems from the word for "tuning" (as in "tuning a piano"), and Heidegger frequently refers to moods as "*Gestimmtsein*," which means "being attuned" or "attunement." A mood is a particular way we are "tuned in" to the world in our activities. For Heidegger, we are always in some mood or other: he discusses such examples as fear, boredom, hope, joy, enthusiasm, equanimity, indifference, gaiety, satiety, elation, sadness, melancholy, and desperation. But even the "pallid lack of mood which dominates 'grey everydayness'" (345)—the dreary blandness surrounding our humdrum activities—is a mood in this sense of the word:

The pallid, evenly balanced lack of mood, which is often persistent and which is not to be mistaken for a bad mood, is far from nothing at all. Rather, it is in this that Dasein becomes satiated with itself. Being has become manifest as a burden. (134)

We can slip over from one mood into another, but we can never be free of moods altogether. As we will find in a moment, even the pure, "disinterested" theoretical attitude is a mood with its own way of disclosing the world.

How is the all-pervasiveness of moods consistent with Heidegger's goal of overcoming subjectivism? The answer to this question is found in the fact that, for Heidegger, moods are not "subjective" or "psychic" in any sense. Moods are not "fleeting experiences which 'color' one's whole 'mental attitude'" (340) in some fashion. They are not a "subjective coloring" that is cast over brute material "reality." Heidegger says that

having a mood is not related to the psychical in the first place, and it is not itself an inner condition which then reaches forth in an enigmatical way and puts its mark on things and persons. (137)

Our situatedness cannot be discovered by inward-turning or introspection.

Situatedness is far removed from anything like coming across a psychic condition. It has so little to do with a kind of apprehending that first turns

around and turns back on itself, that only because the "there" has already been disclosed in situatedness can inward-turning reflection come across "experiences" at all. (136)

A mood is a quality of Being-in-the-world as a whole, and is therefore *prior* to any distinction of "inner" and "outer":

A mood assails us. It comes neither from "outside" nor from "inside," but arises out of Being-in-the-world, as a way of such Being. (136)

Moods arise out of and range over the holistic complex of Being-in-the-world. We saw that there is a reciprocal relation between our self-interpretations and the practical contexts we find ourselves in. To be human is to be contextualized in a meaningful situation: one that is awkward, dangerous, embarrassing, frightening, or just dull. Moods contribute to shaping the meaningfulness of these situations. Through my self-interpretations I constitute the meaning of the situation—as one that is "awkward," for instance, but not exactly "embarrassing." But the situation also constitutes my possible self-interpretations. I can only find out that the burning sensation I feel after doing something foolish is "shame" and not "guilt" because of my grasp of the situation and its significance in my culture. In Heidegger's conception of Dasein as Being-in-the-world, there is no way to demarcate the "subjective" side of things from the "objective" features of a context. Moods are discovered not by looking inward, but rather by getting a feel for the entire situation.

Heidegger claims that moods have a disclosing function that is both deeper than and prior to perception or cognition. Moods reveal our Being-in-the-world in three ways. First, they disclose to us the raw "givenness" of life—the fact that we *are* and that we have our being as a task that we must assume in some way or other.

In attunement, Dasein is always disclosed according to a mood as that entity to which it has been *delivered over* in its Being—as the Being to which it is delivered over and which, as existing, it has to be. (134; my italics)

Moods reveal "the pure 'that it is'" of Dasein's thrownness, its "naked 'that it is and has to be'" (134), which remains "veiled in its 'whence' and 'whither'" (135). This disclosure does not just bring us knowledge of the presence of a "thing." Instead, it brings us into a sense of the gravity and weightiness of the task of life that stands before us as our own. The biblical language of being "delivered over" to ourselves conveys the ominous undertone of a secularized banishment: in our moods we are disclosed as thrown onto ourselves, as forlorn in "*the facticity of being delivered over*" (135) to our own lives. Our existence "stares [us] in the face with the inexorability of an enigma" (136), as a burden that has to be taken up. Because our responsibility seems so burdensome, Heidegger says that our most common response to this disclosure is "evasiveness" and "fleeing" into the trivialities of commonplace affairs.

The second disclosing function of moods is to reveal the specific nature of our context as a totality.

The mood has already disclosed, in every case, Being-in-the-world as a whole, and makes it possible first of all to direct oneself towards anything. (137)

Our moods modulate and shape the totality of our Being-in-the-world, and they determine how things can count for us in our everyday concerns. Heidegger's point is that only when we have been "tuned in" to the world in a certain way can we be "turned on" to the things and people around us. Moods enable us to focus our attention and orient ourselves. Without this orientation, a human would be a bundle of raw capacities so diffuse and undifferentiated that it could never discover anything. What we *do* encounter in our attuned situatedness is not just worldhood, but rather a highly determinate cultural world. Through our moods we discover the range of possibilities laid out in our world. As Heidegger says, "In its way of attunement, Dasein 'sees' the possibilities out of which it proceeds" (148).

The third disclosing function of moods follows from the second. On the basis of our attuned ways of orienting ourselves in the world, entities can *matter* to us in specific ways. "The attunement of situatedness existentially constitutes the world-openness [*Weltoffenheit*] of Dasein" (137), and *through* this openness entities can come to *punctuate* our lives in some way or other. What we initially encounter in the world is not "sense data" or "bare particulars," but things that are useful, harmful, fascinating, dull, messy, appealing, or disgusting. The ability to come across things that are value-laden depends on our prior attunement to the world. If there were no attunement to the world—no pre-given "set" that gives us a template for approaching things—there would be no "experience" or "perception" either. Heidegger says that we could never be affected by anything "if situated Being-in-the-world had not already submitted itself to having entities in the world 'matter' to it in the ways which its moods have outlined in advance" (137).

As the world waxes and wanes with our shifting moods, things come to stand out as important or to recede into insignificance.

To be affected by the unserviceable, resistant, or threatening character of what is ready-to-hand becomes ontologically possible only insofar as Being-in as such has been determined existentially beforehand in such a manner that what it encounters within the world can *matter* to it in this way. The fact that this sort of thing can matter to it is grounded in one's situatedness. . . . (137)

The all-pervasive background of mood guides and shapes our "sense of reality" and makes it possible for us to be agents in a familiar world.

It follows from this characterization of our situatedness that there can be no such thing as a pure, "disinterested" way of merely observing the world as it is "in itself." The Cartesian ideal of a purely contemplative spectator or observer who simply registers "facts" is an illusion. Since interestedness is necessary for "seeing *as*"—that is, for focusing and orienting our perception—a pure "subject of experience" could never see anything. For Heidegger, scientific disinterestedness is itself a form of interestedness. The attempt to see the world "objectively" as a collection of mere objects with properties requires a special adjustment that, far from leading to an absence of mood, creates a new and rather limiting sort of mood. The mood of pale "scientific objectivity" is governed by very specialized interests and therefore gives us no more privileged a view of "reality" than religious fervor or blinding rage.

It is precisely when we see the "world" unsteadily and fitfully in accordance with our moods, that things in the world show themselves in their specific worldhood, which is never the same from day to day. By looking at the world theoretically, we have already dimmed it down to the uniformity of pure "objects," though admittedly this uniformity comprises a new wealth of things which can be discovered in pure determining and characterizing. (138)

Since there can be no moodless apprehending of things, even the purest *theoria* is a mood that governs how things will appear. There are no "facts" than can be discovered independent of all moods.

Although Heidegger says that moods "assail us" (136), he does not believe that we just passively suffer them. "Dasein can, should, and must, through knowledge and will, become master of its moods" (136). To think that we are merely buffeted about by uncontrollable moods would be a form of inauthenticity. But to say that we can control our moods "through knowledge and will" does not mean that we can get out of them altogether. "When we master a mood," Heidegger says, "we do so by way of a counter-mood; we are never free of moods" (136). I can only overcome my fearfulness, for instance, by fixing myself in a mood of equanimity or indifference.

It might seem that if we generally encounter the world "unsteadily and fitfully" through our shifting moods, Heidegger will have a hard time accounting for the obvious continuity, coherence, and harmony of our common ways of discovering the world. But it is important to realize that for Heidegger our moods are generally *public*. In everydayness, Dasein is the "Anyone," and that means that its attunement is always a *shared, communal* way of being tuned in to the world. As we grow up in the social world into which we are thrown, we also become masters of a determinate range of possible moods that are "accepted" in our world. According to Heidegger,

Publicness, as the kind of Being that belongs to the Anyone, not only has in general its own way of having a mood, but needs moods and "makes" them for itself. (138)

Our moods are always regulated and generated by a shared attunement to public "forms of life" in our culture. Through this attunement (which Heidegger refers to as "finding a footing" in *The Essence of Reasons*)³ we achieve something like what Wittgenstein calls the "agreement in judgments" (*Übereinstimmung*) that underlies and makes possible our regular, orderly practices.⁴ What our attunement gives us is "not agreement in opinions but in form of life."⁵

To become a participant in an ongoing culture therefore always carries with it a process of attunement into the public background of situatedness, which lets things matter in determinate ways. What is given first is a "co-situatedness" that

³*The Essence of Reasons*, trans. Terrence Malick (Evanston: Northwestern, 1969), pp. 108–9.

⁴Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, (New York: Macmillan, 1958), para. 242. Wittgenstein speaks of the need to "find our feet" with others on page 223.

⁵*Ibid.*, para. 241.

is made explicit in communicating with one another. Dasein is always a "we," a "co-Dasein" or "Dasein-with," and this "is already essentially manifest and public in a co-situatedness and a co-understanding" (162). In our everyday lives, we are generally "delivered over to" the public way of interpreting things, "which controls and distributes the possibilities of average understanding and of the situatedness belonging to it" (167–168). From this standpoint our moods are not "private" or "personal," but rather are essentially public, part of the "world" instead of something *in* the "self."

The dominance of the public way in which things have been interpreted has already been decisive even for the possibilities of having a mood—that is, for the basic way in which Dasein lets the world "matter" to it. The Anyone prescribes one's situatedness and prescribes what and how one "sees." (169–170)

The unbounded optimism of the 1960's American "youth-culture" and the undercurrent of discouragement of the 1980's are examples of shared moods that give us a "set" through which we perceive things in common ways.

Situatedness is directional or "intentional" (if that word is stripped of its usual mentalistic associations). Heidegger considers the "general structure of situatedness" (140) by examining the "inauthentic" mood of fear. Three components may be distinguished in fear. First, there is *that in the face of which* we fear: the frightening or fearsome, what threatens us. Second, there is *that about which* we fear: what we are fearful for, what is threatened. And, third, there is the *fear-ing as such*: the fearful mood that discloses the threatening as a threat. In the case of fear, what we are afraid *of* is always some definite entity within the world that is encountered as detrimental. What we are afraid *for* or *about* is always some definite possibilities for our lives: Heidegger says that "the target of this detrimentality is a definite range of what can be affected by it" (140). Finally, the fear-ing as such is the underlying mood that enables us to encounter things as threatening and lets them "matter" to us in a particular way. Fearfulness is "a slumbering possibility of situated Being-in-the-world" (141), which discloses the world and lets entities count for us as threatening.

It might be helpful to consider a concrete example. Suppose my marriage has been on the rocks for a while, and one night I storm out of the house and check into a motel. Returning the next morning I find the house empty and an ominous-looking letter addressed to me in my wife's hand on the kitchen table. My stomach tightens, my throat constricts: this is surely the end. I stare at it in horror, fumbling for a cigarette, glancing at the newspaper headlines without reading, humming a few bars of a TV jingle. My reaction is crippling fear. Heidegger says that fear "bewilders us and makes us 'lose our heads.'" (141). "One backs away in bewilderment" and "leaps from one thing to the next" (342). In this case, what is encountered as threatening—"that in the face of which" I fear—is a specific entity in the world: the letter and its full significance. What is threatened—"that about which" I fear—is a definite possibility of my existence: my understanding of myself as a husband and family man. I am fearful *for* myself in some of the roles I have taken over from the Anyone, roles that give me an identity and make me feel secure in the public world. Finally, what makes

it possible for me to encounter the letter as threatening is the undertone of fearfulness that tunes me into the world. Only because I am attuned to the shared, public mood of fearfulness about the instability of marriages and the need for attachments can the letter stand out as frightening.

Heidegger's notorious analysis of what he calls the "basic situatedness" of anxiety or *Angst* presents an "objectless" mood similar to boredom or cheerfulness. But even anxiety has a directional structure and for this reason has a crucial disclosive role in revealing who we are. Unlike fear, anxiety is not anxious "in the face of" some specific entity in the world. "That in the face of which one has anxiety is not an entity in the world;" on the contrary, in anxiety the meaningful context of the practical world "collapses into itself; the world has the character of completely lacking significance" (186). The familiar world of objects, which had been a comfortable haven for our dispersal into everyday preoccupations and routines, suddenly begins to recede into utter meaninglessness:

that in the face of which one has anxiety is not encountered as something definite with which one can concern oneself; the threatening does not come from [things in the world], but rather from the fact that none of these things "say" anything any longer. (343)

As entities recede into stark insignificance, "the world in its worldhood obtrudes itself" (187). What is threatening us in anxiety is not something *in* the world, but rather the world itself: "*That in the face of which one has anxiety is Being-in-the-world as such*" (186).

Whereas in fear one is afraid for oneself in particular roles, in anxiety *that about which* one is anxious is not a specific range of possibilities. Anxiety shatters our complacent confidence that the roles, status relations, and vocations we have taken over from the public world can ultimately define us and provide us with a meaning for our lives. What anxiety is anxious about is "naked Dasein" (343), stripped of its ordinary interpretations of itself as a place-holder in socially approved slots, and brought before itself as an "authentic ability-to-be-in-the-world" (187). The social roles and personae that we have drawn from the Anyone are seen for what they are—the property of the Anyone and therefore not really our own. In this way, "anxiety individualizes Dasein for its ownmost Being-in-the-world" (187). It reveals to us the fact that the task of living out our lives "to the end" is something uniquely our own—it cannot be shirked or delegated. Anxiety has a unique disclosive role because it reveals to us what it is to be human in the deepest sense. Whereas in everyday life we tend to be dissipated and distracted in an endless array of Anyone possibilities, in anxiety we are brought face to face with our ownmost responsibility for making something of our lives as a whole.

But the recognition of our uniqueness does not imply that we can exit from the social world to attain the status of a Nietzschean "Overman." Although anxiety may display our social life as a game that cannot ultimately define us, it is still the only game in town and we *have to* play it. Anxiety discloses our solitary obligation to make something of our lives as a whole, but it also reveals that this task can only be achieved *within* the context of Being-in-the-world. Heidegger says that "anxiety individualizes Dasein," but this individualization "brings

Dasein face to face with its world as world, and thus brings it face to face with itself as Being-in-the-world" (188). Anxiety discloses being human as the "thrown projection" it is: a unique, undelegatable project of making something of a life that is inextricably caught up in a cultural context.



JEAN-PAUL SARTRE

(1905-1980)

Introduction

A philosopher, novelist, playwright, and political activist, Jean-Paul Sartre continued to be one of the most controversial and lively figures in twentieth-century philosophy. His early plays, novels, and philosophical essays in "existentialism" (a label he adopted for his philosophy) are still considered among the most influential books of the century. In his longest and most famous work, *Being and Nothingness* (1943), he brought to fruition several years of study in both psychology and a new philosophical discipline called "phenomenology," which he characterized as the study of the essential structures of human consciousness. But before he wrote *Being and Nothingness*, he had already completed a lengthy manuscript he proposed to call *The Psyche*. It was never published, and most of the manuscript (which we know about from Sartre's lifetime companion, Simone de Beauvoir) was lost. He did, however, publish two works based on this original manuscript—*The Psychology of Imagination* (1940) and *The Emotions: A Sketch of a Theory* (1939). In *The Emotions*, Sartre criticized both the James-Lange theory of emotion as well as various psychoanalytic theories. He went on to sketch his own phenomenological theory of emotion, in which he focused on the way emotions alter our experience of the surrounding world. This theory is reprinted here.

At the core of Sartre's philosophy, from beginning to end, is the concept of freedom. His intention in *Being and Nothingness*, for example, is to characterize human existence such that it is "without excuse." He argues relentlessly that we are responsible for everything we do and everything we are. And this includes our emotions. Thus Sartre could not disagree more with William James's theory, according to which emotions are largely instinctual, physiological reactions over which we have no control. Our emotions, Sartre says, are "magical transformations of the world," voluntary ways in which we alter our consciousness of events and things to give us a more pleasing view of the world. Typically, Sartre argues, these "transformations" are a form of "escape-behavior," ways of avoiding some crucial recognition about ourselves. Perhaps his most elegant and simple example is Aesop's fable about the fox and the grapes; the fox tries to reach the grapes on the vine, but cannot. He makes light of his failure by deciding "They are sour anyway." But, "it is not the chemistry of the grapes that has changed," Sartre says—it is the fox's attitude. He has come to look at the grapes as sour, to prove he didn't want them anyway.

So too, he generalizes, our emotions are strategies we employ to avoid action, to avoid responsibility, to "flee from freedom," in the language of *Being and Nothingness*.

Although Sartre never developed a full-scale theory of the emotions, he nevertheless continued to use *The Emotions* in his later work, in particular, *Being and Nothingness*. There his view of emotions becomes even more voluntaristic; and some emotions, for example, anguish (*angoisse*) and shame, become the key to his overall interpretation of the "human condition" and the various ways we look at ourselves and others and come to make ourselves into the kind of creatures we are. His analysis in *The Emotions* of the way emotions are strategies for avoiding facing up to ourselves and our situation became the prototype for the notion of "bad faith," a central idea in *Being and Nothingness*.

From The Emotions: A Sketch of a Theory

A Sketch of a Phenomenological Theory

Perhaps what will help us in our investigation is a preliminary observation which may serve as a general criticism of all the theories of emotion which we have encountered. . . . For most psychologists everything takes place as if the consciousness of the emotion were first a reflective consciousness, that is, as if the first form of the emotion as a fact of consciousness were to appear to us as a modification of our psychic being or, to use everyday language, to be first perceived as a *state of consciousness*. And certainly it is always possible to take consciousness of emotion as the affective structure of consciousness, to say, "I'm angry, I'm afraid, etc." But fear is not originally consciousness of being afraid, any more than the perception of this book is consciousness of perceiving the book. Emotional consciousness is, at first, unreflective, and on this plane it can be conscious of itself only on the non-positional mode. Emotional consciousness is, at first, consciousness of the world. It is not even necessary to bring up the whole theory in order clearly to understand this principle. A few simple observations may suffice, and it is remarkable that the psychologists of emotion have never thought of making them. It is evident, in effect, that the man who is afraid is afraid of something. Even if it is a matter of one of those indefinite anxieties which one experiences in the dark, in a sinister and deserted passageway, etc., one is afraid of certain aspects of the night, of the world. And doubtless, all psychologists have noted that emotion is set in motion by a perception, a representation-signal, etc. But it seems that for them the emotion then withdraws from the object in order to be absorbed into itself. Not much reflection is needed to understand that, on the contrary, the emotion returns to the object at every moment and is fed there. For example, flight in a state of fear is described as if the object were not, before anything else, a flight from a certain object, as if the object fled did not remain

present in the flight itself, as its theme, its reason for being, *that from which one flees*. And how can one talk about anger, in which one strikes, injures, and threatens, without mentioning the person who represents the objective unity of these insults, threats, and blows? In short, the affected subject and the affective object are bound in an indissoluble synthesis. Emotion is a certain way of apprehending the world. . . . The subject who seeks the solution of a practical problem is outside in the world; he perceives the world every moment through his acts. If he fails in his attempts, if he gets irritated, his very irritation is still a way in which the world appears to him. And, between the action which miscarries and the anger, it is not necessary for the subject to reflect back upon his behavior, to intercalate a reflexive consciousness. There can be a continuous passage from the unreflective consciousness "world-acted" (action) to the unreflective consciousness "world-hateful" (anger). The second is a transformation of the other.

At present, we can conceive of what an emotion is. It is a transformation of the world. When the paths traced out become too difficult, or when we see no path, we can no longer live in so urgent and difficult a world. All the ways are barred. However, we must act. So we try to change the world, that is, to live as if the connection between things and their potentialities were not ruled by deterministic processes, but by magic. Let it be clearly understood that this is not a game; we are driven against a wall, and we throw ourselves into this new attitude with all the strength we can muster. Let it also be understood that this attempt is not conscious of being such, for it would then be the object of a reflection. Before anything else, it is the seizure of new connections and new exigences.

But the emotive behavior is not on the same plane as the other behaviors; it is not *effective*. Its end is not really to act upon the object as such through the agency of particular means. It seeks by itself to confer upon the object, and without modifying it in its actual structure, another quality, a lesser existence, or a lesser presence (or a greater existence, etc.). In short, in emotion it is the body which, directed by consciousness, changes its relations with the world in order that the world may change its qualities. If emotion is a joke, it is a joke we believe in. A simple example will make this emotive structure clear: I extend my hand to take a bunch of grapes. I can't get it; it's beyond my reach. I shrug my shoulders, I let my hand drop, I mumble, "They're too green," and I move on. All these gestures, these words, this behavior are not seized upon for their own sake. We are dealing with a little comedy which I am playing *under* the bunch of grapes, through which I confer upon the grapes the characteristic of being "too green" which can serve as a substitute for the behavior which I am unable to keep up. At first, they presented themselves as "having to be picked." But this urgent quality very soon becomes unbearable because the potentiality cannot be realized. This unbearable tension becomes, in turn, a motive for foisting upon the grapes the new quality "too green," which will resolve the conflict and eliminate the tension. Only I cannot confer this quality on the grapes chemically. I cannot act upon the bunch in the ordinary ways. So I seize upon this sourness of the too green grapes by acting disgusted. I magically confer upon the grapes the quality I desire. Here the comedy is only half sincere. But let the situation be more urgent, let the incantatory behavior be carried out with seriousness; there we have emotion.

For example, take passive fear. I see a wild animal coming toward me. My legs give way, my heart beats more feebly, I turn pale, I fall and faint. Nothing seems less adapted than this behavior which hands me over defenseless to the danger. And yet it is a behavior of *escape*. Here the fainting is a refuge. Let it not be thought that this is a refuge *for me*, that I am trying to *save myself* in order not to *see* the wild animal *any more*. I did not leave the unreflective level, but, lacking power to avoid the danger by the normal methods and the deterministic links, I denied it. I wanted to annihilate it. The urgency of the danger served as motive for an annihilating intention which demanded magical behavior. And, by virtue of this fact, I did annihilate it as far as was in my power. These are the limits of my magical action upon the world; I can eliminate it as an object of consciousness, but I can do so only by eliminating consciousness itself. Let it not be thought that the physiological behavior of passive fear is pure disorder. It represents the abrupt realization of the bodily conditions which ordinarily accompany the transition from being awake to sleeping.

Passive sadness is characterized, as is well known, by a behavior of oppression; there is muscular resolution, pallor, coldness at the extremities; one turns toward a corner and remains seated, motionless, offering the least possible surface to the world. One prefers the shade to broad daylight, silence to noise, the solitude of a room to crowds in public places or the streets. "To be alone with one's sorrow," as they say. That is not the truth at all. It is a mark of good character to seem to meditate profoundly on one's grief. But the cases in which one really cherishes his sorrow are rather rare. The reason is quite otherwise: one of the ordinary conditions of our action having disappeared, the world requires that we act in it and on it *without that condition*. Most of the potentialities which throng it (tasks *to do*, people *to see*, acts of daily life *to carry out*) have remained the same. Only the means of realizing them, the ways which cut through our "hodological space" have changed. For example, if I have learned that I am ruined, I no longer have the same means at my disposal (private auto, etc.) to carry them out. I have to substitute new media for them (to take the bus, etc.); that is precisely what I do not want. Sadness aims at eliminating the obligation to seek new ways, to transform the structure of the world by a totally undifferentiated structure. In short, it is a question of making of the world an affectively neutral reality, a system in total affective equilibrium, of discharging the strong affective charge from objects, of reducing them all to affective zero, and, by the same token, of apprehending them as perfectly equivalent and interchangeable. In other words, lacking the power and will to accomplish the acts which we had been planning, we behave in such a way that the universe no longer requires anything of us. To bring that about we can only act upon our self, only "dim the light," and the noematical correlative of this attitude is what we call *Gloom*; the universe is gloomy, that is, undifferentiated in structure. At the same time, however, we naturally take the cowering position, we "withdraw into ourselves." The noematical correlative of this attitude is *Refuge*. All the universe is gloomy, but precisely because we want to protect ourselves from its frightening and limitless monotony, we constitute any place whatever as a "corner." It is the only

differentiation in the total monotony of the world: a stretch of wall, a bit of darkness which hides its gloomy immensity from us.

We must first note that the few examples we have just cited are far from exhausting the variety of emotions. There can be many other kinds of fear, many other kinds of sadness. We merely state that they all are tantamount to setting up a magical world by using the body as a means of incantation.

True emotion is . . . accompanied by belief. The qualities conferred upon objects are taken as true qualities. Exactly what is meant by that? Roughly this: the emotion is undergone. One cannot abandon it at will; it exhausts itself, but we cannot stop it. Besides, the behavior which boils down to itself alone does nothing else than sketch upon the object the emotional quality which we confer upon it. A flight which would simply be a journey would not be enough to establish the object as being horrible. Or rather it would confer upon it the formal quality of *horrible*, but not the matter of this quality. In order for us truly to grasp the horrible, it is not only necessary to mimic it; we must be spell-bound, flooded by our own emotion; the formal frame of the behavior must be filled with something opaque and heavy which serves as matter. We understand in this situation the role of purely physiological phenomena: they represent the *seriousness* of the emotion; they are phenomena of belief. They should certainly not be separated from behavior. At first, they present a certain analogy with it. The hyper-tension of fear or sadness, the vaso-constrictions, the respiratory difficulties, symbolize quite well a behavior which aims at denying the world or discharging it of its affective potential by denying it. It is then impossible to draw exactly a borderline between the pure difficulties and the behavior. They finally enter with the behavior into a total synthetic form and cannot be studied by themselves; to have considered them in isolation is precisely the error of the peripheric theory. And yet they are not reducible to behavior; one can stop himself from fleeing, but not from trembling. I can, by a violent effort, raise myself from my chair, turn my thought from the disaster which is crushing me, and get down to work; my hands will remain icy. Therefore, the emotion must be considered not simply as being enacted; it is not a matter of pure demeanor. It is the demeanor of a body which is in a certain state; the state alone would not provoke the demeanor; the demeanor without the state is comedy; but the emotion appears in a highly disturbed body which retains a certain behavior. The disturbance can survive the behavior, but the behavior constitutes the form and signification of the disturbance. On the other hand, without this disturbance, the behavior would be pure signification, an affective scheme. We are really dealing with a synthetic form; *in order to believe* in magical behavior it is necessary to be highly disturbed.

Thus the origin of emotion is a spontaneous and lived degradation of consciousness in the face of the world. What it cannot endure in one way it tries to grasp in another by going to sleep, by approaching the consciousness of sleep, dream, and hysteria. And the disturbance of the body is nothing other than the lived belief of consciousness, insofar as it is seen from the outside.

PART 4

CONCEPTUAL ANALYSIS AND EMOTION

In the Anglo-American tradition, the analysis of emotions typically turns to emotion CONCEPTS and the language we use to ascribe and describe emotions. In fact, one of the primary questions raised in this tradition is whether emotion-words do, in fact, refer to any particular phenomenon, especially a "feeling" of the sort described by so many theorists. In the following selections, Gilbert Ryle raises this question about emotions as part of his overall campaign against "the myth of the ghost in the machine," the Cartesian idea that there is mind and there is body and emotion-words describe the former rather than the latter. Errol Bedford then raises more detailed questions about the idea that emotions are essentially "feelings." Anthony Kenny translates the Continental concern with "intentionality" into a more linguistic concern about the nature of certain kinds of "intensional" sentences in which emotions are described.

In the past thirty years, much of the discussion in philosophy has involved the relationship between emotions and rationality. In the remaining selections, Robert C. Solomon defends the idea that emotions are rational in the strong sense that they are like actions and defined by judgments (in "Emotions and Choice"). Cheshire Calhoun takes issue with this in "Cognitive Emotions." Michael Stocker objects that such "cognitive" theories leave out the most important aspect of emotions, namely their "affectivity" (in "The Irreducibility of Affectivity"). Ronald De Sousa returns to Kenny's

notion of "intensionality" in his "Emotions and Their Objects" (from his book, *The Rationality of Emotion*). Patricia Greenspan tackles the problem of emotions and rationality directly in her book, *Emotions and Reasons* (in "Reasons to Feel"). Martha Nussbaum defends a particularly strong interpretation of the "cognitive" thesis in her "Emotions as Judgments of Value and Importance," and Paul Griffiths appropriately finishes off our collection by telling us "What Emotions Really Are."

The debate will no doubt be continued.



GILBERT RYLE

(1900–1978)

Introduction

Gilbert Ryle was appointed to the senior philosophical chair at Oxford University when World War II ended in 1945. He began his philosophical career as a phenomenologist, publishing his first essays on Husserl and Heidegger, but by the 1930s, he had completely altered his approach to philosophical issues. This was largely through the influence of the logical positivists (who argued that any meaningful statement must be verifiable through experience, and, thus, metaphysical, ethical, and religious claims are meaningless) and Ludwig Wittgenstein (who emphasized the necessity of examining how concepts are used in ordinary discourse in order to understand their meaning). As a result, Ryle became instrumental in the development of a common-sense movement in philosophy that has since come to be called “ordinary language philosophy” or simply “Oxford philosophy.” Philosophy, Ryle argued, should discover the “logical forms” of our ordinary language. That is, it should examine how particular terms can and cannot be used. Thus, if we want to know what anger is, we should not engage in metaphysical speculation about anger, but rather we should examine the conditions under which it is ordinarily appropriate and meaningful to say someone is angry. In taking this new approach, Ryle tried to eliminate those metaphysical mysteries that philosophers in the past created by using misleading expressions and abusing ordinary language.

Ryle’s philosophy culminated in his important book, *The Concept of Mind*, which he published in 1949. There he argues that earlier theorists have presented us with a misleading and mistaken picture of the mind as a “ghost in a machine.” They thought of the mind as something inside us, radically closed off from the view of other people. This picture of the mind, Ryle claims, resulted in the creation of numerous philosophical pseudo-problems, for example, the problem of determining whether other minds exist and of ever knowing what others are thinking or feeling. Ryle attempts, in *The Concept of Mind*, to eliminate this “ghost” entirely. He appeals to the way we use mental concepts, for example, emotion, thinking, and knowing, in ordinary language and then concludes that we do not use these terms to refer to private goings-on inside people. Rather, we use mental terms to indicate that people are disposed to behave in predictable ways. So, for example, when we say that John is angry, we do not mean that he is experiencing some private feeling we cannot see; rather we simply mean that John is disposed to shout, growl, hit people, break things, etc. What this

means is that we are not in a better position to know what our feelings are than are others. For Ryle, an emotion is nothing but a disposition to behave in certain characteristic ways. And it is the same with thoughts, feelings, motives, desires, and all other mental occurrences.

"Nothing but" claims are always suspicious, and Ryle's claim that emotions are nothing but dispositions is no exception. Subsequently, philosophers have criticized Ryle's theory of emotion for being simplistic and for omitting, for example, cognitive features of emotion (see the selection from Bedford). Ryle's theory did, though, have the virtue of turning philosophers' attention to the importance of behavior in emotion. Although earlier behaviorist psychologists, such as Watson, had analyzed emotions in terms of behavior, such analyses went virtually unnoticed in philosophical circles. Not until Ryle's work was serious attention paid to the role of emotional behavior and to the importance of looking at the way we use emotion terms.

From The Concept of Mind

(1) Foreword

In this chapter I discuss certain of the concepts of emotions and feeling.

This scrutiny is necessary because adherents of the dogma of the ghost in the machine can adduce in support of it the consent of most philosophers and psychologists to the view that emotions are internal or private experiences. Emotions are described as turbulences in the stream of consciousness, the owner of which cannot help directly registering them; to external witnesses they are, in consequence, necessarily occult. They are occurrences which take place not in the public, physical world but in your or my secret, mental world.

I shall argue that the word "emotion" is used to designate at least three or four different kinds of things, which I shall call "inclinations" (or "motives"), "moods," "agitations" (or "commotions") and "feelings." Inclinations and moods, including agitations, are not occurrences and do not therefore take place either publicly or privately. They are propensities, not acts or states. They are, however, propensities of different kinds, and their differences are important. Feelings, on the other hand, are occurrences, but the place that mention of them should take in descriptions of human behaviour is very different from that which the standard theories accord to it. Moods or frames of mind are, unlike motives, but like maladies and states of the weather, temporary conditions which in a certain way *collect* occurrences, but they are not themselves extra occurrences.

(2) Feelings versus Inclinations

By "feelings" I refer to the sorts of things which people often describe as thrills, twinges, pangs, throbs, wrenches, itches, prickings, chills, glows, loads, qualms,

hankerings, curdlings, sinkings, tensions, gnawings and shocks. Ordinarily, when people report the occurrence of a feeling, they do so in a phrase like "a throb of compassion," "a shock of surprise" or "a thrill of anticipation."

It is an important linguistic fact that these names for specific feelings, such as "itch," "qualm" and "pang" are also used as names of specific bodily sensations. If someone says that he has just felt a twinge, it is proper to ask whether it was a twinge of remorse or of rheumatism, though the word "twinge" is not necessarily being used in quite the same sense in the alternative contexts.

There are further respects in which the ways in which we speak of, say, qualms of apprehension are analogous to the ways in which we speak of, say, qualms of sea-sickness. We are ready to characterise either as acute or faint, sudden or lingering, intermittent or steady. A man may wince from a pricking of his conscience or from a pricking in his finger. Moreover, we are in some cases ready to locate, say, the sinking feeling of despair in the pit of the stomach or the tense feeling of anger in the muscles of the jaw and fist. Other feelings which we are not prepared to locate in any particular part of the body, like glows of pride, seem to pervade the whole body in much the same way as do glows of warmth.

James boldly identified feelings with bodily sensations, but for our purposes it is enough to show that we talk of feelings very much as we talk of bodily sensations, though it is possible that there is a tinge of metaphor in our talk of the former which is absent from our talk of the latter.

On the other hand, it is necessary to do justice to the crucial fact that we do report feelings in such idioms as "qualms of apprehension" and "glows of pride"; we do, that is, distinguish a glow of pride from a glow of warmth, and I shall have to try to bring out the force of such distinctions. I hope to show that though it is quite proper to describe someone as feeling a throb of compassion, his compassion is not to be equated with a throb or a series of throbs, any more than his fatigue is his gasps; so no disillusioning consequences would follow from acknowledging that throbs, twinges and other feelings are bodily sensations.

In one sense, then, of "emotion" the feelings are emotions. But there is quite another sense of "emotion" in which theorists classify as emotions the motives by which people's higher-level behaviour is explained. When a man is described as vain, considerate, avaricious, patriotic or indolent, an explanation is being given of why he conducts his actions, daydreams and thoughts in the way he does, and, according to the standard terminology, vanity, kindness, avarice, patriotism and laziness rank as species of emotion; they come thence to be spoken of as feelings.

But there is a great verbal muddle here, associated with a great logical muddle. To begin with, when someone is described as a vain or indolent man, the words "vain" and "indolent" are used to signify more or less lasting traits in his character. In this use he might be said to have been vain since childhood, or indolent during his entire half-holiday. His vanity and indolence are dispositional properties, which could be unpacked in such expressions as "Whenever situations of certain sorts have arisen, he has always or usually tried to make himself prominent" or "Whenever he was faced by an option between doing something difficult and not doing it, he shirked doing the difficult thing."

Sentences beginning with "Whenever" are not singular occurrence reports. Motive words used in this way signify tendencies or propensities and therefore cannot signify the occurrence of feelings. They are elliptical expressions of general hypothetical propositions of a certain sort, and cannot be construed as expressing categorical narratives of episodes.

It will however be objected that, besides this dispositional use of motive words, there must also be a corresponding active use of them. For a man to be punctual in the dispositional sense of the adjective, he must tend to be punctual on particular occasions; and the sense in which he is said to be punctual for a particular rendezvous is not the dispositional but the active sense of "punctual." "He tends to be at his rendezvous on time" expresses a general hypothetical proposition, the truth of which requires that there should also be corresponding true categorical propositions of the pattern "he was at today's rendezvous in good time." So, it will be argued, for a man to be a vain or indolent man there must be particular exercises of vanity and indolence occurring at particular moments, and these will be actual emotions or feelings.

This argument certainly establishes something, but it does not establish the point desired. While it is true that to describe a man as vain is to say that he is subject to a specific tendency, it is not true that the particular exercises of this tendency consist in his registering particular thrills or twinges. On the contrary, on hearing that a man is vain we expect him, in the first instance, to behave in certain ways, namely to talk a lot about himself, to cleave to the society of the eminent, to reject criticisms, to seek the footlights and to disengage himself from conversations about the merits of others. We expect him also to indulge in roseate daydreams about his own successes, to avoid recalling past failures and to plan for his own advancement. To be vain is to tend to act in these and innumerable other kindred ways. Certainly we also expect the vain man to feel certain pangs and flutters in certain situations; we expect him to have an acute sinking feeling, when an eminent person forgets his name, and to feel buoyant of heart and light of toe on hearing of the misfortunes of his rivals. But feelings of pique and buoyancy are not more directly indicative of vanity than are public acts of boasting or private acts of daydreaming. Indeed they are less directly indicative, for reasons which will shortly appear.

Some theorists will object that to speak of an act of boasting as one of the direct exercises of vanity is to leave out the cardinal factor in the situation. When we explain why a man boasts by saying that it is because he is vain, we are forgetting that a disposition is not an event and so cannot be a cause. The cause of his boasting must be an event antecedent to his beginning to boast. He must be moved to boast by some actual "impulse," namely an impulse of vanity. So the immediate or direct actualisations of vanity are particular vanity impulses, and these are feelings. The vain man is a man who tends to register particular feelings of vanity; these cause or impel him to boast, or perhaps to will to boast, and to do all the other things which we say are done from vanity.

It should be noticed that this argument takes it for granted that to explain an act as done from a certain motive, in this case from vanity, is to give a causal explanation. This means that it assumes that a mind, in this case the boaster's mind, is a field of special causes; that is why a vanity feeling has been called in

to be the inner cause of the overt boasting. I shall shortly argue that to explain an act as done from a certain motive is not analogous to saying that the glass broke, because a stone hit it, but to the quite different type of statement that the glass broke, when the stone hit it, because the glass was brittle. Just as there are no other momentary actualisations of brittleness than, for example, flying into fragments when struck, so no other momentary actualisations of chronic vanity need to be postulated than such things as boasting, daydreaming about triumphs and avoiding conversations about the merits of others.

But before expanding this argument I want to show how intrinsically unpalatable the view is that, on each occasion that a vain man behaves vaingloriously, he experiences a particular palpitation or pricking of vanity. To put it quite dogmatically, the vain man never feels vain. Certainly, when thwarted, he feels acute dudgeon and when unexpectedly successful, he feels buoyant. But there is no special thrill or pang which we call a "feeling of vanity." Indeed, if there were such a recognisable specific feeling, and the vain man was constantly experiencing it, he would be the first instead of the last person to recognise how vain he was. . . .

We must reject, then, the conclusion of the argument which tried to prove that motive words are the names of feelings or else of tendencies to have feelings. But what was wrong with the argument for this conclusion?

There are at least two quite different senses in which an occurrence is said to be "explained"; and there are correspondingly at least two quite different senses in which we ask "why" it occurred and two quite different senses in which we say that it happened "because" so and so was the case. The first sense is the causal sense. To ask why the glass broke is to ask what caused it to break, and we explain, in this sense, the fracture of the glass when we report that a stone hit it. The "because" clause in the explanation reports an event, namely the event which stood to the fracture of the glass as cause to effect.

But very frequently we look for and get explanations of occurrences in another sense of "explanation." We ask why the glass shattered when struck by the stone and we get the answer that it was because the glass was brittle. Now "brittle" is a dispositional adjective; that is to say, to describe the glass as brittle is to assert a general hypothetical proposition about the glass. So when we say that the glass broke when struck because it was brittle, the "because" clause does not report a happening or a cause; it states a law-like proposition. People commonly say of explanations of this second kind that they give the "reason" for the glass breaking when struck.

How does the law-like general hypothetical proposition work? It says, roughly, that the glass, *if* sharply struck or twisted, etc. *would* not dissolve or stretch or evaporate but fly into fragments. The matter of fact that the glass did at a particular moment fly into fragments, when struck by a particular stone, is explained, in this sense of "explain," when the first happening, namely the impact of the stone, satisfies the protasis of the general hypothetical proposition, and when the second happening, namely the fragmentation of the glass, satisfies its apodosis.

This can now be applied to the explanation of actions as issuing from specified motives. When we ask "Why did someone act in a certain way?" this ques-

tion might, so far as its language goes, either be an inquiry into the cause of his acting in that way, or be an inquiry into the character of the agent which accounts for his having acted in that way on that occasion. I suggest, what I shall now try to prove, that explanations by motives are explanations of the second type and not of the first type. It is perhaps more than a merely linguistic fact that a man who reports the motive from which something is done is, in common parlance, said to be giving the "reason" for the action. It should be also noticed that there are lots of different kinds of such explanations of human actions. A twitch may be explained by a reflex, the filling of a pipe by an inveterate habit; the answering of a letter by a motive. Some of the differences between reflexes, habits and motives will have to be described at a later stage.

The present issue is this. The statement "he boasted from vanity" ought, on one view, to be construed as saying that "he boasted and the cause of his boasting was the occurrence in him of a particular feeling or impulse of vanity." On the other view, it is to be construed as saying "he boasted on meeting the stranger and his doing so satisfies that law-like proposition that whenever he finds a chance of securing the admiration and envy of others, he does whatever he thinks will produce this admiration and envy."

My first argument in favour of the second way of construing such statements is that no one could ever know or even, usually, reasonably conjecture that the cause of someone else's overt action was the occurrence in him of a feeling. Even if the agent reported, what people never do report, that he had experienced a vanity itch just before he boasted, this would be very weak evidence that the itch caused the action, since for all we know, the cause was any one of a thousand other synchronous happenings. On this view the imputation of motives would be incapable of any direct testing and no reasonable person would put any reliance on any such imputation. It would be like water-divining in places where well-sinking was forbidden.

In fact, however, we do discover the motives of other people. The process of discovering them is not immune from error, but nor are the errors incorrigible. It is or is like an inductive process, which results in the establishment of law-like propositions and the applications of them as the "reasons" for particular actions. What is established in each case is or includes a general hypothetical proposition of a certain sort. The imputation of a motive for a particular action is not a causal inference to an unwitnessed event but the subsumption of an episode proposition under a law-like proposition. It is therefore analogous to the explanation of reactions and actions by reflexes and habits, or to the explanation of the fracture of the glass by reference to its brittleness.

The way in which a person discovers his own long-term motives is the same as the way in which he discovers those of others. The quantity and quality of the information accessible to him differ in the two inquiries, but its items are in general of the same sort. He has, it is true, a fund of recollections of his own past deeds, thoughts, fancies and feelings; and he can perform the experiments of fancying himself confronted by tasks and opportunities which have not actually occurred. He can thus base his appreciations of his own lasting inclinations on data which he lacks for his appreciations of the inclinations of others. On the

other side, his appreciations of his own inclinations are unlikely to be unbiased and he is not in a favourable position to compare his own actions and reactions with those of others. In general we think that an impartial and discerning spectator is a better judge of a person's prevailing motives, as well as of his habits, abilities and weaknesses, than is that person himself, a view which is directly contrary to the theory which holds that an agent possesses a Privileged Access to the so-called springs of his own actions and is, because of that access, able and bound to discover, without inference or research, from what motives he tends to act and from what motive he acted on a particular occasion. . . .

In the case of every action, taken by itself, for which it is natural to ask "From what motive was it done?" it is always possible that it was not done from a motive but from force of habit. Whatever I do or say, it is always conceivable, though nearly always false, that I did it, or said it, in complete absence of mind. The performance of an action from a motive is different from its performance out of habit; but the sorts of things which belong to the one class also belong to the other. Now to say that an action was done from force of habit is patently to say that a specific disposition explains the action. No one, I trust, thinks that "habit" is the name of a peculiar internal event or class of events. To ask whether an action was done from force of habit or from kindness of heart is therefore to ask which of two specified dispositions is the explanation of the action.

Finally, we should consider by what tests we should try to decide a dispute about the motive from which a person had done something; did he, for example, throw up a well-paid post for a relatively humble Government job from patriotism or from a desire to be exempt from military service? We begin, perhaps, by asking him; but on this sort of matter his avowals, to us or to himself, would very likely not be frank. We next try, not necessarily unsuccessfully, to settle the dispute by considering whether his words, actions, embarrassments, etc., on this and other occasions square with the hypothesis that he is physically timorous and averse from regimentation, or whether they square with the hypothesis that he is relatively indifferent to money and would sacrifice anything to help win the war. We try, that is, to settle by induction the relevant traits in his character. In applying, then, the results of our induction to his particular decision, i.e. in explaining why he came to it, we do not press him to recall the itches, pangs and throbs that he registered in making it; nor, probably, do we trouble to infer to their occurrence. And there is a special reason for not paying much heed to the feelings had by a person whose motives are under investigation, namely that we know that lively and frequent feelings are felt by sentimentalists whose positive actions show quite clearly that their patriotism, e.g. is a self-indulgent make-believe. Their hearts duly sink when they hear that their country's plight is desperate, but their appetites are unaffected and the routines of their lives are unmodified. Their bosoms swell at a march-past, but they avoid marching themselves. They are rather like theatregoers and novel readers, who also feel genuine pangs, glows, flutters and twinges of despair, indignation, exhilaration and disgust, with the difference that the theatregoers and novel readers realise that they are making-believe.

To say, then, that a certain motive is a trait in someone's character is to say that he is inclined to do certain sorts of things, make certain sorts of plans, indulge in certain sorts of daydreams and also, of course, in certain situations to feel certain sorts of feelings. To say that he did something from that motive is to say that this action, done in its particular circumstances, was just the sort of thing that that was an inclination to do. It is to say "he *would* do that."



ERROL BEDFORD

Introduction

Twentieth-century Anglo-American "analytic" philosophers did not pay nearly as much critical attention to the emotions as did their colleagues in Europe. In fact, the emotions were often explicitly dismissed from conceptual analysis precisely on the grounds that there was no logical structure to be analyzed, that emotions were strictly "non-cognitive" and the province of biology and psychology, not philosophy. In the 1940s, an ethical theory called "the emotive theory of ethics" gained considerable currency in both England and the United States (through such authors as A. J. Ayer and C. L. Stevenson, for example); according to this theory, entire domains of philosophy—ethics, aesthetics, and religion, in particular—were dismissed from further deliberation on the grounds that they were mere matters of "attitude" rather than belief or judgment.

In the 1950s, this began to change, and one of the primary reasons for the change was a widely influential article by Errol Bedford—"Emotions"—which was presented to and then published by the Aristotelean Society in London; in it emotions were given their philosophical due. Ryle's ideas are pervasive in Bedford's argument, but the attention to the details of emotional phenomena goes far beyond Ryle's general treatment in *The Concept of Mind*.

From Emotions

The concept of emotion gives rise to a number of philosophical problems. The most important of these, I think, concern the function of statements about emotions and the criteria for their validity. A solution to these problems is offered by what I shall call the traditional theory of the emotions, and I should like to begin by discussing some aspects of this. According to this view¹ an emotion is a feeling, or at least an experience of a special type which involves a feeling. Logically,

From Errol Bedford, "Emotions," *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* 57, 1956–57.
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¹"We must hold," writes McTaggart, "that the cogitation of that to which the emotion is directed, and the emotion towards it, are the same mental state, which has both the quality of being a cogitation of it, and the quality of being an emotion directed towards it." (*The Nature of Existence*, Vol. 2, p. 146.) (I think it is important to ask what "directed towards" could mean here.) Russell claims that emotions also involve bodily movements. In *The Analysis of Mind* he says that "An emotion—rage, for example—is a certain kind of process. . . . The ingredients of an emotion are only sensations and images and bodily movements succeeding each other according to a certain pattern." (p. 284.)

this amounts to regarding emotion words as the names of feelings. It is assumed that to each word there corresponds a qualitatively distinct experience which may, although it need not, find "expression" in outward behaviour. If it does, this behaviour entitles us to infer the existence of the inner feeling, and therefore to assert, with some degree of probability, statements of the form "He is angry." Looked at in this way, emotions naturally come to be thought of as inner forces that move us, in combination with, or in opposition to other forces, to act as we do. Briefly, anger is a specific feeling which leads the angry man to show the signs of anger (e.g., striking someone) unless he is willing to, and able to, suppress them. It follows, I take it, that to explain behaviour by saying that a man acted as he did because he was angry, is to give a causal explanation, although, admittedly, a causal explanation of a special sort.

I am going to argue that this involves a fundamental mistake: the logical mistake of treating emotion words as names, which leads in turn to a misconception of their function. There might, all the same, be more to be said for this view if it were less inadequate at the psychological level, if it did not presuppose a richness and clarity in the "inner life" of feeling that it does not possess. What evidence is there for the existence of a multitude of feelings corresponding to the extensive and subtle linguistic differentiation of our vocabulary for discussing emotions? This assumption gains no support from experience. Indignation and annoyance are two different emotions; but, to judge from my own case, the feelings that accompany indignation appear to differ little, if at all, from those that accompany annoyance. I certainly find no feeling, or class of feelings, that marks off indignation from annoyance, and enables me to distinguish them from one another. The distinction is of a different *sort* from this. . . .

In any case, does the truth of such a statement as "He is afraid" logically require the existence of a specific feeling? I imagine that it would nowadays be generally conceded that emotion words are commonly used without any implication that the person they refer to is having a particular experience at any given time. But it may be said, granting this, that such expressions as "is afraid," "is angry," nevertheless gain their whole meaning from an indirect reference that they make to experiences, and can only be defined in terms of feelings. A man can feel angry as well as be angry; the expression "is angry" may not name an experience, but "feels angry" surely does, and all that can be meant by saying that someone is angry is that he is liable to, and sometimes does, feel angry. I do not think, however, that this argument can prove what it sets out to prove, i.e. that anger necessarily involves a specific feeling. In the first place, "feels angry" is often able to serve instead of "is angry." We can say, "I felt angry about it for days afterwards." A more important point is that one cannot understand what it is to feel angry without first understanding what it is to be angry. If we can assume the meaning of "is angry," or teach it (ostensively or by a descriptive account), we can go on to explain "feels angry" by saying that it is to feel as people often feel who are angry. But how could we explain the expression "feels angry" without presupposing that the person we are explaining it to understands "is angry?" The only possible method open to us would seem to be this: to make him angry, e.g., by insulting him, and then to say to him, "Well, feeling

angry is feeling as you feel now." The difficulty is that, if the view I am criticising is correct, we cannot ensure in this way that we have taught him the meaning of the expression. We have to be certain that he has experienced a specific feeling. Yet it is logically possible that the insult (or other stimulus, and it is a crucial point that there is no *specific* stimulus) has failed in its object—it may have produced no feeling, or the wrong feeling, or so confused a mixture of feelings that he cannot discriminate the essential from the unessential (the matter is, if anything, even more difficult from his point of view). We cannot exclude this by arguing "He is angry, therefore he feels angry," for how are we to know that he is angry? *Ex hypothesi* his behaviour is not proof of this. And having as yet no guarantee that he has grasped what the question means, we obviously cannot ask him whether he feels angry. Nor can we discover that he has understood the meaning of the expression by observing that he uses it in the same way as we do, for, *ex hypothesi* again, this will not prove that he means the same by it. The conclusion to be drawn, if I am right, is that being angry is logically prior to feeling angry, and therefore that being angry does not entail feeling angry, and *a fortiori* does not entail having any other feeling.

Now it may seem that this does not accord with the confidence we have in our beliefs about our own and other people's emotions respectively. But is this really so? We do not first ascertain that a man feels angry, and then conclude that he is angry. On the contrary, we realise that he is angry, and assume (perhaps wrongly) that he feels angry. Behavioural evidence for a statement about emotions is evidence in its own right, so to speak, and not because it entitles us to infer to private experiences. For if we have good grounds for the assertion that a person is jealous, we do not withdraw this assertion on learning that he does not feel jealous, although we may accept this as true. It is, after all, notorious that we can be mistaken about our own emotions, and that in this matter a man is not the final court of appeal in his own case; those who are jealous are often the last, instead of the first, to recognise that they are. This is scarcely consistent with the view that the criterion for identifying an emotion is the recognition of the special qualities of an experience; it is intelligible if the criteria are different from, and more complex than this. I am going to discuss these criteria shortly. For the moment, I only want to suggest that the traditional answer to the question "How do we identify our own emotions?" namely, "By introspection," cannot be correct. It seems to me that there is every reason to believe that we learn about our own emotions essentially in the same way as other people learn about them. Admittedly, it is sometimes the case that we know our own emotions better than anyone else does, but there is no need to explain this as being due to the introspection of feelings. One reason for this is that it is hardly possible for a man to be completely ignorant, as others may be, of the context of his own behaviour. Again, thoughts may cross his mind that he does not make public. But the fact that he prefers to keep them to himself is incidental; and if they were known they would only be corroborative evidence, not indispensable evidence of a radically different sort from that which is available to other people. It is only in some respects, then, that each of us is in a better position to understand himself than anyone else is. Against this must be set the possibility of self-deception and a reluctance to admit that we are, for instance, vain or envious.

I must now meet what is, I think, the most serious objection that is likely to be made to this—the alleged impossibility of distinguishing, from an external observer's point of view, between real anger, say, and the pretence of it. It is sometimes claimed that although someone might behave as if he were angry, and give every appearance that he would persist in this behaviour, there would still be a sense in which he might be shamming. What then is the difference between being angry and merely pretending to be? It may be held that it can only lie in the fact that the man who is pretending is not in the appropriate state of inner feeling. . . . Let us contrast the cases of a man who is angry and another, behaving in a similar way, who is only pretending to be. Now it may well be true that the former feels angry, whereas the latter does not, but in any case it is not this that constitutes the difference between the fact that the other is only pretending to be. The objection rests on a misconception of what pretence is. There is necessarily involved in pretence, or shamming, the notion of a limit which must not be overstepped; pretence is always insulated, as it were, from reality. Admittedly, this limit may be vague, but it must exist. It is a not unimportant point that it is usually *obvious* when someone is pretending. If a man who is behaving as if he were angry goes so far as to smash the furniture or commit an assault, he has passed the limit; he is not *pretending*, and it is useless for him to protest afterwards that he did not feel angry. Far from his statement being *proof* that he was not angry, it would be discounted even if it were accepted as true. "He was angry, but he did not feel angry" is not self-contradictory, although it is no doubt normally false. If in a particular case it is difficult—as it may be—to settle the question, "Pretended or real?," that can only be because the relevant public evidence is inadequate to settle it. What we want is more evidence of the same kind, not a special piece of evidence of a different kind. . . .

II

Having, I hope, cleared the ground a little by putting some preliminary arguments against the traditional theory, I now want to consider whether an adequate alternative to it is provided by a dispositional theory of emotions, and to discuss the criteria for the use of emotion words. Can the concept of an emotion be fully elucidated without using non-behavioural, indeed non-psychological, concepts? I will try to justify the negative answer that I think should be given to this question.

To begin with, statements about emotions cannot be said to describe behaviour; they interpret it.² The situation seems to be that emotional behaviour, so to speak, is far from being homogeneous. The behavioural evidence for "He was angry" varies with the person and the occasion; in different cases it is not the same, and possibly it may not even be partially the same. Conversely, the same,

²This is not to say that we do not also use the word "description" in such a way that (3) (immediately below) might form part of a description of some incident. When I say that (3) does not describe I am making what could be looked on as a technical distinction between description and interpretation, which is meant to indicate a difference of order between (3) and (1) or (2). Higher order statements explain and interpret what lower order statements describe.

or similar, behaviour, can be differently, and correctly, interpreted in different circumstances, for example as anger, indignation, annoyance, exasperation or resentment. Accordingly, categorical descriptive statements, e.g. (1) "He raised his voice and began to thump the table," and hypothetical descriptive statements, e.g. (2) "If I had gone on teasing him he would have thrown something at me," are evidence for such statements as (3) "He was very angry," but they are not part of what these statements mean. Clearly, on hearing (3), it would be proper to ask for details, and such details could be given in (1) and (2). (1) and (2) would therefore give additional information to that already given in (3). To put the matter another way, (1), (2) and (3) are independent of one another in respect of truth and falsity. (1) may be true when (3) is false (a man can thump the table and raise his voice—to emphasise a point—without being angry), and (3) may be true although (1) is false (for not all angry men thump tables). The same holds of the relationships of (2) and (3). The truth of (2) is perfectly compatible with joining in the fun; anger, on the other hand, is consistent with not being prepared to throw things. I think that this would still hold with other statements substituted for (1) and (2). It does not seem to be possible, therefore, to analyse (3) into a set, however, complex, of categorical and hypothetical statements that describe individual behaviour. (3) does not sum up, but goes beyond, the behavioural evidence for it, and it would always be logically possible to accept the evidence and deny the conclusion. Although when we say (3) we are in a sense talking about the behaviour on which its truth rests, anger is not merely a disposition, and cannot be reduced to a pattern of behaviour, actual or potential.³ All that can be said about the logical relationships between (3) and such statements as (1) and (2) is that it is a necessary, but not a sufficient, condition for the truth of (3) that some statements such as (1) and (2) should be true, without it being possible to specify which. . . .

What I am suggesting is that people who share the same information and the same expectations about another person's behaviour may possibly place different emotional interpretations on that behaviour, if their knowledge is confined to descriptive statements about it. It may be urged that this difference of opinion can be eliminated as further evidence of the same type comes to light, and that it can only be eliminated in this way. The assumption underlying this—that the criteria for assertions about emotions are purely behavioural—is not, however, borne out by an examination of the way in which we actually use emotion words. These words, when used without qualification, carry implications, not merely about behaviour, but also about its social context. Consider the distinction between two emotions that have a close similarity, shame and embarrassment. The behaviour of an embarrassed man is often not noticeably different from that of one who is ashamed; but there is an important difference between the respective situations they are in. In a newspaper article last year, Mr. Peter Davies, the publisher, was said to be "to his mild embarrassment" the

³Let me give an analogy. "Jones is responsible for this muddle" is a statement about the behaviour its truth is dependent on, although it is not shorthand for a set of statements describing that behaviour.

original of Peter Pan. The embarrassment is understandable, and the epithet appropriate, whether its application is correct or not. Yet we can say at once that if the writer of the article had alleged that Mr. Davies was "to his shame" the original of Peter Pan, this would have been incorrect; it is scarcely conceivable that it could be true. The reason for this is obvious, and it is logical, not psychological, since it has nothing to do with Mr. Davies' behaviour, still less with his feelings. It is simply that the fact that Barrie modelled Peter Pan on him is not his *fault*—it was not due to an act of his, and there is nothing reprehensible about it anyway. In general, it is only true to say of someone "He is ashamed of so and so" if what is referred to is something that he can be criticised for (the criticism is commonly, though not perhaps necessarily, moral). It is, in other words, a necessary condition for the truth of the statement that he should be at fault. The word "embarrassed" is not connected in the same way with blame and responsibility; the claim that it makes is the vaguer and weaker one that the situation is awkward or inconvenient and so on. . . . The connexion between shame and responsibility is not, of course, ignored in the traditional theory of emotions. It appears as the doctrine that every emotion must have an appropriate object; that it is impossible (psychologically) to experience the feeling specific to shame unless you recognise that you are open to criticism. But there are no limits to what men may feel; we can only set limits to what they can say. This is merely the misrepresentation of a logical point as a piece of implausible *a priori* psychology.

The point of the example is to show that although knowledge of facts that is quite independent of knowledge of behaviour cannot by itself establish a given interpretation of that behaviour, it can be sufficient definitely to exclude it. . . .

Statements about emotions may also involve another, and somewhat different, type of commitment, which has an even closer bearing on the elucidation of their function. It can be illustrated in the contrast between hope and expectation, and I think this throws some light on the question why one is, and the other is not, usually counted as an emotion. The most apparent difference between them is that hoping for and expecting an event express different degrees of confidence that the event will happen. To expect something is to believe that it is more likely than not to happen. In the case of hope it is only necessary that it should not be an impossibility. This is, however, not the only, nor the most crucial, difference. Phrases which express a low degree of confidence, e.g. "I think it may . . .," "Perhaps it will . . ." cannot be substituted without loss for "I hope that . . ." The expression "I hope that . . ." implies, in addition to a very vague estimate of probability, an *assessment* of whatever is referred to in the clause that follows. I think it is clear that one cannot hope for something, although one can expect something, without judging it favourably in some respect, or from some point of view. Compare (1) "I don't favour a higher purchase tax but I expect it will be raised," with (2) "I don't favour a higher purchase tax, but I hope it will be raised." (1) Creates no surprise; (2) demands further explanation. Does he think it bad for the country, but profitable to him personally because he has a large stock of goods on which he has already paid tax? Does he regard it as

unsound fiscal policy in general, but advisable temporarily in an inflationary economy? Failing an answer to questions such as these (2) is surely a puzzling remark, and (3) "I don't favour a higher purchase tax in any respect, but I hope it will be raised" seems to me to be self-contradictory. . . . It is a psychological truism that men do not, with some exceptions, hope that their opponents will win; it is a truth of logic that they cannot hope that their opponents will win without approving of this in *some* respect. . . .

To generalize from this example: emotion words form part of the vocabulary of appraisal and criticism, and a number of them belong to the more specific language of moral criticism. Normally, the verbs in their first-person use imply the speaker's assessment of something, and in their third-person use they carry an implication about an assessment by the person they refer to. . . .⁴

So far I have discussed the conditions which appear to govern the truth and falsity of statements about emotions. While emotion concepts do not form an altogether homogeneous group, I believe that this is correct as a broad outline. But there is one respect in which it needs to be supplemented. This concerns the sense in which emotions (as opposed to statements about emotions) can be justified or unjustified, reasonable or unreasonable. It is fairly obvious, to begin with, that the behavioural criteria for the use of emotion words are not connected with the application of these predicates. The way in which a man behaves will determine whether he is or is not angry. But *if* he is angry, the behavioural evidence for this is not in itself relevant to the question whether his anger is justified or unjustified. On the other hand, if the claim that an emotion word makes about a situation is not satisfied, this is often indicated by saying that the emotion is unjustified or unreasonable. The attribution of the emotion, that is to say, is not withdrawn, but qualified. An example will make this clearer. Suppose that B does something that is to A's advantage, although A thinks that it is to his disadvantage [e.g. B, a solicitor administering A's affairs, sells some shares that A believes (wrongly) will appreciate]. Now it would be misleading to say simply, except to a fully informed audience, "A resents what B did"—this surely carries the incorrect implication that B has injured A. To guard against this it is necessary to add "but his resentment is quite unjustified," or some equivalent expression. A's belief that B has done something that affects him adversely is, however, a necessary condition if the word "resentment" is to be used at all. The distinction between what the situation is, and what it is believed to be, is normally unimportant, and for this reason emotion words make an objective claim unless special precautions are taken to exclude or cancel it (e.g. "He was afraid but no one else was" [there was no real danger], "Your surprise is quite unjustified" [it was only to be expected]).

How far can these distinctions be accounted for by theories in which emotion concepts are treated as psychological concepts? I am inclined to think that if an emotion were a feeling no sense could be made of them at all. It may be said

⁴But the words "right," "unreasonable," etc., when used to qualify third person statements sometimes serve as endorsements of, or refusals to endorse, this assessment on the speaker's part. I discuss this point below.

that an emotion is unjustified when a feeling is inappropriate or unfitting to a situation. But I find this unintelligible. Feelings do not have a character that makes this relationship possible. In any case, the interpretation suggested is not what is meant by saying that e.g. a critic's contempt is unjustified. In general, I do not think it can be maintained that logical predicates apply either to feelings or to sensations. What reasons could be given for or against a feeling, or for or against its "inappropriateness" to a situation? If someone were to say "I felt a pang this afternoon," it would be meaningless to ask whether it was a reasonable or unreasonable pang. The matter is different if he says "pang of regret," but the phrase "of regret" does not *name* the feeling, as I have already argued, and the pang of regret is justified, if it is, not as a feeling, but because his regret is justified. . . .

A dispositional theory of emotions may be thought to be on stronger ground, since it can be argued that behaviour may be unreasonable or unjustified. To use a previous example again, to say that someone has an unjustified contempt for Bartok is to say, I take it, on this view, that certain categorical and hypothetical statements are true of him, and that these statements describe behaviour that is unjustified. In other words, the assertion that contempt for Bartok is unjustified means that a certain pattern of preferential behaviour is unjustified. But what is this pattern of behaviour? Presumably it will consist in doing (or being prepared to do) things of this sort: switching off when Bartok's music is announced on the Third Programme, wasting free tickets for a concert of his music, never buying records of Bartok, going for a walk when a neighbour plays his music on the violin, and so on; in short, choosing against this composer whenever a choice presents itself. Now let us suppose that contempt for Bartok is unjustified, as it undoubtedly is. Even so, this behaviour may be perfectly reasonable or justified, and therefore cannot constitute an unjustified contempt for Bartok. It is open to a different interpretation, that the person who behaves in this way is simply uninterested in this composer's music, or in modern music generally. Consistently to choose against something is not necessarily to condemn it, or to be contemptuous of it, because this choice is susceptible of rational explanation in other ways.

III

I must now amplify what I have said in passing about the functions performed by statements that refer to emotions. It is generally assumed that these functions are to report feelings, or to report, predict or explain behaviour. Now although some statements containing emotion words are used in these ways, and particularly as explanations, the force of the qualifications "unjustified" and "unreasonable" in itself suggests that this is much less common than might be thought, and my contention is that it would be a mistake to imagine that the primary function of these statements is to communicate psychological facts. Their principal functions are judicial, not informative, and when they are informative, it is often not merely psychological information that they give. Consider the following remarks, as they might be used in suitable contexts in everyday life:

- (1) "They are very jealous of one another"
- (2) "I envy Schnabel's technique"

- (3) "I feel ashamed about it now"
- (4) "I never feel the slightest pang of regret for what I did"
- (5) "am quite disgusted with the literary men" (Keats)
- (6) "Well, I hope you are ashamed of yourself"
- (7) "His pride in the Company's record is unjustified"
- (8) "He is very disappointed in you"

Of these examples, the first is different from the rest, its point, I assume, being to inform the hearer that a certain relationship exists between the persons referred to, e.g. in a suitable context, that they are rivals in their profession. The other remarks have what I have termed, for want of a better word, a judicial function. (2) Praises Schnabel; it resembles, say, "Schnabel has a brilliant technique," although it is more tentative and personal, and implies more than this—it would only be said by another pianist. (3) is an admission of responsibility, or perhaps a plea in mitigation, and (4) is the justification of a choice. (5) and (6) imply highly unfavourable assessments. In (5) Keats condemns literary men, and he goes on (Letter of 8th October, 1817) to give part of his reasons for feeling disgusted by an anecdote about Leigh Hunt. The force of (6) seems to lie in its mixture of blame with imputation of responsibility—there are two general lines of reply to it, either (a) "No, I think I was quite right" or (b) "No, it wasn't my fault." (7) is either a way of saying that the person referred to is taking more credit than he deserves, or of saying that the Company's record is not as good as he believes. The normal conversational point of (8), I think would be to convey blame.

In general then, the affinities of (1) to (8) are not with descriptive statements about what people feel and do, but with a different type of statement altogether. . . .

IV

What kind of an explanation of behaviour are we giving when we account for it in terms of emotions? I should like, in conclusion, to sketch the general lines on which I think this question ought to be answered. As this is no more than a corollary of the preceding discussion I can put it very briefly.

The traditional theory gives the answer that emotion words explain behaviour by specifying its cause, i.e. a certain feeling or inner experience. But surely, when we ask what caused someone to do something, we usually neither expect nor receive an answer in terms of feelings. The answer takes the form of a reference to some external circumstance, if that is relevant, or to some thought, memory, observation, etc., that accounts for the action. If we refer to feelings at all, this appears to be a type of explanation that we fall back on as a last resort, because it is unilluminating and only one step removed from saying that the action is unaccountable. What seems to me to be wrong, then, on this score, with the traditional view is that it does not do justice to the explanatory power of emotion words. For the fact is that to know the feeling that may have preceded an action is not to understand it, or to understand it only very imperfectly. One can remember an action that one did many years ago, an action that one no longer understands, and the question "Why did I do it?" can remain in the face

of the clearest recollection of what it felt like to do it. If emotion words merely named some inner experience that preceded or accompanied behaviour, to explain behaviour by using them would not give the insight that it does.

A quite different answer to this question is proposed by Professor Ryle in *The Concept of Mind*. Referring to what he calls "inclinations" or "motives," Professor Ryle writes, "The imputation of a motive for a particular action is not a causal inference to an unwitnessed event but the subsumption of an episode proposition under a law-like proposition" (p. 90). Again, "To explain an action as done from a certain motive is not to correlate it with an occult cause, but to subsume it under a propensity or behaviour-trend" (p. 110) . . . It does not seem to me that emotion words explain merely in the relatively superficial way that dispositional words explain, if "the glass broke because it was brittle" is to be taken as a model, however rough, of this kind of explanation. To refer to a man's laziness or fondness for gardening is to account for what he does on a particular occasion by removing the need for a *special* explanation of it; by showing that his conduct is not in any way surprising or unusual, but part of the regular pattern of things that he does or is likely to do. To assimilate emotion words closely to dispositional words is to give an incomplete account of their explanatory function; they explain behaviour more fully than could be done by saying, in effect, that it was only to be expected. ("To say that he did something from that motive is to say that this action, done in its particular circumstances, was just the sort of thing that that was an inclination to do. It is to say 'he *would* do that.'" *Ibid.*, pp. 92-3.) I would suggest that emotion words go beyond this sort of explanation in two ways. First, by setting the action to be explained, not merely in the context of the rest of an individual's behaviour, but in a social context. "He was rude to you because he was jealous" resembles "I helped him because he was a friend" in accounting for his behaviour by the reference it makes to his relationship with other people. Secondly, emotion words explain by giving the reason for an action, in the sense of giving a justification for it. "He refused an interview because of his contempt for journalists" explains the refusal by connecting it with an assessment made by the person whose behaviour is referred to. In this respect it has some analogy with, for instance, "He reads Gibbon because he thinks highly of his style." Emotion concepts, I have argued, are not purely psychological: they presuppose concepts of social relationships and institutions, and concepts belonging to systems of judgement, moral, aesthetic and legal. In using emotion words we are able, therefore, to relate behaviour to the complex background in which it is enacted, and so to make human action intelligible.



ANTHONY KENNY

Introduction

One of the key components of emotion, according to most Continental theorists, is the property of "intentionality." But however central to the Continental philosophers this concept may have been, it was treated with suspicion by many Anglo-American philosophers. (See, for example, the quick dismissal of it in the first footnote of Bedford's essay.) It was a matter of some significance, therefore, when Anthony Kenny took on the topic of intentionality in his book, *Action, Emotion and Will*, which was published in 1963. Kenny is also a scholar of ancient and medieval philosophy and has written extensively on Aristotle, Descartes, and the Scholastics. These influences are clearly represented in the following discussion of "intentional objects," in which he tries to make clear the nature of intentionality and the peculiar nature of the "objects" to which emotions are "directed."

Kenny uses the term *intensionality* (with an "s") instead of *intentionality* (with a "t") and this may cause some confusion. Kenny is primarily concerned with the language of emotions, in which the late medieval notion of "intensionality" is particularly appropriate. The phenomenological concept of "intentionality," by contrast, has become the favored term in analyses that attempt to bypass language and go straight for "the things themselves" (in Husserl's locution), that is, the objects of experience independent of their description in language. The relationship between the two concepts, "intensionality" and "intentionality," remains a subject of considerable debate.

From Action, Emotion and Will



Objects

In the first part of this book I spoke frequently of the "object" of an emotion or desire, contrasting the object of such a mental attitude with its cause. In the last chapter I described the object of an action as being that which changes as a result of the action. It is clear that we have here two different senses of "object," or two different kinds of object. The objects of mental attitudes are sometimes called "intensional objects": let us call the object of an action which is not a mental act a "non-intensional object." We must now consider the relationships and the differences between intensional and non-intensional objects.

From Anthony Kenny, *Action, Emotion and Will* (New York: Humanities Press, 1964).

It will, I hope, have been clear to the reader throughout that when I speak of "the object of an action" I do not mean to refer to the point of an action, or the purpose or objective with which someone acts. I have also tried to avoid using the word "object" in such a way that it is equivalent to "thing" or "substance," as when people speak of finding a strange object in the cupboard, or philosophers talk of objects in the external world. The sense of "object" which I have hitherto employed and wish now to discuss is one which derives from the grammatical notion of the *object* of a transitive verb. The object of fear is *what* is feared, the object of love is *what* is loved, the object of cutting is *what* is cut, the object of heating is *what* is heated. In discussing the nature of objects we are simply discussing the logical role of the object-expressions which complete the sense of intensional and non-intensional verbs.¹

There was a scholastic adage: *Obiectum specificat actum*. There are two ways in which objects specify acts. First, and obviously, one and the same verb may be used to report quite different actions if its sense is completed with different object-expressions. Smoking a pipe differs from smoking a cigar, and killing mice is not the same thing as killing men. Verbs completed by object expressions describe species of the genus described by a verb alone: stealing silk handkerchiefs is one sort of stealing, and eating snails is one sort of eating. Some of these specific distinctions are more important than others; in different societies different distinctions play different roles. In most societies the difference between killing men and killing mice is clearly marked; in some eating pork is significantly different from eating lamb. Much of moral philosophy could be regarded as an attempt to discover or lay down which are the significant specific differences between human actions.²

Objects specify acts in another way, which was brought out by the scholastic distinction between material and formal objects. Anything which can be ϕ d is a material object of ϕ ing. Beer, for example can be seen, and so beer is a material object of seeing; when the executioners burnt Joan of Arc, Joan was the material object of their burning. The formal object of ϕ ing is the object under that description which *must* apply to it if it is to be possible to ϕ it. If only what is P can be ϕ d, then "thing which is P" gives the formal object of ϕ ing. Descriptions of formal objects can be formed trivially simply by modalising the relevant verbs: only what is edible can be eaten, only what is inflammable can be burnt, only what is tangible can be touched. But there are other descriptions of formal objects which are not trivial in this way. Only what is dirty can be cleaned, only what is wet can be dried, only what is coloured can be seen, only what is criminal can be committed, only what is difficult to obtain can be striven for, only other people's property can be stolen. "Other people's property" is a description of the formal

¹If this is clearly understood, there seems to be little danger, and great convenience, in talking of "objects" rather than of "object-expressions." Geach criticizes this usage on the grounds that it leads to saying e.g. "some objects of mental acts do not exist." But this sentence is objectionable so long as it means only that some object-expressions lack reference.

²For the scholastic dictum cf. Aquinas, *Summa Theologica* Ia 77, 3; and Ia IIae 18, 2; *actio habet speciem ex obiecto, sicut et motus ex termino*. The doctrine is based on passages in Aristotle, e.g. *De Anima* II 415 a 14ff, *N. Ethics*, 1774 b 5.

object of *stealing*, just as "one's own spouse" is a description of the formal object of *divorcing*. Joan of Arc was the formal object of burning not *qua* saint, nor *qua* woman, but *qua* inflammable material.

To assign a formal object to an action is to place restrictions on what may occur as the direct object of a verb describing the action. The restrictions may be of various kinds. They may, for example, concern time: only what is past can be remembered or avenged, only what has not yet happened can be dreaded or awaited. Or they may concern place: only what is present can be enjoyed, only what is absent can be missed. Or they may concern good and evil; only something thought to be good can be envied, only something thought to be evil can be regretted. There is no formal object of *thinking of*, because there are no restrictions on what may be thought of: any expression which can occur as an object-expression after any verb, can occur as an object-expression after the verb "... think of. . . ." So that if we are to say that there is a formal object of thought we must say that it is: anything whatever.³

A formal object should not be confused with an internal accusative, such as occurs in the expressions "to dream a dream," "to play a game." The dream is not anything over and above the dreaming, nor the game over and above the playing; but my neighbour's property can be identified as such quite independently of my stealing it, and my wife is not brought into existence by my divorcing her.

Formal objects specify actions in a manner different from that in which, as we saw above, all objects specify actions. Verbal nouns, like other nouns, may be ordered in accordance with the scheme of genus and species: murder is one sort of homicide, and homicide is one sort of killing; spying is one sort of treason, and treason is one sort of crime. One way in which a species of action may be differentiated from other species of the same genus is by a difference in its formal object.⁴ Thus, if we take (voluntary) killing as a genus, homicide differs from other species in this genus as being the killing of *a human being*; if we take homicide as a genus, murder differs from other species in this genus as being the killing of an *innocent* human being. If we take making as a genus, then cobbling differs from tailoring because the formal object of the one is footwear and of the other clothes.

Now both intensional and non-intensional actions are specified by their formal objects: this, and not the mere grammatical similarity between such sentences as "Macbeth feared Banquo" and "Macbeth killed Banquo," is the reason for treating intensional and non-intensional objects together before distinguishing between them. Emotional attitudes, like other mental attitudes, have formal objects; some of the philosophical errors about the emotions which we considered in the first part of this book might be described as mistakes about their formal objects. Descartes and Hume, with the philosophers and psychologists who followed them, treated the relationship between an emotion and its formal object, which is a logical one, as if it were a contingent matter of fact.

³This is the meaning of the scholastic expression "*obiectum intellectus est ens ut sic.*" This dictum is sometimes quaintly interpreted by neo-Scholastics as meaning that the intellect is a faculty for the intuition of Pure Being.

⁴There are other ways: roasting and boiling are species of cooking, but their formal objects are the same. So too one can *crawl to* anywhere that one can *walk to*. The difference between species in such cases is made by the manner, and not by the object, of the action (cf. Aristotle, *N. Ethics*, 1174 a 31).

If the emotions were internal impressions or behaviour patterns there would be no logical restrictions on the type of object which each emotion could have. It would be a mere matter of fact that people were not angered by being benefited, nor afraid of what they already know to have happened; just as it is a mere matter of fact that most people are nauseated by slugs crawling from beneath an upturned stone and sneeze on getting pepper in their nostrils. There would be no more reason why, once in a while, a man might not be grateful for being harmed, or be proud of a defect, than there is why, once in a while, a man may not feel a sinking in the stomach while being complimented, or weep on the receipt of good news.

In fact, each of the emotions is appropriate—logically, and not just morally appropriate—only to certain restricted objects. One cannot be afraid of just anything, nor happy about anything whatsoever. If a man says that he is afraid of winning £10,000 in the pools, we want to ask him more: does he believe that money corrupts, or does he expect to lose his friends, or to be annoyed by begging letters, or what? If we can elicit from him only descriptions of the good aspects of the situation, then we cannot understand why he reports his emotion as fear and not as hope. Again, if a man says that he feels remorse for the actions of someone quite unconnected with him, or is envious of his own vices, we are at a loss to understand him.

It is, of course, quite possible for someone to be grateful for a physical injury, if he regards it as having done him some good; as members of the House of Lords frequently tell us that they are grateful to those who caned them at school. It is also possible to be proud of a vice or a crime or a defect, if one can represent it to oneself as a virtue or an achievement or an advantage: as Don Juan may boast of his prowess with women, or Topcliffe brag of his skill as a torturer, or a beggar in a bazaar glory in the unsightliness of his sores. What is not possible is to be grateful for, or proud of, something which one regards as an evil unmixed with good. Again, it is possible to be envious of one's own fruit trees; but only if one mistakenly believes that the land on which they stand is part of one's neighbour's property; just as it is possible to feel remorse for the failure of the crops in Vietnam if one believes that it was due to the inadequacy of one's own prayers. What is not possible is to envy something which one believes to belong to oneself, or to feel remorse for something in which one believes one had no part.

The medieval schoolmen gave expression to restrictions such as those we have outlined by saying that the formal object of fear was a future evil, of envy another's good, or remorse one's own past sins. In this they were following Aristotle, who gives, in his *Rhetoric*, but without the terminology, a list of the formal objects of the emotions. It is not, of course, correct to say e.g. that the formal object of envy is another's good *tout court*: one must say that it is something *believed to be good and believed to belong to another*, as our example above shows. Thus Aristotle in defining anger says that it is a desire for *what appears to be revenge for what appears to be an insult*.⁵ The description of the formal object of a mental attitude such as an emotion, unlike a description of the formal object of a non-intensional action, must contain reference to belief. Only what is wet in fact can be dried; but something which is merely believed to be an insult may provoke anger.

So far I have used "intensional action" and "intensional object" simply as equivalent to "mental act" and "object of a mental act or attitude" without giving any criterion

⁵*Rhetoric*, 1378 a 30ff

for distinguishing intensional objects from non-intensional objects. We might define intensionality heuristically as "the formal property which is peculiar to the description of psychological events and states." The attempt, then, to give a proper definition of intensionality will consist in an attempt to find what formal property, if any, belongs always and only to descriptions of psychological phenomena. It was thus, historically, that the notion of intensionality was introduced, or reintroduced, into philosophy by Brentano.

Looking for a property which would mark off psychical phenomena from physical phenomena, Brentano first considered and rejected the suggestion that the peculiarity of psychical phenomena was that they lacked extension. He then proposed a different criterion of distinction:

Every psychical phenomenon is characterized by what the medieval scholastics called the intensional (or mental) existence of an object, and what we, not quite unambiguously, would call "relation to a content" "object-directedness" or "immanent objectivity." ("Object" here does not mean reality.) Each such phenomenon contains in itself something as an object, though not each in the same manner. In imagination something is imagined, in judgement something is accepted or rejected, in love, something is loved, in hatred something is hated, in desire something is desired and so forth.

This intensional existence is a property only of psychical phenomena; no physical phenomenon displays anything similar. And so we can define psychical phenomena by saying that they are those phenomena which contain an object intensionally (*Psychologie von Empirischen Standpunkt*, Book II, chapter 1, section 5).

In reading this passage we feel a certain difficulty. It is true that where there is love then *something* is loved, if there is to be hatred then *something* must be hated; but is it not also true that if heating takes place then *something* is heated and if cutting takes place then *something* is cut? "Heat" and "cut" are not psychological verbs: how then can Brentano say that object-directedness is peculiar to psychological phenomena? He appears to have taken a feature common to all grammatically transitive verbs as being a peculiarity of psychological verbs.⁶

The answer to this difficulty becomes clear only if we refer to the scholastics from whom Brentano borrowed the notion of intensionality. It will be remembered that in the last chapter we defined the object of an action as that which was changed as the result of an action. This definition applies only to nonpsychological actions; and the scholastics placed the intensionality of psychological actions precisely in the fact that they did not change their objects. If Peter has painted his house, then Peter's house must now be different from what it was before he painted it; but if Peter has looked at his house, it may now be exactly the same as it was before he looked at it. To find out whether the doctor has cured his patient, we must examine the patient; to find out whether the doctor has fallen in love with his patient, we must ask or observe the doctor. Where a non-psychological action brings about a change, the change is in the object and

⁶Husserl, in a passage which reads like a commentary on Brentano's text, seems to accept the conclusion that *any* action which has an object is intensional.

not, save *per accidens*, in the subject; where a psychological action brings about a change, the change is in the subject and not, save *per accidens*, in the object.

Aquinas frequently makes this distinction between two different kinds of action: *actio manens in agente* and *actio transiens in obiectum*. Thus he writes:

There are actions of two kinds: some actions, such as heating and cutting, pass over into external matter; others, such as understanding, perceiving, and wanting, remain in the agent. The difference between them is this: actions of the first kind bring about a state not of the agent which initiates the change, but of what is changed; whereas actions of the second kind bring about a state of the agent.⁷

This distinction solves the difficulty which we felt about Brentano's account of intensionality: but it presents difficulties of its own. The physician may heal himself, and the change thus brought about is in the agent; yet healing is not a psychological performance, since drugs can do it as well as men. This difficulty, though of venerable antiquity, is fairly trivial; a more serious one concerns local motion. When I climb the Matterhorn, the change brought about appears to be in me: I who was at the bottom of the mountain am now at the top. But "climb" is not, or not obviously, a psychological verb. In this case, the change brought about is a change in the *relation* between myself and the Matterhorn: the state which ensues upon my action is expressed by the relational proposition "I am on top of the Matterhorn." And we have all along admitted, in company with most logicians, that in a genuinely relational proposition both terms are on an equal footing. The result of the action has therefore no more claim to be regarded as a fact about the agent than as a fact about the object.

In our time, Brentano's thesis has been developed by Chisholm (*Perceiving*, Ch. XI). Chisholm gives three criteria for intensionality. The first is this:

A simple declarative sentence is intensional if it uses a substantival expression—a name or a description—in such a way that neither the sentence nor its contradictory implies either that there is or that there isn't anything to which the substantival expression truly applies.

By this criterion, he observes, "Diogenes looked for an honest man" is intensional, whereas "Diogenes sat in his tub" is not.

Another criterion which Chisholm offers concerns what Quine calls "referential opacity." It may be summarized as follows. Let E be a sentence of the form "A = B" (where A and B are names). Then if P is a sentence containing A, and Q is a sentence like P except that it contains B wherever P contains A, P is intensional if P and E do not together imply Q. These are the criteria which Chisholm gives for diagnosing intensionality in sentences which do not contain propositional clauses.

⁷Aquinas goes on to explain how the sense of "change" differs when we talk of the agent as changing from when we talk of the object as changing. My translation of "*perfectio*" as "*bringing about a state*" may be questioned; it was suggested by the parallel passage in Ia 87, 3c where *aedificatio* (a performance and not a state in the sense defined in the previous chapter) is called a "*perfectio*." Aquinas claims, perhaps without justification, to base his distinction on that made by Aristotle in *Metaphysics* Θ (1058 a 3–37).

An objection to these criteria is that by them many expressions containing psychological verbs are not intensional. "Know," for instance, is a psychological verb, but "Diogenes knows an honest man" implies that there is an honest man; and "Dr Jekyll = Mr Hyde" and "James knows Dr Jekyll" together imply "James knows Mr Hyde," though of course they do not imply "James knows that Dr Jekyll is Mr Hyde." So far as I can see these criteria as they stand are sufficient, but not necessary, conditions for intensionality. The scholastic criterion therefore seems preferable for diagnosing the intensionality of a verb which is followed by a direct object which is a substantival expression.

Psychological verbs occur not only in sentences of the simple subject-verb-object form, but also, and most characteristically, in sentences containing *that*-clauses. Examples are "think," "say," "wish," "decide," and "regret." Such verbs, obviously, need not be followed by *that*-clauses in all their uses: many take an accusative and an infinitive, or simply an infinitive, where the accusative in question would be the same as the subject of the main verb. Other psychological verbs, such as "want," "intend," and "urge," show a marked preference for these latter forms. We can say that it is characteristic of many psychological verbs that they occur in sentences which, though not containing any truth-functional connectives, contain more than one verb. Thus Russell classed reports of beliefs, desires and so forth under the heading "propositions with more than one verb." We might take the possibility of occurring as the main verb of such a sentence as a criterion of intensionality. . . .

By these criteria of intensionality which we have borrowed from the scholastics and from Chisholm, reports of emotional states and acts of the will are intensional sentences. A consideration of the emotions and the will must therefore include an account of how such sentences containing intensional objects are to be analysed. . . .



ROBERT C. SOLOMON

Introduction

Robert C. Solomon is the author of *The Passions* (1976) and a number of essays and other books on the nature of emotion. He is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Texas at Austin. In this early essay, he defends a "cognitive" theory of emotions in which evaluative judgments play an essential role.

From Emotions and Choice

Do we choose our emotions? Can we be held responsible for our anger? for feeling jealousy? for falling in love or succumbing to resentment or hatred? The suggestion sounds odd because emotions are typically considered occurrences that happen to (or "in") us; emotions are taken to be the hallmark of the irrational and the disruptive. Controlling one's emotion is supposed to be like the caging and taming of a wild beast, the suppression and sublimation of a Freudian "it."

Traditionally, emotions have been taken to be feelings or sensations. More recently, but also traditionally, emotions have been taken to be physiological disturbances. Accordingly, much of this century's literature on emotions is dedicated to mapping out the relationship between sensations and correlative occurrences. William James, for example, takes consciousness of emotions to be consciousness of physiological occurrences. Other philosophers and psychologists, for one reason or another, have tried to reduce the emotion to a physiological occurrence, or, alternatively, have focused on the feeling of emotion and denied any conceptual role to the physiological occurrence. But these traditional worries should be quite irrelevant to any analysis of the emotions, for an emotion is neither a sensation nor a physiological occurrence, nor an occurrence of any other kind. "Struck by jealousy," "driven by anger," "plagued by remorse," "paralyzed by fear," "felled by shame," like "the prick of Cupid's arrow," are all symptomatic metaphors betraying a faulty philosophical analysis. Emotions are not occurrences and do not happen to us. I would like to suggest that emotions are rational and purposive rather than irrational and disruptive, are very much like actions, and that we choose an emotion much as we choose a course of action.¹

From Robert C. Solomon, "Emotions and Choice," *Review of Metaphysics* Vol. 28, no. 1 (1973): 20–41. Reprinted by permission of the *Review of Metaphysics*.

¹Perhaps we should distinguish getting into an emotional state and being in one (e.g., getting angry vs. being angry). But nothing turns on this, for being in a state as well as getting into a state, like God's maintenance of the Universe as well as his creation of it, requires devoted activity. Accordingly, I shall be arguing both that we choose an emotion

Emotions are intentional; that is, emotions are "about" something. "I am angry at John for stealing my car." It is not necessary to press the claim that *all* emotions are "about" something. Kierkegaard's dread may be an emotion which is not "about" anything, or, conversely, may be "about" everything. Similarly, *moods*, which are much like emotions, do not have a specific object. Euphoria, melancholy, and depression are not "about" anything in particular, though they may be caused by some particular incident. We might wish to say that such emotions and moods are "about" the world rather than anything in particular. In fact, Heidegger has suggested that *all* emotions are ultimately "about" the world and never simply "about" something particular. But we will avoid debating these issues by simply focusing our attention on emotions that clearly seem to be "about" something specifiable.

"I am angry at John for stealing my car." It is true that I am angry. And it is also true that John stole my car. Thus we are tempted to distinguish two components of my being angry; my feeling of anger and what I am angry about. But this is doubly a mistake. It requires that a feeling (of anger) be (contingently) directed at something (at John's having stolen my car). But feelings are occurrences and cannot have a "direction." They can be caused, but to say that I am angry "about" John's having stolen my car is very different from saying his stealing my car caused me to be angry. John's act might cause me to be angry "about" something else, e.g., my failure to renew my insurance. It might be false that John stole my car, though I believe that he did. Then it is false that John's stealing my car caused me to be angry, but still true that what I am angry "about" is John's stealing my car. One might suggest that it is not the alleged *fact* of John's stealing my car that is in question, but rather my *belief* that he did. But what I am angry "about" is clearly not that I believe that John stole my car, but rather *that John stole my car*.

Feelings do not have "directions."² But I am angry "about" something. The relationship between my being angry and what I am angry about is not the contingent relation between a feeling and an object. (Though it is surely contingent that I am angry at John for stealing my car.) An emotion cannot be identified apart from its object; "I am angry" is incomplete—not only in the weak sense that there is more information which may be available ("Are you angry about something?") but "I am angry" requires that there *must* be more information available ("What are you angry about?") But feelings have no such requirements. Anger is not a feeling; neither is anger a feeling plus anything else (e.g., what it is "about").

Neither can "what I am angry about" be separated from my being angry. Of course, it makes sense to say that John's having stolen my car is something different from my being angry at him for doing so. But it is not simply the *fact* that

and that we continuously choose our emotions. There is no need to separate these arguments.

²I take this to be definitive of the difference between "emotion" and "feeling" as I am using those terms here. Emotions are intentional; feelings are not. I do not deny that the everyday use of "feeling" is broader than this and includes both of these concepts. I find this ambiguity less objectionable than others surrounding "sensation" and like terms.

John stole my car that is what I am angry about; nor is it, as I said above, my *belief* that John stole my car about which I am angry. I am angry about the intentional object "that John stole my car." Unlike the *fact* that John stole my car, this intentional object is opaque; I am not angry that John stole a vehicle assembled in Youngstown, Ohio, with 287 h.p., though that is a true description of the fact that John stole my car. I am not angry that someone 5'7" tall got his fingerprints on my steering column, yet that is a true description of the fact that John stole my car. Sartre attempts to point out this feature of what emotions are "about" by saying that their object is "transformed"; D. F. Pears points to the same feature by noting that it is always an "aspect" of the object that is the object of an emotion. What emotions are "about," as in beliefs, can only be identified under certain descriptions, and those descriptions are determined by the emotion itself. This does not mean that what emotions are about are beliefs—only that emotions share an important conceptual property of beliefs. "Being angry about . . ." is very much like "believing that. . ." To be angry is to be angry "about" a peculiar sort of object, one that is distinguished by the fact that it is what I am angry "about." Husserl describes this peculiarity of mental acts in general by insisting that an intentional act and an intentional object are "*essentially* correlated." For our purposes, the point to be seen is that emotions cannot be discussed in terms of "components," by distinguishing feeling angry and what I am angry about. (Pears, e.g., begins by making this distinction.) In Heideggerian phrase, I am never simply angry, but there is always "my-being-angry-about. . ."

If there is no legitimate distinction between feeling angry and what I am angry "about," or, to put it in a different way, if the connection between my being angry and what I am angry "about" is a conceptual and not causal connection, then it is easy to explain a feature of emotions that has been pointed out by many analysts. A change in what I am angry "about" demands a change in my anger; if I no longer feel wronged by John, who only bought a car that looks like mine, I cannot be angry at John (for stealing my car) any longer. One cannot be angry if he is not angry "about" having been wronged. Similarly, one cannot be ashamed if he does not accept some responsibility for an awkward situation, nor can he be embarrassed if he does not find the situation awkward. If emotions were feelings, it would be a peculiar coincidence that the feelings were so faithful to our views of our situation, that they did not hold onto us with a momentum of their own after opinions had passed, that they were not so "irrational" as to pay no attention to our opinions at all. But emotions are not feelings, nor feelings plus what they are "about"; the format of an emotion is "...-about-..." And so it is no surprise that emotions change with our opinions, and so are "rational" in a very important sense.

Emotions typically involve feelings. Perhaps they essentially involve feelings. But feelings are never sufficient to differentiate and identify emotions, and an emotion is never simply a feeling, not even a feeling plus anything. Moreover, it is clear that one can have an emotion without feeling anything. One can be angry without feeling angry: one can be angry for three days or five years and not feel anything identifiable as a feeling of anger continuously through that prolonged period. One might add that one must have a disposition to feel angry, and to this, there is no objection, so long as being angry is not thought to

mean "having a disposition to feel angry." I do not know whether it makes sense to suppose that one can be angry without ever feeling angry. But I do know that it does not even make sense to say that one feels angry if one is not angry. This might seem mysterious, if we accept the traditional view that anger has an identifiable feeling attached to it (for then why could one not have the feeling without whatever else is involved in anger?). And this might seem obvious on the traditional view that anger *is* a feeling (for then being angry is nothing but having the feeling of anger). But on our account, anger is not a feeling, nor does it involve any identifiable feeling (which is not to deny that one does feel angry—that is, flushed, excited, etc., when he is angry). One can identify his feeling as feeling angry only if he is angry. It is true that I often feel something when I become angry. It is also true that I feel something after I cease to be angry. I am angry at John for stealing my car. Then I discover that John did not steal my car: I cease (immediately) to be angry. Yet the feeling remains: it is the same feeling I had while I was angry (flushing, etc.). The feeling subsides more slowly than the anger. But the feeling, even if it is the same feeling that I had while I was angry, is not a feeling of anger. Now it is just a feeling. Sometimes one claims to feel angry but not be angry. But here, I would argue that the correct description is rather that one does not know exactly what one is angry "about" (though one is surely angry "about" something); or perhaps one is angry but does not believe he ought to be. One cannot feel angry without being angry.

A familiar move in the analysis of emotions subsequent to the discovery that emotions are not feelings or occurrences is the thesis that emotions are conceptually tied to behavior; that is, the ascription of an emotion to a person is the ascription to him of various sorts of behavior. Thus, to be angry is necessarily to "anger-behave." Of course, it is evident that one can *pretend* to be angry, that is, anger-behave without being angry, and so pretending has become a major topic in the analysis of emotions. (More on this in Section II.) What is generally agreed is that a single piece of behavior is never conceptually sufficient to identify an emotion, or to distinguish emotions from pretense. E. Bedford, for example, suggests that what is always needed is at least "more of the same." Since Ryle's *Concept of Mind*, this "more of the same" is provided by the suggestion that ascribing an emotion to a person is not to simply describe one or more episodes of behavior but rather to ascribe to him a disposition to behave. But there is considerable confusion about the nature of such disposition-ascriptions, and the suggestion is clearly unsatisfactory as an analysis of *my* having an emotion. The behavioral analysis does maintain one important feature of emotions, their intentionality, though authors (e.g., Ryle, Armstrong) who favor this analysis are often intent to reject "intentionality" as well. But for our purposes, we can remain uninvolved in these issues that have become virtually definitive of "philosophy of mind." We can agree that it is undeniably true that if a person is angry he has a disposition to anger-behave and leave it entirely open whether this connection between emotions and behavior is conceptual, or causal, or something else. The purpose of this essay is to show that emotions are very much like actions, and if it should turn out that emotions are actions in any such straightforward sense, this can only make our task easier. And so, we can simply say of the behavioral analysis: insofar as it is true, it supports our thesis.

"Emotions are caused." The idea that emotions are occurrences naturally gave rise to the idea that emotions are caused. Many philosophers would argue that, if emotions are occurrences, then they must be caused, and conversely, that if emotions are caused they must be occurrences. But if, as I am arguing, emotions are not occurrences, then they cannot be caused.

But surely this is wrong. We do speak of the cause of anger, the cause for sadness, a cause for fear. And surely emotions, as intentional, are typically if not necessarily *reactions* to something that happens to us. Sometimes this cause is manifest in what the emotion is "about"; for example, I am angry about your hitting me; your hitting me is the event which caused me to become angry. But sometimes the cause for an emotion is *not* what the emotion is "about." The cause of my anger might be too little sleep and too much coffee. The cause of my love might be sexual deprivation. But I am not angry "about" lack of sleep and hyperstimulation, and I am not in love with my sexual deprivation (nor is my love "about" a cure for my sexual deprivation).

The cause of an emotion is a function in a certain kind of explanation. The cause must in every case be distinguished from what my emotion is "about" (its "object"). The cause is always an actual event (or state-of-affairs, etc.). The object of my emotion is always an intentional object. The cause is subject to certain law-like generalizations in a way that objects of emotions are not. If I claim to be angry because of a harsh review of my book, pointing out that I have not become angry at previous harsh reviews of my book is sufficient to show that the cause of my becoming angry is not (my reading of) the review of my book, but it is not sufficient to show that I am not angry "about" the harsh review. I am not in any special position to know the cause of my emotion (though only I know, as a matter of fact, that I did not sleep last night, that I had had four cups of coffee); I am always in a privileged position to identify the intentional object of my emotion. This is *not* to say that my knowledge of the object of my emotion is "immediate" or "direct," nor is it to claim that my identification of the object of my emotion is "incorrigible." It is possible and not unusual that I should misidentify—sometimes in a gross way—what I am angry about, or whom I love, or why I am sad. I may identify the object of my anger as John's having stolen my car, but I am really angry at John for writing a harsh review of my book. I may think that I love Mary, when I really love my mother. And I may think that I love Mary when I am really angry about the harsh review of my book. The problem of "unconscious emotions" would take us far beyond our current argument. For now, it should suffice for us to insist that the difference between identification of the cause of an emotion and its object is not a difference between direct and indirect knowledge—as traditionally conceived—or a difference between corrigible and incorrigible identification. The cause of an emotion is an occurrence (state-of-affairs, etc.) of a type that stands in a lawlike connection with emotions of that type. The object of an emotion is simply "what the emotion is about," whether or not it is also the cause, whether or not it is even the case, and whether or not the subject himself knows it to be the object of his emotion.³

³There is nothing in our analysis which is not compatible with an all-embracing causal theory. We might agree with writers like A. I. Goldman, who argues that intentional char-

We have noted that emotions are interestingly similar to beliefs. We can now explain this similarity by claiming that emotions are judgments—normative and often moral judgments. “I am angry at John for taking (“stealing” begs the question) my car” entails that I believe that John has somehow wronged me. (This must be true even if, *all things considered*, I also believe that John was justified in taking my car.) The (moral) judgment entailed by my anger is not a judgment *about* my anger (although someone else might make such judgments to the effect that my anger is justified or unjustified, rational, prudent, foolish, self-indulgent, therapeutic, beneficial, unfortunate, pathological, or amusing). My anger *is* that judgment. If I do not believe that I have somehow been wronged, I cannot be angry (though I might be upset, or sad). Similarly, if I cannot praise my lover, I cannot be in love (though I might want her or need her, which, traditional wisdom aside, is entirely different). If I do not find my situation awkward, I cannot be ashamed or embarrassed. If I do not judge that I have suffered a loss, I cannot be sad or jealous. I am not sure whether all emotions entail such judgments; moods (depression and euphoria) surely present special problems. But emotions in general do appear to require this feature: to have an emotion is to hold a normative judgment about one’s situation.

The idea that an emotion is a normative judgment, perhaps even a moral judgment, wreaks havoc with several long cherished philosophical theses. Against those romantics and contemporary bourgeois therapists who would argue that emotions simply *are* and must be accepted without judgment, it appears that emotions themselves are already judgments. And against several generations of moral philosophers who would distinguish between morality based upon principle and morality based upon emotion or “sentiment,” it appears that every “sentiment,” every emotion is already a matter of judgment, often moral judgment. An ethics of sentiment differs from ethics of principle only in the fact that its judgments are allowed to go unchallenged: it is an ethics of prejudice while the latter is typically an ethics of dogma.

We can now see why “what an emotion is about” is not simply a fact; nor is it even a fact under certain descriptions. The object of an emotion is itself “affective” or normative. It is not an object *about* which one makes a judgment but is rather defined, in part, by the normative judgment. The peculiar emotional object, *that John stole my car*, can only be fully characterized as the object of my anger. “That John stole my car” is also the name of the object of my belief, of course, and perhaps of any number of other propositional attitudes I hold. But the object of my anger, *that John stole my car*, is an inseparable piece of my being angry. This sounds strange, no doubt, if the intentional object of the emotion is thought to be a fact or a proposition. But my anger-at-John-for-stealing-my-car is inseparable from my judgment that John in so doing wronged me, while it is

acterizations of actions (in terms of “reasons”) also function in causal explanations of a Hempelian variety. I do not wish to argue a similar thesis regarding emotions here, but I want to be careful not to preclude any such theory. Similarly, nothing I have said here bears on the so-called “free will problem”; I want to show that emotions should be viewed in the same categories as actions, whether or not there are further arguments that might lead us to conclude that not even actions are chosen freely.

clear that the *fact* that John stole my car is very different from my anger or my judgment. My anger *is* my judgment that John has wronged me.

It has always been recognized that there is some difference between our ascriptions of emotions to ourselves and our ascriptions of emotions to others. I know that I am angry and what I am angry about very differently than I know that John is angry and what he is angry about. (This first person privilege remains the presupposition of, and is not undermined by, either the Freudian concept of "unconscious emotions" or by recent philosophical attacks on "in corrigibility.") On the traditional view in which emotions are feelings, this difference has been explained by appeal to the peculiar "privacy" of sensationlike occurrences. But emotions are not feelings and not occurrences, we have argued, but rather judgments. Yet the difference between first- and other-person cases can still be made out, and in a far more convincing way than on the feeling-analysis of emotions. *You* can say of me, "he is angry because he thinks John stole his car, which he did not." *You* can say of me, "he is angry about the review, which actually was favorable, but only because of his lack of sleep and his having drunk too much coffee." *You* can say of me, "he doesn't really love Mary, but rather a mother-surrogate." But *I* cannot say these things of *myself*. "I am angry at John because I think that he stole my car, which he didn't" is nonsense. If emotions are judgments, then the sorts of "pragmatic" paradoxes that have long been celebrated regarding judgments in general will apply to emotions also. "I am angry about x, but not x" raises the same problems as "P, but I do not believe P." No feeling-account of emotions can account for such paradoxes. But, if emotions are intentional, emotions must partake in conceptual relationships in a way that mere occurrences, feelings, or facts do not. If I am angry about John's stealing my car, there are certain beliefs which I logically cannot hold, for example, the belief that John did not steal my car.

The difference between first- and other-person ascriptions of emotions lies in the realm of the "pragmatic paradoxes." Given that I have certain emotion, there are certain beliefs which you can have (including beliefs about me) but which *I* cannot have. The most interesting set of beliefs in this regard are those which pertain to the *cause* of an emotion. Earlier, we argued that the cause of an emotion is a fact (state of affairs, etc.) which can be variously ("transparently") described and occupies a role in lawlike generalizations. The *object* of an emotion, however, is limited by certain judgments (is "opaque") which are determined in the subject's having that emotion. But this distinction, we can now add, breaks down in the first-person case. If I am angry *about* John's stealing my car (the object of my anger), then I cannot believe that the sufficient *cause* of my anger is anything other than John's stealing my car. *You* can attribute my unjust anger to my lack of sleep. *I* cannot. If I attribute my anger to lack of sleep, I cannot be angry at all. And this is not simply to say that my anger is "not reasonable." (I cannot say that of myself either, except perhaps in extremely peculiar circumstances, for example, following extensive psychoanalytic treatment, which here, as elsewhere, confuses all distinctions as well as the patient regarding first- vs. other-person ascriptions of emotions, motives, intentions, etc.) I can only be angry so long as I believe that what has caused me to be angry is what

I am angry about. Where the cause is different from what I am angry about, I cannot know that it is.

One can argue that the person who is angry (or in love, or sad) is in the worst position to pick out the cause for his anger (or love or sadness) *as opposed to its object*.⁴ We can only add that this thesis marks out a conceptual necessity. We earlier pointed out the familiar phenomenon that our emotions change with our opinions and argued that this was not a causal matter and not a coincidence, but a consequence of the thesis that emotions are themselves judgments. We can now add that our emotions change with our knowledge of the causes of those emotions. If I can discover the sufficient cause of my anger, in those cases in which the cause and the object are different (and in which the newly discovered cause is not itself a new object for anger, as often happens), I can undermine and abandon my anger. It is here that Freud's often debated notion that emotions are "defused" by bringing them to consciousness contains an important conceptual truth too often and too easily dismissed by philosophers. Once one becomes aware of the cause of his emotions as opposed to its intended object, he can indeed "defuse" his emotion. And in those familiar Freudian cases in which one mistakenly identifies the object of his emotion (he thinks he is angry at his teacher: he is "really" angry at his father), correcting this identification can, in those cases where the correctly identified object is also the cause of the emotion, also "defuse" it. Where Freud opened himself to unnecessary criticism, I believe, was in his construing this as a *causal* relationship, a "catharsis" of repressed emotional air bubbles in the mental digestive system. But it is not as if my recognition of the true cause of my anger *causes* the easing of my emotion. Rather, my recognition of the true cause of my emotion amounts to a denial of the judgment which is my lack of sleep and overdose of coffee, I thereby abandon my anger. Of course, the flushing, pulsing, irritable *feelings* of anger may thus be *caused* to diminish by the disappearance of my anger, but these are, as we have argued, in no case my anger.

If emotions are judgments and can be "defused" (and also instigated) by considerations of other judgments, it is clear how our emotions are in a sense *our doing*, and how we are responsible for them. Normative judgments can themselves be criticized, argued against, and refuted. Now if *you* criticize my anger at John by maintaining that he has not wronged me, you may conclude that my

⁴Freud has a curious way of defending this thesis, which is surely central to much of his theory. Because he attempted to maintain a thesis of the intentionality of the "affects" within a strictly causal model, he obscured the distinction between object and cause. Without crucifying Freud on this point, as Peters, MacIntyre, and others have attempted to do, it is important to see that Freud typically confuses first person and third person accounts, and the concept of the "unconscious" as an "assumption" (e.g., see the essay "The Unconscious," *Collected Papers*, Vol. VI) often depends upon the failure of the subject to be capable of applying third person ascriptions—notably, ascriptions of the cause as opposed to the object of an emotion—to himself. Without in the least detracting from Freud's overall conception of the unconscious, we must insist that the subject is never logically privileged with respect to the causes of his emotions, but that he does have some such authority (without infallible authority) with respect to what he is "affected about."

anger is unreasonable, unfair, and perhaps unbecoming. But if you should convince *me* that John has not wronged me, I do not simply conclude that my anger is unreasonable, unfair, or unbecoming, I *cease to be angry*. Similarly, I can make myself angry at John by allowing myself to be convinced that he has wronged me. I can dwell on minor behavioral misdemeanors on John's part, building them into a pattern of overall deceit and abuse, and then become angry at any one or any number of these incidents.

Since normative judgments can be changed through influence, argument, and evidence, and since I can go about on my own seeking influence, provoking argument, and looking for evidence, I am as responsible for my emotions as I am for the judgments I make. My emotions *are* judgments I make. Now one might argue that all we have shown is that one can take steps to *cause* changes in his emotions, such as one can take steps to diminish a pain by pulling out a splinter or take steps to prevent being hit by a bus by crossing only on the proper signals. And it is true, of course, that one cannot *simply* choose to be angry or not to be angry, but can make himself angry or cease being angry only by performing other activities. But this is true of judgments in general: I cannot simply choose to judge a situation fortunate, awkward, or dangerous.⁵ It is worth noting that I cannot *simply* perform most actions either: I cannot simply assassinate a dictator. I must do something else (pull the trigger of a rifle, let slip the string of the bow, push the button activating the detonator). Yet, although it is also true that I cause the death of the dictator (I do not cause the killing of him), I kill the dictator. Similarly, making judgments is something I *do*, not something that happens to me and not something I simply cause, even though I cannot *simply* make a judgment in many cases. (Legal judgments by an appropriately empowered judge or judiciary should *not* be taken as paradigm cases here.)

I must be in appropriate circumstances to pass judgment, have some evidence, know something of what the judgment is about. Of course, one can make judgments rashly, with minimal evidence and with superficial knowledge of what the judgment is about. Emotions, we can now see, are rash judgments, something I do, but in haste. Accordingly, the evidence upon which I become emotional is typically (but not necessarily) incomplete, and my knowledge of what I am emotional about is often (but again not necessarily) superficial. I can take any number of positive steps to change what I believe and what judgments I hold and tend to make. By forcing myself to be scrupulous in the search for evidence and knowledge of circumstances, and by training myself in self-understanding regarding my prejudices and influences, and by placing myself in appropriate circumstances, I can determine the kinds of judgments I will tend to make. I can do the same for my emotions.

II

Against the near-platitude "emotions are irrational," we want to argue that emotions are rational. This is not only to say that they fit into one's overall behavior in a significant way, that they follow a regular pattern (one's "person-

⁵Though perhaps I can simply *express* such a judgment.

ality"), that they can be explained in terms of a coherent set of causes. No doubt this is all true. But emotions, we have argued, are judgments, and so emotions can be rational in the same sense in which judgments can be rational. (Of course, judgments can be irrational, but only within the context of a rational activity.) Judgments are actions. Like all actions, they are aimed at changing the world. But, although the expression of a judgment may actually produce such a change, the judgment itself is more like the winding of the mainspring of an intention to change the world rather than the overt activity which will do so. But if emotions are judgments, and judgments are actions, though covert, emotions too are actions, aimed at changing the world (whether or not their expression actually does succeed in changing the world). In other words, emotions are purposive, serve the ends of the subject, and consequently can be explained by *reasons* or "in-order-to" explanations.

Because emotions are usually thought to be occurrences that we suffer, the idea that emotions are purposive actions has not been given sufficient attention. But consider the following very familiar sort of case:

Joanie wants to go to a party: her husband does not. She begins to act bored and frustrated; he watches television. She resigns herself to reading, sighing occasionally. He asks if she has picked up some shirts from the laundry: she says "no." He flies into a rage. He needs shirts (he has hundreds). He needs one of *those* (they are all the same). She is negligent (she was busy). She takes advantage of him (she stays with him). Naturally, she rebels, but she is upset, with mixed guilt and anger. She thinks him unreasonable, impossible, and slightly neurotic. Their encounter is short-lived. She goes off to read; he settles back before the television. The party is out of the question.

What are we to say of this familiar sort of case? It appears to be given that the husband's anger is inappropriate to the incident. His being angry about his wife's failure to pick up his shirts seems unreasonable; and the *intensity* of his anger is most surely unwarranted. To this, the standard response, since well before Freud, has been to suppose that the husband is really angry about something else; perhaps he is redirecting anger from his day at his office—anger which could not be expressed as safely toward his superiors as it could to his wife. Or perhaps the anger is accumulated anger from weeks or months of minor marital frictions. Or perhaps, it might be suggested, the anger is caused by the fact that the husband is tired.

But, in this case—and many other cases—there is an alternative sort of explanation that is available and persuasive. The anger can be explained, not in terms of what it is "about" or what causes it, but in terms of its *purpose*. The husband, in this case, has *used* his anger to manipulate his wife. He has become angry "about" the shirts *in order to* get his wife's mind off the party and in order to stop her irritating reminders. His anger is not a disruption of his activities (watching television, refusing to go to the party) but a part of it, its winning strategy. The best explanation of his anger is not that it was caused by anything (although that is not precluded) and not that it was "about" anything in particular (although that is surely true), but that he got angry at his wife *in order to* continue watching television and in order to ensure that his refusal to go to the party would be successful.

But if emotions are rational and purposive, why is it that emotions are so often counterproductive and embarrassing to us, detours away from our aspirations and obstacles blocking our ambitions? Why do emotions so often appear as disruptions in our lives, threats to our successes, aberrations in our rational behavior? We can outline three distinct accounts of the apparent "irrationality" of emotions.

First, it is the situation in which one becomes emotional that is disruptive, a detour, an obstacle, a threat, and not the emotional response. Emotions are urgent judgments; emotional responses are emergency behavior. An emotional response occurs in a situation in which usual intentions are perverted or frustrated; an unusual response is necessary. The normative judgments involved in having an emotion are inseparable from the overall network of our motives, beliefs, and intentions. The fact that emotions typically lead to apparently "pointless" behavior is not a consequence of emotions being irrational, but rather a natural consequence of the fact that emotions are responses to unusual situations in which usual behavior patterns seem inappropriate. The intentions of an emotional reaction are not infrequently impossible. The angry or sad man may wish to undo the past; the lover may want to possess, and be possessed by, his loved one. This is why Sartre calls the emotions "magical transformations of the world." One can always reduce the range of his emotional behavior by developing stereotyped responses, by avoiding all unusual situations, or by treating every situation as "usual." These are common but perhaps pathological ways of choosing our emotions. But such common "control" is not the avoidance or the suppression of a wild psychic beast; it is simply the avoidance of situations (or recognition of situations) where one's behavior patterns will not suffice. Emotions are rational responses to unusual situations. They differ from "cool" judgments and normal rational deliberate action in that they are prompted in urgency and in contexts in which one's usual repertoire of actions and considered judgments will not suffice. An emotion is a necessarily hasty judgment in response to a difficult situation.

It must be added that the "hastiness" of a judgment does not entail that it is made quickly. For example, one can make a hasty judgment after weeks of half-hearted deliberation. Similarly, although emotions are typically urgent and immediate responses, one can become increasingly angry over a period of time, or one finds that an emotion that is formed in urgency is then maintained in full force for weeks or even years. But what distinguishes emotions from ordinary judgments is their lack of "cool," their seeming urgency, even after weeks of simmering and stewing. There are no cold emotions, no cool anger, no deliberate love. Emotions are always urgent, even desperate, responses to situations in which one finds oneself unprepared, helpless, frustrated, impotent, "caught." It is the situation, not the emotion, which is disruptive and "irrational."

Second, and consequently, emotions are short-term responses. Emotions are rational in that they fit into a person's overall purposive behavior. But this is not to say that a person's various purposes are always consistent or coherent. Short-term purposes are often in conflict with rather than a means toward the fulfillment of long-term purposes. My desire to drink at the reception may tend toward disaster regarding my meeting of the celebrity who is my reason for

going to the reception. My desire to visit Peking may undermine my ambition to become an FBI agent. Similarly, emotions often serve short-term purposes that are in conflict with longer-term purposes. I may be angry with John because I feel I have been wronged, but this may be inconsistent with my desire to keep a close, unblemished friendship with John. I may love Mary, but this might be totally inconsistent with my intention to preserve my marriage, to remain celibate, or to concentrate on my writing. Thus, the husband in our example might succeed in staying home from the party by becoming angry, but break up his marriage in so doing. It is in this sense that emotions are "blind"; more accurately, they are *myopic*. Emotions serve purposes and are rational; but because the purposes emotions serve are often short-sighted, they appear to be nonpurposive and irrational on a larger view. For the sake of a passion, we destroy careers, marriages, lives. Emotions are not irrational; people are irrational.



CHESHIRE CALHOUN

Introduction

Cheshire Calhoun has written extensively on "moral sentiment" theories of emotion and their impact in ethics. She teaches philosophy at Colby College in Maine. In this essay, written originally for this volume, she reconsiders the "cognitive" theory of emotion and raises a number of serious objections to it.

Cognitive Emotions?

Tess and Carl have been married two years. Tess works to support them, since Carl is in graduate school. Tess' parents (who never liked Carl) constantly warn her that Carl may just be using her to get through school, but Tess denies this. Recently, though, Tess has found herself feeling resentful. She now notices how often she gets stuck with doing the housework, shopping for groceries, and feeding the dog. Carl finds time to read novels and visit friends; Tess doesn't. She notices the luxuries she denies herself so that she can pay for their joint entertainment. She also notices how Carl spends his rare monetary windfalls on himself. Tess feels helpless and trapped in her marriage even though she still denies that Carl is using her.

Beliefs dominate this tale of resentment. Doubts raised by her parents may have sparked Tess' resentment. Once sparked, her resentment unfolds in beliefs about unfair burdens she has to shoulder in her marriage which seem to add up to the unhappy belief about Carl that Tess denies.

Although main characters in stories of emotion, do beliefs actually constitute emotions? Are Tess' thoughts about Carl at least part of her resentment? Most cognitive theorists say, Yes. They usually arrive at this answer after rejecting what they see as the only possible alternative—a causal theory that beliefs cause emotions and emotions, in turn, cause other beliefs. (Carl's excusing himself from housework makes Tess resentful. Her resentment, in turn, causes her to remember other occasions when Carl got out of his fair share of drudgery.) But if beliefs are only causes and effects of emotion, what, asks the cognitivist, is the emotion? A *feeling*? Not all emotions, particularly not dispositional ones, have a "feel." Even when emotional episodes involve "feels," identifying the emotion and marking it off from its emotional cousins seem to require our knowing something about the person's beliefs. Anger and resentment or jeal-

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ousy and envy differ little, if a whit, in their "feel." Their cognitive consorts set them apart. That we appeal to beliefs in identifying emotions suggests that emotion is not merely contingently, causally connected to belief. (For emotions to be so connected, we would have to be able to identify the belief and the emotion independently.)¹

Suppose we agree. Strictly causal accounts of belief and emotion will not do. Even so, other worries may beset the cognitivist's making beliefs constitutive of emotion. We may simply be leaping from the frying pan of causality into the fire of cognitive emotion.

The cognitivist is prey to the incredulous query "What! Emotions are *beliefs*? Isn't that a contradiction in terms?" This is, as I shall presently argue, a perfectly defensible skepticism. Unfortunately, most cognitive theories are explicated in such a way that they fail to elicit this response (when they should). To see the conceptual obstacles to "cognitive emotion" and how they become masked, we might compare two basic sorts of cognitive theory, which I will call "patchwork" and "unity" accounts.

In both accounts, emotions, though most importantly beliefs, are also many other things—patterns of behavior, the "feel" of physiological changes, desires, etc. Patchwork accounts group essentially nonemotional phenomena (nonemotional because they may also occur outside emotion) and treat emotion as a collage of beliefs and other psychological, behavioral, and physiological phenomena. Such patchwork accounts are either logico-linguistic or ontological. For the logico-linguistic philosopher, when we say that emotions are in part beliefs (or behaviors or desires), we elliptically point out that ascriptions of emotions entail ascriptions of certain sorts of beliefs (or behaviors or desires).² The claim "*P* feels *E*," if true, logically entails that *P* holds a belief of sort *B*. Ontologists, not confining themselves to emotion language's logic, boldly assert that beliefs (or behaviors or desires) are ingredients of emotion.³

Significantly, patchwork accounts deny that emotional beliefs *qua* beliefs differ in nature from nonemotional beliefs. Emotional beliefs are just garden-variety beliefs (although they may have typical contents, e.g., a reference to values). My belief that Mr. Dehaney is a boor is, in all respects, exactly the same whether it forms part of my disgust with Mr. Dehaney or whether it is a cool, disinterested judgment. If anything, features *external* to the belief itself distinguish emotional from nonemotional beliefs. (When I am disgusted, my belief

¹Even if emotions are beliefs, causal stories may have their place and use. Not all the constituents of emotion (beliefs, behavior, "feels," desires, and so on) are contemporaneous. Causal tales help us trace the different stages of emotion; and one might speak quite properly, for example, of certain beliefs causing emotional behaviors or physiological disturbances. But her causal stories are not employed to elucidate the causes and effects of an emotion, but rather to explain the relations between the constituent stages of emotion.

²Representative logico-linguistic philosophers of emotion are Anthony Kenny (*Action, Emotion and Will*), Errol Bedford ("Emotion"), George Pitcher ("Emotion"), and Gilbert Ryle (*The Concept of Mind*).

³Ontological versions are advocated, for example, by Frithjof Bergmann ("A Monologue on the Emotions") and Robert Solomon (*The Passions*).

occurs *in the context* of behavioral dispositions, desires, "feels"—a context lacking in nonemotional beliefs.)

Not so in a unity account, which does not reconstruct emotion out of non-emotional phenomena and does not use "emotion" simply as an umbrella term for unique concatenations of these phenomena. If behavior, the "feel" of physiological changes, and most importantly, beliefs constitute emotion, they do so only by taking on uniquely emotional qualities. Sartre, for example, claims that "purely physiological phenomena represent the *seriousness* of the emotion; they are phenomena of belief."⁴ In a similar vein, Dewey argues that only in abstraction can we separate emotional belief from behavioral and physiological phenomena; in reality, behavioral and physiological phenomena actually *make up* emotional belief.⁵ Obviously, "belief" has undergone an extensive transformation. How can a physiological disturbance *be* a belief? Are not these, logically and ontologically, distinct categories?

In engendering such skeptical queries, unity accounts show us what is misleading about patchwork accounts and also what is paradoxical about all cognitive theories. "Emotions are beliefs" does, or at least should, strike as discordant a note as "Physiological disturbances are beliefs." A cognitive emotion is a paradox because the conceptual terrain where "belief" finds its home differs vastly from that of "emotion." On a conceptual map, "belief" lies near "responsibility" (we are culpable for our beliefs and, hence, there could plausibly be an ethics of belief), "activity" (belief is something we do not suffer), "rationality" (even if some beliefs are irrational, the activities of acquiring and holding beliefs occur within our rational, intellectual life), and "judgment" (beliefs have their native home in fully conceptualized and articulated judgments). "Emotion," on the other hand, has a different set of conceptual consorts. Although often tied to (causal or constitutive) cognitions, emotion nevertheless is paradigmatically passive (it happens to us), involuntary (we are not culpable), and a- or irrational (it is part of our animal-physical nature and often interferes in our rational-intellectual life).⁶ This conceptual gulf between "emotion" and "belief" bodes ill for patchwork cognitive theories, which do not reevaluate the nature of emotional belief. Logico-linguistic versions, particularly, fall prey to the

⁴Jean-Paul Sartre, *The Emotions: Outline of a Theory*. New York: Philosophical Library, 1948, p. 74.

⁵John Dewey, "The Theory of Emotion." In *John Dewey: The Early Works*, Vol. 2, Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois University Press, 1967.

⁶One might, of course, deny that "emotion" and "belief" are as disparate concepts as they traditionally have been made out to be. E. M. Curley ("Descartes, Spinoza and the Ethics of Belief"), for instance, has critically attacked the notion that beliefs are voluntary acts for which we are always culpable. He suggests instead that "coming to believe is something much more like falling in love than like raising one's arm" (but note Curley's presumption of involuntarily suffered emotions). On the other side of the fence, Robert Solomon has defended the voluntariness of emotional experience and our responsibility for our emotions on the ground that emotions are beliefs (and, of course, beliefs are voluntary acts). But the fact that both Curley and Solomon feel compelled to challenge standard accounts by *likening* belief to emotion or emotion to belief only underscores the conceptual gulf between the two.

charge of sidestepping legitimate questions about the intelligibility of the cognitivist thesis, and the demands for a remapping of "belief" and "emotion" so that they do not, as it were, occupy different conceptual countries. (This because entailment language is not as strong as ontological language. As long as we focus on the logical relation between emotion and belief ascriptions, we never directly confront the dissonance between "emotion" and "belief," as we do when the talk shifts to emotions' *being* beliefs.)

Even supposing the cognitivist could bridge the conceptual gulf between "emotion" and "belief," she still is not out of the woods. The cognitivist banks on convincing us that fear always goes hand in hand with acknowledged beliefs about danger, resentment with acknowledged beliefs about unfair treatment, and so on. Although this may be true in most of our emotional experience, it is *not always* true. Sometimes emotion is in conflict with our avowed beliefs. (That is, given our emotions we ought to believe something other than we do.) Tess, for instance, claims that Carl does not exploit her, yet she is resentful. Tess' emotions conflict with her avowed beliefs in other areas too:

Tess has a spider phobia. Spiders make her skin crawl and she jerks out of their way, pleading for someone else to kill them. Yet Tess believes spiders are harmless and knows enough spider biology to back up this belief.

Raised in a conservative household, Tess acquired, among other beliefs, the belief that homosexuality is unnatural and immoral. But in college, both friends and professors challenged this. After extensive discussion and reflection, Tess came to believe that homosexuality is neither unnatural nor immoral. But several years later, she suddenly discovered that a good friend is a lesbian and she experienced feelings of shock and revulsion.

Sometimes such emotion-belief conflicts only *appear* to be conflicts. As it turns out, the person's avowed beliefs are mere pretenses or products of self-deception; the emotion actually fits the *real*, unavowed beliefs. Were all emotion-belief conflicts like this, the cognitivist would have no problem. But Tess does not fit this model. The evidence favors her *really* believing what she claims to believe. Why? First, she claims them as her beliefs. And although ultimately we may discredit a person's belief-avowals, we nevertheless give *prima facie* credence to them. (People are innocent of self-deception or pretense until proven guilty.) Second, Tess can justify her beliefs. If she is minimally rational, she ought to and will believe claims for which she can adduce adequate supporting evidence and against which she is unable to provide adequate evidence. Finally, let us suppose she consistently upholds her avowed beliefs over time. Her beliefs here are not mere transients in her doxic life, but fixed tenants. In short, lacking additional strong evidence to the contrary, we cannot justifiably discredit as mere pretense or self-deception Tess' self-consciously held, reasoned convictions.⁷

So unless she purchases the cognitivist position at the price of making it, *a priori*, unchallengeable, the cognitivist must seriously entertain the apparent possibility of there being emotions that do not entail having the emotion-relevant

⁷Her having a strong psychological motive for holding beliefs other than the ones she avows might, for instance, lead us to doubt her belief-avowals.

beliefs. In doing so, she has two options. She might concede the existence of some noncognitive emotions. Or she might try to find a nonquestion-begging way of preserving the tie between emotion and belief in cases of emotion-belief conflict.

With the first option, the cognitivist makes a serious concession. Allowing that there are some noncognitive emotions amounts to denying the centrality of belief and to abandoning the initial project of analyzing emotion in general *via* beliefs, in favor of piecemeal accounts of different sorts of emotions for which only some accounts will invoke beliefs. This might not be so bad. Emotions may lack the homogeneity necessary for a theory of emotion *in general*. But beware of this move. After all, beliefs obtained a central place largely because identifying emotions independently of their cognitive consorts presented such overwhelming difficulties.

Although avoiding this drawback, the second option is a difficult project.

Brute Emotions and the Cognitivist

The cognitivist would like to deny brute emotions that lack an intelligible well-spring in belief. Fear minus a belief in danger is not fear.⁸ She might seek refuge from Tess' seemingly brute resentment, fear, and revulsion (which persist in the face of unresentful, fearless, and unrevolted beliefs) in either the "inertia hypothesis" or the "conflicting belief hypothesis."

THE EMOTIONAL INERTIA HYPOTHESIS

Emotional habits persist through doxic vicissitudes. In her early years, Tess unquestioningly adopted her parents' belief in the immorality of homosexuality and found this life-style revolting. The deep roots of belief in Tess' childhood socialization make her acquisition of emotional habits connected with homosexuality unsurprising. But now, her emotional responses have failed to keep pace with her revised beliefs. Thus, although unintelligible, given her present beliefs, Tess' revulsion is perfectly intelligible given her former beliefs.

The cognitivist thus preserves the universal applicability of her thesis—emotions must have emotion-relevant beliefs—by introducing one qualification. The emotion-relevant belief need not be presently held. This salvaging technique, though, has its price. In emotion-belief conflicts, belief and emotion become fairly radically detached from one another. At these points, one's doxic life and one's emotional life part company. Thus, although Tess' present beliefs, about homosexuality occur alongside peculiar (irrational) emotional habits, her beliefs are no worse off for this. Her beliefs would be no better (no sounder) did she feel an appropriate emotion such as indifference or even approval. Intuitively, though, this does not seem right. We use "feeling" and "believing" inter-

⁸The cognitivist turns James's questions upside down. James asked us to imagine what would happen to fear if we subtracted from the belief in danger the physiological underpinnings of fear. We would, he thought, have only a cool intellectual recognition of danger devoid of affective tone. The cognitivist asks what would happen to fear if we subtracted from its noncognitive underpinnings the belief of danger. We would have only physiological disturbance devoid of affective tone.

changeably, as though feeling were a way of believing. If Tess really believes in the moral neutrality of homosexuality, she should not only *think* that it is morally neutral, but also *feel* that it is. Her inability to do so signals a defect in her belief; her belief would be better (sounder) if she felt the right emotions. And partly for this reason, she may regret feeling revolted and want to alter her emotions. (I will return to this crucial notion of defective belief.)

More crucially, one might (and the cognitivist would) question why emotion should have more inertia than belief. Surely if Tess' original beliefs were deeply rooted in her early upbringing, her beliefs themselves, not just her emotions, should have a kind of inertia. In fact, the assumption that beliefs change while emotions continue invariably the same depends on their being a conceptual gulf between belief (activity/voluntariness) and emotion (passivity/involuntariness)—a conceptual gulf that makes the cognitivist position all the more difficult.

THE CONFLICTING BELIEF HYPOTHESIS

In avoiding the pitfalls of emotional inertia, the cognitivist might deny that people always live up to our ideal of rationality by holding a unified, consistent belief system. People may hold inconsistent beliefs at different levels. Emotionally, Tess has real qualms about a homosexual life-style; but from a critical, reflective viewpoint, she believes it is acceptable. Neither counts as her only real belief. Thus, an unresolved tension pervades her belief system.

To its credit, this resolution explains why we should take our emotions seriously. Emotions are not merely recalcitrant habits that persist long after their appropriate belief consorts have passed. They are symptoms of a doxic ailment that needs to be remedied. Also to its credit, this resolution requires a complex portrait of doxic life. We may never entirely shed beliefs acquired in early childhood. They simply become overshadowed by ones acquired in mature life, losing their affective force as motives as well as their centrality in our belief matrix.

Positing conflicting beliefs to avoid brute emotions has its own dangers. Tess' seemingly surd emotions are neither atypical nor pathological. They are ordinary emotions in an ordinary emotional life. So what must we suppose about our doxic life?—inconsistent beliefs are ordinary occurrences. Surely we are not *this* irrational, even though we may never attain our proud ideal of complete rationality.

Worse yet, the conflicting belief hypothesis violates the language of belief. Linguistically, we *are* entitled to take Tess' avowed beliefs as her (only) real beliefs. We are *not* entitled to accuse her of pretense, self-deception, or what is equally uncharitable, inconsistent beliefs without evidence. The evidence is lacking. Typically, inconsistent beliefs show up simultaneously in *both* emotions and belief-avowals. We could reasonably charge Tess with inconsistent beliefs if she vacillated between accusing Carl of exploiting her (and feeling resentment towards him) and defending the distribution of burdens as equitable (and not feeling resentment). But Tess vacillates neither in her belief-avowals nor in her emotional responses. Here, her inappropriate emotions constitute the sole evidence for conflicting beliefs. Taking this as sufficient evidence begs the question. Do all emotions entail corresponding appropriate beliefs?

In sum, the emotional inertia and conflicting belief hypothesis lead to dead ends. But these dead ends suggest some tentative conclusions. First, we have to concede to critics of cognitive theories that people *can* experience emotions without holding the emotionrelevant belief. Tess can fear spiders without believing they are dangerous. Second, I am strongly inclined to agree with the cognitivist's intuition that there is something defective about beliefs accompanied by inappropriate emotions. Tess' belief that spiders are harmless would be more acceptable were she unafraid of spiders. (The cognitivist errs when she explains this intuition by discrediting Tess' avowed belief entirely or by postulating conflicting beliefs.) Finally, we seem to need to build *some* cognitive element into emotion (although not a belief) to explain how we distinguish between closely related emotions *and* to explain why beliefs accompanied by inappropriate emotions are defective. In short, cases of emotion-belief conflicts doom cognitive theories that make *belief* a constituent of emotion. They do not, however, doom *any* cognitive theory.

Defective Beliefs

Tess' fear of spiders indicates that something is missing from her belief that spiders are harmless. What? We might take our clue from an analysis of belief and defective belief in general. In the end, I want to suggest that the same belief can be held "intellectually" or "evidentially"; and defective belief occurs when we hold a belief only intellectually under conditions that ordinarily would permit its being held evidentially.

BELIEVING EVIDENTIALLY

Sometimes our beliefs are borne out by our own experience. I hold this belief: Main Street is heavily trafficked. When I survey, from my front porch, the stream of traffic down Main Street, this perceptual awareness bears out my belief. (The content of my belief is immediately experienced.) At such times, I hold my belief evidentially.

Sometimes, though, our beliefs are products of inferences, I tell my friend, who has never seen Main Street, about its heavy traffic. He now shares my belief, but only intellectually, by drawing the simple inference from "She says . . ." to "It is. . . ." Another person may have seen Main Street on a map, noted that it was a major thoroughfare, and concluded that it must carry a lot of traffic. Neither individual believes this on the basis of his or her own experience, but rather on the basis of other beliefs from which the character of Main Street can be inferred. They hold the same belief I do, but intellectually, not evidentially.

Neither way of holding a belief is intrinsically superior. Intellectually held beliefs can be poorly grounded (e.g., believing on another's doubtful authority); so can evidentially held beliefs (e.g., believing on the basis of what is in fact an optical illusion). Both ways can be well grounded. They differ only in this: In evidential believings, the belief's content seems to be given in the believer's experience; experience confirms belief. In intellectual believings, the belief's content could have, but has not, been experienced; other beliefs confirm it. (Of

course, one might believe both evidentially and intellectually by having the appropriate experiences and the inferential reasons.)

The sorts of experience requisite for evidential belief vary with the sort of belief. Empirical beliefs will naturally be held evidentially in perceptual experiences. Beliefs in abstract claims like logical truths will be held evidentially in experiences that might aptly be called insights. Evaluative beliefs are typically brought to evidence in emotion. A student believes evidentially in the validity of *modus ponens* when he stops merely accepting his logic text's word and *sees* that (Aha!) *modus ponens* is valid. A child believes evidentially in the obligatoriness of truth-telling when she stops being merely obedient to parental authority and feels the imperative force of this obligation.

Many beliefs cannot be held evidentially in virtue of their content—beliefs about long-past historical events, about other galaxies, about four-dimensional space, or about what it is like to belong to another culture. These beliefs are not defective. Defect enters in when a belief *could* be held evidentially, but we *fail* to hold it so under just those circumstances when a person ordinarily would. Here, believing merely intellectually *is* a defective way of believing. The hopeless logic student, who cannot for the world see *modus ponens*'s validity, but nevertheless believes intellectually that it is valid, holds a defective belief. So too with the aesthetically insensitive person who fails to delight in artistic excellence, but intellectually holds many aesthetic beliefs (either by adopting the good judge's beliefs or by using mechanical rules for judging excellence). These failures the person himself may regret; and we can criticize him for failing (although without implying willful failure).

Defective beliefs can differ in etiology. The logic student fails simply because he lacks an intellectual ability others have. In some cases, habitual patterns of attention (ways of interpreting the world) actually work *against* evidential belief:

Carl was raised to believe that women belong in the home and are incapable of rivaling men in intellectual achievement. As an adult, he came to reject these beliefs. To his mind, he has good reasons for thinking that men and women are equally capable of intellectual achievement. In spite of this, he finds himself preferring male to female colleagues, more inclined to accept the opinions of male interlocutors, and more critical of woman teachers.

In short, although Carl believes intellectually that men and women are equally capable, he *experiences* women as less capable. He has deep-rooted associations between intellectual ability and a masculine deportment (deep voice, masculine clothes and mannerisms, etc.). These associations work against his holding his beliefs evidentially. Moreover, they are also the source of just those experiences that would enable him to believe evidentially in women's intellectual inferiority.

Because this example directly parallels what I take to be happening in emotion-belief conflicts, let me tarry over its salient features.

1. Not only does Carl *lack* the experience requisite for evidential believing (as our logic student did), but he also *has* experiences that conflict with what he believes intellectually. He resembles a person viewing a mirage; he plainly sees

water on the highway ahead and yet knows intellectually there is none. He must now distinguish appearance from reality, constructing reality intellectually rather than being guided by his experience. But like the sufferer from optical illusion, Carl does not waver in the sincerity or firmness of his convictions. His way of experiencing women does not fool him, just as the mirage does not fool us. He may have to remind himself that men and women are equally capable, just as we may have to remind ourselves that the "water" is only a mirage. But the need to remind ourselves springs from the force of the illusion, not the weakness of the belief.

2. Carl's failure to hold his beliefs evidentially is not, as it was for the logic student, radical and inexplicable. It is due to a **complex cognitive set** (or interpretive scheme) that permeates his experience. The illusion of women's inferiority, *unlike* an optical illusion, has its origin in a set of associations and patterns of attention at a prereflective level, which he *brings* to his experience.

3. This cognitive set (including his association of intellectual ability with masculine deportment) *need not form part of his belief system*. His belief system comprises a set of reflectively held, articulable judgments. His cognitive set, by contrast, is a prereflectively held, originally unarticulated system. He may or may not attain reflective, articulate awareness of this cognitive set. Were he to, he might well deny any belief in masculine deportment as an index of intellectual ability (even though this part of his cognitive set is operative in his experience of women).

In short, our cognitive life is not limited to clear, fully conceptualized, articulated beliefs. Instead, beliefs constitute only a small illuminated portion of that life. The greater portion is rather a dark, cognitive set, an unarticulated framework for interpreting our world, which, if articulated, would be an enormous network of claims not all of which would be accepted by the individual as his beliefs.⁹

4. Cognitive sets may be largely passively acquired. Carl acquired his cognitive set concerning women during his early childhood. Because it depends on many variables, including how intimately connected it is with other parts of his overall cognitive set, Carl may never be able to experience women other than he does now. If not deeply rooted, a cognitive set may change with a change of belief. But if it is deeply rooted, Carl's cognitive set may impede his holding his

⁹Recent work on artificial intelligence seems to confirm this suggestion. In constructing a computer that can use natural language, the complexity of the cognitive structure underlying even the most simple-minded conversation has become increasingly evident. To construe this complex cognitive structure as a *belief* matrix would surely do violence to ordinary conceptions of "belief"; we would then have to impute to persons much vaster belief systems than the ordinary individual would acknowledge having.

This thesis (that dark cognitive sets comprise a large portion of our cognitive life) suggests that striving for the ideal of rationality may be largely a matter of bringing to light and articulating our cognitive set. The unreflective, intellectually inactive person may have just as complex a cognitive set as the reflective, intellectually active individual; but they differ in the number of beliefs they hold, the former holding very few in the sense of "belief" I have been using, the latter sustaining an extensive belief system.

beliefs about women evidentially until he openly rejects his cognitive set from his belief system.

Cognitive Emotions

How does this bear on emotion? Suppose that although beliefs are not constituents of emotion, a certain kind of experience is—a “seeing the world as. . . .” To have an emotion is, in part, for the world to seem to be a certain way. And it seems just *that way* that would enable a person to hold evidentially those beliefs that most cognitive theorists want to tie conceptually with emotions. When Tess regards her lesbian friend with revulsion, her friend looks to Tess like a freak of nature. Through the eyes of her resentment, Carl’s actions are those of the manipulative exploiter. If she believed that homosexuality is unnatural or that Carl exploits her, Tess would find in these experiences the substance for evidential believings. Yet like the mirage-seer, Tess need not believe in her emotional world-view. Just as we deny the mirage by calling on beliefs about conditions for optical illusions, so Tess invokes beliefs she holds about herself and Carl to arm herself against the illusion of resentment. She remembers his unfeignable professions of love and his customary, if not indefatigable sensitivity to her needs.

In each instance, the world presents a face to Tess that, intellectually, she denies. In each, she distinguishes what appears emotionally from what she believes is so. Thus, when emotion and belief are in conflict, something like, although not identical with, a conflict of belief transpires. Had she taken her emotionally seen world at face value, she *would* have believed evidentially something that conflicts with what she in fact believes. But she does not take it at face value. Because of her beliefs, Carl’s seeming to exploit her is deflected before it can burgeon into an inconsistent belief.

Nevertheless, Tess’ beliefs about Carl’s character, about the harmlessness of spiders, and the moral neutrality of homosexuality are defective. She *should not* feel resentment, fear, or revulsion; she should not be caught up in these illusions, but instead she should be able to see the world differently and thus hold her beliefs evidentially. The feared spiders are not like a mirage. We are not at fault for seeing a mirage (nothing about us as individuals precludes our seeing dry road), and we cannot intelligibly rebuke ourselves for seeing water as Tess can rebuke herself for fearing spiders.

Tess’ feared spiders resemble Carl’s inferior women. Carl brings to his encounters with women a cognitive set that tailors women to the size of his interpretive mold. Similarly, Tess’ emotions channel her cognitive life down well-worn streams, sometimes catching it up in whirlpools of obsessive thoughts and images. Emotions are themselves cognitive sets, interpretive frameworks, patterns of attention. A host of cognitive presuppositions constitute Tess’ resentful experience of Carl. She regards herself as a captive in her relationship to him, not free to refuse the demands of that relationship (she *has* to support him, she *has* to do the housework). The salient foci of attention are how benefits and burdens are distributed and, especially, how they are distributed to her disadvantage (*he* has time to read novels, *she* does not). The concepts

of fairness, entitlements, desert, and property make up her interpretive framework (that is *his* laundry, so she *shouldn't* have to do it; she shares her money with him, so she is *entitled* to a share of his). The relationship is an ego-centered (and thus potentially adversary) one between two self-interested parties (he gets what he wants, she does not get what she wants). Her resentful cognitive set rivets her attention on everything that fits its framework and forgetfully winks at all else. ("See! There he goes refusing to do laundry again.") In a fairly literal sense, Tess does not see Carl's generosity and solicitousness toward her needs because they do not fit the exploitive frame. (If seen at all, they are twisted: "He vacuumed. He must want something from me.") She must remind herself intellectually that his actions *are* generous.¹⁰

No part of this resentful cognitive set need emerge in her belief system. Tess need not believe that she is trapped with Carl, nor that a just distribution of benefits and burdens is the cornerstone of a good relationship. Nor need she be reflectively aware of her cognitive set. Emotions provide enormously fertile ground for psychological explorations precisely because their cognitive sets are submersed; and emotional "seeings of the world as . . ." resist alteration largely because we lack a clear view of the cognitive set operative in these "seeings as. . ."

Emotional cognitive sets may be passively acquired. Tess' resentment creeps up on her. Her present circumstances may be solely responsible for generating an emotional cognitive set (a few unhappy bouts with Carl about the laundry). But sometimes emotional cognitive sets grow out of nonemotional (or other emotional) ones. Tess may already be predisposed to moralize, to think in terms of rights and fairness, and to regard others from a self-interested perspective. She may also be acutely attuned to dominance relations.

Conclusion

Cognitive theorists have been misled by thinking that the cognitive element of emotion must be a belief or a judgment. The results of so thinking are a conceptual dissonance within those theories (reverberating in the conceptual gap between "emotion" and "belief"), an inability to handle plausibly instances of emotion-belief conflict, and sometimes a grossly simple-minded analysis of the cognitive element in terms of one or a few beliefs (rather than, if anything an elaborate system of beliefs). But our cognitive life involves more than clear, fully conceptualized, articulated beliefs. Interpretive "seeings as . . ." and their background cognitive sets constitute a large portion of our cognitive life. These latter, not beliefs, make up emotion.

¹⁰The evidential character of emotion may explain the enormous difficulty of loosening oneself from bondage to any particular emotion (of "talking oneself out of" an emotion). The stronger the evidentiality of the emotion (one might say, the stronger the *emotion*), the less foothold our real beliefs have in commanding our attention. Overcoming an emotion that conflicts with one's beliefs would, on this account, be largely a matter of avoiding situations that reinforce the cognitive presuppositions of the emotion and of constructing or seeking out situations that are most likely to enable the person to make his beliefs evidential.

Reading cognitive emotions this way pays off. Not only can we explain emotion-belief conflicts, but we can also explain the passivity and involuntariness of emotion as contrasted with belief. Reason and emotion can fall out of step, and emotions can resist change even when beliefs change. Moreover, this reading provides the machinery with which to account for both the tunnel vision of emotional cognition and its dark richness.

What can we infer from a person's emotions? We can legitimately infer that the world must *appear* to them a certain way. To the acrophobic, heights appear dizzyingly treacherous. To the jealous, the beloved appears to have betrayed his love. But can we infer that the person must *believe* that the world is as it appears? No. The world often is not what it appears to be. And although we cannot prevent it from appearing the way it does, we can refrain from giving credence to the appearance. We can deny the real treacherousness of heights. We can deny the real betrayal of love *in spite of* appearances. As inferences about beliefs go, it is best to assume that a person believes or would believe (if she reflected on her experience and cognitive set) in the reality of the world she sees. But this is only a likely wager because sometimes people have what seem to them good reasons for rejecting appearances.

Thus, although the view of emotion I have presented denies the cognitivist claim that beliefs are constituents of emotion or that emotion ascriptions entail belief ascriptions, it is nevertheless a view that sees a grain of truth in these cognitive theories. Ordinarily, emotions do go hand in hand with typical beliefs. But this is not because emotions *are* beliefs. It is because ordinarily we believe that things are as they seem.



RONALD DE SOUSA

Introduction

Ronald De Sousa pursues as a philosopher the evolutionary and functionalist model developed by Darwin (and, more recently, by Frijda). His interest in the *rationality* of emotions is very much of a piece with his concern for the ways that emotions do or do not fit with the world. On the one hand, many traditional models of emotions take them to be thoroughly *subjective*, that is, conforming not to the way the world is but rather projecting or imposing their own view of the world. Against this, De Sousa defends an *objectivist* view, the idea that emotions apprehend something about the world itself. With this in mind, he develops the theory of intentionality with regard to emotions, the idea that emotions are essentially *about* something in the world. Going beyond Brentano and Kenny who argued for the intentionality of emotions, De Sousa refines the theory along several dimensions and argues that emotions, as opposed to mere feelings or subjective projections, can be assessed for both objectivity and rationality.

From The Rationality of Emotion

My title promises an inquiry into the role of emotion in a rational life in the broadest possible sense. This inquiry has two aspects. One concerns the role that emotion does and should play in the exercise of the rational faculties as we traditionally conceive them: the acquisition of beliefs and desires, the transition between them, and their transmutation into actions and policies. The other aspect concerns emotions considered as a component of life and experience, and prompts us to inquire whether they may themselves be subject to rational assessment.

That second inquiry is as old as Plato, who first claimed that emotions and desires might be objectively true or false. In the *Euthyphro* Plato asked in effect whether we love something because it is lovable, or call it lovable because we love it. The first alternative I shall call the *objectivist* answer. It implies that the emotion in question apprehends something in the world that exists independently of our reaction to it. The second, *subjectivist*, alternative implies that the properties that appear to evoke our emotions are in fact nothing more than projections or shadows cast by those emotions themselves. In this book I shall argue for the coherence of an objectivist answer. Often our emotions constitute the apprehension of properties of a certain sort that I call *axiological*. This is not to

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deny that some things we call emotions—such as moods—are merely subjective, or that some of the right kind to be objective are, like beliefs, sometimes mistaken.

Despite a common prejudice, reason and emotion are not natural antagonists. On the contrary: I shall argue that when the calculi of reason have become sufficiently sophisticated, they would be powerless in their own terms, except for the contribution of emotion. For emotions are among the mechanisms that control the crucial factor of *salience* among what would otherwise be an unmanageable plethora of objects of attention, interpretations, and strategies of inference and conduct. What remains of the old opposition between reason and emotion is only this: emotions are not reducible to beliefs or to wants. Plato was right to think that if the soul has parts, it must have three, and not just two.

Emotions and Their Objects

SUMMARY

To prepare the way for an inquiry into whether, and how, emotions can be objective, we need to ask first how they relate to their objects. The question is so complex that some people have despaired of usefully treating it as a single question at all. But the unity of the topic is sustained by the thought that, in various ways, emotions provide us with information about ourselves and the world. Objects represent the variety of types of such information and their different relations to behavior and thought.

Again I begin with some puzzles, intended to set the stage. One puzzle casts doubt on the idea that emotions have objects in the world at all (what I hope may never come to pass). Another raises the *Euthyphro* question: even if emotions do relate to real objects, are the properties that arouse our emotions really in those objects, or are they mere shadows of the emotions themselves? A third concerns whether we can incorrigibly know the objects of our own emotions (can I love, but not know whom I love?) A fourth is whether objects of emotions are identical with their causes (drunkenness may cause irritation but is not its object). A fifth is whether we can sometimes get rid of an emotion merely by redefining its objects ("We have nothing to fear but fear itself"). And the last is the problem of "fungibility": might the object of an emotion be replaceable provided the replacement duplicates the qualities of the original? Or, on the contrary, is love "not love which alters when it alteration finds"? All these puzzles exploit our conflicting intuitions about whether emotions are "objective" or "subjective."

I shall argue that emotions can at least sometimes be assessed, in their own way, for both objectivity and rationality. Here I tackle the preliminary task of sorting out the variety of "object-directedness" in emotions. Later I give reasons to think that emotions have something to tell us about the world, and I explore a "perceptual-epistemic" model according to which they can be ascribed an analogue of truth or correctness. That will prepare the way for conception of emotional rationality.

WHAT ARE OBJECTS? SIX PROBLEMS

I would like to begin by saying what I am talking about. But though I assume that we understand roughly what objects of emotion are, I cannot produce a def-

inition. They are whatever an emotion is *of*, *at*, *with*, *because of*, or *that*. But as we shall see, the looseness of this characterization can hardly be overstressed. We need a taxonomy motivated by what we should like to say about the kinds of things emotions relate to, and the nature of those relations. In philosophy the best motivation lies in *aporia*. I shall begin, therefore, with six problems deliberately intended to promote strangeness.

The First Problem of Realism: Pseudorelations? Most emotions, such as anger, fear, or love, appear to relate the emoter to something else, referred to by name or definite description. Sometimes (in fear or love) the something else need not be as the subject believes it to be. In some emotions (fear, but not so clearly love or anger) it need not even exist. But how can there be a real relation with a nonexistent thing?

A similar puzzle relates to propositional objects. Some third-person ascriptions of emotion require the truth of some contained proposition: "He is indignant that the motion passed," for example, would be misleading if the motion had not passed. Others come with no such requirement: to fear, to hope, to be eager, and, paradigmatically, to desire that *p*, do not imply the belief that *p*. On the contrary, they suggest (without quite implying) that *p* is false. So is there anything here to which the emotion is related? Or do we have only a pseudorelation generated by a grammatical illusion?

The Second Problem of Realism: The Euthyphro Question In a second sense, the question about the reality of objects concerns whether there is any objective matter about which our emotions can be right or wrong. On this common sense is divided. We dispute about the appropriateness of our emotions and dispute carries a presumption of objectivity. But on the other hand emotions are notoriously supposed to be subjective. Some are more so than others: we exact more detailed justification for indignation than we do for love; but that too requires explanation.

Such is the question Plato posed in the *Euthyphro*. It amounts to this: Are my emotions "all in the mind," or do they have real correlates in the outside world? Unfortunately, in this stark form the question is almost impossible to discuss. I shall be content with a more manageable question: whether, and how, the objects of emotion are less objective than those of other modes, such as ordinary sensory perception, the objectivity of which is generally taken for granted. "Taken for granted" does not mean "known to be true." As the history of philosophy demonstrates, no category of objects is immune to skepticism: individuals, universals, solid objects, theoretical entities, mind, or body. But here a comparative answer will suffice.

Privileged Access Elizabeth Anscombe once toured America with the following story. A man went to sleep while leisurely making love. He dreamed he was shoveling coal and taking great pleasure in that activity. Then he woke up and discovered what he was really doing. "Good heavens," said the man, "I was mistaken in the object of my pleasure." If this story is intelligible, then it shows, at least *prima facie*, that it is possible to be mistaken about some objects of emotion. This contradicts the ancient prejudice that we have "privileged access" to our own mind and its objects. But for some emotions that prejudice is exceedingly plausible. How, for example, could I be in love and not know whom I loved?

Object and Cause Many analyses of the relation between emotions and their objects view the object as *constitutive* of the emotion (see Sartre 1948; Kenny 1963; Solomon 1973). This means that the nature and identity of the object partly determine the identity of the emotion. Often—especially in the case of aesthetic emotions—it is natural to assume that if the emotion didn't have *this* object, it wouldn't be *this* emotion. (Only that recording of the Archduke Trio can make me feel *just so*.)

On the other hand, for *O* to be an object of an emotion *E* is commonly for *O* to be taken by the subject to be the cause of *E*. If I am distressed because you stole my teddy bear, I naturally believe that my distress was caused by your theft. Now unless I can blame you twice over—first for theft and second for distress—this gives rise to a dilemma. Is it the fact of your theft that caused my distress, or my belief in the theft? It cannot be the fact, it seems, because I would still be distressed if I were mistaken in thinking you had stolen my teddy bear, and there were no such fact. But it cannot be my belief, either. More exactly, if the cause *is* my belief, then this is an unknowable truth: one of those things that cannot be both true and believed. For if I believed that the true cause of my distress was my belief, surely I couldn't continue to be distressed at you.

These sophisms owe what power they have to the same source as the last three problems. All exploit our conflicting intuitions about the *Euthyphro* question—whether emotions genuinely connect us to the outside world or merely color our vision of it. In different ways, the next two puzzles also exploit this tension between the subjective and the objective.

The Magical Therapy of Solvent Analysis "I'm feeling something, but I don't know what I'm feeling, and I feel that if I knew what I was feeling I wouldn't feel it any more," says a character in Alan Rudolph's film *Choose Me*. This might serve as the motto for a certain kind of philosophical therapy—or as a formula for self-deception.

More instructive in the context of my present interest in objects, there is a curious disappearing act with objects that seems to follow from William James's famous slogan: "Our feeling of . . . bodily changes as they occur *is* the emotion." But suppose I am terrified of an approaching elephant. There is one "of" too many here. See how it works: I recall James's analysis and think to myself, "Ah, this state which seems to be the consciousness of an approaching elephant—it is in fact merely an awareness of certain bodily changes! Those changes are no doubt caused by an awareness of an approaching elephant, but they themselves aren't dangerous: only the elephant is, and it isn't what I am aware of. So the *true* object of my fear is my body, which is literally *nothing to be afraid of*."

That too is a sophism, of course. But it serves to draw our attention to the fact that the "awareness of . . ." that emotions involve stands in need of more scrutiny.

Fungibility Philosophers of perception sometimes debate whether what we really perceive are *things* or *qualities*. In connection with emotion this question has a special urgency. We have already encountered it as "Alcmene's problem" and in connection with the plight of the denizens of Solaris. It can also be seen in the rather brutal treatment of love that we find in Plato. The ideal of love

apparently advocated in the *Lysis* and *Symposium* involves a conversion from the loved one to his lovable qualities in themselves: we are urged, as it were, to commit adultery with our beloved's own good qualities. (Should I be jealous of my own virtues, if you left me for them?) But this is only the last stage of love's saintly madness. At earlier stages, what rationality requires of us is merely holy promiscuity. Having realized that what we love in a young boy is his beauty—first physical, then intellectual—the rational thing to do is to love every other boy equally if he exemplifies the same qualities. This is Plato's dilemma: either endorse high-minded promiscuity, loving whomever you have reason to love, or admit that your love is literally groundless.

This is the problem of fungibility again. Actually, this problem splits into two distinguishable puzzles. To give them handles, I shall call the first one *Plato's love triangle*. It is strictly a problem about the ontology of the objects of emotion: when I love you, is it really you I love, or is it just your qualities? The second, which I shall continue to refer to as *Alcmene's problem*, is a corollary of the first: if there is an ontological difference between particulars and the sum of their properties, why should this matter?

Someone might answer, "It matters because it leads to incoherence. If the object of love is a bundle of qualities, you might find yourself in love with someone you had never met—your lover's twin, perhaps. And that's absurd." But this answer begs the question, for the situation is absurd only if the objects of love are, for some logical or metaphysical reason, necessarily unique. Elsewhere, I tried to clarify what it means for an emotion to be directed at a particular. But why should love be of this kind, and not rather, as Plato thought, directed at properties? When Zeus visits Alcmene in the guise of Amphitryon, he hasn't merely dressed up. He's taken on all of his qualities. (Indeed, he may be more like Amphitryon last month than Amphitryon will be when he returns.) So when Alcmene finds out, why (logically or morally) should she mind?

THE TYPOLOGY OF OBJECTS

To make a start on such a typology, I shall proceed on the assumption defended in the last two chapters: that it makes sense to think of emotions as having biological functions. The first hypothesis to be explored is that emotions can profitably be compared to perception. In pursuing this hypothesis, I shall be guided by an important methodological principle advocated by Ruth Millikan. This principle, which I shall call the *priority of success*, Millikan explains as follows:

If . . . mental intentional states (believing that, intending to, hoping that) are members of proper function or "biological" categories, then they are . . . intentional states not by virtue of their powers but by virtue of what they are supposed to do yet perhaps cannot do. . . . [I]f . . . we push the analogy with biological categories, only *true* beliefs are capable of performing the defining functions of beliefs. We will then be free to look for the defining attributes of beliefs among relations between *true* beliefs and the *actual* world outside. False beliefs will then appear merely as things that were "supposed to" have had such and such relations to the outside world. (Millikan 1984, 17–18)

Similarly, when emotions purport to have objects that do not actually exist, I shall assume that the normal case is the purported case, and that the normal case is the one we should analyze first. (Once again, the concept of normality seems indispensable.)

Let us return to the first of our introductory problems: the problem of "pseudorelations." A straightforward way to bring out the features of normal cases is to compare them with various ways in which things can go wrong. So my procedure will be this: I shall sketch some skeleton cases in which something has gone wrong and collect the lessons they suggest into a series of theses about types of objects and their relation to emotions and their causes.

Targets Many emotion ascriptions make an apparent reference to an actual particular. Sometimes the purported reference fails.

Suppose Calvin says, "I am angry at the person who stole my bicycle." But he is wrong in thinking that his bicycle has been stolen at all. This can be read in two ways.

In one class of cases Calvin has no suspect in mind. The sign that something has gone wrong here is that although Calvin's ascription of anger to himself is sincerely based on the existence of certain feelings, those feelings would not survive Calvin's discovery of the relevant facts.

Another variant differs only in that Calvin believes of a specific person S that S stole his bicycle. Here again, the ascription would be modified by Calvin's discovery either that someone else stole it or that no one did. Both variants credit the world with containing a real bicycle thief. But in the first the thief is specified only generally, whereas in the second she is referred to as a singular individual.

In another class of cases, like hope or fear, the nonexistence of the particular purportedly referred to does not always extinguish the emotion, even when it is known by the subject of ascription. Usually the discovery that the object of fear (a lion loose in the city, say) does not exist is enough to dispel fear. But sometimes—in cases of "irrational fear" (or "theological hope")—such knowledge would have no effect.

Aim The connection of the emotions with the world is not all one way. Earlier, we looked mostly at the other direction of causation: the effect of emotions, through motivation, on the world. This may remind us that the word *object* has yet another meaning. Emotions also have objects in the sense of goals or *aims*. And although aims do not relate directly to the perceptual model, I shall, for completeness, include an emotion's aims in our classification of objects.

Aims are most commonly arranged hierarchically. Aims, like causes, can be remote or proximate. Robert Solomon has argued that all emotions share a higher-level aim: "Self-esteem is the goal of every passion" (Solomon 1976, 97). The aims I have in mind here are the more proximate, consisting rather in immediate expressive behavior.

From an evolutionary point of view, the *behavioral* effects of emotions must have been essential to making them just what they are. In simple cases this means that an emotion will have a characteristic immediate aim—something that it would *make us do*. In the case of "violent" emotions these might be gov-

erned by Panksepp's behavioral subsystems. In other cases the aim is vestigial—only some form of expression, perhaps even only an inclination to some utterance.

A few thought experiments are enough to show that aims can differentiate emotions: could we jump for depression? slouch from joy? smile with envy? rave with benevolence? snicker out of pride? The answer to all these questions is, Well, yes, but not *really*. We could snicker out of pride, given a suitably convoluted chain of motivation. But in some intuitive sense we couldn't do those things as natural expressions of the emotions in question—though what counts as a natural expression is hard to say.

One more qualification is needed. The natural aim of an emotion is not to be confused with the aim that someone might have in expressing or even in feeling one. Striving to evince a sense of humor in order to impress someone with one's wit could be a certain kind of "aim," but that aim, far from contributing to the nature of wit, obviously undermines the claim to have any. The "naturally" expressive aims with which I am concerned here are not in this way self-defeating. On the contrary, they partly define the character of the emotions they express.

Formal Objects Cutting across the categories already discussed are two ways in which an emotion can fail to be appropriate. C. D. Broad made a start on describing these:

Some kinds of emotional quality are *fitting* and others are *unfitting* to a given kind of epistemological object. It is appropriate to cognize what one takes to be a *threatening* object with some degree of *fear*. It is inappropriate to cognize what one takes to be a fellow man in *undeserved pain or distress* with *satisfaction* or with *amusement*. Then again, an emotion which is fitting in *kind* to its epistemological object, may be unfitting in *degree*, i.e. inordinate. . . . (Broad 1971, 293)

As Broad concedes, much more needs to be said about this notion of appropriateness. To begin with, there is a contrast that Broad did not draw sharply enough. Both his criteria—of kind and of degree—can in some measure claim to lay down some conditions of rationality for emotions. But, as he explains it, the difference between kind and degree seems itself to be merely a difference in degree: the inappropriateness of amusement to pain seems to be no more than a particularly nasty example of a disproportionate reaction. But surely it is more than that. We need to delimit the very *conditions of intelligibility* for a given emotion in terms of the properties it implicitly ascribes to the target. The idea we are looking for is that of the *formal object*, which I define in thesis (IX) a second-order property that must be implicitly ascribed to the motivating aspect if the emotion is to be intelligible.

The formal object is a second-order property in the sense that it is supervenient on some other property or properties: something is frightening by virtue of being dangerous, for example. But I shall sometimes speak more loosely—and more naturally—as if the formal property were simply a property of the target. In this looser sense, an emotion is *appropriate*, in part, if the target actually has a focal property in virtue of which the formal object fits the target. Other

necessary criteria of appropriateness, including intensity and fittingness on ethical or aesthetic grounds, are quite properly matters of degree and are highly sensitive to context.

The notion of formal object applies to any state having a content assessable for correctness: it is then, by definition, the *standard of correctness* for that state. Thus, *truth* is the formal object of *belief*, and goodness or *desirability* is the formal object of *want*. The specific formal object associated with a given emotion is essential to the definition of that particular emotion.

PARADIGM SCENARIOS

It is time, to return from the perspective of strategic rationality, rooted in the idea of practical success, to the alternative perspective rooted in the idea of matching. Taking the hint from cases in which the rationality of emotional desires seemed to hang on their history, I shall now explore the conditions of rationality of emotions in terms of their origins. What follows can be viewed as first steps in search of a *semantics* of emotions.

We have already seen how classical writers on the emotions, from Descartes on, are fond of making lists of primitive emotions, then going on to show how the more complex are built out of those. The diversity in the resulting lists is warning enough that this is an unpromising method. And yet it cannot be denied that there are, in other animals as in human babies, modes of behavior that we take to express something like human emotions. I think we can understand, in principle, how our repertoire of emotions gets built up, without positing a set of "primary emotions" that get combined like basic blocks or even mixed like primary colors. We do need a repertoire of primitive instinctual responses, but emotions are not mere responses.

My hypothesis is this: We are made familiar with the vocabulary of emotion by association with *paradigm scenarios*. These are drawn first from our daily life as small children and later reinforced by the stories, art, and culture to which we are exposed. Later still, in literate cultures, they are supplemented and refined by literature. Paradigm scenarios involve two aspects: first, a situation type providing the characteristic *objects* of the specific emotion-type, and second, a set of characteristic or "normal" *responses* to the situation, where normality is first a biological matter and then very quickly becomes a cultural one. It is in large part in virtue of the response component of the scenarios that emotions are commonly held to *motivate*. But this is, in a way, back-to-front: for the emotion often takes its name from the response disposition and is only afterward assumed to cause it.

Recent work on the development and function of smiling in infants provides a striking illustration of this last point. According to Daniel Stern, babies are born with an innate capacity to smile. At the very earliest stage, smiling seems to be a purely biological function, which elicits adult responses without involving any intentional communication. Between six weeks and three months, the baby begins to use the smile "instrumentally," that is, "in order to get a response from someone" (Stern 1977, 45). This does not affect the way the smile looks: in some way it is the same response. But what has changed is how it originates (p. 44).

From this stage on, the behavior needs to be reinforced visually if it is to persist: blind children seem to lose expressiveness in their smiles. The necessary reinforcement comes, of course, from feedback provided in interaction with caretakers. But we should not assume, as both psychoanalysis and behaviorist psychology might incline us to do, that the child is merely a passive recipient of shaping by parental and other external influences. For there is evidence that the feedback received in turn depends on the innate character of the infant's smile. How an infant is treated determines the paradigm scenarios that define its emotional repertoire; but its treatment, in turn, partly depends on its own innate facial characteristics and behaviors. To that extent, physiognomy is destiny.

Those original facial characteristics and behaviors of the infant are spontaneous and purely physiological: at that stage they *mean* nothing at all (Stern 1977, 43–44). Yet we might read these facts as telling us that, in a way, the ultimate initiative in determining the infant's emotional constitution belongs largely to the infant itself. This may be, in the end, what the notion of emotional temperament amounts to. If so, believing in temperament does not require us to believe in primitive emotions: the primitives out of which emotions emerge are not emotions.

A child is genetically programmed to respond in specific ways to the situational components of some paradigm scenarios. But what situational components can be identified depends on the child's stage of development. An essential part of education consists in identifying these responses, giving the child a name for them in the context of the scenario, and thus teaching it that it is experiencing a particular emotion. That is, in part, what is involved in learning to feel the right emotions, which, as Aristotle knew, is a central part of moral education (*Nicomachean Ethics*, II.2).

The process whereby emotions are constructed out of dispositions to respond can be observed from the first few months of life. Mere feedback loops give way to complex interactions that it is plausible to think of as scenarios. First, between six and nine months one can generally make a baby smile by smiling, and cry or frown by frowning. There is "vicarious resonance," but no intentionality. At the next stage the caretaker's expressions have become signs to the infant of what it can expect her to do and feel. After nine months this includes looking to her for guidance as to what to look at and how to feel about it. The infant will follow the caretaker's gaze and, more important, look to her to learn how to react. Late in the second year of life toddlers seem already to have the sense of the existence of other subjects. They become aware that different participants in the same scene will, by virtue of their different roles, feel differently from each other. As we should expect if paradigm scenarios indeed define the very character of our emotions, we acquire the capacity to talk about emotions in terms of the stories that give rise to them sooner than we can talk about the origins of other mental states such as perception. Before the age of three, toddlers can understand that one person's action may lead to another's distress and that certain types of events typically cause certain emotions. They also know that by taking a sequence from an emotional scenario out of context, one can play-act or "pretend" emotions that are not actually being felt. And by the time toddlers are four or five years old, they have a very good sense of what

kinds of stories lead to what simple emotions. Learning these scenarios continues indefinitely, however, as the emotional repertoire becomes more complicated. (Sentiments of guilt and responsibility are not generally understood by six-year-olds well enough for them to infer who is feeling what in stories where such sentiments would be appropriate.) Indeed, perhaps we enlarge our repertoire, much as we increase our mastery of language, well into adult life, though with increasing resistance.

This fits in with the fact that some emotions are more thought-dependent than others. It depends on the paradigm scenarios to which they are related. If the paradigm scenario cannot be apprehended without complex linguistic skills, for example, we shall not expect to find in someone who lacks those skills an emotion specifically tuned to that scenario. That is why, as Iris Murdoch has put it, "The most essential and fundamental aspect of culture is the study of literature, since this is an education in how to picture and understand human situations."

On the other hand, prelinguistic responses such as flight or attack can subsist to define so-called primitive emotions of fear and rage. Thanks, perhaps, to their dependence on relatively separate parts of the brain, they retain their power even over individuals whose repertoire includes the most "refined" emotions. We observe this most easily in other people.



MICHAEL STOCKER

Introduction

Michael Stocker extends the challenge to cognitive theories by accusing them of leaving out what is essential to emotions, feeling or "affectivity." Back in 1975, Stocker issued a memorable challenge to the philosophical community in his essay "The Schizophrenia of Modern Ethical Theories," in which he advanced the claim that ethics had lost sight of the importance of affect in its excessive and exclusive celebration of reason. In *Valuing Emotions* (1996) Stocker (together with psychoanalyst Elizabeth Hegeman) pursues this argument with regard to theories of emotion and insists that affect, rightly understood, cannot be eliminated from any adequate analysis of emotion. This is not to deny the cognitive aspects of emotion but only to insist that an analysis in terms of cognition alone cannot be sufficient to answer the question, "What is an emotion?"

The Irreducibility of Affectivity



Three interrelated claims are central to this work. First, absence and deficiency of affect and emotionality are characterizing features of dissociation, depersonalization, and of various neuroses, borderline conditions, and psychoses. Second, without affectivity it is impossible to live a good human life and it may well be impossible to live a human life, to be a person, at all. Third, accounts of people that deny or omit the fact that people are affective beings are not accounts of healthy people, who can and do lead good and human lives. Putting these together, to accept such accounts is to accept accounts of beings who are, at best, unhealthy, who suffer from these maladies, and who may well not even be people.

In this chapter, I am concerned to show how, and if possible why, recent philosophical accounts of people and even of emotions have ignored or misunderstood affectivity.

The anthropologist Richard Shweder writes, "Three-year olds, Ifaluk islanders, and psychoanalysts (in other words, almost everyone, except perhaps the staunchest of positivists) recognize that emotions are *feelings*." Whether or not philosophers show themselves given to positivism, their treatment of feelings is remarkable. When feelings are discussed at all, they are often radically misunderstood. What is at least as remarkable is their absence as serious topics in philosophical psychology or even moral psychology. Often, they are not even treated as unimportant topics, and are just not examined at all.

From Michael Stocker, *Valuing Emotions* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996). Reprinted with the permission of Cambridge University Press.

There are, of course, some exceptions to this. But, it must be emphasized, these are exceptions to the way feeling and affectivity are treated—that is, are mostly *not* treated—by contemporary philosophers. Feeling and affectivity enjoy the same lack of importance and lack of attention in cognitive psychology, an area of psychology very closely allied with various contemporary philosophical currents. As the academic, research psychologist Robert Zajonc writes, “Contemporary cognitive psychology simply ignores affect. The words *affect*, *attitude*, *emotion*, *feeling*, and *sentiment* do not appear in the indexes of any of the major works on cognition . . .”¹

Before examining some current philosophical views about emotions and affectivity, I should explain why I consider affectivity to be psychic, not or not just bodily. I should also explain why I talk about feelings, in addition to emotions, moods, attitudes, and interests.

PSYCHIC, NOT BODILY

My main explanation of why I place affectivity in the psyche and not, or not just, in the body is put nicely by Descartes. Talking of emotions or passions, he writes, “we feel as though they were in the soul itself.”² This is to contrast those feelings with bodily feelings, which he says, “we relate to our body or some of its parts . . . which we perceive as though they were in our members.” This, of course, would have to be amplified in terms of what the different feelings are about and what we must understand in order to understand the content and the genesis of the feelings or of the activity giving rise to them.

There are undoubtedly many connections between psychic and bodily feelings. Some emotions and feelings are most naturally, and perhaps even necessarily, expressed by bodily means. Further, various feelings seem at once bodily and psychic: for example, some that are involved in sexual desire and sexual activity, in the exultation of climbing a difficult cliff, and in certain forms of disorientation and tension. On the other hand, various feelings do not seem to require any bodily feeling, or, for that matter, any bodily expression: for example, being interested in a philosophy problem one is working on or excited by a movie one is watching.

Notwithstanding the sometimes important relations between psychic and bodily feelings, I will concentrate on psychic feelings. One reason I focus on psychic, nonbodily feelings is to counter the view of many contemporary philosophers that all feelings are nothing but, or at least always involve, bodily feelings. This, especially the former, may explain a theme found in various of the philosophers discussed here: that since bodily feelings are conceptually irrelevant to emotions, feelings are conceptually irrelevant to them. On my view, the premise is true of some emotions, but the conclusion is false.

¹“Feeling and Thinking,” *American Psychologist* 35 (1980):151–175, p. 152, n. 3.

²*The Passions of the Soul* 1.25.

FEELINGS, NOT JUST EMOTIONS, MOODS, INTERESTS, AND ATTITUDES

I now turn to why I talk about feelings, not just emotions, moods, interests, and attitudes. (Henceforth, by "feeling" I mean *psychic* feeling, unless otherwise made clear.) One reason is that it allows us an easy way to refer to the characterizing feature of Plato's and others' middle part of the soul, *thumos*, spirit, distinguishing it from reason and desire. Turning now to a different triad, it is also useful to have a term for what is common to these following three sorts of (if I may) feelings: feelings had by the person, such as being full of interest; feelings about the world, such as being interested in some particular thing; and feelings in the world such as finding a particular thing interesting.³ I do not think "emotions," "moods," "interests," or "attitudes," or any combination of them, is adequate for this.

So too, it is useful to have a common term for the affectivity common to emotions, moods, interests, and attitudes. A further reason to distinguish feelings from emotions, moods, interests, and attitudes has to do with intensity. The intensity of feelings is at least one of the important differentiating factors between anger and rage, between fear and terror, and between many other emotions. It is also one of the important determinants of the waxing or waning of the one into the other.

One further point should be made about my understanding of feeling and affectivity. It is often held that part of the *esse* of affectivity is *percipi*: that feelings must be felt, and part of what it is to be felt involves awareness of the feeling. Many philosophers take this to be Freud's view. And it is indeed a view Freud held early in his career. Giving an account of Freud's "pure discharge" theory of affect, as found in his 1915 paper, "The Unconscious," David Rapaport writes,

Ideas when repressed—when their cathexis is withdrawn, or when they are counteracted—persist as actualities (as memory traces) while affects when repressed (decathected or counteracted) persist only as potentialities.

But as Rapaport also writes, this was problematic even for the early Freud:

I believe that here Freud as yet lacked the observations which could have indicated to him (as they did to him as well as to Brierley and Jacobson later) that discharge thresholds of drives and affects are indispensable concepts of an affect theory. But such thresholds heightened (presumably by counteractings) to attain repression of affect would render the repressed "affect charge" just as actual as memory traces render unconscious ideas. Freud's conception here shows the limitation of a pure discharge theory of affects which has no place in it for threshold structures.

As indicated by Rapaport's "as they did to him . . . later," Freud went on to give up his view that affects require awareness, and came to allow for unconscious affects, as do most, if not all, contemporary psychoanalytic schools and psychoanalysts.

³I am here indebted to Scheler, *Formalism in Ethics and Nonformal Ethics of Values*, especially pp. 256–64 and 332–44.

We might note that this is not the only occasion where philosophers have thought of Freudian theory, and indeed of psychoanalytic theory quite generally, in terms of *early* Freudian theory. In *Being and Nothingness*, Sartre argues that Freud's account of repression involves a mutually inconsistent triad of views all endorsed by Freud: repression involves ego processes; all ego processes are conscious; repression and what is repressed are not conscious. In early works, Freud did hold that ego processes are entirely conscious. But he later came to hold what now goes without saying in psychoanalytic theory and practice: that many ego processes are not conscious, but are unconscious or preconscious.

I agree with the later Freud and contemporary psychoanalysis about the "location" or "nature" of feelings. I do not think that we must be aware of the feelings we are having, or even that we must be aware of having them. As I see matters, awareness of one's feelings can range from full reflective and attentive awareness, through dim and confused awareness, to total or almost total unawareness, including what in psychoanalytic terms is said to be preconscious or even unconscious. But to show the irreducibility of feelings, and to show at least many of the important connections between value and emotions, these issues need not be settled; nor need it even be allowed that we can be less than fully aware of our feelings.

Nonetheless, some brief comments on these issues should be useful. One can feel shame without having any idea why one is feeling shame. Further, one can feel shame without being able to identify one's emotion or emotional state as shame. As Helen Block Lewis writes in *Shame and Guilt in Neurosis*,

Although the level of shame affect was often quite strong, the patients themselves did not identify their own psychological state as shame. Rather, they said they felt "depressed," or "lousy" or "blank." I have tentatively called this phenomenon "overt, unidentified shame" and have traced sequences from it into depressions, diffuse anxiety and obsessive ruminations about shameful events, and about guilt.

So too, one can be angry about something without recognizing what one is angry about. I might recognize that I am angry, but fail to see that I am angry at you, or at you for insulting me. I might be angry without realizing it. I might, instead, misidentify my emotional state as anxiety or boredom. Or I might mistakenly think that I am in no emotional or affective state at all.

Much the same holds for many other emotions. (I say "many" simply to avoid the need to discuss whether it holds for all.) I think all of the following can make perfectly good sense and can be true: "For many years I was unaware that I was resentful at all, much less resentful of you"; "For many years, I was unaware that I was in love with you"; "For many years, I was unaware that I was depressed." One strong piece of evidence for this possibility is that when we learn what emotions we have been having without noticing them, we often learn why we had what had seemed to us inappropriate and unmotivated thoughts and fantasies, as well as previously inexplicable anxiety and tension.

Some theorists—perhaps because they hold that the *esse* of emotions is *per-cipi*—tell us that these phenomena we are not aware of are dispositional, not occurrent. And some tell us that these phenomena are attitudes and moods, not emotions. I disagree with both.

Before showing why, I want to emphasize that here, as so often, the distinction between the occurrent and the dispositional is important. To mention only one point, it gives one of the central explanatory and classificatory categories for various tendencies and pronenesses: for example, my proneness to getting angry at you far more easily than I get angry at others. I also want to emphasize that such long-term anger might be purely dispositional. Even while I have this proneness, it is possible that until I feel myself provoked by you, I am thoroughly and through-and-through calm and in an entirely equable mood. We might, thus, agree with Antonio R. Damasio in *Descartes' Error: Emotion, Reason, and the Human Brain* and think of these times of calmness as times "between emotions," as times when there are only "background feelings."

I do not want to enter into issues about whether we are always in some emotional state or other, or if there are times between emotions, how extensive are those times. But, by continuing with the story just given, I want to emphasize a third point: that even between times of out-and-out anger toward you, I can still be angry at you where this anger is not merely dispositional anger. My anger might only occasionally rise to the surface. When it does, it might not be fully formed as anger at you or even as anger at all. It might be felt simply as a general sourness or a more particular sourness directed especially at you. And when below the surface, it can be there simmering away, troubling the waters. It can serve as part of my standing emotional, background conditions, often unattended to, but fully there as part of my world.

This makes two points of importance for us. First, there may be fewer and shorter times between emotions than is thought. In any case, how much time there is will certainly be a matter of particular circumstances, and individual and social difference—for example, how given a person or people are to emotionality. Second, these forms of anger that are other than out-and-out anger cannot be understood in terms of dispositional anger or some other dispositional emotion. They are there occurrently.

What I have just claimed about emotions is commonplace in regard to beliefs and thoughts, where we distinguish between the occurrent and the dispositional, between the foreground and the background, between what is used and what is attended to; and where we also distinguish among differing degrees of clarity or inchoateness; and where we question how often and how long, or even whether, we can be between all beliefs or thoughts. These, then, are some reasons why we cannot divide all emotions into those that are fully present to us and those that are only dispositional. They are reasons why we cannot understand as dispositional many emotions that are not fully present to us. These reasons can be easily modified, and many require no modification, to show why it is also a mistake to think that all such "feelings" are not feelings, but only moods, attitudes, or interests.

Emotions and Affectivity

We might expect philosophers who pay attention to emotions also to pay attention to affectivity. This expectation, however, is often not met. Many contemporary philosophers think that in the bad old days theorists held that emotions

were, more or less, nothing but bodily feelings, much on the order of a stomach ache or a burn.

This account of history is more fanciful than real. One of our earliest theorists of emotions, Aristotle, stresses the cognitive content of emotions. To take an example that comes up many times in this work, in *Rhetoric* II.2, Aristotle characterizes anger, *orgē*, in terms of the rational, the conative, and also the affective: "Anger [*orgē*] may be defined as a desire accompanied by pain, for a conspicuous revenge for a conspicuous slight at the hands of men who have no call to slight oneself or one's friends" (II.2, 1378a31 ff., tr. Roberts). To have such anger, I must have certain thoughts, including evaluative thoughts, I must have certain desires, and I must also experience pain: I must be pained by the thought of a conspicuous slight, and I must intend to retaliate for the slight.

Jumping more than two millennia, William James did hold that emotions *are* bodily feelings or awareness of them. But even he attached considerable importance to the thoughts, desires, and values of, or attendant on, emotions. This raises a serious problem for those who hold that James thought of emotions *just as* bodily feelings: what role, on their view, can those thoughts, desires, and values play? They are not simply causes of the bodily feelings—if to be *simply* a cause is to be, *as it happens*, a cause that plays no further conceptual role. As I read James, those thoughts, desires, and values can cause those feelings, but feelings do not just, as it happens, have those causes. Rather, it is conceptual of those feelings, when they are emotions, that they have those causes.

One of the best accounts of James on these issues was given recently by Charles Young. He argues that James does not ignore or dismiss thoughts, desires, and values. Instead, he sees them as necessary, but insufficient, for emotions—an insufficiency made good by the presence and awareness of those goings-on. On Young's view, James does not hold that emotions simply are bodily feelings, but only that such feelings are a *differentiating* feature of emotions. In this sense, they make emotions emotional. Briefly put, James's reasons are, first, that we can have the very same thoughts, desires, and values when we do not have an emotion as when we do have it; and second, that the agent's awareness of those physiological goings-on is what differentiates between an affectless complex and its corresponding emotion.

I do not agree with James on the second point: that all emotions are differentiated from their corresponding affectless complexes by awareness of physiological goings-on or bodily feelings. Nor do I think it conceptually true that all emotions even involve *bodily* feelings. But I do agree with him on the first point: that without *feelings*, there is no outrage or even anger, but only "some cold-blooded and dispassionate judicial sentence confined entirely to the intellectual realm, to the effect that a certain person or persons deserve chastisement for their sins." And I also agree with him in holding that there is far more to emotions than what is bodily, and that this "more" involves thoughts, desires, and values or evaluations. Perhaps in *Language, Truth, and Logic*, A. J. Ayer depicted emotions as contentless feelings, perhaps even bodily feelings. (And there is good reason for emotivists to rely on such a conception of emotions, lest their accounts of values in terms of emotions suffer circularity. But not all emotivists

heeded this reason. This is shown in William Alston's argument that Charles Stevenson's emotivism was circular precisely this way, because of the role of *approval*—that is, thinking *well* of—in the “reducing” emotion.

Feelings are Rarely Merely Feelings

The arguments just given are clearly insufficient to still all doubts about more complex reductive accounts. Perhaps, then, it would be useful to sketch a consideration that might incline people to think that some reductive account must be possible. Suppose it is agreed that we cannot get an account of care or interest in terms of desire and reason. How, it might nonetheless be asked, could those or similar accounts be improved, much less made successful, by the incorporation of feeling? How would the addition of some inner pang, say, improve the account? The thought here is that feelings are too much inner phenomena and conceptually too poor to bolster up accounts of care, concern, and interest.

A variant of this thought has immediate application to my claims that, because they are affective, at least some emotions have significant evaluative and even moral importance. How, it will be asked, can feelings—mere feelings, inner pangs or other conceptually poor inner phenomena—have such evaluative and moral importance?

A complete reply would involve an account of the nature of psychic feelings, and especially how, like other psychic elements, they are connected with the inner and the outer. Here it should be sufficient to note the following. Undoubtedly, some psychic feelings are panglike. A momentary tingle of psychic tension or excitement might be panglike. It might also provide an example of an entirely inner goings-on. Whether it is panglike or entirely inner may well be interesting, but not for our present concerns. Indeed, for present purposes the present objection is beside the point and misguided.

It must be remembered that the psychic feelings with which I have been concerned—care, concern, and interest—have been shown to have conceptual complexity. Just consider their relations with reasons and content-laden objects. Further, those psychic feelings often should be thought of not merely as connected with, but as “modes” of, action, reason, or desire: for example, one can act, see, or desire *with* interest. These psychic feelings are not conceptually impoverished the ways pangs are supposed to be. Nor are they any more objectionably inner than are desire and reason.

In other chapters, we will see that feelings are complex, intrapersonal and interpersonal, social, and also that they are evaluatively and morally important. In caring about emotions one is caring about what is complex, intrapersonal and interpersonal, social, and valuable, and also affective. In short, feelings are not mere feelings; there is little that is mere about them; and this helps explain how what is mistakenly thought of as mere feelings can be of vital evaluative and moral importance.



PATRICIA GREENSPAN

Introduction

Patricia Greenspan also takes up the challenge of understanding the rationality of emotions, focusing on the relationship between practical reasoning and emotions and the reasons we give for emotions. On the way she develops a larger vision of the ways in which emotions encompass evaluative judgments and argues that the judgmental (cognitive) theory does not adequately account for the diversity of emotions. Like Stocker, she defends the importance of affect, not just as an accompaniment or component of emotion but as itself intentional, directed toward an object.

Reasons to Feel

In reaction to the Cartesian account of emotions as sensations, a number of contemporary philosophers have suggested that we explain them in terms of *evaluative judgments*. Thus, fear is not to be construed just as a set of chills, shudders, and the like—introspectively identifiable events of feeling. Rather, it essentially involves a belief that danger looms—perhaps as a cause of sensation or its physiological underpinnings, but at any rate, as a necessary element of genuine cases of fear. This judgment is partly factual but also partly evaluative: It is about the likelihood of harm from some source, with “harm” understood as an evil. Its detailed factual content typically serves to exhibit an “object” of fear—something it is directed towards as a putative source of harm—and thus to distinguish the emotion from objectless sensations, of the sort that might be felt in reaction to the cold. But its negative evaluative content is needed to explain why it amounts to *fear* rather than some other reaction to an envisioned possibility, such as thrilled anticipation—and why fear amounts to a *reasonable* reaction in certain situations.

I grant these points to “judgmentalism,” as I shall call this view; and I shall feel free to rely upon them without reviewing the arguments for them here. But I think they can be incorporated into a broader evaluative view, allowing for propositional attitudes that are weaker than strict belief: states of mind, like *imagining* that danger looms, that involve entertaining a predicative thought without assent. For judgmentalism, as I shall argue, does not do justice to the diversity of emotional phenomena. It also suggests an oversimple answer to justificatory questions, about the reasons for emotions and their role as reasons for

action. With belief as the “intentional” component of emotion—the component that is *about* something, and hence is capable of misrepresenting its object—“emotional justification” would seem essentially to be justification for and by belief. I hope to lay the foundation for a subtler account, however, by bringing in a noncartesian element of object-directed *affect*, whose object is an evaluative proposition. Shudders and chills may be about some state of affairs, in short, and the same may be said of generalized comfort or discomfort.

Let me propose, then, that we look at emotions as compounds of two elements: affective states of comfort or discomfort and evaluative propositions spelling out their intentional content. Fear, for instance, may be viewed as involving discomfort at the fact—or the presumed or imagined fact (I shall say “the thought”)—that danger looms. This gives only a general pattern of analysis and is meant to do no more; further specification must wait upon investigation of particular emotional states. But by breaking down emotions into layered affective and evaluative components, with the latter taken as objects of the former, the pattern should provide us with a way of approaching two main questions of emotional justification:

- (1) How are emotions justified by the situations in which they arise?
- (2) How does emotion function in the justification of action?

At the outset, bypassing issues of moral justification, I have two corresponding theses in mind, based on the interpretation of emotions as “propositional feelings”:

- (1) Although its appropriateness may be explained in terms of belief warrant, the evaluative component of emotions need not rest on reasons adequate for belief.
- (2) The affective component of emotions gives them a special role to play in rational motivation, as “extrajudgmental” reasons for action.

But the two theses will turn out to exhibit some complex links. In particular, the full justification of emotions themselves will depend on (2), as well as on (1)—on the practical “adaptiveness” of appropriate emotions, or their instrumental value as spurs to action.

The implications of my argument will be seen more clearly as the two theses are defended in detail in light of my proposed analysis of emotions.¹ Briefly, though, I hope to use the two theses to exhibit the special rational and moral significance of emotion as a supplement to judgment. The motivational influence of the full range of emotions will turn on (1), as we shall see, because of the importance of *imagination* to emotional evaluation—particularly evaluation from another person’s standpoint, or “identification,” which I take to be central to *moral* motivation. The greater part of this essay will focus on (1), since (2) presupposes the distinction it draws between emotion and belief. But my defense of (2) will eventually bring out my reason for stressing the distinction: It allows

¹For clearer and somewhat modified accounts of the argument I sketch here see my “Practical Reasoning and Emotion,” in *The Oxford Handbook of Rationality*, ed. A. Mele and P. Rawlings (Oxford: Oxford University Press, forthcoming).

emotions a role in rational motivation that is not simply parasitic on that of judgment. For "judgmentalism" subsumes emotions under a conventional rational category at the cost of slighting their own role as reasons.

For the moment, an example should help to distinguish the two theses, as claims about *rational* justification, from the common view of emotions as features of fully human sensitivity or the like. Let us look at one of the less sentimentalized cases of emotion: wary suspicion, in regard for one's own self-interest. Suppose I am involved in a business transaction and seem to "pick up on" something about the salesman that puts me on guard about his trustworthiness. My suspicion, in this case, supposing that it does count as a state of feeling, amounts to one of the milder varieties of fear. It is important to my argument here that such states need not be extreme—need not involve "states" in the sense of "agitated states" but simply current *conditions* of feeling. I am not "in a state," in the popular sense of the expression; and the feeling I have is neither very intense nor an experience of some particular sensations, like chills and shudders, that are characteristic of full-blown fear. We may grant, however, that my feeling does go beyond assent to a proposition: that X, the salesman, is likely to mislead me in some way that I would find injurious (injurious to my interests, that is). I am *uncomfortable about* that presumed state of affairs and thus am undergoing an emotion even though my discomfort might resist explanation in terms of any very specific mental event. Rather, it amounts to a general state of negative feeling, perhaps a kind of mental tension, directed towards an evaluative proposition of the sort that is characteristic of fear.

In standard cases the evaluative proposition will be one I take to be true. But in order to allow for the possibility that my emotion parts from belief, I shall use "the thought that [the proposition holds]" as a noncommittal expression introducing the object of my discomfort, or what I am uncomfortable about. The expression should not be taken as implying that I am uncomfortable about the fact that such a thought occurs to me; indeed, the thought need not occur to me explicitly. Rather, the object of my discomfort amounts to the *content* of the thought: that I face a threat of injury from X. Because the affective component of suspicion is intentionally directed towards this evaluative component on my view, the emotion may be said to have a propositional "internal" object, along with the object given *in* the proposition, as the source of harm.² This means that my suspicion is not just like chills or shudders, or even general discomfort, *accompanying* an evaluative thought in the way that a headache might accompany the thought that I am losing out in a business transaction with X. Even if it were "objectless," in fact—if its evaluative component did not pick out a particular source of harm—the emotion would have intentional content; for its affective component must at least be directed towards an *indefinite* proposition on my analysis.

²This is not to say that all emotions have propositions as their objects. Most obviously, love is not love that someone has a certain lovable trait or the like but rather love of the person. However, my suggestion will be that such cases can be analyzed into components involving comfort or discomfort with a propositional object (e.g., discomfort that one is at a distance from the love-object).

The propositional object of emotional discomfort need not be an object of *belief*, however. In the present case we might suppose that I reject the corresponding judgment, since I think I have reason to believe, and no good reason not to believe, that X is entirely trustworthy. He has been highly spoken of by others whom I trust, and I cannot say what it is about his manner on this occasion that stands behind my feeling to the contrary. Indeed, I cannot even say that the feeling is based on something about his manner: Perhaps I am simply uneasy in an unfamiliar situation. So I manage to dismiss the feeling—intellectually, at any rate—as a product of my own inexperience in business transactions. It does persist; but I “explain it away,” resisting any tendency to take it as something that would survive the collection of further evidence. Although I keep thinking—entertaining the thought—that X is apt to mislead me, I do not *think that* he is, in the sense that involves assent to the content of my thought. Rather, the case supposes, I attribute it to my own imagination.

My “intuitive” suspicion may be *warranted*, however, even though I do not take it to be and even though the corresponding belief would not be, under the circumstances. There may be some features of X’s way of presenting himself that do back up my reaction, that is, but are not perceived clearly enough to justify a belief that X is untrustworthy. All the evidence I have—including any memories of my similar reactions on past occasions—counts *against* that judgment. And yet my emotion may be appropriate, not just because in this case it happens to fit the facts, but rather because it is here controlled by some relevant features of my perceptual situation. I might have at least *prima facie* evidence for belief, if I were able to specify those features at least roughly; but as things stand now, I do not know enough about the subliminal sources of my emotion even to attribute them to its object. I am reacting to something about X’s eye movements, say, something whose relevance to untrustworthiness could be explained by a developed science of “body language,” if there were one. But from my current evidential standpoint the emotion would seem to be best explained by my own uneasiness. So it seems that the emotion may be appropriate in a case where its corresponding belief is neither warranted nor held.

Some would insist that “belief” be widened to make this out as a case where I do hold—unconsciously, perhaps—that X is untrustworthy. Here let me just say that I am suspicious of this apparent appeal to simplicity. Its use in defense of a neatly reductionist theory runs the risk of slighting the special rational significance of emotion. If we are to address the question whether emotions add anything of value to beliefs in this and other cases, it would be well to avoid transferring their intentional content to some attenuated notion of belief. I shall eventually argue that what emotions add to beliefs depends on their partial justification in *extraevidential* terms—in terms of practical “adaptiveness,” or a kind of instrumental value that is not properly brought to bear on assessments of belief warrant. This means that in at least some cases an appropriate emotion may be one that parts from warranted belief. But to make out this rational possibility as a real one, we need to put some limits on the attribution of beliefs. In general, it seems that belief is just one propositional attitude among others. In the present case we may speak of the subject as “feeling as though” X is untrustworthy—meaning “feeling” in the broad sense indicated earlier, not so easily

picked apart from thought and *possibly* involving belief. Where it amounts to an emotion, though, it also involves an affective state directed towards the corresponding evaluative proposition, which may be held in mind without assent.

This compound feeling sometimes includes or yields an action requirement—a negative evaluation of alternatives to action—as an object of discomfort. In such cases, I want to argue, the emotion may also supplement belief in adding immediate pressure towards action. Thus, in the case of suspicion, as long as I am uncomfortable at the thought that X is likely to injure my interests, my discomfort puts me on guard against that possibility. It extends to a negative evaluation of failure to watch X carefully and thus adds a rational motive—the improvement of my present state of feeling—to any independently perceived (or imagined) need for watchfulness. If only to calm myself, in immediate terms, I ought to pay particular attention to what X says and does. This example should indicate how the special motivational force ascribed to emotions depends on my account of emotional discomfort as *object-directed* and hence as serving to hold an evaluation in mind more reliably than beliefs and objectless sensations. The content of even an acknowledged belief need not be an object of current attention; and unpleasant sensations that merely accompanied it might very well distract one from it or from a requirement to act in light of it. By itself, the evaluation of X as untrustworthy may be said to give rise to an action requirement, in the sense of a thought that I ought to keep an eye on X. But this is just what is sometimes called “a desire in the philosopher’s sense,” covering wants or preferences without any motivational force. Discomfort need not add pressure to this essentially affectless desire where it has no related intentional content but simply amounts to a further consequence of the same evaluation and hence a kind of affective symptom of emotion.

It would be no more than an incidental fact about my objectless discomfort, that is, that it would be relieved most naturally and effectively by *acting on* the accompanying desire, taking steps to falsify the evaluation that gave rise to it. Instead, consider how I might respond to a headache caused by the thought of myself as a hopeless failure in business. I might turn attention *away from* the evaluation. Perhaps I ought to work to get rid of the psychological causes of my reaction, calming myself independently of any attempt to lessen the likelihood of injury from X. The same might be said of object-directed discomfort, of course, in a case where my reaction is inappropriate—or where it would be practically maladaptive. I might be dependent on X for some benefit, say, in a case where he would notice and resent a guarded attitude. But let us restrict attention to a case like the present one, where my suspicion is assumed to be warranted and to have the usual sort of instrumental value, even if I have no good reason to think so. On the view proposed here, the emotion itself serves as a reason for action insofar as it yields discomfort about an action requirement. Discomfort at the thought that I ought to keep an eye on X—that there is a need to do so, which I have yet to satisfy fully—follows from my suspicion in its situational context and amounts to a *motivating* desire on this view. My discomfort apparently will continue unless and until I satisfy the requirement; so it adds a rational motive for action to that provided by affectless thought and desire, even in combination with affective emotion *symptoms*.

However, the perceptual situation to which an emotion is appropriate justifies it only as an adequately grounded response. It is one that a subject *may* quite rationally forgo, if he can—in favor of belief, where belief is warranted, or some propositional attitude short of belief but not involving comfort or discomfort. Consider the case of suspicion once again, and extract my evaluation of X as untrustworthy—a “feeling” of sorts, though not yet an emotion, on my view—from its overlay of discomfort, or feeling *tone*. Even on our assumption that I have adequate grounds for the emotion, the evaluation without the discomfort would do just as well for noninstrumental rational purposes—as a “representation,” let us say, of my perceptual situation. I may have “every reason” for feeling tense about a threat of injury, but for representational purposes I have no *compelling* reason. The claim that I actually ought to *feel* suspicious in my business dealings with X must rest on some view about the practical insufficiency, without emotion, of my concern for my own interests. An evaluation, especially one from which I withhold belief, is unlikely to have the same grip on my behavior in the absence of negative feeling tone; and it is this fact that lets us complete our justification of the emotion. Appropriateness is not enough to mandate feeling, in short. Where there are no moral “reasons to feel,” as in this case, we need to bring in practical adaptiveness.



MARTHA NUSSBAUM

Introduction

Martha Nussbaum continues the argument for emotions as evaluative judgments, drawing heavily from recent psychology and psychoanalysis as well as from the ancients, especially the Stoics. In several of her earlier works, *The Therapy of Desire* and *Love's Knowledge*, she analyzed and developed the Stoic view of philosophy as therapy and their rich but polemical theory of emotions. In her very recent book, *Upheavals of Thought*, she further elaborates the Stoic analysis in her own terms. Like the Stoics, she argues that emotions are essentially judgments that can be rationally assessed and educated. But unlike the Stoics, she holds that many emotions are rational, not irrational, and, again unlike the Stoics, she extends her analysis to animals and infants and broadens the scope of the judgments that constitute emotions.

Emotions as Judgements of Value and Importance



It is almost impossible to understand the extent to which this disturbance agitated, and by that very fact had temporarily enriched, the mind of M. de Charlus. Love in this way produces real geological upheavals of thought. In the mind of M. de Charlus, which only several days before resembled a plane so flat that even from a good vantage point one could not have discerned an idea sticking up above the ground, a mountain range had abruptly thrust itself into view, hard as rock—but mountains scul[p]ted as if an artist, instead of taking the marble away, had worked it on the spot, and where there twisted about the another, in giant and swollen groupings, Rage, Jealousy, Curiosity, Envy, Hate, Suffering, Pride, Astonishment, and Love.

—Marcel Proust, *A la recherche du temps perdu*

The story of an emotion, I shall argue, is the story of judgements about important things, judgements in which we acknowledge our neediness and incompleteness before those elements that we do not fully control. I therefore begin with such a story, a story of fear, and hope, and grief, and anger, and love.

I

Last April I was lecturing at Trinity College, Dublin. As my mother was in hospital convalescing after a serious but routine operation, I phoned at regular inter-

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vals to get reports on her progress. One of these phone calls brought the news that she had had a serious complication during the night, a rupture of the surgical incision between her oesophagus and her stomach. She had developed a massive internal infection and fever, and, though she was receiving the best care in a fine hospital, her life was in jeopardy. This news felt like a nail suddenly driven into my stomach. With the help of my hosts I arranged to return on the next flight, which was not until the following day. That evening I delivered my scheduled lecture, on the subject of emotions. I was not then the same exuberant self-sufficient philosopher delivering a lecture, but rather, a person barely able to restrain tears. That night in my room in Trinity College, I had a dream in which my mother appeared emaciated and curled into a foetal position in her hospital bed. I looked at her with a surge of tremendous love and said, 'Beautiful Mommy'. Suddenly she stood up, looking as young and beautiful as in the photographs of the time when I was two or three years old. She smiled at me with her characteristic wit and said that others might call her wonderful, but she preferred to be called beautiful. I woke up and wept, knowing that things were not so.

During the transatlantic flight the next day, I saw, with hope, that image of health before me. But I also saw, and more frequently, the image of her death, and my body wanted to interpose itself before that image, to negate it. My blood wanted to move faster than the plane. With shaking hands I typed out paragraphs of a lecture on mercy, and the narrative understanding of criminal offenders. And I felt, all the while, a vague and powerful anger—at the doctors, for allowing this crisis to occur, at the flight attendants, for smiling as if everything were normal, and above all, at myself for not having been able to stop this event from happening, or for not having been there with her when it did. On arriving in Philadelphia I called the hospital's intensive care unit and was told by the nurse that my mother had died twenty minutes before. My sister, who lived there, had been with her and had told her that I was on my way. The nurse asked me to come and see her laid out. I ran through the littered downtown streets as if something could be done. At the end of a maze of corridors, beyond the cafeteria where hospital workers were laughing and talking, I found the surgical intensive care unit. There, behind a curtain, I saw my mother in bed, lying on her back, as I had so often seen her lying asleep at home. She was dressed in her best robe, the one with the lace collar. Her make-up was impeccable. (The nurses, who had been very fond of her, told me that they knew how important it had been to her to always have her lipstick on right.) A barely visible tube went into her nose, but it was no longer hooked up to anything. Her hands were yellow. She was looking intensely beautiful. My body felt as if pierced by so many slivers of glass, fragmented, as if it had exploded and scattered in pieces round the room. I wept uncontrollably. An hour later I was on my way to my hotel, carrying my mother's red overnight bag with her clothes and the books I had given her to read in the hospital—strange relics that seemed to me not to belong to this world any more, as if they should have vanished with her life.

II

This story embodies several features of the emotions which it is my endeavour to explain here: their urgency and heat; their tendency to take over the person-

ality and move one to action with overwhelming force; their connection with important attachments, in terms of which one defines one's life; one's sense of passivity before them; their apparently adversarial relation to "rationality" in terms of cool calculation or cost-benefit analysis, or their occasionally adversarial relation to reasoning of any sort; their close connections with one another, as hope alternates uneasily with fear, as a single event transforms hope into grief, as grief, looking for a cause, expresses itself as anger, as all of these can be the vehicles of an underlying love.

In the light of all these features, it might seem very strange to suggest that emotions are forms of judgement. And yet it is this thesis that I shall defend. I shall argue that all these features are not only not incompatible with, but are actually best explained by, a version of the ancient Greek Stoic view, according to which emotions are forms of evaluative judgement that ascribe great importance to things and persons outside one's control. Emotions are thus, in effect, acknowledgements of neediness and lack of self-sufficiency. The aim is to examine this view and the arguments that support it, showing how the original Stoic picture needs to be modified in order to be philosophically adequate. In this way I hope to restore to the philosophical and political discussion of emotion a dimension that has too frequently been overlooked in debates about whether emotions are "rational" or "irrational."¹

My focus will be on developing an adequate philosophical account. But since any adequate account in this area must respond not only to the data of one's own experience and to stories of the experience of others, but also to the work done to systematize and account for emotional experience in the disciplines of psychology and anthropology, I draw on those disciplines as well. Neo-Stoic views have recently been gaining ascendancy in cognitive psychology, in work on helplessness and control, and on emotion as "appraisal" of that which pertains to a creature's "thriving"; and in anthropology, in work on emotion as an evaluative "social construction." Since the Stoic view needs to be connected to a plausible developmental account of the genesis of emotion in infancy, I also draw on pertinent material from the object-relations school of psychoanalysis,² which converges with the findings of cognitive psychology and enriches the account of the complexity of human history.

¹Some elements of a related philosophical position are in William Lyons, *Emotion* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980); Robert Solomon, *The Passions* (New York: Doubleday, 1976); Robert Gordon, *The Structure of Emotion* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987); and Ronald de Sousa, *The Rationality of Emotion* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1987).

²Above all, the work of W. R. D. Fairbairn, *Psychoanalytic Studies of the Personality* (London: Tavistock, 1952); Christopher Bollas, *The Shadow of the Object: Psychoanalysis of the Unthought Known* (London: Tavistock, 1987), and Nancy Chodorow, *The Reproduction of Mothering* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980); with much reservation and criticism, the work of Melanie Klein, *Love, Guilt, and Reparation and Other Works, 1921-45*, and *Envy and Gratitude and Other Works, 1946-63* (London: Hogarth, 1984, 1985). Experimental psychology, anthropology, and psychoanalysis are brought together in an illuminating way in John Bowlby, *Attachment, Separation: Anxiety and Anger*, and *Los: Sadness and Depression* (New York: Basic Books, 1982, 1973, 1980).

Throughout, the explananda will be the genus of which grief, fear, love, joy, hope, anger, gratitude, hatred, envy, jealousy, pity, guilt, and other relatives are the species. The members of this family are distinct, both from bodily appetites such as hunger and thirst as well as from objectless moods such as irritation or endogenous depression. Though there are numerous internal distinctions among the members of the family, they have enough in common to be analysed together; and a long tradition in philosophy, beginning from Aristotle, has so grouped them.³

III

The Stoic view of emotion has an adversary: the view that emotions are "non-reasoning movements," unthinking energies that simply push the person around, and do not relate to conscious perceptions. Like gusts of wind or the currents of the sea, they move, and move the person, but obtusely, without vision of an object or beliefs about it. In this sense they are "pushes" rather than "pulls." This view is connected with the idea that emotions derive from the "animal" part of our nature, rather than from a specifically human part—usually by thinkers who do not have a high regard for animal intelligence. Sometimes, too, the adversary's view is connected with the idea that emotions are "bodily" rather than "mental," as if this were sufficient to make them unintelligent rather than intelligent.⁴

The adversary's view is grossly inadequate and, in that sense, it might seem to be a waste of time to consider it. The fact, however, that it has until recently been very influential, both in empiricist-derived philosophy and in cognitive psychology, and through both of these in fields such as law and public policy, gives reason to reflect on it. A stronger reason for reflecting upon this view lies in the fact that the view, though inadequate, does capture some important aspects of emotional experience, aspects that need to figure in any adequate account. If we first understand why this view has the power that it undeniably does, and then see why and how further reflection moves us away from it, it will lead to an understanding of what we must not ignore or efface in so moving away.

Turning back to my account of my mother's death, we now find that the "unthinking movements" view does appear to capture at least some of what

³The word I shall use for the explananda is "emotions." The Stoic view used the term *pathe*—previously a general word for "affect"—in order to demarcate this class and to isolate it from the class of bodily appetites. For this reason, the philosophical tradition influenced by Stoicism has tended to use the word *passions* and its Latin and French cognates. To contemporary ears, this word denotes a particular intensity, especially erotic intensity, as the more inclusive Greek term *pathe* did not. I therefore use "emotion" as the best translation and the best generic term—although I shall comment both on the kinetic element that led to the original introduction of that word and also on the element of passivity that is stressed in the Greek term.

⁴I believe, and argue subsequently, that emotions, like other mental processes, are bodily, but that this does not give us reason to reduce their intentional/cognitive components to non-intentional bodily movements.

went on: my feeling of a terrible tumultuousness, of being at the mercy of currents that swept over me without my consent or complete understanding; the feeling of being buffeted between hope and fear, as if between two warring winds; the feeling that very powerful forces were pulling my self apart, or tearing it limb from limb; in short—the terrible power or urgency of the emotions, their problematic relationship with one's sense of self, the sense of one's passivity and powerlessness before them. It comes as no surprise that even philosophers who argue for a cognitive view of emotion should speak of them this way: Seneca, for example, is fond of comparing emotions to fire, to the currents of the sea, to fierce gales, to intruding forces that hurl the self about, cause it to explode, cut it up, tear it limb from limb. It seems easy for the adversary's view to explain these phenomena: for if emotions are just unthinking forces that have no connection with our thoughts, evaluations, or plans, then they really are just like the invading currents of some ocean. And they really are, in a sense, non-self; and we really are passive before them. It seems easy, furthermore, for the adversary to explain their urgency: for once we imagine them as unthinking forces we can without difficulty imagine these forces as extremely strong.

By contrast, the neo-Stoic view appears to be in trouble in all these points. For if emotions are a kind of judgement or thought, it would be difficult to account for their urgency and heat; thoughts are usually imagined as detached and calm. Also it is difficult to find in them the passivity that we undoubtedly experience: for judgements are actively made, not just suffered. Their ability to dismember the self is also overlooked: for thoughts are paradigmatic, as it were, of what we control, and of the most securely managed parts of our identity. Let us now see what would cause us to move away from the adversary's view and how the neo-Stoic view responds to our worries.

What, then, makes the emotions in my example unlike the thoughtless natural energies I have described? First of all, they are *about* something; they have an object. My fear, my hope, my ultimate grief, all are about my mother and directed at her and her life. A wind may hit against something, a current may pound against something; but these are not *about* the things they strike in their way. My fear's very identity as fear depends on its having an object: take that away and it becomes a mere trembling or heart-leaping. In the same way, the identity of the wind as wind does not depend on the particular object against which it may pound.

Second, the object is an *intentional* object: that is, it figures in the emotion as it is seen or interpreted by the person whose emotion it is. Emotions are not *about* their objects merely in the sense of being pointed at them and let go, the way an arrow is let go against its target. Their aboutness is more internal and embodies a way of seeing. My fear perceived my mother both as tremendously important and as threatened; my grief saw her as valuable and as irrevocably cut off from me. (Both, we might add—beginning to approach the adversary's point about the self—contain a corresponding perception of myself and my life, as threatened in the one case, as bereft in the other.) This aboutness comes from my active way of seeing and interpreting: it is not like being given a snapshot of the object, but requires looking at it, so to speak, through one's own window. This perception might contain an accurate view of the object or it might not.

(And, indeed, it might take as its target a real and present object, or be directed at an object that is no longer in existence, or that never existed at all. In this way too, intentionality is distinct from a more mechanical directedness.) It is to be stressed that this aboutness is part of the identity of the emotions. What distinguishes fear from hope, fear from grief, love from hate—is not so much the identity of the object, which might not change, but the way the object is perceived: in fear, as a threat, but with some chance for escape, in hope, as in some uncertainty, but with a chance for a good outcome, in grief as lost, in love as invested with a special sort of radiance. Again, the adversary's view is unable to account for the ways in which we actually identify and individuate emotions, and for a prominent feature of our experience of them.

Third, these emotions embody not simply ways of seeing an object, but beliefs—often very complex—about the object.⁵ It is not always easy, or even desirable, to distinguish between an instance of *seeing x as y*, such as I have described above, from the belief that *x is y*. In order to have fear—as Aristotle already saw it—I must believe that bad events are impending; that they are not trivially, but seriously bad; that I am not in a position to ward them off; that, on the other hand, my doom is not sealed, but there is still some uncertainty about what may befall. (*Rhetoric* II 5) In order to have anger, I must have an even more complex set of beliefs: that there has been some damage to me or to something or someone close to me; that the damage is not trivial but significant; that it was done by someone; that it was done willingly; that it would be right for the perpetrator of the damage to be punished. (*Rhetoric* II 2–3) It is plausible to assume that each element of this set of beliefs is necessary in order for anger to be present: if I should discover that not *x* but *y* had done the damage, or that it was not done willingly, or that it was not serious, we could expect my anger to modify itself accordingly, or recede. My anger at the smiling flight attendants was quickly dissipated by the thought that they had done so without any thought of disturbing me or giving me offence. Similarly, my fear would have turned to relief—as fear so often does—had the medical news changed, or proven to be mistaken. Again, these beliefs are essential to the identity of the emotion: the feeling of agitation by itself will not reveal to me whether what I am feeling is fear or grief or pity. Only an inspection of the thoughts will help discriminate. Here again, then, the adversary's view is too simplistic: severing emotion from belief, it severs emotion from what is not only a necessary condition of itself, but a part of its very identity.

Finally, there is something marked in the intentional perceptions and the beliefs characteristic of the emotions: they are all concerned with *value*, they see their object as invested with value. Suppose that I did not love my mother or consider her a person of great importance; suppose I considered her about as important as the branch on a tree near my house. Then (unless I had invested the branch itself with an unusual degree of value) I would not fear her death, or hope so passionately for her recovery. My experience records this in many

⁵Subsequently, I argue that in the case of animal emotions, and in the case of some human emotions as well, the presence of a certain kind of *seeing as*, which will always involve some sort of a combination or predication, is sufficient for emotion.

ways—not least in my dream, in which I saw her as beautiful and wonderful and, seeing her that way, wished her restored to health and wit. And of course in the grief itself there was the same perception—of enormous significance, permanently lost. This indeed is why the sight of the dead body of someone one loves is so painful: because the same sight that is a reminder of value is also an evidence of irrevocable loss.

The value perceived in an object appears to be of a particular sort—although here I must be more tentative since I am approaching an issue that is my central preoccupation. The object of the emotion is seen as *important* for some role it plays in the person's own life. I do not fear just any and every catastrophe anywhere in the world, nor (so it seems) any and every catastrophe that I know to be bad in important ways. What inspires fear is the thought of the impending damage that threatens my cherished relationships and projects. What inspires grief is the death of a beloved, someone who has been an important part of one's life. This does not mean that the emotions view these objects simply as tools or instruments of the agent's own satisfactions: they may be invested with intrinsic worth or value, as indeed my mother had been. They may be loved for their own sake, and their good sought for its own sake. But what makes the emotion centre around her, from among all the many wonderful people and mothers in the world, is that she is *my* mother, a part of my life. The emotions are in this sense localized: they take up their stand "in my tent," and focus on the "small lamp" that goes out there, rather than on the general distribution of light and darkness in the universe as a whole.

Another way of putting this point is that the emotions appear to be eudaimonistic, that is, concerned with the agent's flourishing. And thinking about ancient Greek eudaimonistic moral theories will help us to start thinking about the geography of the emotional life. In a eudaimonistic ethical theory, the central question asked by a person is, "How should I live?" The answer lies in the person's conception of eudaimonia, or human flourishing. The conception of eudaimonia includes all that to which the agent ascribes intrinsic value; for instance, if one can show that there is something missing without which one's life would not be complete, then that is sufficient argument for its inclusion. (Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* I, IX 9) The important point is this: in a eudaimonistic theory, the actions, relations, and persons that are included in the conception are not all valued simply on account of some instrumental relation they bear to the agent's satisfaction. This is a mistake commonly made about such theories under the influence of utilitarianism and the misleading use of "happiness" as a translation for eudaimonia. Not just actions but also mutual relations of civic or personal *philia*, in which the object is loved and benefited for his or her own sake, can qualify as constituent parts of eudaimonia. On the other hand, they are valued as constituents of a life that is my life and not someone else's, as my actions, as people who have some relation with me.⁶ This, it seems,

⁶The contrast between such eudaimonistic and more impartialist views is brought out and distinguished from the contrast between egoism and altruism. Bernard Williams, "Egoism and Altruism," in *Problems of the Self* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973).

is what emotions are like, and this is why, in negative cases, they are felt as tearing the self apart: because they have to do with damage to me and to my own, to my plans and goals, to what is most urgent in my conception of what it is for me to live well.

We have now gone a long way towards answering the adversary, for it has been established that his view, while picking out certain features of emotional life that are real and important, has omitted others of equal and greater importance, central to the identity of an emotion and to discriminating between one emotion and another: their aboutness, their intentionality, their basis in beliefs, their connection with evaluation. All this makes them look very much like thoughts after all; and we have even begun to see how a cognitive view might itself explain some of the phenomena the adversary claimed on his side—the intimate relationship to selfhood, the urgency. But this is far removed from the neo-Stoic view, according to which emotions are just a certain type of evaluative judgement. For the considerations we have brought forward might be satisfied by a weaker or more hybrid view, according to which beliefs and perceptions play a large role in emotions, but are not identical with them.

We can imagine, in fact, three such weaker views, each with its historical antecedents:

- (1) The relevant beliefs and perceptions are *necessary conditions* for the emotion.
- (2) They are *constituent parts* of the emotion (which has non-belief parts as well).
- (3) They are *sufficient conditions* for the emotion, which are not identical with it.

The logical relations among these options are complex and need scrutiny. (1) does not imply, but is compatible with (3). (3) does not imply, but is compatible with (1). (1) is compatible with (2)—the beliefs may be necessary as constituent elements in the emotion; but we might also hold (1) in an external-cause form, in which the beliefs are necessary conditions for a very different sort of thing that is not itself a belief. The same can be said for (3): a sufficient cause may be external or internal. (2) is compatible with (3), since even if the belief is just a part of the emotion, and not the whole, it may be a part whose presence guarantees the presence of the other parts.

We have gone far enough, I think, to rule out the external-cause form of (1) and of (3), for we have argued that the cognitive elements are an essential part of the emotion's identity, and of what differentiates it from other emotions. So we are left, it appears, with (2)—whether in a form in which the belief part suffices for the presence of the other parts, or in a form in which it is merely necessary for their presence. What are those other parts? The adversary is ready with a fall-back answer: non-thinking movements of some sort, or perhaps (shifting over to the point of view of experience) objectless feelings of pain and/or pleasure. A number of questions immediately come to mind about these feelings: What are they like if they are not *about* anything? What is the pleasure *in*, or the

pain at? How are they connected with the beliefs, if they do not themselves contain any thought or cognition?⁷ These questions will shortly be reviewed.

IV

I must begin a fuller elaboration and defence of the neo-Stoic view by saying something about judgement. To understand the case for the view that emotions are judgements, one needs to understand exactly what a Stoic means when he or she says that; I think we will find the picture intuitively appealing, and a valuable basis (ultimately) for a critique of the familiar belief-desire framework for explaining action. According to the Stoics, then, a judgement is an assent to an appearance. In other words, it is a process that has two stages. First, it occurs to me or strikes me that such and such is the case. (Stoic appearances are usually propositional, although I shall later argue that this aspect of their view needs some modification.) It looks to me that way, I see things that way⁸—but so far I haven't really accepted it. Now there are three possibilities. I can accept or embrace the appearance, take it into me as the way things are: in this case it has become my judgement, and that act of acceptance is what judging is. I can repudiate it as not the way things are: in that case I am judging the contradictory. Or I can let it be there without committing myself to it one way or another. In that case I have no belief or judgement about the matter one way or the other. Consider a simple perceptual case introduced by Aristotle. (*De Anima* III 3) The sun strikes me as being about a foot wide. (That's the way it looks to me, that is what I see it *as*.) Now I might embrace this appearance and talk and act accordingly; most children do so. If I am confused about astronomy, I may refuse to make any cognitive commitment on the matter. But if I hold a confident belief that the sun is in fact tremendously large, and that its appearance is deceptive, I will repudiate the appearance and embrace a contradictory appearance. There seems nothing odd here about saying both that the way of seeing the world is the work of my cognitive faculties and that its acceptance or rejection is the activity of those faculties. Assenting to or embracing a way of seeing the world, acknowledging it as true *requires* the discriminating power of cognition. Cognition need not be imagined as inert. In this case, it is reason itself that reaches out and accepts that appearance, saying, so to speak, "Yes, that's the one I'll have. That's the way things are." We might even say that this is a good way of thinking about what reason *is*: an ability by virtue of which we commit ourselves to viewing things the way they are.

Let us now return to my central example. My mother has died. It strikes me, it appears to me, that a person of enormous value, who was central to my life, is

⁷By "cognitive" processes I mean processes that deliver information (whether reliable or not) about the world; thus, I include not only thinking, but also perception and certain sorts of imagination.

⁸It should be stressed that despite the usage of the terms *taking in* and *acknowledging*, this notion of appearing is not committed to internal representations, and it is fully compatible with a philosophy of mind that eschews appeal to internal representations. It seems that neither Aristotle nor the Stoics had an internal/representationalist picture of the mind; nor do I.

no longer there. It feels as if a nail has entered my insides; as if life has suddenly a large rip or tear in it, a gaping hole. I see, as well, her wonderful face—both as tremendously loved and as forever lost to me. The appearance, in however many ways we picture it, is propositional: it combines the thought of importance with the thought of loss, its content is that this importance is lost. And, as I have said, it is evaluative: it does not just assert, “Betty Craven is dead.” Central to the propositional content is my mother’s enormous importance, both to herself as well as to me as an element in my life.

So far we are still at the stage of appearing—and notice that I was in this stage throughout the night before her death, throughout the long transatlantic plane ride, haunted by that value-laden picture, but powerless to accept or reject it; for it was sitting in the hands of the world. I might have had reason to reject it if, for example, I had awakened and found that the whole experience of getting the bad news and planning my return trip home had been just a nightmare. Or, I might have rejected it if the outcome had been good and she was no longer threatened. I did accept that she was endangered—so I did have fear. But whether or not she was or would be *lost*, I could not say. But now I am in the hospital room with her body before me. I embrace the appearance as the way things are. Can I assent to the idea that someone tremendously beloved is forever lost to me, and yet preserve emotional equanimity? The neo-Stoic claims that I cannot. Not if what I am recognizing is that very set of propositions, with all their evaluative elements. Suppose I had said to the nurses, “Yes, I see that a person I love deeply is dead and that I’ll never see her again. But I am fine: I am not disturbed at all.” If we put aside considerations about reticence before strangers and take the utterance to be non-deceptive, we will have to say, I think, that this person is in a state of denial. She is not really assenting to *that* proposition. She may be saying those words, but there is something that she is withholding. Or, if she is assenting, it is not to that same proposition but perhaps to the proposition “Betty Craven is dead.” Or even (if we suppose that “my mother” could possibly lack eudaimonistic evaluative content) to the proposition “My mother is dead.” What I could not be fully acknowledging or realizing is the thought: “A person whom I deeply love, who is central to my life, had died,” for to recognize this is to be deeply disturbed.

It is of crucial importance to be clear about what proposition or propositions we have in mind. For, if we were to make the salient proposition one with no evaluative content, say, “Betty Craven is dead,” we would be right in thinking that the acceptance of that proposition could be at most a cause of grief, not identical with grief itself. The neo-Stoic claims that grief is identical with the acceptance of a proposition that is both evaluative and eudaimonistic, that is, concerned with one or more of the person’s most important goals and ends. The case for equating this (or these) proposition(s) with emotion has not yet been fully made, but so far it appears far more plausible that such a judgement could in itself be an upheaval. Another element must now be added. The judgements that the neo-Stoic identifies with emotions all have a common subject matter: all are concerned with vulnerable externalities: those that can be affected by events beyond one’s control, those that are unexpected, those that can be destroyed or removed even when one does not wish it. This implies that the acceptance of

such propositions reveals something about the person: that she allows herself and her good to depend upon things beyond her control, that she acknowledges a certain passivity before the world. This emerges in the complex combination of circumstantial and evaluative considerations that must be present in the relevant propositions.

At this point, it can be concluded not only that the judgements described are necessary constituent elements of the emotion, but that they are sufficient as well. It has been argued that if there is no upheaval the emotion itself is not fully or really present. The previous arguments suggest that this sufficiency should be viewed internally: as that of a constituent part which itself causes whatever other parts there may be. I have spoken of the way in which the relevant judgements are a part of the identity conditions of the emotion; however, there is need for further analysis since it may still appear counter-intuitive to make the emotion itself a function of reason, rather than a non-rational, cognitive movement.

Well, what element in me *is* it that experiences the terrible shock of grief? I think of my mother; I embrace in my mind the fact that she will never be with me again—and I am shaken. But how and where? Does one imagine the thought as causing a trembling in my hands, or a fluttering in my stomach? And if so, does one really want to say that this fluttering or trembling *is* my grief about my mother's death? The movement seems to lack the aboutness and the capacity for recognition that must be part of an emotion. Internal to the grief must be the perception of the beloved object and of her importance; the grief itself must quantify the richness of the love between us, its centrality to my life. It must contain the thought of her irrevocable deadness. Of course, one could now say that there is a separate emotional part of the soul that has all these abilities. But, having seemingly lost one's grip on the reason for housing grief in a separate non-cognitive part, reason looks like just the place to house it.

The adversary might now object that this is not yet clear. Even if one concedes that the seat of emotion of must be capable of many cognitive operations, there also seems to be a kinetic and affective aspect to emotion that does not look like a judgment or any part of it. There are rapid movements, feelings of pain and tumult: are we really to equate these with some part of judging that such and such is the case? Why should we not make the judgement a cause of emotion, but identify emotion itself with these movements? Or, we might even grant that judgment is a constituent element in the emotion, and, as a constituent element, a sufficient cause of the other elements as well, and yet insist that there are other elements, feelings and movements, that are not parts of the judgement. I have begun to respond to this point by stressing the fact that we are conceiving of judging as dynamic, not static. Reason here moves, embraces, refuses; it moves rapidly or slowly, surely or hesitantly. I have imagined it entertaining the appearance of my mother's death and then, so to speak, rushing towards it, opening itself to absorb it. So why would such a dynamic faculty be unable to house, as well, the disorderly motions of grief? And this is not just an illusion: I am not infusing into thought kinetic properties that properly belong to the arms and legs, or imagining reason as accidentally coloured by kinetic properties of the bloodstream. The movement towards my mother was a movement of my thought about what is most important in the world; that is all that needs to be

said about it. If anything, the movement of my arms and legs, as I ran to University Hospital, was a vain mimesis of the movement of my thought towards her. It was my thought that was receiving, and being shaken by, the knowledge of her death. I think that if anything else is said it will sever the close connection between the recognition and the being-shaken of that experience. The recognizing and the upheaval belong to one and the same part of me, the part with which I make sense of the world.

Moreover, it appears that the adversary is wrong in thinking of the judgement as an event that temporally precedes the grieving—as some of the causal language suggests. When I grieve, I do not first of all coolly embrace the proposition, “My wonderful mother is dead,” and then set about grieving. No, the real, complete, recognition of that terrible event (as many times as I recognize it) *is* the upheaval. It is as I described it: like driving a nail into the stomach. The thought that she is dead sits there (as it sat before me during my plane ride) asking me what I am going to do about it. Perhaps, if I am still uncertain, the image of her restored to health sits there too. If I embrace the death image, if I take it into myself as the way things are, it is at that very moment, in that cognitive act itself, that I am putting the world’s nail into my own insides. That is not preparation for upheaval, that is upheaval itself. That very act of assent is itself a tearing of my self-sufficient condition. Knowing can be violent, given the truths that are there to be known.

Are there other constituent parts to the grief that are not themselves parts of the judgement? In any particular instance of grieving there is so much going on that it is very difficult to answer this question if one remains at the level of token identities between instances of grieving and instances of judging. We have a more powerful argument—and also a deeper understanding of the phenomena—if we inquire instead about the general identity conditions for grief, and whether there are elements necessary for grief in general that are not elements of judgement. In other words, would we withdraw our ascription of grief if these elements were missing? I believe that the answer is that there are no such elements. There usually will be bodily sensations and changes involved in grieving; but if we discovered that my blood pressure was quite low during this whole episode, or that my pulse rate never went above 60 there would not, I think, be the slightest reason to conclude that I was not grieving. If my hands and feet were cold or warm, sweaty or dry, again this would be of no criterial value. Although psychologists have developed sophisticated measures based on brain activity, it is perhaps intuitively wrong to use these as definitive indicators of emotional states. We do not withdraw emotion-ascriptions otherwise grounded if we discover that the subject is not in a certain brain-state. (Indeed, the only way the brain-state assumed apparent importance was through a putative correlation with instances of emotion identified on other grounds.)

More plausible, perhaps, would be certain feelings characteristically associated with emotion. But here we should distinguish “feelings” of two sorts. On the one hand, there are feelings with a rich intentional content—feelings of the emptiness of one’s life without a certain person, feelings of unrequited love for that person, and so on. Such feelings may enter the identity conditions for some emotion; but the word *feeling* now does not contrast with the cognitive words

perception and *judgement*, it is merely a terminological variant for them. As already mentioned, the judgement itself possesses many of the kinetic properties that the "feeling" is presumably intended to explain. On the other hand, there are feelings without rich intentionality or cognitive content, for instance, feelings of fatigue, of extra energy. As with bodily states, they may accompany emotion or they may not—but they are not necessary for it. (In my own case, feelings of crushing fatigue alternated in a bewildering way with periods when I felt preternaturally wide awake and active; but it seemed wrong to say that either of these was a necessary condition of my grief.) So there appear to be type-identities between emotions and judgements; emotions can be defined in terms of judgement alone.



PAUL GRIFFITHS

Introduction

Paul Griffiths also takes to task the cognitive theorists (whom he calls “propositional attitude theorists”), but on the basis of biology and the new theories of taxonomy that philosophers have developed with Darwinian evolution as a model. In *What Emotions Really Are*, he challenges the very concept of “emotion” (while at the same time telling us “what emotions really are”), insisting that the category is a mistake based on “folk psychology” and neglectful of the recent findings in biology and, especially, neurology and brain science. He distinguishes at least two very different categories of emotion, the “affect programs” defended by such psychologists as Paul Ekman and the “higher cognitive” emotions that are shaped and “constructed” by culture. He thus suggests that our question, “What is an emotion?” is at best ambiguous and at worse misleading.

From What Emotions Really Are



Emotions as Psychological Kinds

The aim of this book is to bring to the philosophy of emotion the insights of the last thirty years in the philosophy of mind and philosophy of language—insights that have been studiously ignored by specialists in the field. Emotions are postulated kinds of psychological event. The term *emotion* and the names of individual emotions are kind terms that figure in our everyday understanding of ourselves. This everyday understanding is commonly called “folk psychology.” This simple fact implies a great deal about the theory of emotion. It implies that questions about the nature of emotions cannot be answered in the armchair alone but must be sought in part by empirical investigation of emotional phenomena. We can no more investigate the nature of emotion without the life sciences than we can investigate the nature of the planets without the physical sciences. But while the relevance of scientific data has been accepted in the rest of the philosophy of mind, emotion theory has remained deep in the armchair and has used science only as a source of anecdote.

The fact that emotions are putative kinds of psychological state also draws attention to what should be a central question for the philosophy of emotion. Does our best current science have any role for these postulated psychological

From Paul Griffiths, *What Emotions Really Are: The Problem of Psychological Categories* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1997). Reprinted with the permission of The University of Chicago Press.

kinds? If it does not, then there is an important sense in which the emotions do not really exist. This does not mean that nothing is going on in people who are said to be experiencing emotion. It means that the emotion category does nothing to illuminate what is going on in those people. The category of superlunary objects, or objects outside the orbit of the moon, had an important role in Aristotelian science. There really are objects outside the orbit of the moon, but the category of the "superlunary" is as arbitrary a way of grouping objects together as it is possible to devise. There is no such thing in nature as a distinction between the superlunary and the sublunary realms. The search for a theory of superlunary objects and their characteristics was a mistake. Similarly, the idea that we need a theory of the emotions, or a theory of some specific emotion, may be a mistake. The failure of the philosophy of emotion to look to the science of emotion and ask these questions puts it seriously out of step with the rest of philosophy. The question of whether the apparatus of folk psychology is the best way to understand the mind has been a central question in the philosophy of mind for decades. It has hardly been raised in the philosophy of emotion.

For the last thirty years the philosophy of emotion has been dominated by a single program of research, albeit one that has had a number of variant forms (Griffiths 1989; Deigh 1994). At the core of this program is the belief that emotional phenomena can be dealt with by a psychology whose main theoretical entities are the beliefs and desires that feature in everyday explanations of people's actions. These theoretical entities are the "propositional attitudes" of folk psychology. I call the accounts that have issued from this program "propositional attitude theories." Propositional attitude theories are primarily concerned to combat the "feeling theory" of emotion. The feeling theory holds that emotions are introspective experiences characterized by a quality and intensity of sensation. The identity of the emotion depends on this quality. The inherent pleasantness or unpleasantness of the quality causes people to act in ways characteristic of the emotion. The propositional attitude theorist thinks this picture pernicious as well as false. It protects emotions from rational criticism and bolsters false views in ethics and aesthetics that depend on the contrast between thought and emotion (e.g., Greenspan 1988). In recent years, however, the hostility to feeling theories has lessened and some propositional attitude theorists have attempted a compromise, allowing emotions a number of elements, one of which may be introspective sensations (Clarke 1986; Ben-Zeev, 1987).

Because propositional attitude theorists see an account in terms of feelings as the only other option, they often refer to their view as the "cognitive theory" of emotion. In previous work I have gone along with this (Griffiths 1989, 1990), but the label *cognitive* suggests a concern with the findings of cognitive psychology and with the study of emotions as part of human information processing and nothing could be more misleading. The mainstream philosophy of emotion has little interest in empirical research and has systematically ignored the ways in which our understanding of the mind/brain has been enriched during the last thirty years. The alternative views that I shall canvass have at least as much claim to be called "cognitive," since they derive directly from the study of human information processing. But these views find themselves at odds with most of the commonplaces of the propositional attitude program.

The opposition between propositional attitude theories and the feeling theory, and the derivative debates on the rationality and moral status of emotions, have dominated the philosophical literature. Well-known alternative approaches like the "affect program" theory have been largely ignored by philosophers. The publication since 1945 of articles on the social construction of emotion (e.g., Armon-Jones 1986a, 1986b) has rather broadened the debate, but even here the old concern with the dichotomy of thought and feeling has been apparent. Philosophical constructionism, rather than challenging the orthodox view, sees itself as an ally against the evils of the feeling theory. In consequence, the issues between the profoundly individualistic propositional attitude theory of emotions and a theory which stresses the place of emotion within the social system remain almost unexplored.

I reject propositional attitude theories in two ways. First, I reject them on a substantive level. All major variants of the program face substantial objections and that the research program as a whole has a range of standing problems on which it has made little progress. Second, and more important, I reject them methodologically. The adherents of propositional attitude theories have relied almost entirely on conceptual analysis to derive their account of emotion. I suggest that these epistemological foundations will no longer bear the weight. The use of conceptual analysis to study emotions seems to rest on the following argument. Conceptual analysis can reveal to us the conditions for the application of various emotion terms. Understanding these application conditions will allow us to frame "definitions" of these various emotions, and, by abstraction, a general definition of emotion. This approach is nicely exemplified in Wayne C. Davis's dismissal of empirical findings about fear: "Such facts are not generally known, and so could not be part of the meaning of 'fear,' which is my concern in this paper" (1988, 465-66). This sort of thinking is why so much of the existing literature consists of "definitions" of emotion concepts using necessary and sufficient conditions or prototype analyses.

But this approach to emotion presupposes a view of the semantics of kind terms. It presupposes that the meaning of kind terms is given by the rules which competent speakers use to apply those terms. We can investigate emotion by conceptual analysis because everyday beliefs about the referents of kind terms are true by definition. This is a view which has been very broadly rejected in the philosophy of language.

The initial impetus for this rejection came from the causal theories of meaning of the 1970s (Kripke 1980; Putnam 1975). These theories proposed a new kind of semantics for "natural kind terms." This is the philosopher's sense of "natural kind" rather than the social scientist's sense. The philosopher's natural kinds are categories that correspond to real distinctions in nature, like chordata or chlorine. The social scientist's natural kinds are categories that all human societies tend to use, such as tree and bird. Causal theories claimed that the meaning of a natural kind term is in part a schema, to be filled in after further empirical investigation. The term *water* has as part of its meaning a schema such as "whatever is of the same kind as the samples of wet, potable stuff which we call 'water.'" Wetness and potability constitute a "stereotype" of water. The stereotype is used to pick out the putative natural kind, but it may turn out later

that the stereotype is unrepresentative of the kind as a whole. In the case of water, it turns out that the natural kind is HOH and that the stereotype is not bad. However, causal theories also allows the possibility that our original samples do not constitute a scientifically interesting kind. If this occurs, two responses are possible. First, speakers can accept that some of the samples aren't really instances of the kind or that some things which were rejected as samples really are instances of the kind. In this case the kind term is retained with a revised extension and stereotype. For example, barnacles turned out to be crustaceans, like crabs and lobsters, although those who introduced the kind "crustacean" thought the opposite. Second, speakers can respond by deciding that the kind is not really a kind. The superlunary and "hysteroid depression" have disappeared from our ontology, although their instances remain.

If fear is a putative natural kind like water or crustacean then a causal theory would say that "fear" has as part of its meaning a schema awaiting the results of future research. Fear is "whatever is happening to people in these paradigm cases." This implies that conceptual analysis alone cannot determine the real nature or the extension of fear. Linguistic intuitions about the extension of a natural kind term may simply be mistaken (Stich 1983). All conceptual analysis will reveal is the current stereotype of fear. To insist that all and only the things that fit this stereotype are examples of the kind is simply to stand in the way of clarifying the concept. It is exactly akin to insisting that whales are fish because people called them so. Current science, rather than conceptual analysis, must be used to fill in the schematic element of the meaning of "fear." If science can find no interesting kind corresponding to all the paradigm cases of fear, then we must either reclassify some of the paradigm cases or replace fear and its companions with some more adequate categories.

Although the semantics of natural kind terms is a complex and changing field, there is broad agreement that revision of stereotype and revision of extension, sometimes to the point of elimination, are characteristic of the development of natural kind terms over time. Any adequate semantic theory of kind terms must explain these facts. This is enough to overthrow the methodology that has supported the propositional attitude approach to emotion. Analyzing the current understanding of a term does not reveal the nature of its referent, only what people believe about that referent. These beliefs, and hence the understanding of the term, can change in the light of empirical discoveries about the referent. . . .

Natural kind concepts presume that there is some reason why properties are clustered in similarity space. This presupposition underlies people's everyday inductive practices. It is assumed that the property correlations marked by concepts will hold up in future instances. In children, the extension and intension of concepts are refined as the child becomes acquainted with its culture's best explanation of why those concepts are useful in explanation and induction. This psychology of concepts informs the account of natural kinds and theoretical categories in the life sciences which I develop in part two of the book. I argue that the phenomenon of conceptual change due to scientific discovery is a continuation of this pattern of human conceptual development. The theory of natural kinds finds its real home as part of the psychology of concepts and can be made independent of issues concerning metaphysical realism.

The implications of the "theory view of concepts" for the practice of conceptual analysis are similar to those of the older, causal theories of meaning. The theory view implies that conceptual analysis can reveal only a community's current beliefs about the referent of a concept. Concepts are answerable to future findings about the referent, as well as to the way that referent is currently understood. Analysis can reveal the epistemic project in which a community is engaged with a concept, but the way that project develops will depend on what the community finds out through empirical investigation. If philosophers want to know about emotion, rather than about what is currently believed of emotion, analysis must proceed hand in hand with the relevant empirical sciences. . . .

Current Theories of Emotion

Some of the most successful scientific approaches to emotion have been based on evolutionary theory and human ethology. The first of these evolutionary approaches is the "affect program" theory associated with Paul Ekman and inspired by Darwin's work on emotion (Ekman 1972; Darwin 1872). In its modern form, the affect program theory deals with a range of emotions corresponding very roughly to the occurrent instances of the English terms *surprise*, *fear*, *anger*, *disgust*, *contempt*, *sadness*, and *joy*. The affect programs are short-term, stereotypical responses involving facial expression, autonomic nervous system arousal, and other elements. The same pattern of response occurs in all cultures and homologues are found in related species. These patterns are triggered by a cognitive system which is "modular" in the sense that it does not freely exchange information with other cognitive processes. This system learns when to produce emotions by associating stimuli with broad, functional categories such as danger or loss. To do this it uses the organism's past experience and some specialized learning algorithms which depart substantially from the norms of traditional learning theory. It is not possible to do justice to Ekman's views using the common opposition between "naturalistic" and "social constructionist" views of emotion so often applied to scientific research on emotion. The "naturalist" is normally described as someone who believes that all or some emotional responses are the same in all cultures (Armon-Jones 1986b). But at the very least a distinction must be drawn between the input and output sides of emotional responses. Ekman claims that the output of the affect programs is stereotyped and pan-cultural, but he makes no such claims about the eliciting conditions of affect programs.

I interpret the affect program research in the light of several recent debates in the philosophy of biology. I argue that both Darwin and Ekman make a good case for the view that the pan-cultural facial expressions call for evolutionary explanations and show that this does not lead to the usual conclusion that emotional responses are innate. The notion of innateness is multiply ambiguous and does not form a useful framework for thinking about evolved traits (Bateson 1991; Gray 1992). I also distinguish two radically different things that are meant by calling a trait "universal." Ekman believes that many aspects of emotion are *pan-cultural*—they are found in all or most human populations. But this is a very different thesis from the claim that these aspects of emotion are part of a universal "human nature." Brown eyes are found in all or most human popula-

tions, and are a product of human evolution, but they are not part of a universal "human nature." The affect-program theory is quite consistent with the idea that human emotions are *polymorphic*—they display heritable variation within populations. Finally, I consider Darwin's and Ekman's work in the light of the debate over adaptationism. I interpret this debate as a methodological one concerning the adequate confirmation of evolutionary hypotheses. I argue that Darwin and Ekman employ adequate methodologies to guard against the charge of adaptationist "storytelling" and contrast their success in this regard with the failures of some other authors who have adopted an evolutionary perspective on emotion. . . .

Although "biological" and social constructionist approaches to emotion have often been seen as rivals, I believe that both have important and complementary contributions to make to an understanding of human emotion. I evaluate a number of different conceptions of "social construction." The most interesting insights of constructionism are embodied in the view that there are emotional responses whose existence depends on the existence of cultural models of normal emotional response. These responses are interpreted by the subject and their society as natural and involuntary when they are in fact produced in conformity to local cultural norms. In some cases the production of an emotional response may involve subconscious planning to conform to a cultural model. These responses are distinguished from simple pretenses by the subject's lack of conscious access to their causes. In other cases, the role of the cultural model may be more distant. Cultural norms form an environment which reinforces certain behaviors. This results in conformity to the norms without an explicit representation of conformity as a goal. While the imperialistic claims of social constructionists to explain the whole domain of emotional phenomena are unjustified, their theories are important for a number of reasons. First, the constructionists have drawn attention to the fact that the everyday "folk psychology" of emotion is not purely descriptive. It contains prescriptions of how people should behave, and collective pretenses about how people do behave. These mythical aspects of emotion cannot be smoothly integrated into a developing scientific understanding of human psychology. Common beliefs about emotion must be understood as social products rather than the simple results of introspection. The function of such beliefs is often to misrepresent rather than to illuminate underlying cognitive processes. The socially active nature of folk psychology points once again to the shortcomings of traditional philosophical work on emotion. Philosophers have only analyzed the current stereotypes of emotion concepts. Studies of the social role of a concept can reveal why a stereotype takes its current form and how it may respond to changing social conditions. I argue that many emotion concepts will be epistemically unstable. Like traditional concepts of gender, they cannot serve their social functions once those functions are publicly acknowledged. Social constructionist research can therefore contribute to a fuller understanding of the dynamics of kind concepts.

There is another reason why social constructionist research is important. Cultural models of emotion play a major role in the construction of the psychological phenotype. Social constructionist ideas can make an important contribution to the research program into the higher cognitive emotions. . . .

Eliminating "Emotion"

My central conclusion is that the general concept of emotion is unlikely to be a useful concept in psychological theory. It is meant to be a kind of psychological process that underlies a certain range of human behaviors. But there is no one kind of process that underlies enough of this behavior to be identified with emotion. Emotion is like the category of "superlunary" objects in ancient astronomy. There is a well-defined category of "everything outside the orbit of the moon" but it turns out that superlunary objects do not have something specially in common that distinguishes them from other arbitrary collections of objects. In the same way, a social and historical account can be given of why various aspects of human psychology and physiology have been brought together under the single heading of "emotion." However, what we know about these phenomena suggests that there is no rich collection of generalizations about this range of phenomena that distinguishes them from other psychological phenomena. They do not constitute a single object of knowledge. Current knowledge suggests that the domain of emotion fractures into three parts.

The best understood emotional responses are the short-term, salient cases of anger, fear, disgust, sadness, joy, and surprise. The affect program approach gives a reasonable account of these states.

Psychologists and philosophers have assumed that if evolution illuminates the mind it will throw light on mental states and processes classified in terms of their function and will do so by describing the adaptive purpose for which they evolved. In the light of these presuppositions it is surprising that the most successful detailed work on the evolution of emotions—the affect program theory—classifies emotions as evolutionary homologies. The affect programs are identified with certain emotional states in primates and more broadly with emotional states in other vertebrates. The objects the theory describes, like the fear affect program, are the products of a particular sequence of evolutionary events. The research leading to the affect program theory assumes that human emotions will resemble those of animals roughly in proportion to the degree of relationship between humans and other species. Octopuses have psychological mechanisms which serve the same function as fear—avoiding dangers—but no one expects to find the fear affect program in octopuses.



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Psychological and Biological Literature

Since the early 1900's, psychologists have written a great deal on emotion, and much of this work draws on biological and anthropological studies. Because the psychological literature is so vast, the following bibliography focuses on recent psychological and some biological and anthropological works as well as some of the heavily referenced older ones. Also included are some philosophical critiques of psychological theories of emotion.

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Contemporary Analytic Literature

Within the past four decades the number of philosophical publications on emotion has increased dramatically. The following bibliography lists a very selective portion of that recent work. Other contemporary philosophical writings on historical, psychological, and continental theories of emotion may be found under those three heads; and those works often contain noteworthy philosophical contributions to the general discussion of emotion.

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